























Chapter I. Introduction to Cameralism. ................................1 8
C h a p t e r  I I .  T h e  C i v i c s  o f  O s s e . ......................................3 3
Chapter III. The Civics of Obrecht. ...................................4 7
Chapter IV: The Cameralistics of Seckendorff. ..........................6 0
C h a p t e r  V :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  B e c h e r . ..............................9 5
C h a p t e r  V I :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  S c h r ö d e r . ...........................1 1 8
C h a p t e r  V I I :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  G e r h a r d . ...........................1 5 0
Chapter VIII: The Cameralistics of Rohr. .............................1 5 9
C h a p t e r  I X :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  G a s s e r . .............................1 7 6
C h a p t e r  X :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  D i t h m a r . ............................1 8 8
C h a p t e r  X I :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  Z i n c k e ..............................1 9 5
C h a p t e r  X I I :  T h e  C a m e r a l i s t i c s  o f  D a r j e s ..............................2 2 4
Chapter XIII. The Cameralistics of Justi. ..............................2 3 9
C h a p t e r  X I V :  A r g u m e n t  o f  J u s t i ’ s  “ S t a a t s w i r t h s c h a f t ”...................2 6 3
Chapter XV Justi’s Political Philosophy. ..............................3 3 3
C h a p t e r  X V I :  J u s t i ’ s  “ P o l i c e y w i s s e n s c h a f t ” ...........................3 6 6
C h a p t e r  X V I I :  J u s t ’ s  C a m e r a l i s t i c  M i s c e l l a n i e s .........................3 8 6
Chapter XVIII. The Cameralistics of Sonnenfels (“Introduction”). ..........4 0 6
Chapter XIX. The Cameralistics of Sonnenfels (“Polizey”). ...............4 2 5
Chapter XX: The Cameralism of Sonnenfels (“Handlung”). ...............4 4 3
Chapter XXI. The Cameralistics of Sonnenfels (“Handlung Und Finanz”). ...4 5 8
C h a p t e r  X X I I :  S u m m a r y ...........................................4 9 3
N o t e s ..........................................................5 0 1

Like its predecessor in this series, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, the present
book is a mere fragment. It deals with a single factor of the social process in the
German States. It finds this factor already effective in 1555. It does not attempt to
trace each link in the chain of continuity from that date. It reviews the most important
seventeenth-century writers in the line of sequence, but the emphasis of the book falls
in the eighteenth century. I have carefully excluded the problem of relations between
this literary factor and other social elements, and I have purposely refrained from
estimating its ratio of importance among the formative forces of the period.
Conclusions of that order must come from a larger synthesis, for which the present
study supplies merely a detail.
To justify my belief that the labor which this book cost was well spent, it would be
necessary to prove first, that Americans have much to gain from better understanding
of the Germans; and second, that just appreciation of the present social system of the
Germans is impossible for Americans unless they are willing to trace it historically.
These propositions must be left, however, without the support of argument, merely
as the author’s profession of faith.
To readers of English only, cameralism is virtually a lost chapter in the history of
the social sciences. Although everything now belonging to German polity has a part
of its heredity in that type of social theory, not every reputable student of the social
sciences in America could correctly define the term, and few could name more than
one or two writers to whom it is properly applied.
In a word, the cameralists were a series of German writers, from the middle of the
sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, who approached civic problems from
a common viewpoint, who proposed the same central question, and who developed
a coherent civic theory, corresponding with the German system of administration at
the same time in course of evolution. To the cameralists the central problem of
science was the problem of the state. To them the object of all social theory was toAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 5
show how the welfare of the state might be secured. They saw in the welfare of the
state the source of all other welfare. Their key to the welfare of the state was revenue
to supply the needs of the state. Their whole social theory radiated from the central
task of furnishing the state with ready means.
For reasons to be mentioned later, allusions to the cameralists in English books,
whether original or translated, are more frequent among the economists than
elsewhere. If, however, we consult the two handbooks of the history of economic
theory in most frequent use by students in this country, we find that they barely allude
to cameralism, and their historical perspective would be clearer if they did not
mention the subject at all. In the second edition of Cossa,
1 Klock, Becher, Hornigk
(sic), and Schröder are disposed of in a paragraph of about seventy words, and
another paragraph two lines longer, in the chapter on the physiocrats (!), mentions the
“Chamber Sciences,” as represented by Justi and Sonnenfels only. The third edition
of the same book, or the volume which took the place of a third edition, translated
under the title An Introduction to the Study of Political Economy, mentions the same
three Austrians, and adds a couple of lines on SeckendorS in the section on
“Industrial Freedom;” it mentions Gasser, Dithmar, and Darjes in the section on
“Professional Chairs, Newspapers, and Academies;” it gives a paragraph each to Justi
and Sonnenfels, in the section entitled “Bureaucratic and Professorial Eclecticism;”
and then, after a few statements thirty-four pages later, about the “German
Physiocrats,” it for the first time finds its bearings among German thinkers with Rau,
who began to write a generation after cameralism in the strict sense had passed its
prime. Ingram evidently abstracted from Roscher, by some principle of selection
which does not appear, a dozen names of German “mercantilists” of the cameralistic
period. The summary way in which he disposes of them shows that he had no first-
hand knowledge of these writers, and that he utterly misapprehended their place in
the history of German thought. If one were so fortunate as to learn the names of the
cameralists, and turned to Palgrave for more information, little would be found
beyond repetition of scraps gathered from Roscher; and these so disconnected that
they would hardly pique curiosity to pry farther. All the other English aids to
knowledge of cameralism are so scattered that an adequate introduction to the subject
by means of them would be out of the question.
During the last generation, American readers of German appear to have relied, as




Of Kautz it is enough to say that he was of the rear guard of the rhetoricians. His
book is wonderfully plausible if not lucid reading. Its early pages appear to express
methodological conclusions which the maturest scholarship has not superseded.
Unfortunately, the author’s own procedure, as it appears in the body of the book,
shows that for him these imposing propositions had merely the force of impotent
generalities. His actual method is first, derivation, by some occult means, of certain
general principles under which to subsume the economists of the period; then,
second, use of the writers of the period as so many illustrations of the principles.
When projected upon this vicious circle, the course of thought in successive stages
falls into alluring symmetry. A little inquiry into the facts, however, shows that these
pleasing constructions are mainly fictitious.
For example, Kautz locates the second of his three great divisions of economic
ideas “between the end of the Middle Ages and Adam Smith.” This second period
he interprets as that of independent investigation, “in which the national-economic
ideas and principles were no longer mixed and combined with the political, legal, and
religious systems of theory, but were presented as a totality of peculiar special
cognitions.”
4 The truth of this generalization depends upon the standard used for
measurement of relative bondage to conventionality and independence of it.
Compared with the age of the schoolmen the period from Martin Luther to Adam
Smith was of course intellectually free. On the other hand, if contemporaries of Kautz
had gone back to the economic and political theorists of the intermediate period, with
no preparation but nineteenth-century ideas, they would have been amazed at the
degree in which social thinking of all sorts was paralyzed by dogmatic
prepossessions. Even if Kautz’s generalization had been qualified in a way to make
it valid, use of it as a premise from which to deduce interpretation of the economic
theories of the period was like finding a sufficient explanation of the course of
American experience since 1776 in terms of the mere negative condition of
independence from England. Anyone who can have patience with discursive essays
upon long-distance impressions of the development of economic theory would find
Kautz impressive. As a guide to critical study of the actual process he is impossible.
Whatever our estimate, on the other hand, of the “historical school,” and of
Roscher’s contributions to economic theory, there can be no doubt about the value
of his services to economic-history. The volume cited above, on the history ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 7
economic theory in Germany, has served as an almost unchallenged authority on the
subject for a generation. Those who have had most occasion to work in the field
which this book surveys will be most sincere in their gratitude to the author. The
present volume could surely not have been written if Roscher had not blazed the way.
Nevertheless, the farther I went in the studies which this book reports, the more my
wonder grew that German scholarship had not yet produced a work which would be
as evident an advance upon Roscher as he was upon Kautz. For obvious reasons such
a book must be written in Germany. At the same time, comparison of the perspective
of foreign scholars may be worth something as an aid in establishing the viewpoint
from which the evolution of German social theories should be reconsidered.
It is approximately true that knowledge of the cameralists as a group has remained
as it was left by Roscher. The most general thesis of the present work is that the
cameralists have not yet come to their own in the assignment of historical values. In
other words, while acknowledging my debt to Roscher, I find it necessary to impeach
his authority.
In the first place, Roscher was essentially a collector, not an interpreter. Yet,
although his chief merit was as an assembler of details, I have still been surprised at
the number of times in which I have found him apparently in error about matters of
fact. It was not my affair to find out whether these slips were more his fault or his
misfortune. At his time the evidence which would have corrected the errors of detail
may not have been accessible. At all events, the writers in Die allgemeine deutsche
Biographie  almost invariably justify more or less important modifications in
Roscher’s accounts of the individual careers of the cameralists. My own study of
these writers has been confined to their books. For such biographical introduction as
was necessary I have relied throughout, unless exception is noted, upon the work just
named, whenever it differed from Roscher.
But the chief issue with Roscher is much more radical. For a generation the world’s
interpretation of the cameralists has virtually been stereotyped in the form which he
cast. The more specific thesis of the present work is that his version of the
cameralists utterly misses their real meaning. It is a blur produced by a combination
of methodological fallacy and historical nearsightedness. German scholars alone are
within reach of the means fully to reconstruct the history if the thesis is sustained. I
hope I am right, however, that the very distance from the bulk of the sources, which
compels attention to the main movement of thought, confers a distinct advantage inAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 8
making out the larger meanings of the body of literature in question.
In order to justify this challenge of venerable tradition, account must be taken of the
immediate antecedents of Roscher’s book. In 1858 Leopold Ranke submitted to the
Bavarian Royal Academy of Sciences a plan for a series of twenty-four volumes on
the history of the sciences in Germany. The subjects of those volumes in the series
which are most intimately related to the present issue are: (1) Gesrhichte; (2) Kriegs-
wissensrhafl; (3) Jurisprudenz; (4) Allgemeines Staatsrecht und Politik; (5)
Nationalokonomie und kameralistische Fächer; (6) Landwirthachaftslehre. For the
convenience of the writers available, and for facility of popular exposition, these
subdivisions were doubtless more suitable than any others that might have been
proposed. As a programme for critical research, however, the standards of today
being the criterion, that division of labor surrendered the work in advance to
preconception and misconstruction. A precisely analogous fallacy would be involved
in a scheme today to parcel out among different scholars, in accordance with present
national boundaries, an analysis of the political conditions of Europe at the time of
Charlemagne. The political map of Europe in the ninth century was not as it is today,
and analysis based on the contrary assumption would deserve rejection without a
hearing. But the inchoate social sciences, from the middle of the sixteenth century to
the end of the eighteenth, were no more homogeneous and coterminous with
scientific categories at the middle of the nineteenth century than national frontiers of
the ninth century retain their places in the twentieth. In other words, the Bavarian
Academy did not undertake to find the centers in the past from which the evolution
of the social sciences could be traced step by step and process by process. On the
contrary, it sponsored a plan which called for a conventionalizing of previous
centuries in terms of nineteenth-century classification. This scheme ruthlessly
inverted the rule which had been the first great historiographical commandment with
promise since Savigny and Niebuhr.
The result was a conspicuous vindication of the violated principle. The sort of
analysis which the present volume reports very early unearths the fact that the
conventional division of labor in the series threw the data out of their relations and
retarded discovery of their meaning. In particular it assigned the cameralists to
Roscher,
5 while it estopped analysis of them at their proper center within the scope
of Bluntschli.
6 Using the terms in the sense in which they are understood in the
United States today, the cameralists were not primarily economists. They wereAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 9
primarily political scientists. This single perception demonstrates the unreliability of
both Roscher and Bluntschli upon the cardinal question of the meaning of the
cameralists for the evolution of the sciences in Germany. The first critical question
to be answered in an interpretation of the cameralists is: What was their specific
purpose, the center from which they proceeded, the interest which gave the respective
ratings to all their other interests ? Rarely is this question answered as promptly and
as decisively as in the case of the cameralists. The answer exhibits in cameralism the
germination, not of an academic abstraction, but of a whole civic polity.
Turning to the defect of historical nearsightedness, a typical symptom may be taken
from Bluntschli.
7 He says:
The Germans applied their attention tardily to general civic science
(Staatswissenschaft).  In the sixteenth century Italians and Frenchmen, in the
seventeenth Dutchmen and Englishmen, and in the eighteenth Englishmen and
Frenchmen were far in advance. Only by degrees did the Germans overtake these
leaders, and presently it was their fortune, through diligence and thoroughness of
investigation, through moral earnestness of endeavor, and through the loftiness of
their standpoint and the energy of their thinking, to equal the foremost and to win
general recognition.
In a certain sense the first two of these propositions are as true as the last. At the
same time, this conventional judgment is in large part a mere survival of that
obsession which filled Germany, and to a certain extent the rest of Europe, during the
eighteenth century, with awe and fear of everything political made in France. In effect
Bluntschli follows Weitzel
8 in canceling the cameralists from the account, while he
discusses other Germans of much less real importance for civic science. Von Mohl
had meanwhile written,
9 and had really given the cameralists more credit than
Bluntschli allows, though he does not in principle vary from tradition. It is not
necessary, if it were possible, to cloud the title of other countries to respect for their
achievements in the political sciences. My contention is that the Germans were not
as sterile in this field as it has been their own fashion to suppose. In fact there was
no more virile political thinking in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries than that of the German cameralists. I do not say that it was as profound,
as abstract, as highly generalized, as political works of the first rank produced by
other nations. It was suited to the occasions which set its task. It was constructive. It
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counterpart, it is impossible to demonstrate how much the cameralism of the books
was cause and how much effect of the cameralism of the bureaus. I do not raise that
question. The same dilemma is at least as pertinent to Grotius or Locke or
Montesquieu as to the cameralists; and on the ground of probable influence upon
affairs the case of the latter does not on the whole suffer by comparison with any
political theorists whatsoever. Moreover, the plea that neither the letter nor the spirit
of these technologies in any great degree molded the actual political practices of the
time would, by parity of reasoning, exclude every great human document from rank
among the formative forces of the period that produced it. This arbitrary measure of
meaning factors in history would leave among admitted social forces not a single
standardizing formulation of human conduct, from the New Testament to Magna
Charta and the last three amendments to the American Constitution.
At all events the cameralists of the books did their share toward systematizing the
polity which was most intensively developed by the Germans. Their works contain
in embryo everything which has made the German system today the most effective
economizer of national energy in the world. If a tree should be known by its fruits,
scholars in general, and the Germans in particular, have grossly blundered in
slighting the sturdy stock from which the mighty growth of German civic theory and
practice has developed.
There is a contrast between Roscher’s method of approaching the material and my
own in another respect. Roscher attempts in general to exhibit the cameralists in
national groups, in connection with the administrative policies of their respective
princes. That he is unable strictly to carry out this plan is evident from the titles of
his chapters, from the twelfth to the twentieth inclusive, viz.: “The Dutch School and
the Mercantile System;” “The Conservative National Economics of the Middle of the
Seventeenth Century;” “The National Economics of the Last Great German
Polyhistorian;” “The Austrian National Economics under Leopold I;” “The Prussian
National Economics under the Great Elector;” “Leibniz and the Beginnings of the
Halle School;” “The National Economics of Friedrich Wilhelm I;” “The National
Economics of Frederick the Great;” “The Older Eclectics of the Eighteenth Century.”
My plan, on the contrary, ignored the merely national relations of the respective,
authors, and treated them as nearly as possible chronologically, and as phenomena
of a coherent tendency of thought. It can hardly be claimed that the last word has
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advantages, and that the employment of both, at their highest efficiency, and in co-
operation with each other, will doubtless be involved in the programme of future
historians of this period.
There is nowhere between the lines of this book a wish to glorify German
bureaucracy at the expense of American republicanism. The advantage to Americans
of understanding German institutions will not come from adopting or even imitating
them, but from adapting whatever may be learned from their workings to the
improvement of our own institutions. The aim of this book is accordingly to find a
point of departure for interpretation of German social theories and practices through
their own process of evolution. The Hegelians would say it is a typical manifestation
of the nature of things that the German and American polities should tend to
complete each other. The one starts with the assumption of the state as the social unit.
The other starts with the assumption of the individual as the social unit. Experience
has shown that neither assumption is the whole truth, that each assumption is part of
the truth, and that the social problem rests hard upon the need of a reconstruction
which shall organize these two phases of the truth into a convincing basis for present
social action. I venture again to express my belief that a service may be rendered to
the American side of this assimilation by promoting acquaintance with the spirit of
German polity. Taking it for granted that the best way to understand the German type
of society and of social theory is through their evolution, I have undertaken to show
that the trunk line of this evolution from the Reformation to the French Revolution
is marked by the cameralists.
This book is not a contribution to the social sciences in the sense, that it draws upon
previously unknown sources. The cameralists have been catalogued over and over
again.
10 Additional sources will doubtless be assembled when German scholars
interest themselves in recovering this portion of their history. My effort has been
rather to determine a new standpoint for explaining the sources. Nor is an attempt to
put the cameralists in their proper historical perspective new in itself. Not to speak
of interpretations attempted while the cameralistic series in the strict sense was still
incomplete, we may date the beginnings of historical treatment of cameralism from
Rossig.
11 Almost without exception these reviews of cameralism have been so
indiscriminate that the meaning of the movement has been obscured, if not positively
misrepresented. Thus, to take the most important instance, Roscher, in consequence
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identities by jumbling together survivals of mediaeval legalism like Besold, political
scientists of the obsolescent not the evolving type like Bornitz, political philosophers
of massive mold like Pufendorf, historical philosophers like Moser, metaphysical
philosophers like Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, and incidentally the cameralists. Not by
a valid process of analysis, but by sheer force, Roscher reduces these unlike
quantities to the common denominator “economist.” In the same way, and perhaps
even more fallaciously, Bluntschli had joined together heterogeneous elements as a
continuous series in political science. I do not deny that every type of theory reacts
upon every other type; but it is juvenile to assume that in any age the influence of a
metaphysician and of a historian, for example, upon each other’s peculiar type of
thinking, is as direct and intense as that of two metaphysicians or two historians.
Sometimes such cross-fertilization is more fruitful than in-and-in breeding. Again it
is not. Neither is it to be assumed in a given case without proof. Nor can it be taken
for granted that propositions occurring casually in one theory, but belonging
primarily to another, may be carried over at face value into the theory to which they
secondarily belong. For instance, a theologian might cull from every economic author
of the last fifty years passages which carry some sort of theological implications.
Those implications might or might not have been apparent to the authors themselves
and intended by them. In any event it would be absurd to make a history of theology
for the last fifty years by patching together such passages with others which were
immediately theological in their premises and purpose. Before a truthful expression
of one type of theory can be made in terms of another the mental latitude and
longitude of each group of theorists, and even of each individual theorist, must be
accurately determined, and corrections must be made accordingly in the presumptive
force of their formulas. Neither Bluntsclili nor Roscher properly recognized this
principle. It is a marvel therefore that German scholarship has permitted the books
of these authors so long to hold their place as standard accounts of the process of
evolution in the German social sciences. The following pages are devoted to
determining the group equation of the cameralists only.
Meanwhile the little book of Marchet
12 deserves much more attention than it seems
to have received, either in Europe or in this country. Indeed, I could not have
expressed myself as above about the persistent authority of Roscher if I could trace
in recent German literature any considerable tendency to countenance Marchet’s
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assumption that, since Blunlschli and Roscher, German social theory previous to the
nineteenth century is to be considered as a closed incident. I must acknowledge that
Marchet has very largely anticipated my conclusions, particularly upon the fabulous
character of tradition with respect to German mercantilism as a theory, and as to the
doctrine of population. Any competent scholar was bound to reach similar results if
he analyzed the sources instead of repeating hearsay.
Until I had reached my own conclusions from examination of the original writers,
I deliberately ignored the commentators as far as possible. Marchet was accordingly
merely a name to me until I had completed my manuscript. This was for-tunale,
because if I had been familiar with his work I could not have been sure of the
independence of my own judgment. Tn matters of detail Marchet notes particulars
which I had omitted, others which I had not discovered, about Seckendorff, Becher,
Hornick, Schröder, and Justi. His estimate of Hornick is especially notable, as he had
the advantage of access to his book and other evidence which I could not obtain. On
the other hand, comparison of my own method, and its resulting interpretation, with
Marchet’s tends to confirm my belief that I am on the right track. In the first place,
the extent to which Marchet relies on the generalization eudaemonism to explain the
political philosophy of the time too closely resembles the method of Kautz. In the
second place, Marchet is not sufficiently free from the prime fallacy of Roscher. He
does not perceive that he has to deal with several distinct types of theorists. These
must be analyzed in turn, with reference to their respective centers of attention,
before a valid synthesis of their unlike doctrines is possible. That is, the same sort of
analysis to which this volume subjects the cameralists must be performed upon
several distinct groups of thinkers, e.g., the general philosophers, the political
philosophers, the moral philosophers, etc. Since this particular analysis has not been
applied rigorously by Marchet to the cameralists as such, or to either of the other
groups included in his survey, his book, with all its merits, leaves these theorists still
not properly differentiated, and not interpreted strictly by the functional meaning of
each, in the whole process of developing a system of social doctrines.
Schmoller has rescued the method of Roscher from futility by projecting the large
survey within which all details of civic development, particularly in Germany, must
be located. In his more intensive historical work Schmoller has dealt immediately
with industrial and administrative development more than with the growth of
theories. Analysis of the cameralists therefore explains one of the systems ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 14
communication, so to speak, that penetrated the territory in which Schmoller’s
primacy among explorers is secure. His monograph, Mercantilism, is the best
introduction that can be recommended for the present volume. The relation of his
more extended and technical treatment of the subject to the present study is indicated
in the first chapter of this book.
In the following pages I have tried to present a digest of everything in the writings
of the leading cameralists which is necessary to an impartial conclusion about their
meaning for the German social sciences. Accordingly I offer in this volume a source
book containing the most pertinent evidence about the real significance of the
cameralists. These sources put each reader in possession of the means of testing my
conclusions, and of estimating the cameralists for himself. The only preconception
which I carried to the study of these theorists was the historical commonplace that
they must be allowed to speak for themselves, and from their own standpoint,
whatever that might prove to be. This commonplace has had at best fitful respect
among social theorists or historians of social theory.
My chief interest in the cameralists is least of all antiquarian. I want to know what
can be learned from them that is of permanent use for sociological methodology. My
suspicions were early aroused that the fate which had befallen them would turn out
to enforce certain primary methodological laws in application to the social sciences;
and first of all the law that every historical actor must be judged primarily with
reference to his immediate purposes, not as though his purposes were those of the
moment at which the judgment was passed. I suspected that some of the non
sequiturs which are epidemic in the social sciences would be found undisguised in
a comparison of the cameralists as they really were with the tradition of them in the
histories. It seemed to me that, if this turned out to be the case, exposure of the bad
logic, in an example so far in the past that it enlists no partisan prejudice, would do
more to promote valid reasoning upon current questions in the social sciences than
possible direct refutations of contemporary argument. I therefore undertook a
laborious historical search, not chiefly from historical interest, but for specifically
methodological purposes. If historical valuations of the cameralists had mistreated
them, I wanted to ferret out the precise flaw in the process, as a concrete warning
against parallel miscarriages of judgment at present.
All that I knew about the cameralists, when I began this study, I had learned from
Roscher. On the general grounds indicated above, I decided that if Roscher’sAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 15
composite picture of so many different types did justice to each, and to the synthesis
of them, it would be an amazing coincidence; and I determined to find out for myself
whether such a phenomenon had occurred. I first studied Justi, and at once made out
indications which had not appeared in Roscher’s report. It was evident moreover that
there were more intimate relations than a mere chronological before-and-after
between Justi and other writers. Following this clue, I abstracted from Roscher’s
heterogeneous collection of men who had more or less directly affected economic
ideas a group with like marks of species. German civic theory in general so evidently
proceeds from or at least through this type of thinkers that the finding marks
forthwith furnish the fixed points from which to interpret the whole evolution of
German social science. Whether the record proves to contain exhibits of
methodological principles, either in the breach or in the observance, is discussed in
the concluding chapter.
I have intentionally disobeyed the rules of good writing by retaining in the text
many German words, instead of trying to propose English equivalents. This was for
two chief reasons: first, that translation unavoidably interprets, and in the present
connection it almost certainly interprets anachro-nistically. Any terms by which we
might translate leading concepts of the cameralists, unless they might be careful
circumlocutions, would impute to them shades of meaning which would really be
ours, not theirs. In another class of cases I have gone still farther in retaining German
terms or even considerable quotations, when I judged that the matter in hand would
have value only for readers somewhat familiar with German. This was both for the
sake of precision and to retain local color.
With the same purpose in view I have deliberately chosen awkward renderings of
many German expressions. By so doing I have most accurately indicated the ideas of
the various authors. In many ways their thought was not as our thought, and it is a
falsification of history to make them speak as men would now. American conceptions
of the growth and meaning of German social theory have been confused by neglect
of translators to count with this elemental fact. This has been amply emphasized in
the body of the book, but I add a typical instance from a different source., While
writing this preface I had occasion, in another connection, to consult the English
version of Heeren’s Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems.
13 Of European
states from the beginning of the sixteenth century, Heeren is made to say:
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limited. Without the aid of the nobility no important war could be carried on; without
the consent of the cities no taxes could be levied. Without standing armies (a small
beginning excepted), without political economy
14 (for no art was known but that of
getting money), there existed, in reality, at this time no power, in the present
acceptation of the word.
In the first place, Heeren’s own proposition about Staats-wirthschaft was a
generality which would not bear rigorous criticism. In the second place, whether the
author had a correct idea in mind or not, the term Slaatswirtlischafl itself has to be
credited with a different content for every period of which it is positively or
negatively predicated. It did not even have the identical connotations when Heeren’s
last edition was published which it had carried when the book first appeared; and
never and nowhere had it meant precisely what writers or readers in England in 1864
understood by the phrase “political economy.” Still further, as the following clause
stands in the quotation it furnishes a second illustration of the need of paraphrase
fairly to represent the original. The author’s real meaning would be conveyed by the
substitute: “the financial administration of states did not go beyond programmes for
raising revenues.” Standing by themselves, these particular instances are not of
firstrate importance. They are merely samples of thousands scattered through English
literature of the social sciences. The aggregate effect of unhistorical renderings of
German terms, added to the unsatisfactory condition of the German tradition itself,
is a state of regrettable misinformation among English readers about the actual course
of development in German social theory and practice. I have tried, therefore, to report
the cameralists in language that reflects the partial analysis actually in their minds,
and which does not represent them as using nineteenth- and twentieth-century
concepts of Germans, still less of Englishmen or Americans.
It has been my intention also to retain all archaisms and other peculiarities, even to
obvious typographical errors, in quotations, titles, etc., in order to represent the exact
state of the texts used. My notes, however, were reorganized several times, and were
recopied by several hands. Moreover, space limits compelled me to omit an appendix
which would have occupied 150 pages. It was to contain the tables of contents of the
principal books cited, and other illustrative material. The retrenchment compelled
frequent alterations in the body of the book. At the time of revising the proof most
of the volumes used had necessarily been returned to libraries in this country and
Germany. I have not been unmindful of the duty of verification, but it was thus notAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 17
strictly within my power. I fear therefore that, although I have fortified myself as well
as circumstances would permit against material errors, in matters of form the
citations contain inaccuracies which might have been removed if the sources had
been longer at my disposal. The capitalization, spelling, punctuation, etc., must
accordingly be taken as illustrating rather than precisely transcribing the passages
cited.
My most grateful thanks are due to the Königliche Bibliothek at Berlin for the loan
of a large number of the cameralistic works without which this book could not have
been written. My obligations are equally real for similar assistance from the libraries






Every theory, system, science is in some way a reflection of the prevailing purposes
of the time in which it developed.
No hypothesis about the precise nature of the cause and effect concerned is
concealed in this commonplace. We need not raise that question. Enough that in
some way or other, which it is not necessary to discuss at this point, our philosophies
echo the dominant purposes of the time that produced them.
If we attempt to detach a system of thought from the whole scheme of activities
impelled by the prevailing systems of purposes, and if we try to set forth the meaning
of that thought as though it had no connection with those purposes, the result is
inevitable misinterpretation.
The same effect follows unintentional not less than deliberate separation of a body
of thought, in which we are especially interested, from the surrounding circumstances
of its development. It is like abstracting a plant from the soil and atmosphere which
are the media of its existence, and then expecting it both to grow and to reveal the
abstract process of its previous growth.
Speaking particularly of the social sciences, their crudeness at present is in part the
result of arbitrary dismemberment of the process of which science is an
interpretation, and consequent substitution of fictitious processes, more or less
remote from one another and meaningless for one another. We have then, so far as
we depend upon these sciences for knowledge, a collection of ghosts stalking abroad
in defiance of all known laws, and apparently tending less and less to explain reality.
A single instance in which this has occurred on a rather large scale furnishes the
primary motive of this book We are to deal with cameralists and cameralism. A
history of neither is to be attempted. At most this book may be called a brief of the
argument which a history would have to complete if it were to satisfy sociologists.
An authentic interpretation of cameralism necessarily gives the most prominentAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 19
place, in the center of the picture, to Justi. In order however rightly to estimate Justi,
the work of other cameralists before and after his time must be analyzed and
compared with his system. For the purposes of this survey then we shall regard
cameralism as beginning with Seckendorff,
15 and ending with Sonnenfels.
16 A history
of cameralism would have to begin more than a century before these pioneers. It
would trace beginnings earlier than the time of Elector August of Saxony (1553–86)
and Landgrave Philipp of Hesse (1518– 67). It would follow changes of form,
content, relations, and name, and it would be obliged to show, finally, that present
differences between German and English institutions must be stated partially in terms
of the persistence in the one case of a cameralistic tradition which was never
naturalized in the other.
Lexis, in Conrad’s Handwörterbuch, under the title “Kameralwissenschaft,” states
that the emperor Maximilian I established several Reichshammer, e.g., the
Kammergericht,  1495, and that in the course of the sixteenth century the type of
administration began to be developed in the chief states of the Empire. If we refer to
this infancy of the system and of its technology, we are obliged to set our boundaries
back so as to include among the writers Melchior von Osse, whose Testament was
written in 1555, and Georg Obrecht, whose Fünf unterschiedliche Secreta Politica
appeared in Strassburg in 1617. These authors will presently be discussed at some
length.
Readers who use English only know cameralism chiefly through the historians of
economics. The interpretation of cameralism in English tradition arbitrarily wrests
the thing and its science from the setting in which it is intelligible. Exaggerating
almost to paradox, we may say that cameralism was not a theory and practice of
economics but of politics. Cameralism was a technique and a theory of administering
a peculiar type of state in a society constructed out of peculiar types of purposes. To
be sure, economic conditions and purposes formed their share of the circumstances
to which cameralism was an adaptation. The argument which will follow is not an
attempt to turn the flank of the economic interpretation of history. No issue is raised
with those who insist that the ultimate elements of all factors of social situations are
economic. Be that as it may, the actors in a given social situation think of the
elements with which they are dealing as different in kind, and they construct their
systems of theory and practice accordingly. Cameralism raised, directly and
deliberately, no fundamental questions of pure economics. It was primarily a theoryAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 20
and a technique of government. Solution of problems of the nature and laws of
wealth is logically antecedent to governmental institutions, to be sure, but until the
last quarter of the eighteenth century the principle had been generally ignored.
Governmental theory dealt with economic problems of course. Instead of formulating
these separately as economic problems, however, it recognized no economic
problems of the degree of generality familiar since Adam Smith’s time. It dealt with
economic relations as merely incidental to the application of governmental principles,
and the latter, as proclaimed at the time, were in many respects narrowly provincial.
The situation which actually existed in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was a resultant of purposes which were conditioned first by these chief
objective factors, viz., the soil and climate of the country; the state of the arts
required for using natural resources; the domestic industrial structure, and the foreign
trade relations; the ecclesiastical organization; the Holy Roman Empire; the character
of the states within the Empire, and outside of it in Europe including nearer Asia; the
prizes for national competition in the wealth of the Americas, the Levant, and the
remote East; and the personal equation of the citizens. Then, second, there were
firstrate subjective factors, which may be scheduled as the contemporary science, the
theology or philosophy, the legal tradition both from Roman and Teuton sources, the
political philosophy, and the rule-of-thumb conclusions which passed as wisdom in
the conduct of life, from individual habit to the policies of states.
In this situation, as a matter of fact, the idea of the state and of government
dominated all the other factors. So far as interests of the state could be distinguished,
they settled the relative importance of everything else. The purposes of the state were
paramount. The cameralists were servants of the state. Cameralism was the system
elaborated by the chief agents of the rulers, partly as mere classification of practices
which rulers had already adopted; partly as ways and means of accomplishing more
of the purposes which the state proposed.
But in order properly to prepare for intelligent interpretation of cameralism still
simpler elements of the situation must be called to mind.
In the first place, we must remember that the German territorial sovereignties in the
period of the Reformation were essentially more like a typical Virginia plantation,
in the most flourishing days of the Old Dominion, than like any political unit with
which modern Americans are familiar. Even if the prince controlled territories which
it would not be extravagant to describe as big farms, it was long before the operationsAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 21
of management were transformed from the primitive type of the big landed estate to
a definitive civic structure. The administration of German states developed by a
process which it does not fall within the scope of this book to trace, from the status
in which the consort of the prince presided in person over the revenues of the
principality, almost as directly as the New England farmer’s wife managed her dairy.
The advisers and chief functionaries, who gradually acquired the meaning which we
find them possessing in the cameralistic period, were genetically differentiations of
this proprietary relation and policy. The lord of the estate was to their minds,
whatever their particular philosophy, a fixed term in the equation of life. They were
powerless to think of a social order as rational which did not revolve about him as
a regulator.
The great majority of the people in the German states, the peasants and artisans
particularly, were regarded by the wisest men of the time as incapable of successful
initiative. As an estimate of actual conditions the judgment was undoubtedly correct.
The people were accordingly held to be dedicated by dispensation of Providence and
the laws of nature to the condition of wardship, and to be fit for action only under
authority. The fallacy of this generalization need not concern us. It is a historical fact
and force. The ruler and his government were quite consistently seen in the most
plausible light when they were contemplated as fulfilling the duties of guardianship
over these industrially and politically incompetent masses. Under the circumstances
paternalism was not an arrest of development; still less in principle an abuse of
power. Whether in operation or in theory, it was the ideal expression of the situation.
Again, from the beginning, the German states were involved in a struggle for
existence. With the kind of necessity here concerned we have now nothing to do,
beyond recognizing it as a factor taken for granted by the statesmen of the period. In
fact the most importunate problem for every German state was, in its own
calculation, that of self-maintenance, and especially by control of an adequate
military force.
The cameralists of the books, as distinguished from the cameralists of the bureaus,
although the former class was usually recruited from the latter, were the men who
worked out for publication, and especially for pedagogical purposes, the system of
procedure in accordance with which German governments were supposed to perform
their tasks. As a rule these men were employed in administrative positions of some
sort, and spoke to a certain extent from experience. They were not mere academicAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 22
theorists. We may characterize these cameralists of the books as the group of writers
distinguished from their contemporaries and from earlier and later theorists by
constructing a “science” or group of “sciences” around the central consideration of
the fiscal needs of the prince. We might coin the name “fiscalists,” and it would be
more appropriate to their actual character than either of the terms by which they have
been known. Under the circumstances to which we have referred, the most constant
and pressing need of the ruler was ready money. The men who elaborated the theory
of government for these German states had virtually to answer this question: What
programme must a wise government adopt, in order first and foremost to be
adequately supplied with ready money, and thus able to discharge the duties of the
state in their various orders of importance? The most typical of these men expressed
this paramount consideration very positively and frankly. One of the reasons why
later cameralists used superficially different formulations of the same essential
regime, was that the fiscal systems had become relatively fixed, and could be taken
for granted. The less conventionalized portions of the system, and especially the
idealized versions of its aims, could then come in for a larger share of attention; and
there was more room for speculative excursions into the wider political philosophy
or the deeper metaphysics by which later writers hoped to buttress the system.
In the rough, the chronic condition of the European nations during the cameralistic
period was war, and the primary task of governments, especially in Germany, was
creation of readiness for war. The fiscal policy which was the rule in Europe during
the period is known as the mercantile system.
17 This policy, as a cardinal political
fact, is a datum presupposed by the present study. As Schmoller says (p. 57):
If we pause for a while to consider this foreign and external policy of the European
states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—which it has hitherto been the
custom to regard as the essential feature of the mercantile system—it is not, of
course, our purpose to describe the details of its several forms. The general features
of its regulation are well enough known. Difficulties were put in the way of the
importation of manufactured goods; and their production and exportation were
favored by the prohibition of the export of raw materials, by bounties on export, and
by commercial treaties. Encouragement was given to domestic shipping, to the
fisheries, and to the coasting trade by restricting or forbidding foreign competition.
Commerce with the colonies, and the supplying of them with European wares, was
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place directly from the colony itself, and not by way of other European ports; and
everywhere an attempt was made to establish direct trading relations by great
privileged trading companies, and by state aid in manifold ways. .... The general
features are known; the details have even yet not been subjected to due scientific
investigation. Our only purpose here is to grasp the fundamental ideas of the system;
which, naturally, found varying expressions, here in high duties, there in low, here
in the prevention, there in the encouragement of the corn trade. The thought pursued
everywhere was this: as competition with other countries fluctuated up and down, to
cast the weight of the power of the state into the scales of the balance in the way
demanded in each case by national interests.
We have accepted Schmoller’s general hypothesis in explanation of the mercantilist
system. His view must be taken as representing, in its main features, the consensus
of present historical scholarship. He epitomizes it in this form:
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Our purpose was to show by a particular example, that of Brandenburg, that during
the course of the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, the creation of
the German territorial state was not merely a political but also an economic necessity.
.... We have to do with a great historical process by which local sentiment and
tradition were strengthened, the social and economic forces of the whole territory
consolidated, important legal and economic institutions created; by which, further,
the forces and institutions thus united were led to a battle of competition with other
territories, involving numerous shiftings of toll, confiscation of goods and ships,
embargoes and staple-fights, prohibitions of importation and exportation and the like;
while, within the country itself, old antagonisms softened and trade became more
free.
To so powerful and self-contained a structure and so independent and individual a
policy as the town had reached in an earlier age, the German territory scarcely
anywhere attained .... yet this very time—the second half of the sixteenth century, and
the seventeenth century—was an epoch which gave every inducement for an
economic transformation. The way was already clear, out of the narrow circle of the
small territory into the larger union of forces possible only in the great state. .... These
forces all converging impelled society to some large economic reorganization on a
broader basis, and pointed to the creation of national states with a corresponding
policy. .... Everywhere, save in Germany, economic bodies were stretching out and
becoming political; everywhere new state systems of economy and finance wereAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 24
arising, able to meet the new needs of the time. Only in our Fatherland did the old
economic institutions become so petrified as to lose all life; only in Germany were
the foreign trade, the manufacturing skill, the supply of capital, the good economic
usages, connections and traditions, which the country had possessed up to 1620, more
and more completely lost.
And it was not simply the external loss in men and capital which brought about this
retrogression of Germany, during a period of more than one century, in comparison
with the Powers of the West; it was not even the transference of the world’s trading
routes from the Mediterranean to the ocean that was of most consequence; it was the
lack of politico-economic organization, the lack of consolidation in its forces. What,
to each in its time, gave riches and superiority first to Milan, Venice, Florence, and
Genoa; then later to Spain and Portugal; and now to Holland, France, and England,
and, to some extent to Denmark and Sweden, was a stale policy in economic matters
as superior to the territorial as that had been to the municipal. Those states began to
weave the great economic improvements of the time into their political institutions
and policies, and to bring about an intimate relation between the one and the other.
States arose, forming united, and therefore strong and wealthy economic bodies, quite
different from earlier conditions; in these, quite unlike earlier times, the state
organization assisted the national economy and this the state policy; and, quite unlike
earlier times too, public finance served as the bond of union between political and
economic life. It was not only a question of state armies, fleets, and civil services, it
was a question rather of unifying systems of finance and economy which should
encompass the forces of millions and whole countries, and give unity to their social
life. There had always been great states; but they had been bound together neither by
traffic nor by the organization of labor nor by any other like forces. The question now
was—with a great society divided into social classes widely different from one
another and complicated by the division of labor—to bring about, as far as possible,
on the basis of common national and religious feelings, a union for external defense
and for internal justice and administration, for currency and credit, for trade interests
and the whole economic life, which should be comparable with the achievements, in
its time, of the municipal government in relation to the town and its environs. This
was no mere fancy of the rulers; it was the innermost need of the higher civilization
itself that such enlarged and strengthened forms of social and economic community
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eighteenth centuries, not only in Germany, but everywhere else, is summed up in the
opposition of the economic policy of the state to that of the town, the district, and the
several Estates; the whole foreign history is summed up in the opposition to one
another of the separate interests of the newly rising states, each of which sought to
obtain and retain its place in the circle of European nations, and in that foreign trade
which now included America and India. ....
Only he who thus conceives of mercantilism will understand it; in its innermost
kernel it is nothing but state making—not state making in a narrow sense, but state
making and national-economy making at the same time; state making in the modern
sense, which creates out of the political community an economic community, and so
gives it a heightened meaning. The essence of the system lies not in some doctrine
of money, or of the balance of trade; not in tariff barriers, protective duties or
navigation laws; but in something far greater, namely, in the total transformation of
society and its organization, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the replacing
of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the national state. With this
accords the fact lately pointed out with regard to the literary history of the movement,
that what is peculiar to all the mercantilist writers is not so much the regulations of
trade which they propose for the increase of the precious metals as the stress they lay
on the active circulation of money, especially within the state itself.
19
The last sentence in this quotation from Schmoller suggests the peculiar relation of
the cameralists to mercantilism upon which we shall try to show that their writings
prove tradition to be misleading. Mercantilism, the instinctive national policy of
states in the process of evolution, while at the same time in miscellaneous struggle
with other states, was the most prominent objective reality in the civic life of the
time. On the other hand, later writers about mercantilism have created a grotesque
mythology of the. political and economic theory supposed to have been held by the
supporters of the policy. The present study does not extend to mercantilistic theorists
outside of Germany. While we are prepared, in the proper place, to challenge the
credibility of this mythology as it applies to other countries, our propositions in this
book refer not merely to German theorists alone, but to the cameralistic group among
those theorists. The cameralists are generally reputed to have been typical
mercantilists, in the sense that they are alleged to have taught certain economic
doctrines implied by the mercantilistic policy. One of the results of appeal to the
cameralistic books themselves is proof that mercantilism in the supposed sense, thatAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 26
is, as a specific system of false economic generalizations, cannot be found in these
sources.
Adam Smith did much to create belief in this mythological mercantilism. When we
analyze his chapter on “The Principle of the Commercial or Mercantile System,”
20
we find that it produced its effect in this direction more by innuendo than by precise
assertion. The chapter begins with the sentence:
That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which
naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of commerce,
and as the measure of value.
The poison in the sentence gets its venom in part by association with the title of
Book IV, “Of Systems of Political Economy,” and with the subtitle of chap. i. The
reader understands Smith to imply that there have been systems of “political
economy” based on the idea that “wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver;”
and that there was a “commercial or mercantile system” which posited this principle.
It turns out in the first place that Smith did not distinguish, in this part of his work,
between “political economy” as a theory, and economic policy. He asserts that
interested parties have succeeded in persuading nations to act as though money were
the only wealth, and thereupon he indulges in a homily upon the absurdity of that
idea. Nevertheless, he concludes
21 that a system of “political economy” which rested
on this absurdity widely prevailed. Thus he says:
The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted
in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a
country which had no mines only by the balance of trade, or by
exporting to a greater value than it imported; it necessarily became
the great object of political economy (sic) to diminish as much as
possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and
to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of
domestic industry.
A history of the growth of this mercantilistic myth would be instructive, and it is
to be hoped that it will some day be written. We may content ourselves with a single
comparatively modern and somewhat more full-grown version of the same fiction,
this time by a writer who may fairly be presumed to have included the Germans moreAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 27
directly in his generalization than was probably the case with Smith.
22 This historian
of political science says:
The Mercantile System, then, or Colbcrtism, was the first attempt to put the
fundamental principles of the theory of management [Wirthschaftslehre] on a
scientific and orderly basis. The central point of the same was the attribution of
exclusive value to the precious metals.
23 Consequently the effort in every possible
way to acquire gold and silver, and to retain the same: hence also the anxiety for a
favorable balance of trade. The means relied upon were: exclusive (sic) promotion
of the transforming industries, and of foreign trade, especially attainable through
privileges, advances of capital, precise regulations for industries, monopolies,
favorable commercial treaties and exclusive relations with colonies; then prohibition
of the export of the precious metals, and of raw materials fit for domestic
manufacture.
Nothing is easier than to show conclusively the incorrectness of the fundamental
idea, as well as the impropriety of the means employed. It would therefore be a waste
of time to stop for discussion of the absolute truth of the system. At the same time,
the question of its relative value for the times and circumstances is not to be disposed
of in the same way. It has long since been observed by others that this first system of
political economy (sic) was not a product of minds exploring truth with a distinctly
conscious purpose. It was rather the generalization of the actual programme of certain
eminent statesmen, particularly Colbert.
24 It is equally easy to prove, however, that
the essential fundamental idea of these statesmen, and therewith of the system built
upon it, emerged necessarily from the economic condition of Europe after the middle
of the seventeenth century. The accumulation of great sums of money for defraying
the costs of war and supplying the luxury of courts was the involuntary task of the
officials intrusted with the management of states. This task could be discharged
easiest, not to say solely, by constant increase of the export of goods. These were
wanted in the newly accessible parts of the world, and would be paid for in gold and
silver. Of a basing of popular welfare, and therewith of the income of the crown,
upon more prosperous agriculture, not a word could be said; partly because of the
lack of all rational knowledge of agricultural economy on the part of the landed
gentry, together with the utterly suppressed condition of the peasantry, partly because
the development of this source of wealth could not keep pace with the above-
mentioned need.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 28
Such mixtures of Wahrheit und Dichtung are the substitutes for objective
interpretation of the cameralistic period which our generation has inherited, and we
have accepted them almost without question. How far from the truth was the last
sentence in the quotation may be inferred from the bibliography of agriculture
published by Zincke.
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Now the fact is that “mercantilism” as political economy, in the sense at present
associated with that term, in contrast with political policy, did not exist among the
cameralists. This was, first, because political economy was not born till after their
time, and second, because such material for political economy as was contained in
their theories was wonderfully sound, as far as it went, on the meaning of money and
the precious metals. It is as absurd to charge the theorists of the mercantilistic period
with the economic vagaries of which (by inference from the opportunistic policies
of the governments which they served, and which they themselves to a certain extent
approved) our modern logic might prove them constructively guilty, as it would be
to charge the economists of England today with dogmas which might be deduced
from generalization of British policy in the Boer war. Mercantilism, the policy, was
war more than it was philosophy. It was the practical answer to the practical question,
What is the practical thing for our state to do under present circumstances? A
situation might easily be imagined in which, with a war to be fought at a distance
with a strong nation, the people of the United States, irrespective of party affiliations
or economic principles, might afford a certain type of reasoners all the evidence they
would want for the assertion, “The people of the United States all believe that coal
is the only wealth.” The conclusion would have essentially the same sort of logical
support, and would have the same degree of validity, which examination of the
sources discovers in the case of the cameralists and their alleged mercantilism. They
certainly believed in a mercantilistic policy. They certainly did not believe in the
mercantilistic political economy which has been charged to them by an age that does
not understand the meaning of the policy.
Tradition has dealt quite as uncritically with cameralistic beliefs about population.
They have been represented as directly contrary to the Malthusian principle. The
cameralists have been supposed to believe unlimited increase of the number of
citizens both possible and desirable. In reality the Malthusian problem never
distinctly appeared above their horizon. Their beliefs about population were
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and the farmers of the prairie states act upon every year of abundant crops. They
assume that hands enough are not to be had for harvesting. The cameralists knew as
well as modern economists do that there was a limit beyond which more mouths
could not be fed. They did not qualify their statements about population quite as
carefully as men must who have in mind the Malthusian chapter in economic theory.
Substantially, however, they held tenable views of the subject as far as they went, and
their efforts to promote population would propably be duplicated today, under
parallel circumstances, by the most convinced Malthusians in the world.
Perhaps the most radical misunderstanding of the cameralists, especially on this
side of the Atlantic, is in connection with their theories of absolutism. To Americans,
absolutism is so unthinkable as a principle of political philosophy, that nothing
tolerable can be credited to theories in which such a postulate is a factor. But
Americans would have become much profounder political philosophers than they are,
if they had been patient enough to learn a little more about the part which the fiction
of absolutism has performed in the process of civic evolution. They might have
become more docile if they had perceived that the European superstition of the
absolutism of rulers differs more in degree than in kind from the American
superstition of the absolutism of the constitution. The truth is, each of these illusions
was a legal fiction which promoted social control by expressing in the most vivid
way practicable the enormous value of obedience to the accepted authorities. Each
of these fictions was the idiom in which an age said, in its most impressive way, “The
law must be obeyed.” Americans have been taught so exclusively the dark phases of
absolutistic regimes that they resent suggestion of factors in the case which they have
not considered. While absolutism as a principle is indefensible, it has been of
incalculable service as a makeshift; and sometimes, notably in the case of most of the
cameralists, the absolutistic element which occupied the place of honor in the formal
philosophy of the state was subordinated in effect by the moral force of judgments
which made steadily in the direction of more authentic civic principles.
But we must indicate the central motive of the cameralists in a positive way. Apart
from all details, whether on the credit or debit side, the salient fact about the
cameralistic civic theory was its fundamental assumption of the paramount value of
the collective interests, or in other words the subordination of the interests of the
individual to the interests of the community. The absolutistic state, of which
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for democracies. That same absolutistic state maintained certain scales of social
value, and arrived at certain types of concrete result, to which democracies thus far
have not attained. Whether we will or no, human experience is social. The type of
association is more important to the continuous process of human achievement than
the choices of individuals. Whether any society has found the just balance between
social ascendency and individual liberty, the principle that social ascendency must
practically outrank private preference is vital to civilization. Whether the Germans
have overemphasized the col-lectivistic principle, future centuries must decide. Even
if Americans are unprepared to concede that our democracy has given individualism
too much license, it will be the part of wisdom for us to inspect the achievements of
German collectivism without deciding in advance that they contain nothing from
which Americans can derive instruction.
Whether the collectivistic principle is ever beneficially to modify democracy or not,
there is hardly room for debate upon the proposition that in sheer economy of social
efficiency Germany has no near rival among the great nations. Whether the method
of this achievement costs more than it is worth, is an open question. That, in view of
what it has accomplished, it is worth understanding, is beyond dispute. The
explanation of the German type of success cannot be reached without calculating the
significance of the cameralists.
It has passed into a world’s proverb that the German schoolmaster won the
campaign of Sedan. It would be a superficial version of that approximate truth, if the
schoolmaster in the case were supposed to be the pedagogue who taught the men in
the three columns that crossed the Rhine. The school in which the wonderful
proficiency of modern Germany was trained was its whole civic system. No part of
the machinery of modern history has been regarded more contemptuously by the rest
of the world than the petty German principalities. They were ignoble and obstructive
enough, to be sure, but this is not the complete account. Each, with its minute
cameralis-tic organization, functioned like the drill sergeants with the raw levies. The
incapable masses of the German people were divided into squads, and disciplined for
civic duties, and after the dull drill of centuries were delivered over to the united
nation as the most completely socialized citizens in modern European history.
Without attempting to determine the precise degree of influence which each
theorist, or the government behind him, exerted upon the development of
cameralism, we may begin with a rapid sketch of the more prominent text-writers.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 31
In general it is needless to bring into this account biographical material in addition
to that to be found in Die allgemeine deutsche Biographie. While it is necessary to
base our work upon the presumption of familiarity with Roscher,
26 the argument of
this book is a direct challenge of the correctness of Roscher’s interpretation.
27 We
shall go to the writings of the cameralists themselves for direct evidence of the
presumptions, the content, and the sociological significance of their system.
The term Kammer, derivatives of which have been transliterated into English to
denote a theory and practice for which Englishmen have no exact equivalent, is itself
a variant of the Latin camera, in turn from the Greek {.
28 Cameralism was
the routine of the bureaus in which the administrative employees of governments,
first of all in the fiscal departments, did their work; or in a larger sense it was
systematized governmental procedure, the application of which was made in the
administrative bureaus.
Roscher distinguishes in the second half of the seventeenth century three principal
tendencies among the German national economists:
29
first a practical-conservative tendency, which had its chief seat in the
small territories of middle Germany and was best represented by
Seckendorff. Then a purely scientific tendency, belonging almost
wholly in the north of Germany, where as typical contrasts Pufendorf
and Conring loom up. A third group, viz., the practical-progressive,
attaches itself most closely in part to Austria, in part to the great
Electors.
It begs the question at the outset, to use the phrase with which Roscher begins
detailed discussion of these tendencies. To speak of “the conservative national
economics”
30 in the second half of the seventeenth century in Germany is to imply
that there already was a systematic economics in the sense in which that phrase was
understood two hundred years later, when Roscher wrote. It is certainly not true that
an economic theory existed in Germany at that time in the sense carried by the phrase
in England since Adam Smith. It would be less difficult to support a claim that
economics in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century was merely a
more highly developed form of the theory which constituted the social science of the
cameralists. This would however at best be a misleading version of the facts.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 32
Economic science in Germany was merely a subordinate and subconscious factor in
the came-ralistic theory of governmental management. It had not gained
independence as a science of wealth relations, irrespective of the forms of
government under which they exist. The economic presumptions of the cameralists,
whether essentially sound or not, were at first merely the folklore of homely thrift,
not critical analyses of general economic relations. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the center of social interest was civic, not economic. With this theorem as
our point of departure we are bound to arrive at a revised version of the economic
theories of the period.
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If the purpose of this book were to trace minutely the evolution of cameralism, our
problem would lead back into investigation of generations of men, princes and their
servants, of whom Osse was in many ways typical. Such an inquiry would take us far
beyond the scope of the present study. It would be rather an investigation of the
history of German political institutions in general, especially after the Reformation,
than interpretation of a single quasi-academic factor in that civic development. It
would bring to the center of attention quite different types of evidence from that to
which this argument is restricted. Osse functioned chiefly as an agent of princes at
a time when the territorial sovereignty of the German rulers was still undecided, and
when the administration of German states was in an early formative stage. His
activity as an author was relatively accidental, yet his influence in this character was
incomparably more lasting than in any other. He is cited here, however, rather as a
means of marking the relativity of the writers to be noticed more at length, than as
properly within the bounds of the present survey.
Osse was born in the hamlet of Ossa, near the obscure town of Geithain, in 1506.
He studied law at Leipzig, was “scholarly, conscientious, laborious, gentle and deeply
pious.”
32 He served.for a time in the army; for several years he occupied the chief
lectureship in law at Leipzig; in 1537 he was mentioned by Zarncke as consiliarius
Misnensis; he remained a counselor of Herzog Georg till the death of the latter;
passed to the service of Herzog Moritz, 1541; the same year was released by Moritz
to enter the service of the elector Johann Friedrich, where he remained as chancellor
for six years. There are confusions in dates at this period, but after employment of
uncertain length at Meiningen, Osse was in 1547 made Hofrichter in Leipzig. In 1550
he represented the elector at the Diet of Augsburg. On account of ill health he
withdrew from his judgeship in 1555, and composed the document which is his chief
title to a place in history. He died in 1556.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 34
A more searching inquiry into the personal record of Osse is unnecessary. In spite
of the author’s own usage, and that of his editor Thomasius, which we follow,
Roscher uses the form “Ossa,” corresponding to the acepted spelling of his
birthplace.
It appears further that, in spite of his prestige at Leipzig, Osse was not in full favor
with the Saxon theologians. The complete story of this phase of his career would take
us far afield, in the general culture-history of the period, and we must pass it with a
mere hint. Philipp Melanchthon soundly berated Osse and five other advisers of
Herzog Moritz, and he embellished one of his denunciations with the couplet:
Hiengen die Sechs an einen Strick. Das war Sachsen und Meissen Gliick.
33
The editor, Thomasius, implies that the reputation thus referred to made Osse
uncomfortable at the court of Johann Friedrich, and accounts for his resignation.
Thomasius protests, however, that he can find no adequate ground for Osse’s bad
repute with the elector. While declining to enter into the merits of the case, he
submits this consideration, viz.:
Philipp Melanthon (sic) was no angel himself, and there are proofs enough that not
everything which came from Melancthon as a judgment of other men can be taken
as a divine truth or an infallible gospel.
At bottom, the case against Osse appears to have been that his break with traditional
religious ideas was not as complete as the Lutherans demanded. He was accused of
being still at heart a papist. In commenting upon this charge, Thomasius furnishes the
interesting item that Osse’s copious quotations from the Vulgate, instead of the
Lutheran version, were among the most damaging evidences of his guilt.
We turn directly to the Testament, the document which entitles its author to rank
as a forerunner of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cameralists.
34 It is a
monograph written in the last year of its author’s life, and by command of his prince,
and was intended, both by prince and his emeritus adviser, to serve the purpose for
which Adam Smith later invoked the hypothesis of “the impartial spectator.”
The form in which the document is now most accessible is the edition of Christian
Thomasius, the man who is reputed to have been the first in Germany to introduce
the innovation of academic lectures in the vulgar language. At the time of his
discovery of the document, he was an important factor in the influence of the
University of Halle, of which he is called one of the founders. We shall have
occasion to refer to him again in his proper chronological place. At present we needAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 35
to cite only a few details in which he has thrown light upon Osse.
In the first place, Thomasius says, in the Preface to the document, that he was first
shown the imperfect manuscript, (apparently in 1707) in the Fürstliche Bibliothck at
Wolffen-büttel. He adds that up to that time it was unknown to him, and he had not
even seen the portions that had been printed. Later he bought the full manuscript at
an auction. Thomasius appears to have recognized in Osse a man after his own heart.
Replying to the supposed challenge, Why publish the book of a man about whom so
many suspicions existed? he says (Vorrede, p. 16):
The author is the first of those counselors known to us who gave their opinion as
to the way in which the judicial system is to be improved. The first usually breaks the
ice, and cannot accomplish all, but he leaves the rest to his successors.
The document as we have it occupies, with the editor’s notes, 548 pages. In the
same binding, and filling 264 pages, is Thomasius’ collection of materials on the
history of the University of Leipzig. The title of the collection is Ein kleiner Versitch
von Annalibus. The editing of Osse’s work was in Thomasius’mind a propagandist
measure, and as he regarded improvement of the educational system as the key to the
whole problem, it was appropriate to issue the seemingly unlike documents together.
It appears that Thomasius wanted to publish a treatise on political reform, with
reference both to the Roman and the Canon law. The difficulties proved too great,
and he chose to make Osse’s document the vehicle of some of his ideas. His notes
on the text number 271. The Testament itself contains only 118 sections. Although
the notes are in much smaller type than the text, a rough estimate shows that they fill,
in the aggregate, about one-half the whole space. If we should fully analyze both text
and notes, we should find in them two separate monuments, of two stadia of
development in political philosophy, previous to that marked by the most complete
form of cameralism. For that reason we shall not undertake here a detailed account
either of Osse or of Thoma-sius. Their determining purpose was not identical with
that of cameralism proper. On the whole, they had their center in other groups, with
which this book does not attempt to deal. We may simply note in these two writers
certain germs which must be examined in more developed form in later theorists.
One who knew nothing of the history of the German language, or of its
geographical variations, who assumed that its growth was in a straight line, and who
drew conclusions from literary form alone, would promptly place Osse’s Testament
much later than Obrecht’s Secreta Politica; perhaps even later than Becher. Of courseAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 36
the use of Latin by the side of German in the Obrecht collection strengthens the
impression of age. Osse’s syntax, as well as his vocabulary, approaches closer than
that of either of these writers to modern usage. According to Thomasius’ statement
(Vorrede, p. 33), this is not to be attributed to the editor. He says that he changed
little or nothing in the style, with the single exception of substituting the word oder
in frequent cases for Osse’s word aber. Osse’s own statement of his reason for
writing in German is as follows:
The motives which have moved me to set down my opinions in the German
language, are not for the sake of His Electoral Grace, who, God be praised, was in his
youth thoroughly instructed in the Latin tongue and good arts, but rather the
consideration that this memorial might come to the knowledge of laymen, untaught
in the Latin language, and the desire that they might not be hindered in reading it by
the intermixture of many Latin words.
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Osse begins the Testament with a paragraph which we translate as closely as
possible:
It is among all wise people beyond dispute, that every magistracy (Obrigkeit) may
prove and make evident its virtue and aptitude in two ways. First, in time of war,
through manly deeds, good sagacious projects, and protection of their lands and
subjects, second, in time of peace, through ordering and maintaining of good godly
righteous government, judiciary, and Policey.
36 For with these two every magistracy
should necessarily be adorned and supplied, in order that in every time of war and
peace they (sic) may be able well to govern, protect, control and defend their own.
Osse then enlarges briefly upon the duties which belong to the ruler in time of war;
but he dismisses this side of the case as beyond his competence. As to the other class
of duties, he continues (p. 33):
As to what concerns the government in times of peace, I will write,
as much as God vouchsafes me grace, for He is the ground on which
all must be built which is good, and wherever such ground is lacking
there follows no permanent building.
The author promises to set down truly all that he has observed in the service of five
electors of Saxony, the fifth then living. He frequently repeats that he is doing this
not of his own motion, but at the command of the elector. We may safely assume thatAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 37
the passage immediately following represents Osse’s fundamental opinions as well
as they could be pictured. He says (p. 33):
Such a command I am not at liberty to disregard, and for this reason
I lay down first of all the following ground. All that I hereafter write
will be built upon it. It must also be observed with special diligence.
Government over men is such a high, precious and wonderful thing, that no human
being, no matter how excellent in understanding, reason and wit, is to be intrusted
with exercising it according to his own will, caprice and opinion, for such
government is a higher thing than that the exercise of it could belong to one over
others who by nature are of one origin with him, which same may be known from all
races of animals, since a flock of sheep does not allow itself to be ruled by a sheep,
nor a drove of horses or cattle by one of their own kind, but rather for such
government something else is necessary, which is higher and better than the other
beasts. Now man, who in many ways surpasses the other animals, for the like reason,
since man must be governed, he must be governed by something higher and more
excellent than man himself, if the government is to be stable. Since now nothing
more excellent can be found in this world than man .... who is yet fallible, and has
much in common with the beasts, .... and even in case a man were found who could
be moved from the right by no irregular affections, he would be subject to mortality,
and no one would know what would happen with his successors, therefore almighty
God, out of special grace to human kind, has ordained the means of the common
written law [der ordentlichen beschriebenen Recht und Gesetze] whereby to keep the
temper of magistrates and judges in the right way, in order that the same may govern
others and render justice without any hindrance of inordinate inclinations and
affections, and when one considers the usefulness of such a divinely given means,
one finds that this ordination of rights and laws is one of the highest benefits and gifts
with which God has blessed men here in this life, for such laws and rights were in the
beginning ordained by wise honorable people after necessary consideration, not from
friendship, love or hate, but in general without all inordinate affections and
inclinations. .... When now such common right and law is ordained, even if those
who act contrary to it are punished in accordance with it, .... no one has occasion for
complaint, but everyone is satisfied, since we know that justice has been done to oneAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 38
as well as to another, and that so impatience and uproar of the subjects is avoided.
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A little later (p. 37) the conclusion is drawn still more distinctly:
Hence follows that it is a human duty to hold the common rights and
laws in honor, to esteem them high, and to subject oneself to them
with patience, as the means whereby common peace, repose and
welfare are maintained. And that also the established magistracy is
under obligation to protect such right and law, to enforce it and to
govern according to it, not oppressing anyone by acting contrary to it.
For there can be no doubt that as the powers that be are ordained of
God (Ad. Rom. 13) likewise also human rights and laws by the
powers that be, so that they flow from the providence and special
destiny of almighty God. .... Accordingly everyone should remember
that if he disobeys the magistrate and escapes punishment, yet he is
not assured of escaping the punishment of almighty God.
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At the opening of the second part, Osse says that, in order rightly to understand his
reflections as a whole, it is necessary to read what he has said in the first part about
all Christian governments. As to electoral Saxony in particular, he adds, it has been
the object of special divine favor. He specifies as a fundamental blessing, that the
government is not elective but hereditary, and exclusively in the male line.
39 The
consequence is (p. 204) that the best people in the country are retained in the service
of the court, and the good customs and laws continue undisturbed. The country has
therefore grown in power, resources, public buildings, and otherwise. Then follows
this passage:
And since every government in temporal affairs is of two parts [auf
zweyerley stehet], namely government (sic) and Policey, and then the
judiciary and justice, it is in order that the aforenamed land in this
respect also should be blessed of God before many other lands. For,
in the first place, as respects the government, “hochermeldeter
Churfürst” ordered his court with many dignified people, with counts,
nobles, doctors, etc., who hear the causes presented, reflect upon
these matters, weigh and consult, and with timely advice render trueAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 39
and right decisions. “Seine Churfürsft. Gn.” has also filled the civic
offices with functionaries, with orders that each shall receive what is
due, and that justice shall always be rendered to the subjects. For in
this country, God be praised, domestic peace is maintained, and many
wholesome publications appear against oppression and irregular
administration. Moreover, in this land there is a good and proper
coinage, whereby the people are impelled to trade with one another
in all the things which they need, whereby the revenues of the prince
from commerce increase [Zöll und Geleit], etc. .... For where there is
good coinage there is much trade, and where is much trade and people
.... the land in general has improvement and prosperity, etc.
This passage may be used as a way mark. In the German states at the middle of the
sixteenth century, there were officials and administration enough, but measured by
the cameralism of the middle of the eighteenth century the officials were
unorganized, and the administration unspecialized and unsystem-atized. Men of
Osse’s time were in contact with rudiments of all the governmental activities which
have developed since, but these were relatively inchoate and confused. We have
distinctly disclaimed the purpose of venturing into study of the evolution of
cameralism, either theoretical or applied. Our composite picture of the academic side
of it merely draws in a few lines from this embryonic period.
Osse enumerates as another blessing of the country the founding of “drey Fürsten-
Schulen, als Meissen, Pforten, Grimma,
40 und zwo treffentliche Universitäten und
hohe Schulen.”
41 The author refers to these schools as particularly to prepare men for
official positions and to give them training in legal knowledge. Thomasius comments
to the effect that the papacy was influential enough largely to nullify the benefits of
these foundations. Then mention is made of the two Hoffgerichte held by the elector,
the one at Leipzig, the other at Wittenberg, and the Schöppen are also praised as
beneficent institutions,
42 and besides the other higher and lower courts held by
prelates and nobles on their estates, there are many hundred Land-Gerichte, “so that,
by the grace of God a praiseworthy justice is present in these lands.” Moreover the
country possesses a specially fine Policey,
43 and all affairs are arranged in good order,
and we meet fine, courteous, affable persons in all stations.
44 In addition many natural
and acquired advantages are enumerated which contribute to the happiness of theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 40
country.
Yet in spite of all these blessings, the author finds that it is possible for abuses to
creep in. He finds this danger first in the administration of justice. His earliest
attention is given then to the means of avoiding these evils. The caution with which
he approaches the subject is again outspoken in protestations of obedience to the
command of the prince; and the author refers besides to the demands of the common
welfare (gemeinen Nutz) of all classes in the country, and of many surrounding
countries, as justifying attempts at improvement, in spite of the opposition of those
whose selfish interests are on the side of things as they are.
Osse finds the root of all the difficulties which he has in mind, in the lack of
properly taught and trained men to take the places of responsibility in the state. This
fundamental opinion accounts for the extent to which his argument turns upon
improvement in the universities. He recurs to the three reasons which he had assigned
in sees. XCIV–XCVI of Part I, for unsatisfactory conditions in public life, viz.: (a)
defective training of children, (b) omission to admit young men to the councils of
their elders, (c) frequent changes in office, and he adds a fourth, viz., favoritism to
relatives and friends. This excludes men of more talent from public careers, or from
the places which they would be more competent to fill. The first means suggested for
correcting the evil is a system of secret representatives of the prince at the
universities. Their duty should be to pick out young men of promise, and to
recommend them for appointments. Thereupon follow all the propositions for the
improvement of schools and universities. With respect to the latter, Osse restricts
himself almost exclusively to the “arme betrübte und fast gefallene Universität
Leipzig,” because he professes ignorance of the facts at Wittenberg (pp. 258 ff.). As
a source of information about conditions within and around the University of Leipzig
at the middle of the sixteenth century the succeeding chapters are highly important.
In this connection Thomasius’ Appendix of 264 pages must again be mentioned.
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As will appear however when the systematic cameralists are before us, the principal
questions around which cameralistic theory was built up had not yet risen upon
Osse’s horizon. His document is useful for our purpose merely as a picture of
undifferentiated confusion, with which to compare the highly articulated system of
two centuries later. The Table of Contents is worth consideration. The titles of
chapters must be understood to stand for a series of indictments of everything which
might be classed under those heads at Leipzig, and enough evidence appears to createAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 41
a prima-facie case in favor of the author’s substantial correctness. Here then was a
single group of symptoms which impressed men of Osse’s type as calling for
correction. In later chapters the reasons will appear why we must be content with a
bare reference to this earlier type of social theory.
This first chapter on the specific subject of justice (chap, xiv) is a fine and typical
specimen not merely of Osse’s style, but of the moral valuations which were current
among the more academic thinkers. The contrast between the objective facts of
institutions and conduct on the one hand, and frequent and almost proverbial
formulations of abstract moral standards on the other, is perhaps nowhere more
evident than in this period. We may simply record in passing that citations might
easily be made from the literature of this period, which would compare favorably in
moral import with generalizations of the same order in any subsequent generation.
The essential demands upon justice, as presented in this chapter, are that it shall be
(1) unpartisan, (2) impersonal, (3) incorruptible.
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To this particular chapter on justice Thomasius adds a long note (p. 435) to this
effect:
The author has, to be sure, said much that is good and useful about
justice. He has however forgotten the best and most necessary,
namely, that for good and righteous justice it is necessary that the
same shall be administered as promptly as possible, and that justice
shall not be tediously suspended.
In fact, Osse expresses himself with sufficient clearness on this point in the seventh
and eighth sections of the same chapter.
Then follows an account of the evils actually existing in the Saxon courts, and
suggestions for their correction. The same general scheme is followed in the
succeeding chapters in the division on justice. Distinguishing the chapter on Policey
from the latter for purposes of emphasis, and because the subject occupies such a
unique position in the cameralistic period, we must give our attention to the editor,
although, as we have intimated, he ought not properly to be considered in the series
of writers with whom we are chiefly concerned, and although the chronological order
is disarranged by attention to him here. Osse begins the chapter on Policey with a
remark to this effect: Aristotle and the greater part of the ancient wise men have heldAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 42
that a good Policey of a land or a city requires four “pieces,” viz., “Princeps,”
“Concilium,” “Praelorium,” and “Populus.” These the author translates, “a ruler or
overlord; good wise counsel; unpartisan, good judicature, and a pious obedient
people.”
47 As in the case of an earlier reference to Policey, Thomasius at once takes
the cue, and his note is an important symptom. Beginning with bibliographical
references which form one of the lines of evidence by which we trace the influence
of authors to be discussed later,
48 Thomasius continues (p. 500):
This very year there appeared at Franckfurth am Mayn a book entitled Entwurff
einer wohleingerichteten Policey. It contains seven sheets. The author, who does not
give his name, assumes that the flourishing condition of the financial system of a
state must rest upon four chief pillars, namely Policey, fiscus, commerce, and
taxation. The Policey has to do with the internal and external condition (Verfassung)
of the state.
49 The internal condition consists in part of a vigorous society, namely,
(1) in a vigorous growth of the inhabitants, partly in a joyous life, both of the soul,
namely, (2) in a religious worship, (3) in virtuous conduct, and (4) praiseworthy
education; and of the body, in its sustenance, and satisfaction, through (5) abundance
of necessary, useful, and superfluous means-of-life, (6) robust health, and (7)
peaceful security. The external condition consists (8) in the good order of people,
things, and places, and (9) in a convenient ornamentation of city and country. On the
contrary, every state is disintegrated and disordered through (1) decline of population,
(2) disregard of religion, (3) vicious life, (4) neglect of education, (5) lack of
sustenance and increase of the pauper class, (6) epidemics and plagues, (7)
turbulence, revolts, and private quarrels, (8) irregular confusion of social strata,
affairs, and places, (9) uncultivated lands and badly ordered towns. For promotion
of the different kinds of good works, and removal of the evil, the author proposes in
general the establishment of a Policey bureau, the members of which should be
charged with (1) giving their earnest attention to the above points, (2) averting
harmful occurrences, (3) controlling disorder, or (4) bringing complaints before the
proper tribunals, (5) maintaining reliable watchmen and detectives, (6) conducting
unexpected visitations and inquisitions, (7) keeping a watchful eye on peaceful
persons, things, and places in the state, (8) to that end drawing useful ordinances
relating to persons and things, (9) responsibility for observance of the same.
Thereupon the author enlarges upon each of these nine points of good Policey,
especially upon the population, religion, virtuous conduct, good kinds of education,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 43
riches, health, security, order and adornment of a state, especially upon the means of
securing these things, and of avoiding the opposite. Now the author deserves praise,
in the first place [continues Thomasius], for attempting to treat of political things in
a brief and very well-connected and rather clear didactic fashion, in contrast with the
condition of which I have so often complained, viz., that there has been scarcely an
attempt in universities at such pedagogy in political things. Indeed everyone who
reads this writing will find in it much whose truth he will comprehend, and the
introduction or abolition of which he will agree with the author in finding highly
desirable for the state. He will accordingly be pleased that in a few hours’ reading he
has learned from the author more well-connected truths than if he had spent two years
with political works written according to the Aristotelian method. ....
Thomasius then refers to a second monograph of the same author, another tract also
published by him this year, viz., Politische Gedanken, welcher gestalt Monarchen
und Könige, Republiquen und Fürsten, nebst ihren Reichen, Ländern und
Unterthanen, durch eine leichte methode mächlig und reich seyn oder werden
können; and he continues:
In this connection much remains to be said in order to make such a
tract complete. I will attempt, however, to mention only the principal
things, as suggested by this brief introduction, (1) It is to be wished
that the author had explained somewhat more clearly how the Policey
system should be distinguished from the fiscal, commercial and
taxing systems. He observes at the outset, to be sure, that the fiscal
system should deal with the Oeconomie
50 of the country and the
domains of sovereigns; the commercial systems with trade and
business [Handel und Wandel], with the appertaining occupations and
professions; the taxing system with the arrangements for contribution
to the state, and he promises to expand his thoughts upon these three
neighboring pillars. After he thereupon announces, however, that the
Policey has charge of the internal and external condition [Verfassung]
of a state, one is not without reason for the opinion that, because the
fiscal, commercial and taxing systems also belong to the internal or
external condition of the state, these three pieces must also be
counted as parts of the Policey system. And if one should say that theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 44
Policey system is here understood in a restricted sense, namely, so far
as the same takes account of the well-being [Wohlseyn] of the
subjects, since on the other hand the fiscal and taxing systems aim at
the well-being of the rulers, this difference might have been
announced at once without circumlocution by the author, but on the
other hand it would then not be clear how the commercial system is
distinguished from the Policey system, especially as everyone
understands that the same belongs to the fifth chapter, and the author
also there recommends the commercial system as a necessary part of
the same. (2) It is very serious that the author regards all these four
pillars not as the ground of a peaceful and virtuously reasonable state,
but as a ground of the increasingly prosperous fiscal system, and that
at the beginning of the second tract he lays down this rule as a basis:
“All considerable rulers must attend to their sole ultimate purpose
[eintzigen Endzweck] and highest interest, viz., to become powerful
and (supplying from the title the words carefully omitted in this
passage) rich.”
51 For although in the present tract he chatters about
religion and virtue, it is on the other hand very suspicious when, at
the beginning of the second chapter (p. 18), he announces that he will
not inquire whether religion is an invention of the clergy and
statesmen, who introduced it for spiritual or secular purposes, but it
will be enough that the same furnished the chief foundation of a state.
In the same spirit (on p. 5), in reciting the satisfactions of the body he
places riches first, and gives precedence to the same not only over
health but also over peaceful security. Indeed, in chapter i, §6, p. 9,
he recommends polygamy as a serviceable means of increasing the
population. Again he refers to regulation and limitation only of
houses of prostitution, where they are to be tolerated for reasons of
state, etc., etc. Who the author is, I will not disclose, although I
discovered his identity a short time after I had read his two tracts and
had made these notes. Meanwhile he has sufficiently betrayed himself
when, in the tract, How Great Lords May Become Rich (p. 11), he
cites a Discurs published by his father in 1655. ....Albion Small, The Cameralists, 45
It is evident that after writing note 105 above referred to (p. 30) Thomasius saw a
great light, partly through the eyes of this unnamed writer, on the place of Policey in
the administrative system. So much of the note is quoted, however, not primarily for
its connection with Thomasius, but because the resume of the document will be
useful for comparison later. At the same time a few sentences should be added from
the paragraph in Osse to which Thomasius’ note is appended. They continue his
reference to the different divisions of administration. Osse says:
Everything should be directed toward keeping these four parts in good condition,
if one is to maintain a good Policey, for a lord and ruler is in three respects under
obligations to the people divinely intrusted to him; namely, that he should maintain
the same in good prosperous circumstances, which occurs when the people [das
Volck] lives virtuously, and some among them are promoted to learning, and to good
arts, and many wise and learned people are in their number, from whom the rest may
receive good instruction, and they are not left to wander in the darkness of ignorance,
and everything through which such promotion of things useful to the community is
hindered is either prevented or averted by the ruler.
The foregoing is of firstrate importance when we generalize the civic assumptions
of the cameralists.
It is to be noted that Osse could say, “Praise God, this land is already provided with
an honorable, good, and praiseworthy Policey” (p. 506).
52 He could offer only certain
very cautious and vague suggestions about details. For instance, he calls attention to
conflicts of interests between rural and urban populations, which tended to injustice
toward the former, through the tendency to concentrate certain rural occupations,
such as brewing, in the towns (p. 509). Thomasius comments on the justice of his
position, in spite of the foolishness of the grounds on which it is based, viz., that in
Roman law trade was prohibited to the nobility. Again, Osse denounces the
inhumanity of many of the nobility toward the widows and orphans of their
dependents, and calls upon the elector to appoint a supervisor to act as a guardian of
such dependent persons, and to secure their rights against conscienceless nobles. In
the third place, he urges upon the elector correction of practice in the criminal courts,
and especially prevention of illegal resort to torture. Increase of the amount of light
and air in prisons; certain sumptuary reforms, on the ultimate ground (p. 516) that
luxury drains money from the country; attempts to prevent rise in the price of meat;
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all the further changes which Osse was able to recommend.
The Testament proper closes with these considerations. An appendix of seventeen
pages, including the editor’s notes, is added, with the title, Additio Gemeine des Heil.
Reichs Wohlfarth belangende. It replies to the hypothetical question, Supposing the
conduct advised in the Testament were strictly adopted in Saxony, would it not all
be in vain, because of the disorder in the Holy Roman Empire at large? The unhappy
condition of the Empire was attributed by Osse to three causes: (1) the religious
quarrels, (2) the weakening of the judicial authority of the Empire, (3) disregard of
Landfrieden within the Empire. In discussing the situation he puts the emphasis
almost entirely on the first point. The whole matter is primarily political in another
sense from that in which the came-ralists are to be considered, and it is not therefore
material to our inquiry.
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Although Thomasius’ Versuch von Annalibus is not directly germane to our
purpose, its presence in the same volume with the Testament is excuse for alluding
to it again. It is professedly an attempt to stimulate the neglected study of history. It
is a collection of data principally concerning education in Saxony. It covers the
period 1409–1629. To the student of Saxon history, and especially of the University
of Leipzig, it would be an extremely valuable secondary source.		
The only writer whom it is necessary to mention between Osse and Obrecht is
Georg Engelhard von Lohneyss (sometimes written Lohneis, Lohneissen, etc.).
Although his name frequently occurs in the cameralistic books, there is no reason to
regard him as an important contributor to cameralistic science. Thomasius (Vorrede
zum Testament, p. 25) intimates that Lohneyss borrowed much without credit from
Osse. I have been unable to obtain any of his writings. Inama says of him:
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He was of an aristocratic Palatine family. He was first Master of the Horse at the
court of Elector August of Saxony. In 1583 he entered the service of Heinrich Julius
of Braunschweig-Wolfen-büttel, first as Stallmeister, then as Berghauptmann. At
both courts he had rare opportunities for training in the practical administrative
technique of the time. Each court was supposed to have a model administrative
system. August was an eminent and tireless administrator, Heinrich Julius the best
trained jurist among contemporary rulers. At the same time these courts were noted
for their display. From his purchased estates Lohneyss bore the title “Erbherr in
Remlingen und Xeundorf.” For a while he had his own printing establishment,
particularly to secure proper publication of his own writings. His three chief works
were printed here.
55 The latter part of his life is without traces in the confusion of the
Thirty Years’ War. His printing establishment and the stock of his books were
destroyed in the course of that struggle. Seckendorff, in his Vorrede, praised the Hof-
Staat- und Regierungskunst; yet like the rest of the author’s writings it has no special
scientific weight. Still his chief cameralistic work stands, in riches of content and
enlightened judgment, as well as practical insight, far above the mass of theoretical
political products, and forms an immediate preparation for the flourishing period of
German cameralistics inaugurated by Seckendorff’s Teutscher Fürstenstaat.
The biography of Georg Obrecht is best epitomized in Eisenhart’s sketch:
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Obrecht was born in Strassburg in 1547, and died in the same city in
1612. As a young man he studied in Paris. After escaping the
massacre of St. Bartholomew, which cost the loss of his library, he
went to Basel and obtained there the degree of Doctor of Laws in
1574. In 1575 he was made Professor of Law in Strassburg, and he
retained the position to the end of his life. As the fleeting glory of
Wittenberg began to fade, Strassburg assumed the spiritual leadership
of Protestant Germany. Along with Giffen and Gotho-fredus, it was
chiefly Obrecht who founded the fame of the Strassburg academy. He
held various offices and dignities besides his professorship. In 1604
he was made a noble of the empire, and in 1609 he received the title
of Palgrave.
For the purposes of this book Obrecht is important as the author of a single
volume.
57 The chief significance of the five monographs which make up the volume
is disclosed at once in the Preface by the author’s son, Joannes Thomas Obrecht (“J.
C. et Comes Palatinus Caesareus”). As editor he gives an account of the origin and
purpose of the different monographs. Attention is piqued at once by the statement,
“I printed the book at my own expense, and secretly.”
58 According to the editor’s
explanation, the essays are the outgrowth and development of a central purpose,
which is stated in connection with the account of the first document. In a word, the
wars with the Turks had made the question of money to pay expenses importunate.
In the year 1590 Obrecht Sr. had publicly discussed certain theses de principijs belli.
In that discussion he had maintained, among other things, that in order to carry on
successful war, and to defend their lands, governments (Obrigkeiten) must be
provided with an abundance of money (mit einem starcken Gelt Nervo). He had also
announced that he would be ready, on a more favorable occasion, to go into detail as
to the ways in which this Nervus belli might be obtained “through Christian,
righteous, and proper means.”
A single remark of a relatively obscure writer would be of little weight in
supporting a general hypothesis. If there were any doubt that this problem of ways
and means for the maintenance of military operations was desperate in every German
state, it would be necessary to set down this item for what it is worth, and to go into
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done so fully, however, by German historians that no question remains about the
main facts. Our problem is to interpret the phenomena of cameralism as one of the
outgrowths of the times in which these facts existed. Here then was a single theorist.
He confronted a situation which vexed all types of men theoretically or practically
concerned with questions of civic polity in Germany. The key to the situation, as he
saw it, was the need of more money to strengthen the state for war, in particular, as
well as for other purposes. With this as his clue, he reasoned to the best of his ability,
and the result was a scheme, on paper, which may fairly be called a respectable first
draft of a programme which was later worked out in detail, and quite in the same
spirit, by the cameralists. Without prejudging the theories of later writers, and
without generalizing at this point about the extent to which the object of subsequent
thinkers was identical with that of Obrecht, we must define his purpose clearly, and
make it the explanation of his proposals. In a word, he wanted to show how civic
authorities might solve their most importunate problem of commanding the sinews
of war, and of providing for the more ordinary expenses of government. His whole
discussion centers about this theme.
The son does not tell why it was thought necessary to keep the monographs secret.
Apparently the essential reason was that such subjects were thought to be matters for
the rulers and the learned alone, and that either the monographs themselves were not
sufficiently matured for publication, or that no public existed, outside of a select
circle, intelligent or responsible enough to profit by reading them. So far as evidence
appears in the volume itself, Obrecht’s theories contained nothing calculated to
arouse governmental hostility. At the worst they might be regarded as well intended
but visionary.
On the contrary, as the editor further states, Rudolf II called for Obrerht’s opinion
on the fiscal problem, and he accordingly wrote the first monograph. This document
contains 59 pages, with an index of 6 pages, and is chiefly in Latin.
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It is not clear whether the editor means to imply that his father’s further opinion was
demanded from high quarters, or whether the above occasion spurred him to further
study. At all events the account continues to the effect that Obrecht diligently
searched the Politicorum scripta, so far as they were available, and tested them by
the Word of God, in order to learn which doctrines were to be rejected, and which,
as precious pearl and gems, should be loyally retained, and by the grace of God so set
forth and applied that no one could have a grievance against them. The outcome ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 50
this study was the second monograph.
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Of this Bedencken the editor affirms that it was calculated to inspire confidence,
both in rulers and subjects, on the one hand that the proposed means would be
sufficient, and on the other hand that the demands of the government would not be
unreasonable.
Obrecht, however, did not fully trust his own judgment about such important
matters. He did not venture to call the proposal complete until he had consulted,
either in person or in correspondence, during several years, “under pledge of silence,”
eminent theologians, “and highly experienced statesmen.” With this assistance the
Discurs was finished in 1609.
61 The third document in the series is in form an
independent monograph, but the editor says it was drawn from the Bedencken and
was intended to show more plainly how the ideas in the former treatise could be
applied. It was finished in 1610. It contains 46 pages.
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Having gone sp far in his studies, Obrecht discovered that something more was
necessary. He concluded that the entire life of sovereigns and subjects must be
conducted in accordance with the dictates of thrift and morality, or the means would
still be lacking to provide the necessary revenues. Accordingly he harked back to
Roman exploitation of “Censum el Censuram,” and he elaborated a scheme of
Policey,  partly prompted by his conception of the Roman system, partly appropriating
contemporary police arrangements, and partly a speculative proposal. The significant
point is that the animus of the whole undertaking was the proposal to devise means
by which adequate revenues might be assured to the state. At the same time, and this
is a trait that runs through the whole cameralistic regime, the total morale of the
people was to be improved, primarily to be sure for state purposes, but none the less
improvement of the physical, mental, and moral life conditions of all the people was
an avowed and prominent part of the programme. It was not stated by the cameralists
(Justi possibly excepted) as an end-end. It was emphasized with cumulative
insistence as a means-end, and this factor became one of the distinguishing elements
in German polity.
63 The fifth and last document or “secretum” in the series is referred
to as the Aerarium Liberorum. Ostensibly it was a plan of savings and endowment
insurance for children. The author avows quite frankly, however, that in essence it
is a detail in his fiscal scheme. In a word, parents were to lay by, in the hands of the
government, certain regular amounts, to receive interest at 6 per cent., and to be paid
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died before reaching the specified age, both principal and interest should belong to
the government. Since, however, this forfeiture would occur only in consequence of
“a special dispensation of God,” the editor seriously argues that the scheme, for
which he might have quoted Italian precedents, ought not to be considered
inequitable, but rather on the whole as favorable to parents as to the government.
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Beyond this general analysis of the book, our purpose calls merely for a few notes
about incidentals in its contents. Considering the volume then as an exhibit of a
coherent scheme of fiscal administration, we may abstract certain items of evidence
bearing upon tendencies in fundamental political theory which the scheme exhibits.
After a brief address to the emperor, the chapter “Billico-Politicus” opens the
discussion with a highly pedantic introduction upon the topic: Quae ad
Constitutionem Belli Turcici necessaria sint. This is like stopping when the house is
afire, to settle the metaphysical question, What is necessary to constitute a house
afire? The author nevertheless gravely enumerates as the elements in the situation:
“Jus; Summus Magistrates; Hostes; Justa Causa; et Legitima Belli Susceptio.” In ten
pages these implications are expanded, and through brief discussion of the “mature
deliberation” which must precede war, the way is paved for the actual problem of the
tract, viz., enumeration of all available sources of revenue. Without entering into any
of the technical details scheduled, we may notice that the sources of revenue named
are classed under two general heads: first, those which impose a burden upon the
persons supplying the revenue; second, those that impose no burden.
65 This
distinction often reappears in the cameralistic books. In general it does not
correspond with the ideas which would be attached to the terms today. A
“burdensome” tax was one which impaired the citizen’s means of maintaining his
standard of life. A “non-burdensome” tax was one which left the means of livelihood
intact, but might theoretically absorb all increments of profit.
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A single observation will suffice in connection with the second class of resources.
The author names first among the fiscal means which impose no burden upon the
persons who supply the revenue, “bona oikonomia.” In the text he uses the Greek
form {	

}. He explains that he means by it good administration in general.
That is, all functionaries are to exhibit fidelity and diligence, they are not to incur
needless expenses, they are to exercise frugality and parsimony, and thus to have in
hand the means with which to meet unforeseen demands. This observation is
necessary, because a cardinal datum for interpretation of the cameralists is that theyAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 52
did not have the idea, and consequently did not have a word for “economics” in the
sense attached to that term in nineteenth-century English usage. In this early instance,
“bona oikonomia” evidently contained the rudiments, but only the rudiments, of the
concept later represented by such a term as Staats-haushaltung. In the second half of
the eighteenth century, as we shall see, the Greek term was often reserved for
agricultural management only. In the intermediate period its meaning was unprecise.
Our concern at this point is merely to indicate the inchoate condition of the stage of
administrative theory represented by Obrecht, and in particular to put on record this
early use of a term which, in translations into English, has been the innocent occasion
of cardinal misjudgments of essential factors in the development of German social
theories.
The remaining titles in the monograph refer to details of the fiscal resources of the
time which yield nothing for our purpose.
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The second document opens with a series of specifications which picture most
vividly the desperate financial straits of contemporary German rulers, from the
emperor down to the minor princes. Incidentally the author furnishes cumulative
evidence that the “biological analogy” was as serviceable a working tool for him as
for some of the nineteenth-century sociologists.
68 The exhibit and the estimate of
money as the vital force of governments lead to succinct statement of the purpose of
the pamphlet, viz., to call the attention of rulers and governors to the necessity of
diligent reflection abopt these things, and of adopting the means to be proposed, or
better ones, in the interest of themselves and their subjects. The terms in which the
author further urges these claims first reflect very plainly the inchoate,
undifferentiated, and unorganized stage of civic administration in German states, and
secondly, they contain a touch which marks an early form of a moral consideration
not at that time very effective, but later of co-ordinate rank with the requirements for
offensive and defensive strength against external enemies. In a word Obrecht argues
that without money properly to pay civil employees, rulers cannot protect the people
against the injustices of their own servants. He observes in this connection that
“although there are to be sure many magistri, as Bodinus calls them,” who are always
well equipped with means of raising money, yet usually these means tend not merely
to burden the subjects but completely to strip them. No one appears to point out
means which would be just and lucrative, and at the same time serviceable for all
sorts of improvement. He proposes, therefore, to present a scheme which wouldAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 53
satisfy these requirements.
The body of the essay is divided on the lines drawn in the previous paper, viz., first,
means for raising revenues by burdening the subjects; second, means which would
not burden the subjects. This whole range of governmental problems is put under the
head, “Oeconomica administratio.” In general the scheme is merely an amplification
of ideas contained in the earlier essay. The specific propositions do not concern us,
but the conditions which were to be met and the status of reasoning about them may
be somewhat more approximately understood by reference to the titles of chapters.
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If this were a history of administrative technique, or of administrative technology,
Obrecht’s book would furnish many details which would mark a stage in the process.
As we are in search of the fundamental conceptions and ultimate purposes of
cameralism, these details are interesting only in so far as they bear testimony about
those conceptions and purposes. Not because they immediately yield much
information on these points, but for use later in connection with other evidence, we
may note a few items of more than merely administrative significance.
In the first place, Obrecht seems to have understood in a general way the impolicy
of debasing the coinage. Thus he says (p. 108):
That today certain mammon brothers, in search of selfish gain, seek
all sorts of private advantage with the different coins, that they
diminish and weaken the same in weight and value [Schrott und
Korn] is directly contrary to all laws, also to various edicts of the
Holy Empire with respect to coinage, and brings with it beyond all
doubt the curse of God and temporal punishment.
In the second place, Obrecht represents a stage and type of political thinking in
which the traditional taboo of commerce and trade as pursuits for members of the
nobility began to be called in question. Thus, after citing a number of opinions on the
conventional side, he asserts (p. 111):
I however regard commerce as in a way necessary for a republic; and
so necessary, indeed, that it cannot be separated from the body of the
republic. For merchants are in the body of the republic, as it were,
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honorable than despicable when noble and high persons cairy on trade
for the sake of lightening the burdens of their subjects, and of
discharging public obligations with the least difficulty.
To this item should be added a later passage, viz. (p. 122);
A ruler and overlord should make it an object of diligent attention
that in his towns and country regions, so far as opportunity allows, all
sorts of traders should be located. For the traders not only bring into
the country all sorts of necessary wares, at their own cost and risk, but
they also draw out of the country those wares of which the country
has a superabundance. .... But a ruler should look out for the
following four points: I, that the merchants should carry on no
forbidden traffic, nor should they bring forbidden wares into the
country, nor carry them out to forbidden places; II, that no scarcity,
nor hindrance of the subjects in disposing of their wares, should be
brought about by the merchants; III, that they should make no harmful
and usurious bargains but their transactions should all tend to the
common advantage, and not to the injury of their neighbors; IV, that
the merchants should be protected against all unjust violence, for this
is to the advantage not only of the merchants themselves, but of the
subjects in general.
In the third place, Obrecht schedules encouragement of navigation as a means of
enlarging a state’s revenues. He seems to have no suspicion of questions about
“balance of trade,” but pleads artlessly for “provision of vessels that may bring all
sorts of goods and wares from foreign ports, that the same may be sold again.”
Fourthly, he proposes advances from the princely chest, to merchants who bring in
foreign goods. The chief reason for this proposal seems to be that the interest on the
advances would be a considerable source of profit to the prince.
Fifth, Obrecht recommends purchase by government of certain food stuffs, wine,
etc., to be held as a resource against possible scarcity prices, and then to be sold at
reasonable rates, to the advantage both of government and subjects.
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dangers from improper combinations of hand-workers are suggested, and severe
punishments for misusing such organization are recommended. In connection with
the advice that, to promote trade and crafts, fairs and markets should be arranged, a
bare hint of the later population doctrine appears, viz. (p. 127):
And it is beyond all doubt that when all the above is set in operation
with zeal, it will be to the advantage of rulers and overlords in this
respect further, that they will have more populous and better
appointed towns and territories, and that in consequence the various
revenues will be strongly increased and improved.
Disapproval of debts to foreigners, which later became a cameralistic dogma,
appears here as a mild preference: thus (p. 129):
If a ruler is burdened with many and heavy foreign interest charges ....
it is advisable that he raise the amount from his subjects who have
loanable money, and pay the interest to them rather than to foreigners,
for in this way expenses and losses may be avoided.
The first paragraph of the chapter, “Constitutio Aerarij Sancti,” furnishes another
direct testimony, the stronger because it was inadvertent, as to the central purpose
which was molding administrative theory and policy. It is a passage which distinctly
locates the moving springs of cameralism. Translated according to the spirit rather
than the letter it is as follows:
Since it is known to all of good understanding, and an open secret,
and attested by daily experience, that in these last troublous times
there is scarcely a government whose ordinary resources are not daily
and hourly exhausted, and therefore scarcely one can at all times be
happily administered and maintained in constant security by means
of the ordinary revenues; but on the contrary unless by the side of
these customary revenues a government institutes, with the utmost
care, through all sorts of just and righteous means, a special and
extraordinary treasury, such a government and Policey, at a time ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 56
unforeseen war, revolts, and other dangers, will stand unprotected and
open to pillage and enemies, and in the presence of such danger and
violence it can neither be protected nor administered. And although
by extraordinary efforts under such circumstances money may be
raised, yet if the money is collected, and the imminent danger is
averted, yet another danger immediately follows, namely, that the
growing burden of interest charges will ruin the state, as was the case
with the Greek republics, and especially Lacedaemonia, which were
ruined by borrowing from the Persian and Egyptian kings. Hence it
is necessary to show how these dangers may be overcome by an
extraordinary treasury.
As we shall attempt to show, this problem of ways and means to cover the
expanding fiscal needs of the state was the central purpose which gave peculiar
character to cameralism. All the incidental tenets of this technology, whether they
were the opinions of exceptional writers or substantially the consensus of all, must
be interpreted by their connection with this main interest.
This particular Constitutio is partly in the form of an ordinance to be promulgated
by rulers: partly in the ordinary essay form on the merits of certain fiscal
propositions. It contains nothing further in principle necessary for our purpose.
In the fourth document, Policey Ordnung, Obrecht displays foresight which entitles
him to higher rank in the rolls of German political writers than the historians of his
own country have assigned. In general, subsequent events conformed to his views,
and the Policey system afterward developed, to which we must give so much
attention in later portions of this book, was entirely contained in principle in his
proposals. Without attempting to prove this in detail, we may briefly note the
standpoint from which his suggestions issued and the aims which he had in view.
In the Introduction the author points out that all publicists have had regard for two
considerations, and have urged them upon magistrates, viz., first, the census and
censorship, “the fulcra and pillars of politics, and the supports on which all Policey
must rest;” second, “reliable information and sufficient science possessed by every
magistrate concerning the structure and organization of the Policey.”
As to the first of these points, Obrecht states that existing administration makes use
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possible the forms in use should be altogether abolished, and more adequate systems
substituted. He concedes that such abrupt change would be impracticable, and in the
case of the census particularly recommends that the methods now in use be retained.
With reference to the censorship, however, he declares that its policy may be
essentially either preventive or punitive. Just here Obrecht’s foresight is exceptional.
He declares that police programmes of his time know nothing of preventive policies.
The chief emphasis of the document falls therefore on the outline of a police policy
calculated to improve the morale of the people, and thus not merely to diminish vice
and crime, but to raise the general efficiency of the population. Without asking the
question here whether this is a proper function of governments, we have to observe
at the outset that German political theory progressively assumed that such
guardianship and promotion of public morals formed a necessary part of
governmental responsibility. Obrecht was accordingly a pioneer among post-
Reformation thinkers in striking out a path which became one of the trunk lines of
later administrative theory.
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The Preface to the proposed Constitution, which is drafted in the form of a royal
rescript, reiterates the underlying purpose of the proposition in terms which a
translation cannot properly represent, but the substance is approximately this:
The following Police Order and Constitution, with its seven Sanctions
[Sanctionibus] is ordained by us especially that we may every year,
and as far as practicable at all times, have reliable information how
matters stand with all our subjects, young and old, rich and poor, in
all parts of our jurisdiction and territory, and also how matters stand
with our whole Policey, and all of its branches, and how, in this later
wholly perverted time, they may be protected against ruin, and may
be sustained in constant integrity; and how we may bring it about,
after ascertaining all the facts, that our subjects may rightly, well and
usefully bring up their children, and themselves lead a Christian,
worthy life, and thus so conduct themselves that they may be to their
children, to us their divinely appointed rulers, to their neighbor, and
to the common weal, a blessing and an honor, to their own temporal
and eternal advantage.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 58
The first Sanction covered a system of registration of births, both legitimate and
illegitimate; the second, registration and guardianship of orphans and widows; the
third, registration and supervision of young men “nearer their twentieth than their
twenty-third year;” the fourth, registration and continued observation of all other
male persons, above the twenty-third year, “in order that we may have direct
knowledge of the character of all these persons under our whole government:” the
fifth, registration of marriage intentions;
71 the sixth, registration of intentions of
immigrants to become citizens, and of other cases of change of residence by strangers
or subjects; seventh, registration of deaths, including certain related details,
particularly concerning surviving heirs.
The explanations subjoined to this third paragraph, or chapter, take up in turn the
seven “sanctions,” and propose details, beginning with the price to be paid for each
type of registration, and including arguments intended to show the benefits that
would accrue, first to individuals, then to the public, from adoption of the
programme. For example, we find at once (p. 215) the suggestion that each child
registered under the first “sanction,” should receive ein Geburtsbrieff; obviously an
early, if not the earliest proposal of a detail of police technique which later became
a matter of course.
On the side of the public advantages of the proposed programme, Obrecht urges,
still under the device of a supposed ordinance or rescript (pp. 229 ff.), that, at all
times, both in war ami peace, governments would be able to administer more
intelligently; they could maintain the common welfare (Gemeine Wolfart) with more
intelligence and energy; they could also come to the assistance of the subjects more
directly and efficiently; they could, fourth, through the fidelity of the various sorts of
Deputaten contemplated in the programme, in many ways promote the common
advantage (Gemeinen Nutz) better than without such organization.
It cannot be said that this final schedule of reasons for adopting the programme is
likely to affect the modern reader as very convincing. The underlying fiscal purpose,
viz., the collection of fees from the different registrations, is too obvious, while the
advantages urged are both vague and problematical. The same is more evidently true
of the insurance of children proposed in the last document, on which further
comment is unnecessary. These things do not, however, diminish the evidential value
of such a writer as Obrecht. Whether he actually exerted much influence or little,
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beginnings of theoretical and practical tendencies in ways which make their essential
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Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff was born in 1626 and died in 1692. His most
persistent influence was exerted through two books, Der Teutsche Fürsten Staat, and
Der Christen Staat.
72 For our purposes, these books, rather than details of
Seckendorff’s life, are all-important. Enough of his biography may be noted,
however, to indicate the interests for which he spoke. In childhood, Seckendorff was
taught at home, while his father was most of the time in the wars. He was later sent
to school in Coburg and Muhlhausen. In 1636 he went with his mother to Erfurt,
where the foundations of his more mature knowledge were laid. He is said to have
composed Latin orations at the age of eleven. He was a companion of two
Württemburg princes in 1639. He attracted the attention of Herzog Ernst of Gotha,
who sent him to the Gotha Gymnasium in 1640. Soon after this his father was
beheaded on the charge of intended defection to the emperor. The family was
provided for, however, in recognition of the father’s previous services. The son went
the same year to the University of Strassburg, where for several years he studied
philosophy, jurisprudence, and history. In 1645, on his way to continue study at
Erfurt, he visited the court of Gotha. This was the turning-point of his life. The duke
gave him 200 Thaler for a visit to the Low Countries, and on his return appointed
him Hofjunker and superintendent of the ducal library. In these positions his chief
duty was to summarize selected books and recite their contents to the duke in his
leisure hours, on Sundays or during journeys. In 1652, in his twenty-seventh year, he
became Hof- und Justitienrath. The first of his important books, the Fiirsten Stoat,
was written in 1655. “It may be regarded as a sort of handbook of German civil law,
and was valued as such; on the other hand, it had the special approval of
contemporaries, because it contained a systematic arrangement of rules and
prescriptions for a well-regulated governmental administration, based on the model
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position of Geheimer Hof- und Kammerrath im Verwaltungs-dienst, and in 1664 to
the highest dignity in the duchy, that of chancellor. His services were especially
valued in finance, but he was also a power in political, ecclesiastical, and educational
reform. He collaborated (1666) with the scholars Arto-poeus and Böckler on a
Compendium historiae ecclesiasticae, intended primarily for the Gymnasium in
Gotha, but afterward widely used. In 1664 he accepted the call of Duke Moritz of
Sachsenzeitz, as Kanzler und Consistorial-Präsident. He retained the position till the
death of Moritz in 1681, then resigned all his responsibilities except that of
Landschafts-director von Altenburg, and retired to his estate, Menselwitz, near
Altenburg. The Christen Staat (1685) did much to promote the tendency toward
pietism, although the author was not himself strictly a pietist. In reply to the Jesuit
de Maimbourg (Histoire du Lutheranism, Paris, 1680) Seckendorff wrote in an
incredibly short time a work which must still be consulted by all historians of the
Reformation.
73 He arrived at Halle, as chancellor of the new university, October 31,
1692, but died December 18 following.
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Seckendorff’s close relations with Duke Ernst of Gotha were prime factors in his
career. Ernst was eminent among the petty princes of his century. His reputation for
piety was popularized in the nickname “Praying Ernst,” and he was later known as
“Ernst the Pious.” His ecclesiastical laws have been called a complete course in
pastoral theology. He was the father of twenty-two children, and in the management
of his household and of his state he was regarded as an edifying example.
Seckendorff systematized Duke Ernst’s scheme of life. He virtually composed
Ernst’s practices as a manager into a didactic treatise. According to the Preface of the
second edition of Der Fürsten Slaat, his original intention was to treat only of rules
for a single German principality, evidently Gotha, but his plan was afterward
extended to include all German states of the secularized Protestant class.
Roscher regards it as a second cardinal fact in Seckendorff’s career that, shortly
before his death, he gave up the life of retirement upon his estate, to accept the
chancellorship of the new University of Halle. The reasons for Roscher’s opinion that
this change was significant are not apparent. It was a generation after his most
important book appeared, and six years after publication of the volume next in
importance. Such migrations were by no means exceptional, and in this instance
nothing can be inferred from the incident which has the slightest bearing upon
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purpose, viz., interpretation of the history of German economics. This emphasis upon
a merely personal detail is characteristic. Roscher’s service to science was principally
in assembling details. He was much less successful in estimating their value.
Seckendorff is classified by Roscher as conservative, in the sense of adhering to the
old ways, while he was liberal, in the sense of thinking freely, if the phrase may be
accommodated to the rigors of his time. He was not attracted by the innovations in
the Zeitgeist of his period, but clung to the traditions of the generations before the
Thirty Years’ War. In this respect he was in nearly the same antithesis with leading
publicists and mercantilists of his time, that is, to the theories of Leopold I and of the
Great Elector, in which Sully stood to Colbert, or in the eighteenth century, Justus
Möser to the political scientists of the time of Frederick the Great and Joseph II.
Moreover, Seckendorff was attached to the Reformation type of piety, and in spite
of the tendency of the time in the other direction, he gave his political doctrines a
strong religious shading.
Roscher further characterizes Seckendorff as “in civic life no more an absolutist
than in court life he was a sycophant.” This is true in the sense that he dared to regard
the will of God as paramount to the will of the prince; but it is not true in the sense
that he believed any power on earth was justified in holding the prince to account for
his acts. In other words, political theory had virtually outgrown the conception that
the will of the prince was the highest moral law, but it still retained the conception
that the will of the prince was the ultimate civic law. Seckendorff was consequently
the mouthpiece of the type of German state in the middle of the seventeenth century
in which the assumption was fundamental. We shall speak of this as quasi-
absolutism.  Absolutism in the strictest sense it was not. From the point of view of
modern democracy it was virtual absolutism. That is, it was a theory that no one but
God had a right to discipline the prince, because he was responsible only to that
divine power by whose grace he had been made sovereign over a defined group of
men.
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We have then to deal, not with the first, but with one of the early doctrinaires and
officiating administrators of the type of state thus indicated. Their task was to
systematize the administrative routine of that type of state. The theory and the
application were not so sharply distinguished as they have been in later times. The
work of the cameralists was so to serve their quasi-absolute lords that the power and
efficiency of their states would be developed, and that their purposes with referenceAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 63
to competing states would be promoted. All the doctrines of the cameralists were in
fact centered about this main purpose, and all their theories and judgments must be
understood accordingly.
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As a side-light upon the foregoing propositions, scarcely anything could be more
illuminating than the dedication of Der Fürsten Staat. Because our language makes
an exact rendering of the ceremonial titles and phrases impossible, we quote the form
of address in the original, viz.: Dem Durch-läuchtigsten, Hochgebornen Fürsten und
Herrn, Herrn Johann Georgen Erb-Printzen der Chur- und Hertzogen zu Sachsen,
Jülich, Cleve und Bergk, Landgrafen in Thüringen, Markgrafen zu Meissen, auch
Ober- und Nieder-Lausznitz, Grafen zu der Marck und Ravensberg, Herrn zu
Ravenstein, &c. Meinem gnädigsten Hcrrn, &c. Durchläuchtigsler, Hochge-bohrner,
Gnädigster Fürst und Herr, &c.
The quaintness of expression in the extremely adroit and non-committal dedication
itself cannot be reproduced in English The translation can convey only the substance
of the thought, the most obvious peculiarity of which is the rhetorical device of
suggestion, instead of direct statement. It is as follows:
The wisdom, through which kingdoms, principalities, and lands are
happily governed, is in its origin divine, in itself it is lordly and
incomparable, and comprehends in its scope and generality all that
which is found piecemeal in other sciences. It is within the
circumference of each land the indispensable sun, through which
everything is illuminated, warmed, and nourished. It is to be
compared with an inexhaustible sea, into which all other wisdoms
and arts flow, and through high and occult art, for the common
welfare, is again discharged and distributed through the whole land.
It is an evergreen of Paradise of all the most beautiful and useful
plants, of the virtues and good ordinances, each of which in its turn
and place boars grateful fruits. This wisdom King Solomon prayed
the All-wise to grant for his royal office, with which he received also
the greatest treasures and riches of the world as an additional gift.
Foolish therefore those who would penetrate into the secrets of
governments without the attendance and favor of this goddess. All
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by nature sanctioned way, instead of such excellent royal and lofty
science, in the name of the state and of politics, offer perverse and
crafty counsel which plunges themselves and whole lands into ruin.
For what reasons and occasions, Most Gracious Lord, I was moved
to the publication of the present little-worthy work, in which,
according to the slight measure of my feeble powers, I sought to bring
together a few beams of this bright illuminating sun, certain drops
from this great sea, and certain fruits from such a general world-
garden, and according to opportunity to make them useful for the
lands and principalities of our German fatherland, is to a certain
extent set forth in the Preface, wherein also, with humblest apologies
to your most illustrious highness, it is explained through what motive
I allowed myself to seek, under your eminent name, protection for
this very imperfect book. May it please you most graciously to accept
this public expression of my most submissive zeal, as I hereby in
humility and highest veneration most obediently profess it, and with
your gracious permission I remain
His Most Illustrious Highness’
Most Submissive
Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff
According to the standards of the time, this wretched stuff was not fulsome, it was
merely conventional. Something of ‘ the sort, often much more extravagant, occurs
in the dedications of most of the cameralistic books. We shall allow this sample to
stand for all. It is turgid of course, but in that respect it fairly reflects the stage of
thought which it attempted to express. The style was appropriate to the confused
thinking which prevailed about everything pertaining to social relations. But this is
merely incidental. The main thing is that these forms, dictated by tradition in one
respect, yet artfully artless in another, fairly represent the attitude of the cameralists
toward the interests of men in civic society. It was fundamentally an attitude of
worship toward a supposed superior personage endowed with a prerogative of control
over a group of inferior and subject persons. The social science of the time was an
effort so to mobilize the attitude that the states which counted upon it as their chief
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In order to provide ourselves with a background for the doctrines which we are to
analyze, we should from step to step parallel with this analysis unroll the general
picture of German and European politics. For this part of the process recourse must
be had to the historians. We can merely in passing make note of the dependence of
such a study as this upon their larger work. Of the situation just before our time of
departure Bryce writes:
To all parties alike the result of the Thirty Years’ War was thoroughly
unsatisfactory—to the Protestants, who had lost Bohemia, and were
still obliged to hold an inferior place in the electoral college and in
the Diet; to the Catholics, who were forced to permit the exercise of
heretical worship and leave the church lands in the grasp of
sacrilegious spoilers: to the princes, who could not throw off the
burden of imperial supremacy: to the Emperor, who could turn that
supremacy to no practical account. No other conclusion was possible
to a contest in which everyone had been vanquished anci no one
victorious: which had ceased because, while the reasons for war
continued, the means of war had failed. Nevertheless, the substantial
advantage remained with the German princes, for they gained the
formal recognition of that territorial independence whose origin may
be placed as far back as the days of Frederick the Second, and the
maturity of which had been hastened by the events of the last
preceding century. It was, indeed, not only recognized, but justified
as rightful and necessary. For while the political situation, to use a
current phrase, had changed within the last two hundred years, the
eyes with which men regarded it had changed still more. Never by
their fiercest enemies in earlier times, not once by Popes or Lombard
republics in the heat of their strife with the Franconian and the
Swabian Caesars, had the Emperors been reproached as mere German
kings, or their claim to be the lawful heirs of Rome denied. The
Protestant jurists of the seventeenth century were the first persons
who ventured to scoff at the pretended lordship of the world, and
declare their empire to be nothing more than a German monarchy, in
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subjects from making the best terms they could for themselves, and
controlling a sovereign whose religious predilections bound him to
their ecclesiastical enemies. ....
The Peace of Westphalia is an era in the history of the Holy Empire
not less clearly marked than the coronation of Otto the Great, or the
death of Frederick the Second (1250). As from the days of
Maximilian I (1493–1519) it had borne a mixed or transitional
character, well expressed by the name Romano-Germanic, so
henceforth it is in everything but title purely and solely a German
Empire. Properly, indeed, it was no longer an Empire at all, but a
Federation, and that of the loosest sort. For it had no common
treasury, no efficient common tribunals, no means of coercing a
refractory member; its states were of different religions, were
governed according to different forms, were administered judicially
and financially with out any regard to each other. The traveller by rail
in central Germany used, up till 1866, to be amused to find, every
hour or two, by the change in the soldiers’ uniforms, and in the colour
of the stripes on the railway fences, that he had passed out of one and
into another of its miniature kingdoms. Much more surprised and
embarrassed would he have been a century earlier, when, instead of
the present twenty-two, there were three hundred petty principalities
between the Alps and the Baltic, each with its own laws, its own court
(in which the ceremonious pomp of Versailles was faintly
reproduced), its little army, its separate coinage, its tolls and custom-
houses on the frontier, its crowd of meddlesome and pedantic
officials, presided over by a prime minister who was often the
unworthy favorite of his prince and sometimes the pensioner of a
foreign court. This vicious system, which paralyzed the trade, the
literature and the political thought of Germany, had been forming
itself for some time, but did not become fully established until the
Peace of Westphalia, by finally emancipating the princes from
imperial control, had left them masters in their own territories. The
impoverishment of the inferior nobility, and the decline of the
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removed every counterpoise to the power of the electors and princes,
and made absolutism supreme just where absolutism is least
defensible, its states too small to have any public opinion, states in
which everything depends on the monarch, and the monarch depends
on his favorites. After A. D. 1648 the provincial estates or
parliaments became obsolete in most of these principalities, and
powerless in the rest. Germany was forced to drink to its very dregs
the cup of feudalism, feudalism from which all the sentiment that
once ennobled it had departed.
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If then we disregard on the one hand the theologians, on the other hand the legists,
each group in its way acting rather as ballast or as a brake in the several states than
as a propulsive force, the positive social science of Germany from the Peace of
Westphalia to the Napoleonic peril was the theory useful in the administrative
bureaus of these quasi-absolute states. Our purposes will draw a sharp line between
the technical details of this theory and the general social ideas which the theories
implied, on the one hand as their basis and on the other hand as their aims. The
technical details we shall ignore, except as they are necessary for making out the
more important general ideas. Our principal question is, What conceptions of social
relations were peculiar to the cameralists, and what bearing have cameralistic
theories upon the problems of social science in general?
To assist in fixing landmarks, we may say that Seckendorff was the Adam Smith
of cameralism. The evidence now in order is first and chiefest in the two volumes
already named. We shall first examine Der Fürsten Staat.
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The Preface, in archaic and bungling fashion, indicates that the purpose of the book
is not to discuss general political ideas, nor forms of government in the abstract, but
to furnish an account of the operative machinery of a typical German state. Of this
preface, we may note, first, that it indicates knowledge of only one previous writer
in precisely this field, viz., “an experienced courtier, Herr Löhneisen.” Seckendorff
states, however, that he did not have the book at hand when he wrote, and that only
a dim recollection of its contents was in his mind. His book was rather the result of
his own observation. Second, the author thinks that his description of a medium-sized
state may easily be adapted either to the largest or the smallest members of the
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abuses which occur in the management of states. He confesses that so many of them
are within his knowledge that it is difficult not to write satirically about government,
but on the whole he thinks it better to describe administration as it is intended to be,
rather than as it really is. Fourth, the author protests that he has not consciously or
intentionally said anything in the book which invades the sanctity of imperial or
princely prerogative. The fact that such an explanation could be thought of at all is
a cardinal symptom of the arbitrariness of the regime which it reflects. Fifth, the
Preface ends with a devout invocation of the divine blessing upon the emperor and
all the members of the imperial system. Nothing in this petition could be construed
as a direct assertion that these governments are peculiarly sacred. The mixture of
politics and piety, however, is quite in character with what is otherwise in evidence
about the dominant civic conceptions.
The book is divided into four parts. The first and shortest (22 pages) is merely a
demand for a description of the external characteristics of a state, from the
geographical and typographical features, the condition of cultivation and
improvement, to the governmental and social structure. The second part (278 pages)
approximately includes the subjects which Justi afterward assigned both to
Staatskunst and to Policey, i.e., it treats “of the government and organization
[Verfassung
79] of a land and principality in spiritual and secular affairs.” The third
part (266 pages), on the properties and revenues of a ruler, corresponds with the
Finanzwissenschaft, or Cameralwissenschaft in the restricted sense, of the later
cameralists. Instead of a fourth part, co-ordinate with the first three, 198 pages are
devoted to a more specific scheme of organization, in accordance with the foregoing
discussion. The editions after 1664 contain an appendix of 208 pages, consisting of
notes upon various passages in the body of the book.
While the contents of Seckendorff’s system should be rearranged in another form,
to show most distinctly their relations to cameralism as a whole, we must be content
to sketch them in brief, so far as they are important for our purpose, in the order in
which they appear in Der Fürsten Staat and Der Christen Staat.
Seckendorff begins the former book by calling attention to the unreliability, for
purposes of precision, of most previous attempts to exhibit in print the exact
conditions of German states and the consequent need of accurate accounts (pp. 30–
32). These accounts should contain precise descriptions not only of the form of
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proposes to deal, and for subsequent treatment of which he hopes his book will serve
as a model; but they should also describe the external conditions of the country, to
which all rulers and magistrates must accommodate their policies. Because the
present book does not refer to a specific country alone, he says, it can offer on the
latter division of the subject only a tentative (unver-fanglich) model or scheme in
accordance with which the necessary description of the external conditions of each
country may be worked out (p. 33). The scheme proposed is in brief as follows:
First, an account of the name, origin, and circumstances of the
principality; viz., (a) whence the designation is derived; (b) how the
sovereignty over this territory arose; (c) the geographical and
topographical peculiarities of the territory; (d) the need of maps
which shall show these facts (pp. 33–35). Second, an account of the
subdivisions of the country and dependencies; i.e., (a) according to
natural boundaries; (b) according to various artificial arrangements;
(c) the distribution of the territory among various officials; (d) the
subdivisions of magisterial and judicial jurisdictions in the country;
(e) more specific description of each subdivision of the country under
this scheme; (/) streets, bridges, and passes (pp. 35-41). Third, an
account of the qualities and fertility of the territory; i. e., (a) the
fertility of countries in general; (b) varieties of productivity of
countries; (c) special topics to be treated in the description of the
fertility of particular countries (pp. 41, 42). Fourth, an account of the
inhabitants of the country; viz., (a) the uncertainty of the natural
disposition of people;
80 (b) class divisions of the inhabitants;
81 (c)
somewhat more essential marks of difference;
82 (d) personal and
peculiar qualities of the sovereign
83 (pp. 49, 50). Fifth, a roster of the
servants of the ruler and of the government (p. 50).
If the present purpose were to write a history of cameralism, it would be necessary
to analyze these beginnings of a technology, in order to trace, first, the development
of consciousness of the problems, administrative and theoretical, to be solved, and
second, the development of the technique for dealing with those problems. Our
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which cameralism bore to the problems of social science in general. The first book
of Der Fürsten Staat has no bearing upon this purpose beyond its use in confirming
the theorem that cameralism was essentially a phase of the quasi-absolutism which
was the central factor in the machinery of the social process in Germany from the
Reformation to the French Revolution. There was nothing in the programme of
description marked out in this book except the fourth and fifth categories which
would not be equally in place in a democratic country. As it stands in Seckendorff’s
scheme, however, it is a plan for taking account of the stock with which a quasi-
absolutism has to do business. The second part directly addresses the task of planning
the administration of the state, and it still more directly confirms our theorem of
quasi-absolutism. Chap, i deals with the government, sovereignty (Hoheit), and
authority of ruling princes in general.
84 Under this head the analysis proceeds: First,
The government of a country is by no means an autocracy (eigenwillige Herrschaft).
The distinction, as Seckendorff saw it, between an autocracy and the typical German
state of his lime, which we describe as a quasi-absolutism, may best be indicated in
a translation of his own words. He says (pp. 52 ff.):
In German lands, God be praised, we have no knowledge of a power
exercised by a single man in the country, who regards himself as the
highest, and who, with or without right, uses the greatest power upon
all the others for his profit and advantage, according to his will and
caprice alone, as a master is in the habit of domineering over his
chattel men servants and maid servants. On the other hand the
princely government in the German principalities and lands, as in
almost every rightly and wisely ordered Policey, is nothing else than
the supreme and highest dominion of the properly ruling territorial
prince or lord, which is enforced and exercised by him over the
estates and subjects of the principality, also over the land itself and its
appurtenances, for the maintenance and promotion of the common
profit and welfare, and for the administration of justice.
If ideals were realities, German states at this period could not be classed as
absolutistic in spirit and in essence, whatever they were in form. The fallacy which
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purposes of government was not protected by effective safeguards against the
arbitrariness of rulers on whose talent and virtue the realization of the ideal
depended. In other words, the rulers were to such an extent the final judges of what
was involved in “profit and welfare,” and they had so large liberty to decide that
whatever was “profit and welfare” for themselves was identical with the good of the
people and the state, that the regime which cameralism represented was qualified
autocracy, from the modern point of view. We shall see what some of the
qualifications were, and we shall see that the came-ralists in general were opposed
to any further qualifications which would tend to make the ruler more responsible to
the people. The cameralists did much to raise the standards which a benevolent
despot should adopt. They did virtually nothing directly to raise the standards of the
citizens’ rights to insist that their rulers should adopt them. Within limits, to be sure,
but with a scope which developing civic consciousness presently found intolerable,
the princes were the sole judges of what was good for their peoples and states.
Cameralism was the technique and the philosophy of states in which this situation
was taken for granted.
In the second place (p. 53) Seckendorff brings the sovereignty of the prince into
stronger light by comparing it with the subject condition of everybody else in the
state. “When we thus ascribe this supreme authority to the person of the territorial
lord alone, or thereby set aside all other persons in a country, whom we have already
described in the first part, although they also are empowered with certain lordship
and authority either by the prince himself and his ancestors, as well as by other
foreign governments. .... All these, however powerful and rich they are, in
comparison with the prince, are to be regarded severally and collectively as mere
subjects.”
In the next paragraph (p. 54) the author bases this doctrine on (1) the ancient
tradition, (2) the feudal concession of lordship by the emperor to the territorial prince,
(3) the recognition of the supreme authority of the prince by the other estates and
subjects of the country by taking the customary oath of allegiance to him.
Confirmation of the claim is found further (p. 56) in the fact that other high
personages, even of the rank of count, no longer use the form with reference to
themselves, “by the grace of God,” nor does such a person speak or write of himself
as “we.” The prince uses that form, and therewith he expresses his tenure of the
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On the other hand, as previously asserted, the government of a principality consists
in achieving and maintaining the common advantage and well-being, in spiritual and
wordly things (p. 56). Thereupon Seckendorff moralizes: “The final purpose of all
human actions and deeds is the honor of God, for which the human race was
especially created. Particularly however is it seemly for those high authorities who
are God’s deputies on earth to see that the honor of their sovereign heavenly overlord
is sought in all things, etc.” p. 57).
In further commentary on the sacred functions of the prince, the argument
continues: “In former times the clergy deprived princes of large parts of their sacred
prerogatives, but since a large part of Germany, more than a hundred years ago,
turned to evangelical religion by adopting the Augsburg Confession, the princes have
resumed those sacred offices which belonged to them.”
In the third place, the prerogative of the prince in worldly admin” istration may be
specified under four heads (p. 58): First, in establishing his own power and dignity,
so that he will be able to suppress disorders, and will have prestige enough to make
his government efficient in gaining its ends; second, he has to establish power, good
laws and ordinances in the country, by which righteousness, peace, and repose, and
the means
85 of the country and of the people will be brought into being, and
maintained, the evil punished, and the good promoted; third, the supreme jurisdiction
in the country belongs to the prince, that is, to pronounce the law between his
subjects in case they quarrel, and to enforce the findings according to the desert of
each; fourth, it is his duty to establish and use all the means whereby the foregoing
institutions may be set in motion and administered in case of need against
disobedient subjects or foreign enemies and aggressors.
Chap, ii treats of the qualification of the sovereignty of the prince by his relations
to the Empire. In sec. 1, on the “Reichs Hoheit” over the German principalities,
Seckendorff continues in substance: “In order that the opinion may not be inferred
from the previous chapter that any German Landes-Herrschafft is absolutely free, we
have to call attention to the fact that we are speaking of countries within the Roman
Empire of the German Nation, of which the imperial majesty is the supreme head. It
follows that each German country is under the emperor and the Empire. This
involves the consequence that a German prince or Landes-Herr is not responsible
alone to his conscience toward God the Almighty for his government and actions, but
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the due respect and obedience to the regularly chosen ruling Roman emperor and to
the Empire, and to all that the imperial majesty, with the electors, princes, and estates
of the Empire have ordained and may ordain” (pp. 60, 61).
This section, with the remainder of the chapter, is ample commentary upon
Roscher’s judgment cited above (p. 62; vide Roscher, p. 243), that Seckendorff was
a champion of the old order. To him the Empire was still a vital reality. There can of
course be no valid interpretation of German history, not merely in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, but even to the present moment, which does not trace the
actual workings of this survival among the other factors which complicated the
collisions of interests after the Empire became more a theory than a fact. It is as
unnecessary for our present purpose as it would be impossible to compress into a
brief formula the incalculable variety of modifications which the increasingly spectral
reminiscence called the Empire wrought upon the changing political situations of the
period in which cameralism developed. The most essential consideration is this: On
the score of absolutism there was no essential difference for the masses between the
graded feudal type of sovereignty represented by the Empire, and the quasi-absolute
type represented by the would-be independent German princes, with slowly
increasing modifications, down to the Franco-Prussian War. Democracy made
progress directly or indirectly toward its own by collisions of interests among which,
sometimes for weal and sometimes for woe, the imperial interest was a factor. If our
present task were to enter upon analysis of the forces which played upon one another
in Germany from Seckendorff to Sonnenfels, the imperial factor would constantly be
a meaning term in the equation, though with a steadily diminishing coefficient. For
our present purpose the perception suffices that however power and authority were
divided between princes and emperor, the net result for the people of Germany was
quasi-absolutism as the foundation course of their social structure. The quarrels
between the shadowy imperial sovereign and the matter-of-fact territorial sovereigns,
whether of major or minor importance in their immediate effects upon the evolution
of constitutionalism, as the next species of political order in Germany, were in
principle negligible from our present point of view. They were merely details in the
administration of control, which was quasi-absolutism, however it was distributed.
To the ordinary German citizen the presence or absence of the imperial factor in the
political situation simply meant one privileged player more or less in the game in
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imperialism from our calculation, for it was of no significance for our main
consideration, viz., the essential relation of government to citizens, which was the
major premise of cameralism.
For parallel reasons we need not concern ourselves with the class of questions
which Seckendorff raises in chap, iii, viz., the relation of the prince to the hereditary
or customary rights of certain other persons, particularly agnates of the princely
house. These rights may vary from claim to petty prerogative to presumptive share
in the sovereignty. However these items are arranged, they are, as it were, family
matters among the quasi-absolute few, and the political tutelage of the many remains
unaffected.
In chap, iv on the other hand we come upon limitations of quasi-sovereignty which
were in the last analysis of a more democratic character. One of the most constant
difficulties of the modern student of conditions under the regime of “benevolent
despotism” is to understand how there can have been an irreducible minimum of law
for the individual and for non-privileged groups which the quasi-autocrats were
bound to respect. Of course the explanation is that the equilibrium of controlling and
of controlled groups at any moment is a resultant of forces which have previously
passed through many other forms of adjustment. In the conflicts of interests out of
which German civilization of the seventeenth century took shape, a great body of
tradition defining the rights of citizens had been accepted as settled. In the
cameralistic period this body of tradition represented a mass of social inertia,
compared with which imperial claims were merely casual grit in the political running
gear, while the prerogatives of territorial princes were to a considerable extent recent
acquisitions. These customs, which insured a great body of relatively satisfactory
private rights, were in a large degree inconsistent with the autocratic type of
sovereignty which the princes represented. Yet the customary laws were often more
firmly established than the sovereignties, and whatever the theories of divine right,
respect for ancient private rights was the price which the quasi-absolutisms had to
pay for tenure of their balance of power. The critical fact in the quasi-absolutisms of
this period, from our present point of view, was that the people, in the modern sense,
had no initiative in legislation, and a minimum of influence upon public policies
which might at last decide whether their ancient private rights were worth having. At
the same time there was a body of law which in general amounted to much more of
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side, than the shadowy remainder of the older regime exerted from the imperial side.
In the passage next in order (pp. 72 ff.) the nature of these limitations of absolutism
is briefly indicated.
In the first place “the subjects in a country are not slaves.” The alternative
description of what they are is formulated in syntax as cloudy as the idea which it
attempts to express. Its substance is that “subjects are under the righteous government
of authorities divinely appointed to guard the welfare of their bodies and souls
according to Christian, Godly, natural and imperial law, and that they are always to
be protected and cherished by this government according to the cardinal principles
of a commendable form of government, according to the circumstances of the
German principalities, as will be set forth in the remainder of the book.”
Thus there are particular rights and powers [Befügnisse] of subjects which the ruler
is bound to respect, not merely because they are matters of conscience and of ultimate
accountability to God, but because of certain externally binding obligations. For
instance, either the ruler or his predecessors may have promised or conceded
something, or it is incumbent upon him because it is involved in general German
laws and principles, or it is in accordance with ancient tradition.
86 Thus the prince
must, in the first place, have a care for the maintenance of religion, according to both
custom and usage of the country. In the second place the prince must listen to the
complaints of subjects against one another, and must execute justice between them.
In the third place the subjects may rightfully claim that the ruler may not act in a
tyrannical manner toward their possessions. In the fourth place, if he has entered into
agreements with the estates or subjects of his land, the ruler may not act contrary to
his promises, without the consent of said estates or subjects. If it becomes necessary
to change the traditional order, as will often be the case in matters of taxation, it is
proper that the ruler should grant a hearing to the estates, and that he gain their
consent, in order to avoid serious complications. Besides these chief points there are
many others, with reference to which the ruler, “although not from obligation, yet
from praiseworthy and excellent custom, takes council with the estates, and hears
their loyal opinions, although he is not immediately bound thereby” (p. 76).
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Chap, v enters upon analysis of the secular administration. The first theorem is that
the prince should himself administer the weightiest affairs of his land and not leave
them to his servants (p. 84). The fulfilment of this condition consists first in the effort
of the prince to obtain a thorough acquaintance with the circumstances of his landAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 76
(die eigentliche Beschafienheit seines Landes umbstandlich zu wisseri).
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Chap. vi enters into particulars about organization of a chan cellery, but it contains
nothing that contributes in principle to our inquiry. It continues the impression
however that its specifications about the qualifications and duties of civil servants
constitute a highly idealized picture of the desirable, rather than a literal analysis of
actual, official traits.
Chap, vii recurs to the first cardinal division of governmental functions “which
consists in maintaining the sovereign power and dignity in themselves” (p. 102).
At this point we come upon the plainest exhibition of that peculiarity of cameralism
which for the purposes of this interpretation is fundamental. Cameralism posited the
dignity and power of the government as the foremost consideration. Whether this is
a tenable position we are not now concerned to inquire. Our primary object is to
make plain that, this being the fundamental principle of cameralism, all the
subsequent contents of the system must be understood strictly in their relations to this
center. If they are detached from this base, and treated as though they were taught as
universals by the cameralists, or with the same emphasis in relation to some other
center, the whole meaning of cameralism as a phase of social science is radically
misinterpreted. Suppose we say that Abraham Lincoln’s “government of the people,
for the people, by the people” means that the foremost aim of the state is what the
people want, because they want it. Whether this would be a tenable principle we are
also not now concerned to inquire. It is obvious at a glance, however, that the latter
formula taken as a major premise of soial theory would tend to arrange institutions
and policies in a system very different from that which would follow from the
cameralistic assumption. The cameralistic principle tended to exalt government to the
rank of an end in itself. The alternative suggested would tend to subordinate
government to the rank of a means, to be employed in one way or another according
to circumstances, and to be respected much or little in proportion to what it proved
to be worth. Meanwhile, all sorts of variations of judgment would occur between
people who reasoned from one and the other basis, about almost everything with
which governments have to do. It might turn out that from the one standpoint it
would appear, in given circumstances, that taxes should be high, armies large,
governmental employees many, individual initiative distrusted, commercial policies
exclusive, etc., while from the other standpoint the opposite conclusions would be
equally plausible. If we are interpreting incidentals of a theory, it makes all theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 77
difference in the world, therefore, what the basic presumptions of the theory are.
Roscher taught his generation to interpret the cameralists as economists, or at least
English-speaking readers and imitators have understood him so to teach. As we have
said above,
1 that interpretation is a cardinal error. The cameralists were primarily
political scientists, and with a theory which prejudged economic questions that had
not yet arisen in abstract form, but which came later into the center of debate. The
judgments which the cameralists passed on such matters as population, money, taxes,
trade, were dictated by the particular type of political preconception which they
adopted. That is, they were estimates of political expediency under certain assumed
conditions, among them being the presumption of the paramount worth of the
government and its incarnation, the ruler. These cameralistic judgments were not
passed upon economic questions in the shape in which they arose when economic
problems were abstracted and generalized, instead of being treated as details
subordinate to political preconceptions. In so far as we find economic theory in the
cameralistic systems at all, therefore, we have to understand it as virtually an answer
to the question, What, in the given case, best promotes the purposes of the quasi-
absolutism which is the main consideration? Whether the cameralists judged sanely
on that question or not, the answer was not intended by them to fit the primarily
economic questions which were later raised; and it is a historical fallacy to summon
them as witnesses on questions which never came within the range of their
reckoning.
The chapter (vii) in which maintenance of the sovereign power and dignity is
discussed occupies, with its prefixed summary, eighty-two pages. This is a natural
and proportional allotment of space to correspond with the prominence which the
theory assigns to the subject. It is altogether inconsistent with the supposition that the
book was attempting to frame a social theory in which economic problems, as
understood since Adam Smith, should receive due attention. We need to notice the
chapter only enough to illustrate what we have said about its character as a symptom
of partiality for a type of political structure.
In the first place, the chapter deals very largely with details which a modem
democrat would lightly waive aside as mere matters of ceremonial, and good form.
On the other hand, the first important stipulation is of another kind, viz., that the
prince must annually verify the boundary lines of his territories to make sure that his
neighbors are not encroaching (p. 116); and the next follows naturally, viz., that asAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 78
a last resort force must be used to end the aggression (p. 117). The specifications
under the head of protection of the princely dignity with respect to the emperor (pp.
119 ff.) are largely ceremonial pedantries, but if they pertain to matters of importance
they touch the location of authority, not the principle of authority itself; that is, they
refer to balance between the imperial and the princely prerogative. The insistence (p.
123) upon stickling about the terms of treaties, hereditary dispositions,
primogeniture, etc., betrays systematic cultivation of princely self-consciousness,
more than care for more important interests which might be endangered by laxness
about precedents and technicalities. Specification of the regalia, the revenues, etc.,
would belong under this head in any system which made room for government at all,
and Seckendorff’s treatment of them here is in no respect peculiar. The political type
for which he spoke becomes conspicuous, however, when he turns to the means
which must be used to maintain the person and dignity of the prince himself (pp. 129
ff.). The safety and comfort of the chief magistrate will always be of importance in
a civilized state but Seckcndorff raises details of the most trifling sort, like mailers
of petty etiquette, or the kinds of amusements proper to the prince, to a degree of
prominence which would be possible only under arbitrary preconceptions about the
relative values of political persons (e.g., pp. 175 ff.). Parts of the chapter are
prolegomena to a plan of mental and moral education for young princes (e.g., pp.
136, 137, and 138–164). No doubt all this is pertinent to the author’s purpose, bul the
pathos of it is that it is exhortation to which no power in the state was supposed to
be justified in compelling the prince to listen. Other parts of the chapter (e.g., pp.
135, 136) are appeals to the piety of the prince, and rather broad hints that if his
intelligence is not equal to his responsibilities, he may by prayer and consultation
with wise advisers obtain from God the necessary guidance. This is also very sound
advice under the circumstances, but it all emphasizes the crucial presumption that
government by a prince relatively irresponsible to his subjects must be taken for
granted. The principles and policies and working rules of such a government were
the matter in hand. No question was admitted which would go behind this
presupposition of the divine right of such a type of government and ruler. All the
subdivisions of the cameralistic system turned around this primary reservation.
Nothing in this interpretation of Seckendorff is a reflection upon the loftiness of his
views or upon their value as a formulation of the ideals which might make
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that a modern reader is bound to suspect him of secreting between the lines of his
treatise conclusions which he does not state. One can hardly doubt that these
conventional formulations, whether intentionally or not, actually were elements of
the social dynamics steadily making for more equitable distribution of political
power. On the surface, however, no hint of the moral appears that if princes do not
observe these counsels of righteousness and prudence their occupation will presently
he gone. Whether or not such men as Seckcndorff and Justi, not to say Sonnenfels,
had any premonition of the test awaiting quasi-absolutism, their high ideals of
government, and of the character which rulers should maintain, must have been
factors in sharpening the perception of citizens that the reality was too often in
glaring contrast with the standard. The camcralists must thus be scheduled as among
the factors which contributed indirectly to the political reconstructions of the
nineteenth century. Our present business, however, is to show just what cameralism
was, in theory and in practice, in order to find the explanation of the changes in
theory and in practice which impended. In a word, the best elements in the
camcralistic theory were essentials of good government for which the system of
quasi-absolutism furnished no sufficient guarantee. A reversal of the camcralistic
presumptions was therefore inevitable. Instead of starting with the paramount value
of the quasi-absolutistic type of government, and making political and social theory
a technique of maintaining it, post-cameralistic philosophy posited certain popular
purposes as paramount, and then proceeded to adopt the governmental means by
which their ends might be attained.
Chap, viii approaches the classes of subjects which for the modern mind must be
central and essential in political principles and programmes, viz., “the establishment
of good order and laws for the welfare and common benefit of the Fatherland.” (Vide
above, p. 76.) That is, Scckendorff is now occupying the standpoint indicated by the
preamble of the Constitution of the United States. In this chapter he begins to outline
the things which in his judgment would make for ends corresponding with the later
specifications, “form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The essential
difference in the two situations was that cameralism gave hostages to quasi-
absolutism before it entered upon this division of the inquiry. Its answer, therefore,
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as paramount; while the American constitution-makers imagined themselves free
from all political preconceptions; they supposed they were judging questions of
popular welfare upon their merits, and they believed that they were acting upon the
principle of framing political institutions solely for their probable utililty as means
to popular ends. However actual bias may have vitiated the American presumption
of political impartiality, there was a distinct contrast in principle between the
republican attitude and that of the cameralists. The latter, as we have said, formulated
their problem as principally a question of the welfare of the preordained quasi-
absolutism, thus at the outset making the government primary and the people
secondary. The latter formulated their problem as a question of the welfare of
presumably equal citizens, thus at the outset making the people primary and the
government secondary. Only so far as the welfare of equal citizens and the welfare
of quasi-absolute governments involve identical relations could correspondence be
expected between systems starting from such contradictory principles.
Because our inquiry makes the history of administrative technique merely
incidental, our plan does not require analysis of Seckendorff’s cameralism on its
administrative side. We are trying to discover the relation of the cameralists to
general problems of social science. In so far as Justi proves to be representative of
the cameralists, his system will presently be exhibited in considerable detail, as
typical in spirit and purpose, while at the same time more highly elaborated in
structure than the schemes of his predecessors.
Seckendorff begins his outline of the governmental processes by which the peace
and prosperity of the land are to be promoted, by repeating that “the power and
authority to establish such ordinances pertains to the territorial lord and ruler alone,
and it is his duty to promote them according to his best understanding and
knowledge” (p. 192). At the same time he declares (p. 193): “The object of such
ordinances in general is that by means of them justice, peace and prosperity
[Auffnehmen], or the welfare of the land and of the people, may be sought.”
We shall have occasion frequently to point out that, during this quasi-absolutistic
period, inchoate ideas of popular welfare were expressed side by side with formulas
of the paramount importance of the government. The solution of the problems of
adjustment thus presented is simply this: In effect, the ideas of the primacy of
governmental and dynastic interests prevailed until the democratic period changed
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construed, in case of conflict, as a phase of governmental welfare. Meanwhile
expression of popular interests in more and more distinct form must have weakened
the force of the governmental presumption long before the consequences of the
change were visible in more democratic institutions.
In general Seckendorff represents the perspective of political desirability as follows:
Peace, or the internal concord of the country, and security against
enemies, are the consequence of justice, and this in turn will be
promoted by peace and concord, so that it is true, according to the
teaching of King David, that the two kiss each other, and the one
without the other does not exist. Finally, prosperity and welfare are
established chiefly upon these two precious gifts of God, but they are
manifest especially in abundant sustenance and growth of the number
of the people, and in their means, conduct and manners. The supreme
purpose (sic) of all these is the salutary maintenance of the Policey or
of the whole government, in its honor, power and sovereignty, and the
last aim is the honor of God, as we have elsewhere shown (p. 193).
Accordingly Seckendorff regards it as the task of government, and so of
cameralism, to provide an organization and a technique which will not only secure
peace and order, but the good morals of the citizens (p. 195). An extended discussion
follows of details in which the state, partly through the secular administration, partly
through the ecclesiastical and educational system, must curb vice and plant the seeds
of virtue in the people.
If it were a part of our purpose to weigh the merits and defects of quasi-absolutism
or paternalism as compared with democracy, this might be the proper point for
undertaking the process. Instead of that, the occasion may be taken for a single
remark by way of caution and qualification, viz.: Our constant appeal to democracy
in contrast with paternalism does not imply disregard for the historic mission of
paternalism. Certain national groups have reached a stage of development after which
persistence of paternalism would have involved arrest of progress. Other groups have
at the same time progressed more securely and rapidly under the guidance of
paternalism than would have been probable or perhaps possible with any other form
of control. German populations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wereAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 82
unquestionably illustrations of the latter situation. We are not impeaching German
quasi-absolutism in its character as a stage of evolution. We are trying to expose its
fallacy when proposed as an a-priori principle.
Resuming the problem of securing peace and concord, Seckendorff indicates as
means thereto (pp. 201 ff.): good organization of justice and the use of wholesome
laws; (2) strict prohibition of self-enforcement of suppressed rights; (3) good
organization and readiness for action of the personnel of civic control.
On the means of guarding the health and increasing the numbers of the people,
Seckendorff indicates a governmental programme extending from the maintenance
of midwives and nurses, the support of orphans, the subsidizing of physicians and
surgeons,
89 to inspection of foods, of water supplies, measures for cleaning and
draining towns, etc.
Passing to problems of securing to the people means of support, Seckendorff’s
programme includes (pp. 204 ff.): (1) the intention on the part of government that no
subject shall lack means of securing the necessities of life, “except as a special
punishment and providence of God, or by his own fault;” (2) that the surplus or
special products of the country shall be specially conserved as a means of securing
in exchange from other countries their necessary and useful products. Details under
this programme are scheduled to the number of twelve, viz., (1) the fundamental
provision, i.e., the good education of youth; (2) adequate ordering of all means of
making the land yield support;
90 (3) special attention to those goods which are most
generally necessary, i.e., the products of the field, of grazing, of forestry, of the iron,
spinning, weaving, and wool trades; (4) proportional attention to the more vulgar
occupations, i.e., of day-laborers and common servants; (5) ordinances regulating
prices; (6) abolition of usury; (7) regulation of weights and measures; (8) certain
classes of sumptuary laws, i.e., feasting and celebration; (9) other types of sumptuary
laws, i.e., clothing, etc.; (10) discouragement of use of foreign wares as clothing and
food; (11) suppression of various classes of parasites, e.g , gamblers, fakirs,
fraudulent bankrupts, etc.; (12) just management of income-producing properties
belonging to communities.
Thereupon follows a similar outline, under five heads, of measures to be employed
in getting the most advantage from a country’s surplus products, viz. (pp. 214 ff.):
(1) Special account is to be made of the peculiar products of the country, and special
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exerted to maintain the zeal of the people for continuing these specially advantageous
occupations; (3) encouragement must be given to traders from other countries to
purchase these goods; (4) special attention must be given to regulation of subjects
who want to carry on foreign trade in these goods; (5) the people must be protected
by regulation of domestic trade against various kinds of fraud.
In these two series of categories we have in embryo the Policeywissenschaft worked
out in so much greater detail, and with so much more orderly arrangement, by a
succession of writers up to Justi. Seckendorff’s schedules call for two comments
only: first, they show farseeing discernment of factors which must always be rather
elementary in the prosperity of communities; second, they are crude judgments about
wise ways and means for securing these desirable details. In other words,
Seckendorff’s technology was a collection of very premature conclusions about
social causes and effects. The situations to which such judgments were supposed to
apply had not been generalized, and the validity of these rough and ready judgments
had not been adequately tested. That is, Seckendorff’s embryonic
Policeywissenschaft,  from the viewpoint of our present analysis, was merely a
collection of provisional working rules, one effect of which was presently (in the
time of Adam Smith) to produce an effective demand for radical reconsideration of
the presuppositions on which governmental relations to all economic activities had
been based. In comparison with Justi, Seckendorff formulated these rules in a very
loose fashion. They reflected the fundamental policies of quasi-absolutism plainly
enough, however, and progress in systematizing these policies merely intensified
their absolutistic character.
Chap, ix (pp. 218–39) deals with the organization of the courts. There is no
question of principle between quasi-absolutistic and democratic theories of
government, as to the fundamental conception that the government must administer
justice. In this respect there is nothing peculiar to cameralistics which calls for our
attention. If we were making a study of comparative juridical institutions, the systems
of courts in Germany during the cameralistic period would of course occupy an
important subdivision of the treatment. The purposes of this book neither require nor
permit an attempt to consider that branch of German administration.
For similar reasons we may neglect chap, x (pp. 240–59), which deals very
summarily with the means of executing the decrees of courts and with the war
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of the relation of the ruler to ecclesiastical administration, under which rubric
educational administration is included. Here again details are not material for our
purpose. We may observe that, so far as space is an index, Seckendorff makes these
subjects six times more prominent in his general theory of the state than Justi does
in the same connection.
91 This difference probably corresponds with the emphasis
actually placed by the two men upon the ecclesiastical side of government.
Seckendorff appears to have had no doubts whatever that the divine order of the
universe necessarily worked through divinely ordained princes, in whom secular and
religious prerogatives were indissoluble. Justi had no other views for publication. He
accepted the ecclesiastical organization as he found it, and though he expressed a
good deal of contempt for some of its workings he did not venture to offer a theory
of its place in the governmental scheme essentially different from that assigned to it
by Seckendorff.
Reference to the Table of Contents and comparison of Parts III and IV with the
corresponding portions of Justi’s system will afford all the evidence it falls within
our purpose to cite about the place of Seckendorff in the development of the
technique of the subject. We may pass, then, from this outline of the more important
of his two books to a brief analysis of Der Christen Stat.
Our account of Scckendorff would be incomplete without examination of the
version of his views published thirty years later than the volume just described. This
book would be more properly classified primarily as a religious exhortation than as
a political treatise. Since the relations between religion and politics were more in
evidence at the time of its composition than they are at present, more may be learned
from a disquisition of this type, about the shadings of contemporary political
doctrines, than could safely be inferred from a similar book today. So far as possible,
we shall confine our notice to certain features of the book which throw light upon the
author’s cameralistic theories. 
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An incidental touch in the dedication, all the more significant because it was casual,
yet at the same time conventional, was the assumption that the descendants of the
prince to whom the book was dedicated would continue to exercise his prerogatives
“to the end of the world.” If there was any speculation in the mind of cameralistic
authors to the effect that the structures of states might be changed in the course of
time, such vain imaginings were kept below the surface. The strong probability is,
in Seckendorff s case at least, that no such fancy had ever disturbed conventionalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 85
rellections.
The Preface recites that, twenty years earlier, when the author was in service at the
court of Moritz of Saxony, that prince, his consort, and some of the younger members
of the family were greatly disturbed by symptoms of “atheism” among persons who
were regular or occasional visitors at court. The impulse of Pascal’s writings led
Seckendorff to attempt a refutation of atheism, and this constitutes the substance of
the first part of the present book. As the author describes this portion of his work, it
was purely theoretical. It found such a favorable reception at court, however, that he
was encouraged to expand it, and especially to show “how the many and great evils
in all classes were best to be remedied, if the ground of Godliness were rightly
considered, and its chief aim were kept in sight as the guide of all human actions.”
In order to carry out this idea, “the three so-called chief strata [Haupt-Stände] and
their doings” were taken into particular consideration, with especial reference to the
requirements of Christianity upon them. While this reflection was still in progress
(1681) the death of the elector so changed the situation that the author was able to
retire and give more time to writing. He mentions Philipp Jacob Spener of Franckfurt
as among those who read parts of his manuscript and made useful suggestions. The
pains which he takes to excuse the failings of the book, on the ground that he had
always been a man of affairs and not a scholar, savor more of vanity than of modesty.
They affect one as the pettiness of an amateur who was not too zealous about the
substance of his message to be fussy about the impression he would make with
respect to immaterial details of form.
The first book of Der Christen-Stat contains nothing which need occupy our
attention.
93 It is simply a layman’s apologetic for religion as formulated in the
Augsburg Confession. Seckendorff states in his Preface that belief in this body of
doctrine was handed down to him from ancestors who gave their adherence to it
during the lifetime of Luther. It has its chief interest not as an interpretation of
Lutheranism. For that we should go to the theologians. It has merely a secondary
value as a statesman’s attempt to commend Lutheranism primarily to men of his own
class. It is a document of more significance for the religious than for the cameralistic
side of German experience.
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The second book sets forth the ways in which true religion, as expounded in the
previous book, should be applied in the reform of civic conduct.
95 Seckendorff recurs
to a division of citizens which he often employs, viz., the spiritual, the secular, andAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 86
the domestic strata.
96 He admits that in a way the third of these strata includes the
others. For this reason he discusses it first.
He distinctly formulates the purpose of this second book in this way: “To show that
all strata would be most surely reformed according to the rule of Christianity and its
chief purpose.” His initial aim is to show that if this reform should first take place in
domestic life it would make all other civic improvement easier.
The argument proceeds from this premise (p. 188):
The happiness of the domestic stratum, or of each separate human
being, regardless of accidental social status, is to be sought
approximately in this, that one may have health, food, clothing, and
other comforts and necessities of life; then further, according to
circumstances of age and time, that he may marry well, beget
children, live long, and come to no exceptional end. To this must be
added the common civic well-being [bürgerliche Wolfarth], the
freedom or right to associate with his own, to be thereby in
appropriate respect or honor, also to enjoy peace and protection
against wrong and violence.
One is reminded that certain familiar traits of human nature are not modern
inventions, by a reflection which follows this schedule, viz.:
Most people seek to fix the blame and to locate the cause of evils and
misfortunes at the wrong point. Each is more ready to blame another
than himself. Hence arise envy, hatred, hostility, resistance and
embitterment against those who live in better fortune, especially
against government.
All sorts of impotent complaints, the author adds, are accordingly lodged against
rulers, and at last against God, while people ought rather to ask themselves whether
they are themselves in any way the authors of their own troubles. Then follows
homely exhortation, in the name of religion, to observe commonplace rules of
prudence in connection with body and estate. These rules are urged as having a
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essential purport and tendency of the argument.
The fundamental prudence of good bodily habits, of temperance, of frugality, are
presented in their proper relations to subsequent conditions of happiness.
Then follows an equally judicious chapter on the domestic virtues. With mere
changes of detail in the illustrations, it would serve fairly well as the syllabus of a
lecture, or indeed of a series of lectures, in a modern sociological course on the
family.
The argument then passes to the second of the “strata,” but it would be more in
accordance with later usage to say that the rest of the book amounts to a treatise on
practical Christian ethics in the social as distinguished from the individual phases of
conduct, and of course with the theology of the Augsburg Confession as the constant
presupposition. With very crude grouping and analysis of the kinds of activity
treated, the discussion in a way covers the whole range of conduct in the state, as it
presented itself to Seckendorff’s understanding.
The first main proposition is to the effect that all the difficulties encountered in
civic life come from spurious Christianity. Beginning with enumeration of types of
petty neighborhood quarrels, and pointing out their departure from Christian precepts
and ideals, the author treats in a similar way the grosser vices and crimes.
Incidentally, and by departing rather obviously from his text, he introduces in the
fifth chapter an excursus of more interest for our purpose than his proper argument.
It is an observation bearing on the doctrine of population, and seems to have only a
forced relation to the context. He says:
When one however undertakes to speak of the common means of
support and the freedom of citizens, and of the measures necessary
for improving their condition in these respects, a considerable
difference must be taken into account between countries: for the
situation is of one sort in the case of those which derive their ordinary
support from agriculture, and of another sort with those that are
devoted to trade and commerce, particularly to navigation. Because
less of the latter exists in Germany, than in other regions, we have the
more occasion to speak of the other sort. We must know, therefore,
that under ordinary circumstances each region can properly maintain
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of support from its yield. For example, if we consider a village which
has only arable land enough for the cultivation of ten plows, no more
than that number of peasants or teamsters can profitably live there,
but the others must get their living by artisanship, or get a chance to
work outside the boundaries of the locality. If this does not occur,
each hinders the others, or there is a scarcity of support. There can
also be no more handworkers in the locality than these peasants need,
etc. (p. 243).
In this paragraph the author seems to be distinctly on the trail of the law of
diminishing returns. He certainly does not squint toward the conception of population
which has been attributed to the cameralists of the following century. We shall see
that his successors were also much more intelligent on this subject than tradition has
testified.
After expanding the propositions quoted, Seckendorff approaches the moral which
he wishes to enforce, in this way:
Where the Christian doctrine has been accepted, and ecclesiastics and
especially monks have been introduced, from the better cultivated and
improved countries, Italy, France, England, etc., also the police, or the
more comfortable and at the same time more expensive mode of life,
a change has taken place in all localities which could not be properly
supervised or controlled, especially because of the many magistracies,
but it was allowed in many respects to take its own course.
Accordingly no one understands why a given occupation flourishes
in a given locality, whether from some particular natural advantage,
or from special skill on the part of the inhabitants. The present
purpose is to urge that the people chose their course of life almost
entirely without reflection, and as a consequence they do not succeed
in spite of diligence. .... Christianity comes in to improve this state of
things, by laying down certain rules about livelihood, and especially
about moderation.
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weakness of the reasoning, but the evidence it contains as to the views of the official
class at this period about the appropriate aims of government. However practical men
or theorists arranged their aims in the relation of means and end, the physical and
moral well-being of the population governed was a definite and positive purpose. In
the minds of the same men, religion was also both an end and a means with reference
to individual as well as governmental welfare. It is not our affair to criticize the
crudeness and the confusion in their reasonings about religion, and about its relation
to morals and government. The main thing is that they actually recognized desiderata,
with some common sanctions of religion, of philosophy, of prudential and political
expediency, which positively prescribed moral ideals both for governments and for
individuals. These standards of moral value and obligation, which stood for partially
developed interests in German populations, were factors, weaker or stronger, in
shaping both official and popular programmes throughout the cameralistic period.
While other interests were in a sense paramount, these elementary, and in a sense
ultimate, human interests were always perceptibly or imperceptibly in the balance
along with other considerations of state, and their actual importance, as compared
with the interests of rulers as a distinct class, never long at a time ceased to gain an
increasing ratio of influence.
It is characteristic of the lack of system in social ideas at Seckendorff’s time that
from the remarks just quoted he passes immediately to discussion of the sin of tax-
dodging, as we now phrase it, and of evading military service in the just wars which
Christianity does not disapprove. This leads to discussion of the Christian ethics of
conduct in war, and evils both governmental and individual are enumerated and
condemned in considerable detail.
In the sixth chapter of this book, the author, with a slight departure from the
classification which he made at the outset, enters upon discussion of the ethics of the
governing stratum. He at once acknowledges the delicacy of the subject. He says:
This is a dangerous and difficult matter: partly because inborn human
perversity provides that no one hears the truth more impatiently than
those who have the power to ignore it, and to insult those who present
it; partly because, on the other hand, it is a duty to avoid speaking of
the failings of rulers in such a way as to stir up hatred and scorn and
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true Christians (p. 255).
The wise suggestion is made in this connection that preachers would often do better
to send to rulers in writing their complaints about bad government, than to utter them
in the pulpit, in the presence of those who least need to hear them, and in the absence
of those who should be concerned with them most. At the same time Seckendorff
betrays very plain symptoms of the prevailing tendency to demand that true Christian
subjects shall renounce all claim to a right of bringing direct pressure to bear on
rulers if their government is oppressive. The only recourse which his philosophy and
theology fully sanction is prayer to God, that He might soften the heart and instruct
the mind of the delinquent sovereign. On the other hand, the appeal which
Seckendorff makes to rulers to observe the obligations of religion in their conduct of
government, puts the final emphasis not on considerations of justice, and the rights
of the subject, but on the rulers’ hopes of eternal happiness (p. 259).
However we may appraise the force or validity of the sanctions upon which
Seckendorff’s political ethic relied, he certainly outlined a relatively exacting
standard of governmental conduct. It began with the obligation of setting a Christian
example to subjects, in personal habits, on the principle of noblesse oblige, and
covered the whole range of governmental activities. Seckendorff plainly asserts (p.
266) that Christianity puts the origin of ruling authority beyond question. Thus: The
ruling class is ordained of God, although in certain places human means, such as
election or investiture, are instrumental in attaining that position, and the specific
duties of government arc to be learned from the light of reason, and cannot be found
in revelation or the Holy Scriptures. When a sovereign therefore according to custom
writes “by the grace of God,” that is no vain title. It shows rather in part the
sovereignty [Hoheit], and in part the duty: the sovereignty because of sitting in the
place of God, and having to conduct the office according to the divine order. Hence
rulers, as such, are accountable first of all to God, and may also hope for his
protection. This their sovereignty they may use for the suppression of seditious
thoughts of subjects, when the latter presume to override the rulers. The duty may be
learned from the consideration that, because they are ordained by the grace of God,
rulers are bound to conform to the divine law, and thus to promote the welfare of the
people committed to them, and also to observe and fulfill what is promised according
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external means of compulsion are to be practiced, and thus a ruler, if he disregards
his capitulary or his promise, sins before God alone, and is liable to no investigation
by his subjects, yet the fear of God will sufficiently, and more than any external
compulsion, restrain him, and he will regard those who advise him in a contrary way,
and would release him from all laws, as wicked counselors, yes, as tools of the devil.
What is true of these high magistrates, who are subordinated to no other human
power, is true also in its degree of subordinate rulers, etc.
In the following chapter (vii) the author expands the above theorems about the
authority of rulers by going elaborately into the biblical and especially the Pauline
doctrine of the relation of rulers to other Christians. In chap, viii, however, he returns
to the other side of the case, and argues with equal energy that—
At last rulers attain salvation in one and the same way as other
Christians, i.e., by Christian faith, the fruits of which are love and a
pious life. There is only one, and that the straight and narrow way,
through which is the entrance into life. .... Just as the poorest peasant,
so also the greatest king, must attain salvation. Everything which
people of high degree claim for themselves as emancipation,
exemption, and privilege, is sheer deception, and those who help
them to these imaginings are their guides and companions toward
destruction.
Upon this doctrinal basis, exhibit of specific duties is continued; thus, further duties
of setting worthy examples to subjects, for. instance, in checking drunkenness and
neglect of attendance at divine worship by members of the court; duties of the
positive sort, such as promoting the progress of true religion among the subjects; in
particular the duty not merely of protecting the institutions of religion but of laying
down rules of church government. Christian rulers should reform evils in the church
and the clergy.
This duty belongs especially to those Protestant princes who took upon themselves
the prerogatives of Episcopus in externis, and who administer the other jura
Episcopalia,  which the bishops alone previously administered, either in person or
through their Officiates, through certain appointed and sworn persons called
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On the other hand, it is urged as the duty of rulers to refrain from prescribing
articles of faith for their subjects, even when the bishops agree thereto; the duty of
abolishing unnecessary display in church worship is expounded; the importance of
sound learning and the reading of good books by rulers is emphasized. At the close
of the chapter, subjects are exhorted to observe the duties of true Christians in all
these matters, even if rulers fail in any of these respects.
Chap, x develops the author’s ideas of Christian duty with respect to all sorts of
situations before, during, and in consequence of war. It begins with the premise that
peace is a good much to be desired, and its preservation is the first work of
government. Nevertheless, righteous war being permissible and necessary, it is the
duty of governments properly to prepare for it and to carry it on as far as possible in
accordance with the behests of religion. The implications of this doctrine are
developed with considerable detail. The evils of war are frankly admitted, and
remedies pointed out in better observance of Christian precepts. It is urged that “true
and right bravery in war must spring from Christian courage, by reason of the
assurance of a good conscience, and of a better life after death” (p. 346). Eleven
clauses from the imperial articles of war are quoted, to show that Christian principles
are recognized as part of the law of the land for soldiers.
97 The chapter contains also
an argument for the reinstitution of universal military duty; an essay, in twenty-seven
sections, on organization and discipline of a military establishment so created; and
concludes that the proposed scheme would lead to successful ending of war with the
Turks, and efficient conduct of all necessary minor wars.
Chap, xi applies the test of Christian doctrine to the duties of magistrates in
administering justice; chap, xii, to miscellaneous relations of government to subjects,
as in excessive taxation, in infringement upon proper liberty, in luxurious living at
the expense of subjects, in experimenting with alchemy and other magic arts, in
manipulating the coinage, in traffic in public offices, and in establishing monopolies.
The last chapter of this second book returns to one of the initial presumptions of
German civic theory, namely, that the government is bound to perform the functions
of a presiding genius over the general welfare of subjects. At the same time it
reiterates a theorem which in some form and force or other plays its part in all the
cameralistic systems. The chapter begins with a brief expression of both these ideas
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From Christianity, or from Christian love, flows the provision of
God-fearing rulers that their subjects shall have all possible
encouragement and success in their livelihood and occupations, that
their numbers shall increase rather than diminish, because the greatest
treasure of the country consists in the number of well-nourished
people; and to that end not merely external peace and the moderation
of the governing power in collecting taxes, etc., are useful, .... but
every other good institution which governments may adopt whereby
means of livelihood may be assured to the people, and multiplied in
reliable ways, for the more important Christian purpose that they may
have something to give to the needy and thus may be and remain able
to provide for the support of the community [Gemeinen Wesens] and
the care of the poor and the needy.
In the spirit of this introduction, the chapter concludes this division of the author’s
system of ethics with brief reference to the duties of rulers toward vagrants and other
forbidden types, such as gypsies, beggars, etc.; toward promotion of profitable
occupations through good police organization; toward moderation of duties and
imports; toward encouragement of manufactures and commerce; toward selection of
competent officials for dealing with these subjects: and two closing sections contain
further warnings to subjects about their own delinquencies in commerce and
artisanship, with praises of peasants, artisans, and soldiers for their relatively faithful
observance of Christian duty, and a final appeal to the self-interest of rulers to guard
the welfare of these lower classes.
The third book hews much less closely to the lines of the original plan than the
other two. Its title is On the Spiritual Stratum and Its Reform in Particular. The
author’s treatment of the ethics of his two other divisions of activity leads to the
expectation that he will follow the same model with reference to the clergy. Instead
of this, the book deals with every sort of question which could concern people with
ecclesiastical interests at the period of its publication. It has sections which would
have to be classed in turn as exegesis, church history, dogmatic theology, homiletics,
pastoral dudes, clerical ethics, religious pedagogy, the theory of missions, and church
polity. It deals briefly with the education of women. In so far as it touches clerical
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the degree to which the relation of the church to the secular government is slurred
over. If one knew nothing of Seckendorff’s writings beyond this book, the most
obvious inference would be that he had in mind an ecclesiastical organization
practically identical with that of the Protestant Episcopal church in the United States,
and as independent of the civil government. There are passages, e.g., pp. 705 ff., from
which one familiar with his previous writings would immediately supply the
necessary connections of these details with his whole theory of government. I have
found no other passage in the whole succession of came-ralistic authors which treats
of ecclesiastical questions with so little reference to the relations with the political
administration.
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A more general comparison than that of one cameralist with another may help to
interpret the authors in this group. In one particular not yet referred to Seckendorff
was typical of all the cameralists. It may be stated by contrast with Adam Smith. The
latter was plainly a philosopher first, and incidentally an economist.
99 The cameralists
were first and last theoretical or practical administrators. They betray almost no
consciousness that their technique runs back to problems of a fundamental
philosophy. The exceptions to this rule are in the form of barkings back to religious
premises. According to their ecclesiastical connections, they pay more or less
perfunctory tribute to popular Catholic or Protestant religious doctrine. The allusions
hardly go deeper, however, than to phases of doctrine which might have been derived
merely from their pre-confirmation instruction. In short, cameralistics was primarily
a system of and for the bureau. It had only indirect and remote affiliations with the
academy. We shall find that this fact was a very serious obstacle to the progress of
cameralism as a university subject. Dithmar and Stisser will furnish typical evidence.
In this sketch, then, we have presented first of all the conception of a ruler by divine
right, and of the government which he should maintain, as it was put into literary
form by one of the men best entitled to speak for the system. The sketch is of chief
value for this initial element. The secondary features of the regime, although in the
germ in Seckendorff’s doctrines, will appear in more mature form in the descriptions
of later cameralists.		
The cameralistic series next includes three men, Beclier, Hornick, and Schroder,
whose chief contribution to the theory was on its mercantilistic side. To the first and
third of these men a chapter will be devoted. Since it has proved impossible to make
a first-hand study of Hornick, his place in the development of cameralism will be
indicated more briefly.
Johann Joachim Becher was born at Speier in 1635. He died in London in 1682. He
was the supposed originator of the chemical “phlogiston theory.” In the midst of the
material and spiritual ruin which followed the Thirty Years’ War, struggling against
great difficulties, he became a self-taught man of no mean attainments in several
directions. He is said to have supported himself, as well as, for a time, his mother and
two brothers, by serving as an informer. At the age of nineteen he published a
monograph, De lapide tris-megisto; six years later, a Metallurgia; in 1661, a
Universal -sprache, etc. Then he entered into negotiations with the Palatine elector
about establishment of various factories in Mannheim; later, with the elector of
Bavaria about foundation of a German colony in Guiana, a West Indian colony, etc.;
further, about the introduction of a Commercien collegium, and other administrative
devices. In 1666 he was teacher of medicine and body physician of the elector of
Mainz, but in the same year went to Vienna as Commercienrath. He was sent to
Holland on an imperial errand, and in 1667 wrote in ten days (?) his Methodus
didactica; and soon afterward, Regeln der christlichen Bundesgenossenschaft, his
chief cameralistic work, if it may properly be so designated. Meantime he had an
appointment as body physician and chemist in electoral Bavaria and here appeared
his Physica Subterranea seu Acta Labora-torii Monacensis. In the same year he
acquired a feudal title for the Count of Hanau to 3,000 square miles of land between
the Oronoco and the Amazon, and published a Gründlicher Bericht in description of
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ever came of it. In 1670 Becher was called to Vienna in connection with a silk
company and other enterprises. Incidentally, while his personal affairs were
developing poorly, he dashed off a programme for setting the world to rights, in the
monographs Psychosophia and Einladung zu einer psychologischen Societät. A
location for a demonstrative experiment under the latter head was expected from the
bounty of the duke of Güstrow (1674). In 1675 Becher wrote Theses chemicas
veritalem transmutationibus metallorum evincentis, and experimented in Vienna on
extracting gold from the sands of the Danube. His most practical occupation seems
to have been at this period as head of a so-called Manufacturhaus in Vienna, an
institution supported by the government. He fell into disfavor, went to Holland, sold
to the city of Harlem a machine for winding silk, and tried to get the Dutch
government interested in his attempts to get gold from sand. The enmity of Count
Zinzendorf, which had cut short his stay in Vienna, still pursued him, and he went to
England in 1680. The imperial ambassador tried to obstruct his plans here, but the
body physician Dickinson gave him money, and he went to Scotland to study mines
for Prince Ruprecht von der Pfalz. It is said that he wrote his Närrische Weisheit und
weisse Narrheit in the twenty-eight days (?) while he was on the water making this
trip. He returned to London in 1682, and died in October of that year.
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While Becher’s influence upon cameralism was somewhat indirect, it was actual,
and must therefore be duly credited.
He cannot be called in the full sense a cameralist. It is even doubtful if he ever
regarded himself in that light at all.
101 This matter of labels, however, is not
important. Whatever may have been the differences between Becher and the more
typical cameralists, he added something to the content of a theory which at last had
a recognized place for his type of interest.
While Becher’s title to classification as a cameralist is questionable, his moral
rating is still more dubious. Some of his vicissitudes were more his misfortune than
his fault, to be sure, as for example when he was ostracized at Würzburg for
dissecting the body of a woman who had been executed. He was nowhere in the favor
of the clergy. The merchants disliked him for his activities in promoting the theory
of the organization of trading companies. He lost his standing in the Palatinate by the
failure of a perpetual-motion scheme, and he made himself ridiculous among scholars
by a book which promised to teach all Haushaltungskunst in twenty-four hours.
102
Taken in connection with odious personal traits, Becher’s individual and professionalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 97
equation has simply the permanent value for our purposes of a factor in establishing
a technical tradition.
Becher’s most memorable cameralistic work was published in 1668.
103 Its place in
the cameralistic series is entirely different from that of Seckendorff. Indeed, as we
have seen, it can only by accommodation of terms be said to have had a place in the
series. Each petty German state had its little army of functioning cameralists, the
hierarchies of the bureaus. Few of them wrote books, but in some particulars such a
sorry substitute for a book as this miscellaneous collection of Becher better reflects
what they were doing and thinking than the more systematic treatises. Becher’s
Discurs contains no direct internal evidence that the author had ever heard of
Seckendorff. It seems to be the record of the impression made upon an unsystematic
mind by contact with the workings of bureaucracy in various capitals.
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In the dedication to the emperor Leopold, dated September 1, 1672, Becher asserts
that his reasons for the dedication were three: first, that the book was largely written
while the author was on the imperial civil list, and that the material was largely
collected in the course of that service; second, because enemies had scattered the
slander that the author was of no visible use in the imperial service, and the book
would be an answer to the charge; third, because enemies who were identical with
the enemies of the German Roman Empire and of the imperial house had attacked the
author for addressing the common German Fatherland in plain vernacular German,
instead of academic Latin.
Becher adds that he may be reproached for the presumption of dedicating to the
emperor a book which contains discussions of commercial affairs, with which
nobility has nothing to do. The reply is that his majesty is not expected to concern
himself directly with such subjects, but the book is designed to bring more clearly
before his eyes the fact that the commercial classes are contributing to the population
and wealth of the country, and that ways and means of establishing a populous and
self-sustaining community are the most suitable subject-matter of a political policy.
In the Preface to the second edition Becher refers to the contents of the book as
Commercien Materien. He must be interpreted, therefore, in contrast with
Seckendorff, as making the interests of trade his point of departure. While Becher
was thus concerned only secondarily with the theory of administrative organization
in general, it is no less true of him than of the other cameralists that the test to which
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as represented by the government.
Becher goes on to say that, although the first edition found many enemies, and was
in several places forbidden by the clergy, yet it was soon entirely sold. It appears that
the immediate cause of the enmity of the clergy was an innocent quotation upon the
title-page from the jurist Calvinus. It was assumed that John Calvin was the author
quoted, and that the book must contain Protestant poison!
Perhaps the most significant clause in this preface is that in which the author
anticipates charges of partisanship. The implication is that the book contains, perhaps
the author would even have said it is, a commercial programme. Such a programme
is open to misconstruction or to disapproval from many sides. It will wholly please
no party. To the non-Catholics it will seem to be too strongly imperial or Spanish in
its leanings; to the Catholics it will appear too favorable to Holland, etc. Becher
protests, however, that he has introduced documents into the collection rather as
samples of various sorts of instruments, than because he approves the policies in the
course of which the documents were executed. He continues: “The sole end of this
new edition is on my part to give the reader a formulary of various transactions and
political concepts which serve the welfare of the state” (des gemeinen Wesens).’
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Further expressions in the Preface emphasize the fact that the book was written in an
atmosphere thick with petty political strifes. Prejudice and suspicion would construe
it as a party pamphlet, whether it was so intended or not. Under such circumstances,
neither the author nor his public could take an objective and critical attitude toward
the abstract questions involved. The book attempted to deal with public policy,
primarily commercial, as a matter of pure theory. It was in spite of itself to a large
degree a discussion of immediate policies. In drawing conclusions about its contents,
caution must accordingly always be observed against generalizing specific
conclusions into universal doctrines. Becher did not undertake to present a complete
social philosophy. His purpose must be gathered from his own professions. “It is
enough for me to have done what belongs to an upright German man, namely,
conscientiously and faithfully to have served the German Fatherland and its head, the
Roman Imperial Majesty.”
Becher begins the first section of his introduction with this preamble and definition:
Since I am now to make a beginning of showing wherein the
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outset call to mind that man, as the material of the Republic, is an
animal sociabile, and seeks society, as the sacred text itself says, “It
is not good lhat man should live alone.” In order that he may have a
society, other and more men are necessary, and that these may be
born God has created the female sex and ordained marriage, the end
of which is to be fruitful and replenish the earth. I must call to mind
further that, next to reason, human society alone distinguishes the life
of man from that of the beasts, which society is solely and alone the
fundamental cause, beginning, means, and end of all laws and
ordinances which men, both pagans and Christians, have made for the
preservation of this society. .... If then I were rightly to define a state
I should call it a populous, self-supporting community [eine
volckreiche nahrhafte Gemein].
The two chief elements in the concept are then expanded in turn, to the effect that,
on the one hand, unless a community is populous it cannot defend itself, but must be
the prey of every enemy; and on the other hand, that a populous community is
impossible unless sufficient means of support are at command. The idea is also
emphasized that the people in a community furnish one another mutual support. They
live on one another. “When the members of a community arrange their affairs so that
the one lives from the other, the one can earn his piece of bread from the other, yes
that the one plays his support into the hand of the other, that is the right
community.”
106 Becher accordingly concludes that the community is the third person
of a trinity, people, sustenance, community:
For where the latter exists, there will be no lack of people and
sustenance; where this is disturbed [verstimmt], however, there will
be nothing but hatred, enmity, persecution, oppression of the poor,
exaltation of the rich, rebellion, and finally impoverishment and total
ruin. Accordingly, just as when one is to play on a violin one must
first examine and tune each string, so when its sustenance is to be
assured to a community, attention must certainly be paid to every sort
of human being that is there, and nothing appears to me more
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these most difficult points. Each is left to get his living as he may;
whether he is ruined and ruins a hundred others with him, or he
prospers, with the common gain or loss, prosperity or adversity, no
one asks any questions. Because this is the crucial point, however, I
will do my best to consider and dissect [anatomiren] the members of
the community, in respect to the way in which they should work with
each other in the matter of support, I will try then to put them
together, and to form them into a political skeleton [sceleton
politicum].
In the second section the analysis continues:
There are necessarily two sorts of people in a community: the first,
the majority, the second who are the servants of the former, and here
is included the magistracy [Obrigkeit], which is a servant of the
community, and holds the people in good order and social regulation,
so that one may live by the side of another, because the community
is not for the sake of the magistracy, but the magistracy for the sake
of the community. Also the clergy are the servants of the community
in protecting the soul, the learned who protect the mind [Gemüth], the
physicians, apothecaries, barbers, bathers, who guard the health, the
soldiers who guard the body and the whole state and land. All these
are servants of the community, and although they help to increase and
maintain the societatem civilem, they are still not the community
itself, but as stated only servants of the same, who must be paid and
supported by the community, and hence, in order that they may not
become burdensome to the community, they should be made
proportional by the community, that they should be neither too many
nor too few. For if there are more Bürgermeister than citizens in a
city, more preachers and confessors than hearers and penitents, more
schoolmasters than pupils, more doctors than patients, more soldiers
than citizens and peasants, more nobles than subjects, that land is in
bad shape. .... The other sort of people, who essentially constitute the
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of whom the society most consists, because there are most of them in
the society. Such men now, whose servants the former are, may
properly be divided into three orders. The first is the largest, namely,
the peasant order, the second is the handicraft order, the third is the
tradesman’s order. The last is the smallest order. .... While the peasant
order is the most numerous, it is also the most necessary. .... In the
peasant order there are various classes. .... Hence the infallible rule,
Where there is no peasant, the handicraftsman has no material to
work over, and where nothing is worked over there the tradesman
can have nothing to sell; moreover, while the peasant cultivates the
field, he cannot be at home, and while the handicraftsman works at
home, he cannot run about and sell his wares, and while the
tradesman does this he cannot be a peasant or a handicraftsman.
Hence follows the undoubted conclusion, These three orders should
not be mixed together, but it should be possible for them to stand
close together and to make a real community; that is, to support each
other, for where this occurs, .... the object of a proper Policey is
attained, i.e., a respectable and necessary human society.
Referring not to the cameralists in general, but to Becher in particular, I cannot
refrain from pointing out the resemblance of the first part of this remarkable passage
to a pearl in a swine’s snout. If we accept the gem as genuine, we must confess that
its occurrence at just this point is an unexplained sport of nature. It seems to shed
almost pure light of insight into the vicarious character of human society. It is an
ungrateful task to inquire in this case if things really are as they seem, but I find
myself unable to accept these appearances at full value. The evidence hardly warrants
a theory in explanation of ideas which seem to be so at variance with the conceptions
of the time. If I were to propose an explanation it would be that this was merely
imitation of pulpit conventionalities, and repetition of a stilted form which was not
vital with new insight and had not even retained the spirit of the New Testament
doctrine of which it was a hollow echo.
I will add but a single query. If Becher actually saw that society is a system of
reciprocal services, if he saw that the performance of functions for one another is that
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undesirable citizen, if he used the term “servant” as a dignifying epithet for citizens
of the former class, by what reasoning or association of ideas did he draw the line
between the few whom he classed as servants of society and the many whom he left
in the ignominious company of the served ? Until we are instructed by what right the
tiller of the soil and the artisan and the tradesman are rated as essentially less
serviceable to their fellows than those who carry on the relatively non-essential
occupations, we must conclude that Becher’s apparent penetration must be held
under suspicion as tawdry rhetorical embellishment.
We come then to the body of the book, the first part of which treats of “the form of
the government, that is, of those who rule and of those who assist them therein.” We
may repeat that it is not our purpose to investigate the evolution of cameralism. We
are not attempting to make out the stages in the elaboration of the system. We are not
drawing specific comparisons between the programmes of administration outlined
by the successive writers, nor are we trying to appraise the relative merits of their
proposals as a governmental technique, We are studying them in turn in order to be
justified in presenting what they have in common as a typical attitude toward social
problems. We shall present that attitude as it seems to be most characteristically
defined in Justi. Our use of the other writers is rather for the purpose of assembling
features which belong in a composite picture, than to distinguish degrees of
theoretical completeness or variations of technical detail. We refer therefore to his
table of contents for more specific indications of Becher’s analysis, and we confine
our further observations to a few items which may serve as shadings for the picture.
For this purpose we find the opening paragraph available, viz.:
As concerns the first point, namely the kinds of civic authorities
[Obrigkeiten], five sorts are to be distinguished, first spiritual or
secular. The proverb runs, “where parsons rule, there is no good in
the end.” Because their government is not hereditary, their aim is only
to enrich their own, et fit pax in nostris diebus. If a war comes, they
make themselves scarce, after the manner of the hireling in the
gospel. A secular lord does not do this, for the sheep belong to him,
and since there is a succession, such rulers strive much more for the
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Here speaks the partisan, and he reflects one of the sharpest contrasts of his day.
The issue was in some respects more acute in Catholic than in Protestant states. In
the former, the Reformation had agitated and modified, but had left the social
structure externally unchanged. There was accordingly quite as much restiveness
under clerical influence, and sometimes even more, than in the Protestant states,
where the political power of the clergy was assumed to have been broken. In Catholic
and Protestant states alike, the struggle between state and church was not ended, but
merely changed in detail. Neither Catholic nor Protestant clergy were by any means
cured of their lust for power. Whether openly or covertly there was almost
everywhere antagonism between the two types of pretension. In nearly every German
state the antithesis between the temporal and the spiritual power was as real if not as
evident a political factor as it had been when the immediate form of the issue was
Papacy or Anti-Papacy. So long and so far as this conflict was undecided, the
cameralism of a given German state was in part one of the military arms of that
secularism which was still in battle array against ecclesiasticism.
With entire sang-froid as to co-ordination of categories, Becher follows tradition
in naming as the other types of government: third, aristocracy, fourth, democracy,
fifth, a mixture of these.
The basic theorem of Becher’s cameralism is in the proposition:
Monarchical government has the advantage over all the others, and is
the most usual. Indeed it is, so to speak, a duplicate of the divine
government, established in the Holy Scripture, accepted of all nations,
and very profitable for the community (p. 14).
The claim on which Bechcr chiefly relics to support the theorem is this:
A lord who has a succession is more concerned for his land and
people, and makes their interests more his own [hält bey ihnen stich]
than a government to which the sheep do not belong (sic).
Consequently a monarchical government is when a ruler has his own
land and people, and governs over them according to his own will
without interference and limitation [Einreden und Massgeben], but
has such rule in heredity.
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In discussing the merits and demerits of the different types of governments, Becher
assembles a list of counts against monarchy and aristocracy which modern democrats
have judged to be decisive. A sample of his quality may be cited from the paragraph
in which he disposes of democracy:
Namely, where the officials are under obligation to account to the subjects for their
government, and the subjects, if they please, are present in council, and contribute
their best observations, also see and hear the business that is transacted. But the lacks
above found in aristocracies are also found in democracies. In addition to those it
must be mentioned specifically that in the democratic government (sic) there is no
respect for the authorities [der Obern], by reason of the multitude there is no secrecy,
by reason of the number of voices there is often an unskilful consultum, in a word,
in this sort of government occur too often factions, seditions and rebellions.
Having considered the pure governmental forms, Becher discusses mixed forms
under the two heads Monarchal (sic) and Aristocratic (pp. 16 ff.) and reaches almost
the identical judgment in favor of mixed monarchy which he expressed four pages
earlier in favor of pure monarchy, viz.:
Among all sorts of governments this mixed form retains the
preference, and is most in vogue in Kurope. Indeed the Roman
Empire itself consists at this moment of such a government. The
Roman emperor is the supreme head, and presents a monarch. The
eight Electors are the Seniores Imperil, et Patres conscripti, the
princes, estates, and cities present as it were a democracy. All these
three parts secure themselves against one another. Thus the electoral
princes require of the emperor the capitulation, while on the other
hand they must take the oath of allegiance to him. Princes, estates,
and cities of the Empire also co-operate in both ways, and enter into
both the above forms of obligation. .... This mixed form of
government then is the sole conservation of the Roman Empire, the
guarantee that it will never be an absolutum purum vel
aristocraticum,  or a Democraticum Imperium, for if this should
happen the remaining freedom would be at an end. .... The mixed
form is thus the best, but it should be in superlativo monarchical, in
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evident that the Roman emperor in this mixed government should
have the most to say, and that it would not be well if the imperial
sovereignty were too strictly held down by capitulations. ....
One who had read Seckendorff would instantly decide that in this chapter he was
dealing with an inferior order of mind. There is no such discrimination here as that
which we found in Der Fürsten Staat between the king and the tyrant, although we
must confess that the earlier writer was as much in the dark as the later about means
of eliminating the one type and securing the other. I cannot believe that responsible
statesmen, or even strong thinkers of the academic type, could have regarded this
chapter seriously. It bears no marks of derivation from evidence which would have
been likely to carry weight with experienced men, even in that less exacting period.
It is a jumble of judgments about confused and unauthentic statements of fact. It
shows no evidence of insight into the contemporary meaning of the Roman Empire.
It speaks of government as though no more personal interests were concerned than
those of rulers on the one hand, and princes, estates, and cities on the other. It is in
short a schoolboyish essay on a subject of which the elements were not
comprehended by the writer. It had approximately the same relation to the more
respectable contents of the book which we shall discover below between the
historical survey at the beginning of Justi’s Staatswissenschaft and the portions of
which he was competent to speak from pertinent evidence. It was the perfunctory
work of a man retained by a type of government which he was bound to support.
The second chapter (pp. 20 ff.) treats of the “qualities and correlations of those who
rule and those who serve the ruler.” The style suggests the hearsay quality of the so-
called “society novel,” written by an author whose ideas of society are gained through
other novels or the newspapers and observation of supposed representatives of
society in public places. One can hardly imagine that the ruling class could have had
any use for the book, except to promote its circulation among those in whom rulers
and their courtiers would like to inculcate the notion that their superiors consulted
such oracles.
For example, the first specification is that a ruler—
.... must before all things consider whether he has come legitimately
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infallibly rest all his future weal or woe, and easily guess that he who
seizes at government by violence will also usually be expelled by
force and he whose cause is just will have God’s help, though all the
world should be opposed.
A most edifying doctrine, but hardly likely to strike the ruling classes as a novel
variation of the stock formulas of the preachers, or to exert great influence against the
esoteric practices of their kind. The second specification is a similar platitude, viz.:
The magistracy must preserve order in its affairs, and must observe
a strict routine: i.e., not write letters when it is the time to go to
church, not hunt when a session of the council should be held, etc.,
etc.
The third detail is one which a Louis XVI, for instance, found it difficult to arrange,
viz.:
A ruler must be sagacious, and himself understand the art of
governing, in order that he need not always believe the doctors. There
are sometimes rulers who are not sagacious, others are too sagacious.
The first do not know how to discriminate between counsels, and
must therefore follow all their advisers. The others will never follow
advice, and resort to compulsion whenever they are opposed.
It does not seem to have occurred to Becher that, under the regime in which he was
employed, it would be just as logical for a writer on farming to specify the sorts of
weather to be desired. The specifications would have had as much competence
practically in the one case as in the other.
Fourth, some rulers are too diligent, others too indolent. .... Fifth,
there are rulers who in their action and character are either too
deliberate or too hasty. .... Sixth, sometimes rulers have too short
memories, and sometimes they remember grudges too long. ....
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.... Eighth, in all these things it will be very helpful if a ruler has a
care for his authority, does not make himself too common, but is
heroic, brave and resolute: but he must not be too distant, arrogant,
and proud. .... Ninth, a ruler, government, and land should seek the
same consideration among neighboring states as at home, but to that
end should not be quarrelsome, etc. .... Tenth, a ruler must find the
mean between prodigality and parsimony. .... Eleventh, a ruler should
be neither too communicative nor too reserved. .... Twelfth, the
cardinal virtue of great lords and rulers is, finally, that they should be
just and merciful. Too severe is tyranny, too sympathetic is
womanish.
There follows, in similar style, a series of ten propositions, which Becher calls “the
ten commandments” for the use of rulers in relations with their servants. The
illustrations by which the several specifications in the two series are enforced contain
rich material for the culture history of the period. They show that the abuses which
at length doomed quasi-absolutism were evident enough, even then, to those who
cared to observe them. But they show more plainly that they had hardly begun to
make for modification of the fundamental political presumptions held by cameralistic
theorists. The inference from them is merely, “the wise ruler should do so and so.”
The fact that the presumptions of quasi-absolutism provide the people with no way
of requiring the ruler to observe these precepts had not yet weakened these
presumptions in the minds of the cameralists. We shall find that this continues to be
the case, with no acknowledged modification, and so far as decisive evidence goes
with no great modification even in the private opinion of this type of theorist, until
the movement for constitutionalism had won its right to recognition.
On the other hand, the total impression of the collection of commonplaces in the
chapter before us is that of a rather strong appeal to the self-interest of princes to
observe the rules of prudence and justice in the treatment of their people. There is
surprising directness in the hint contained in such words as these:
A great lord must know that he must deal cautiously with soldiers and
learned folk, for sword and quill are two sharp and glorious
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previously served, and the quill can praise and blame, it can write
panegyrics and satires, it can also write those things which find their
way to the ends of the earth, and no one is exempt from its influence.
Hence it is well for great lords to be more careful with their servants
and subjects than with their closest kin (p. 27).
The bearing of the material prosperity and moral well-being of the subjects upon
the strength of the state and of the prince is repeatedly urged, and indeed is seldom
entirely out of sight in the cameralistic arguments. The intimate history of the court
of each German principality would have to be investigated in connection with the
cameralistic doctrines current from generation to generation in each, if we were to
know how actual government and the theories of the cameral-ists reacted upon each
other as alternate cause and effect.
In chap, iii, on “the form and order of a good government,” Becher attempts to set
forth “the universal political laws by which land and people are conveniently and
well governed.” He regards it as necessary, however, to begin the chapter with “a
short digression, and as a preliminary to show how and whence magistracies and laws
are derived, how they must be constituted [bestellt] and how far they extend.”
The origin of governments is explained upon the traditional dogmatic basis, and
there is nothing to indicate that the stilted thought and expression contained anything
more than prudent reflection of prevailing orthodoxy. Thus:
Government is said to be the means by which man is enabled to live
according to his nature, which is created in the divine image. This
nature is made up of five elements [Stücke], each corresponding to
one of the cardinal elements in the nature of the divine being. These
latter are, (1) his existence, (2) his perfection, (3) his omniscience, (4)
his omnipotence, (5) his eternity. Accordingly, after “the fall,” by
which man had lost the ability to realize the divine image in himself,
God instituted government, and gave laws to bind men to the laws of
nature. Since the laws of nature are of five sorts, so there are now in
the world five strata [Stände], laws and governments, (1) The
spiritual stratum and its laws affect religion. (2) The moral laws affect
honor, virtue, good conduct, and the nobility (sic!). (3) The doctrinalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 109
stratum and its laws affect the learned and sciences. (4) The civil
courts pertain to possessions, sustenance, and goods. (5) The criminal
court has to do with body and life, under which may be included the
maintenance of health, and defense by force and war. The exposition
continues:
“Since in these five points all is included which belongs to the
maintenance of the human condition, in order to govern these five
kinds of laws and their subjects, that is, to hold men in the state of
humanity and the natural laws, God has ordained magistracy [Obrig-
keit] which should be obeyed as God himself. As has been said, it is
the office of the rulers by good laws to maintain, protect, govern, and
control their subjects in the true religion; love and knowledge of God;
in good morals, discipline, honor and integrity; in good and various
sciences; with respect to their support and honorable earnings, their
health and life, also legitimate increase. In these five points consists
the origin of all laws and the foundation of authority and obedience.
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.... Hence arises an important double question, namely, in what form
princes, lords and the nobility in their government receive an
hereditary succession and complete power over the subjects? Is it that
they should make them chattels, and sell them at will to others,
incidentally with no respect for the above-mentioned welfare of the
subjects; i.e., that they should act contrary to all the five points above
indicated; and can subjects with good conscience obey rulers of this
sort?”
Becher’s attempt to answer the latter question throws still stronger light upon the
obsession of quasi-absolutism which is the determining factor in the thought of the
time. He had no difficulty in entertaining the supposition that a ruler might be
oppressive. The possibility does not appear to have shaped itself in his imagination
that the oppressed might conceivably govern themselves. When the hypothetical
question is put in terms which make obedience to an oppressive ruler intolerable, the
only alternative which Becher is able to consider is recourse to another ruler. Thus
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Here arises the most difficult question, Who shall pass on the errors
of the government? For it is not seemly “for the subjects themselves
to censor their government. I say therefore they should lay their
complaints before their neighbors 
109 or other unpartisan judges, and
urge their government to answer, and much rather intrust the matter
to strangers, than attempt to carry it out themselves (p. 45).
Immediately following this passage, Becher distinguishes between pagan and
Christian slavery. He calls the former tyrannical; he pronounces the latter conducive
to the good of the subjects. He urges accordingly that peasants have no right to resist
their lords, when the latter coerce them for their own (the peasants’) good!
Thereupon he adds the judgment that rulers will be condemned by the heavenly
powers to temporal misfortune and eternal punishment if they are utterly regardless
of their subjects’ good.
Having thus satisfied his conscience by warning rulers of the supposed
consequences of misusing their power, Becher turns to the positive question, By what
means are the five departments of government above indicated to be carried on? The
reply is that a ruler who purposes to govern with regard to what has been said, should
organize five distinct collegia, each to have in charge one of the five sorts of laws
and administration above scheduled.
The first collegium should have charge of the souls of the subjects, their religion,
worship, fear of God, etc. The second should care for the moral discipline of the
subjects. The third should be charged with the education of youth, promotion of the
sciences, etc. The fourth is civil, and attends to ordinary questions touching temporal
prosperity of the state, property, outlays, and income. The fifth might be called
collegium vitale, for its duties are with the health and protection of the subjects,
against both secret and public enemies.
The further exposition of the duties of these bureaus consists more of incoherent
complaints about evils which need correction in the different groups of activities than
of technical details. The inference is that most of this organization, so far as the
author was informed, was not yet in existence. Thereupon follows in the fourth
chapter a sample scheme of Policey. It is a plan approved by the bishop of Mainz for
adoption in his episcopal city, but apparently not actually put into execution (p. 60).
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municipal conditions in Mainz at the middle of the seventeenth century.
The speculative and academic character of this first part of the Discurs leaves the
impression that it was in effect rather hortatory than responsible. The inference which
it suggests throughout is that, so far as Becher was acquainted with the facts,
provision for all these details of administration was incomplete and inefficient.
Part II proposes an analysis of “the material of the republic, that is, of those who are
governed, namely the subjects.” In comparison with the first part, this portion of the
book seems to reflect less certain conventional forms of thinking, if not of acting, and
more of the author’s own individuality. Although this second part is amateurish
enough, it bears evidence of closer approach to the affairs discussed than is visible
in the earlier chapters. The inference that the author was not primarily a cameralist
is strengthened. That is, in the course of his occupational mutations he had now
become interested in promoting trade. Under the circumstances of the time, the only
hope of accomplishing much in this direction was through governmental initiative.
Becher accordingly patched his appeal for attention to the promotion of trade into a
sort of general cameralistic scheme. It does not appear, however, that the aim to
strengthen the government was as distinctly central and paramount in his thinking as
in the programmes of the more typical cameralists. Indeed, we may say that, so far
as this book is concerned, he was in rather striking contrast with them. His chief
purpose could not be called economic in the scientific sense, but it was primarily
commercial and secondarily political. If Roscher had not ranked him with the
cameralists, the perspective of the literary history of the period would be more
accurately indicated by passing him over with a much briefer notice than the undue
prominence given to him by Roscher will permit.
This second part of the Discurs may be described as an account of the state of trade
in Germany. The subject is approached through a characterization of the three strata
that make up the bulk of the population—the traders, the artisans, and the peasants.
Because this was more nearly fallow ground as a literary theme than the subject of
government in the abstract, Becher could appropriate less in the way of current
generalization, and the result is a painful exhibition of untrained powers of
expression. The style is hopelessly involved. The sentences run distractedly from one
predicate into another, and their relation to their subjects is left so largely to the
discretion of the reader that the precise affirmation intended by the author is always
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is the main line of thought (pp. 98 ff.):
1. These three strata should be under one administration, not three, else confusion
will result.
2. The main end to be aimed at for these strata is increase of their numbers.
3. Consumption is the center and source of the well-being of these strata. The
fundamental aim of governmental policy therefore should be to promote
consumption. In a word, consumption maintains these three strata. Consumption is
their soul. Consumption is the only means of binding these strata together, and it
enables them to live upon one another. For promoting consumption, indeed, the
trading stratum is necessary in the community in proportion to the size of the peasant
stratum. The latter increases the population, but the former nourishes it (sic), for as
I shall presently show, the sole consumption of these three strata, and thus their
sustenance, depends on the merchant, for the artisan lives on him and the peasant on
the artisan. I am best acquainted with such of this stratum as are wholesalers
[Verläger].
110 . . . . These wholesalers must truly be regarded as the foundation pillars
of the community.
4. Trade in foreign goods, when the same could be produced at home, makes for the
destruction of the community. Instead of favoring men who enrich themselves by
bringing in foreign goods, we ought to deal with them as the meanest criminals (p.
106). On the other hand, those merchants by whom the state gains in money and
sustenance are, next to nature, the nursing-mother that makes the desert to bloom.
This theme is elaborated with a zeal that the earlier sections did not betray.
5. These three strata have three dangerous and highly harmful and destructive
enemies: the first checks population, viz., Monopolium; the second limits means of
support, Polypolium; the third divides the community, Propolium.
In a following section these three abuses are considered in turn; the first being
described as “when one member alone in the community has that in the way of
support upon which otherwise many others could live.” The term Polypolium
(unrestricted competition for employment) is defined by the statement:
“In order to remedy the evils of monopoly the Dutch have abolished
all ‘Zünffte,’ and have admitted Polypolium, in that everyone is at
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thither in great numbers and rob one another of work .... by which the
traders and wholesalers keep the artisans in constant poverty and
toil.”
Propolium is not directly defined, but Becher evidently uses the word in the sense
of the old English terms “forestalling” and “engrossing.”
From this general introduction Becher passes to his specific and technical material,
the state of trade, and wise methods of promoting it, through a general account of
trading companies, as devices by which the evils of monopoly and of Polypolium
may be avoided. Having specified the general conditions under which he would have
the privileges of such companies restricted, Becher divides trade into fourteen types,
“to which all others may be reduced.” For each of these branches of trade he proposes
the organization of a trading company under governmental patronage and control.
This then completes the theoretical part of the book. The remainder is occupied,
first, with a survey of the condition of each of these fourteen branches of trade,
second, with a miscellaneous collection of documents illustrating commercial and
other transactions more or less properly governmental, with which in most instances
Becher claims to have had somewhat intimate connection.
We may append all that it is necessary to say about the second of the three men
named in the opening paragraph of this chapter.
Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick (sometimes written Hörnigk, Horneck, etc.) was born
in 1638. He sjjent his early years in Vienna, studied law at Ingolstadt, and obtained
the Doctor’s title there in 1661. He lived a considerable time at Vienna, visited the
German courts on a political mission in the company of the Spanish Franciscan and
Bishop of Croatia, Christopher Rojas, and about 1690 entered the service of Cardinal
Lamberg, Prince Bishop of Passau, as Privy Counselor. He died in 1712. His first
political publication was Hippophili Galeacii de Corneliis Francopolitae wahrer
Bericht von dem alien Konigreich Australien, in which he argued for political
consolidation of the estates of the German Empire, and support of a common army
to resist French attempts at annexation. The book which appears to have made most
impression appeared in 1684, with the title, Oesterreich über attes, Wann es nur will.
Das ist: Wohlmeinender Fürschlag, Wie Mittelst einer Wohlbestellten Landes-
Oeconomie, Die Kayserl. Erb-Lande in kurtzem über alle andern Staaten von Europa
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machen.
From all the allusions to the book which I find in the cameralistic series, as
distinguished from later commentators, I discover no reason for crediting the author
with firstrate constructive influence upon the theory. Roscher quotes the publisher
of the edition of 1784 to the effect that “Austria owes to this book the greater portion
of its well-being.” If this is not gross exaggeration, it is very strange that the theorists
betray so little sense of debt to him. Since I have been unable to examine the book,
my opinion is of little value, but all the indications which the succeeding cameralistic
books contain lead me to classify Homick with his brother-in-law Becher by the
modern commercial term “promoter.” Apparently Hornick made an impressive
argument for industrial and commercial development. If he did more than this for
cameralistic theory, I have been unable to trace it. (Vide Inama, All. d. Bib., in loc.,
and Roscher, pp. 289 ff.)
The following paragraphs contain the substance of Roscher’s account of Hornick’s
book.
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This book was written under immediate influence of impressions made by the
frightful experiences, of Germany, and especially Austria, in the eastern and western
wars between 1680 and 1684. I recall only on the side of Louis XIV “the Chambers
of Reunion,” 1680, the conquest of Strassburg and Casale, 1681, the French invasion
of the Spanish Netherlands, 1683, the seizure of Luxembourg and Trier, 1684: all as
humiliating as the contemporary siege of Vienna by the Turks was horrible. “The
cunning of the French has brought almost everything into such chaos, that one can
reckon one’s dates from nothing except God and oneself,” says Hornick (chap. ii).
But the author hopes for “decisive war with that arrogant nation” which “will find its
way into France” (25). The thing to do is to make economic preparations for that
alternative, especially as France bases its predominance quite essentially upon
economic things. “Would to God we might take the general French programme
[allgemeine Lands-Oeconomie] in many particulars as a good model (23). No state
in Europe can look to its policy, without either in much or in little thereby breaking
with hated France” (33). There can be no more dallying in Austria. The might of a
people depends essentially upon the ratio of its means to those of its neighbors. Now
Germany, as compared with the mighty advances made by France, England, and
Holland in the last hundred and fifty years, has not only stood still (7) but through
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greater the necessity of its rise, and especially through the same programme which
has made Holland and France so rich, in spite of all the wars, which at this moment
is followed by the English against France (24). The state must prevent “loss of our
best blood, the very marrow of our strength, our good gold and silver, by the million,
by purchase of useless wares from our hereditary enemies.”
It cannot be said that Hornick identified possession of money with wealth. On the
contrary he made this definition: “The power and excellence of a land is its surplus
of gold, silver, and all other things necessary or convenient for its subsistence, and
so far as possible derived from its own means, without dependence upon others, and
including the appropriate cultivation, use and application of the same” (9). Quite
special worth must be attributed to the independence of a land, which to be sure can
never be complete, but must always be aimed at as an ideal. Everything pertaining
to the thrift of a land falls into two classes: Gold and silver, and indeed copper,
“which in their worth and use equal all other things, and on account of their civic use
are in a class by themselves;” then the means of food, clothing, shelter, etc. A land
that had only gold and silver would be rich, to be sure, but very dependent, since gold
and silver can neither feed nor clothe people. A land that has all other things except
gold and silver is somewhat more independent, to be sure, but yet not sufficiently so,
“because gold and silver are somewhat necessary in the most of human
circumstances, while in the rest they are indispensable.” A land with neither of the
two species of goods in its own resources, like Holland or Genoa, is insecure, even
in the most splendid development of its commerce. Most independent is the land
which is rich in both classes of goods, for example, China (8). The comparison of
gold with the blood leads Hornick to the thought that the princely treasure may play
the role of the heart (22). Yet he is not consistent. His views on mining and on
foreign trade are rather quite mercantilistic. “It were better, no matter how strange it
may appear to the ill-informed, to pay two Thaler for a ware if they remain in the
country, than one if it is to leave the country” (9). It also sounds paradoxical, but it
is true, that mining should be continued even when its cost is much in excess of its
output. “The outlay remains in the country; what is extracted from the earth remains
not less in the country.” Accordingly the state is as much richer from the so-called
Freibauzechen as a merchant who gets 100 per cent, on his capital (31).
Hornick bases these views on the difference between the thrift of individuals and
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even makes the fine observation, somewhat in advance of his time, that the so-called
cameral-management (as we say, Finanzwirthschaft) is “particular management,”
thus maintainable only on the basis of the general thrift of the country. This latter is
the chief reason why the attention of the state to the general thrift cannot be rated as
a mere parergon of the treasury (2, 32).
112
Quite in the spirit of the mercantile system are the “nine chief rules of public
economy,” svhich Homick offers as “a merchant’s or cameral alphabet” (9): (1)
Precise investigation of a land, also through experiments, and full use of its
productive capacity, especially of precious metals; (2) transformation (Verarbeitung)
in the country itself of all raw materials not fit for use in their natural state; (3)
utmost increase and useful employment of population; (4) no export nor useless
hoarding of gold and silver; (5) so far as possible, restriction to use of home products;
(6) necessary foreign wares should be exchanged at first hand, and not for money, but
for home products, and (7) so far as possible (they should be bought [?]) in
unmanufactured form; (8) greatest possible export of “superfluous” home products,
and preferably for gold and silver; (9) no importation to be permitted, if enough of
the same goods, and of tolerable quality, can be furnished at home.
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To the author these rules seemed such an obvious version of “eyes open and hands
ready to take hold,” that he thought “their reasonableness must be evident to
everybody. Only a peasant might not be able to understand them” (24). Whoever
contradicts them, sit nobis velut ethnicus et publicanus et patriae hostis (3).
The bulk of Hornick’s book is an attempt to furnish proof that Austria, more than
any other European state, possesses the natural endowment for economic
independence and wealth. It has at once productive veins of the precious metals (and
not so far off as Spain’s!) and abundance of the chief necessities of life (10–14).
Everything to be sure is still in the highest degree undeveloped. There is no enterprise
or venture, the richest natural treasures are allowed to lie unused, raw materials are
exported to be brought back at doubled price in manufactured form, the population
is sparse, their luxury seeks mostly foreign products, etc. (16–18). Still the
inhabitants are by no means lacking in mental equipment for trade and industry (15).
It occurs here, as usual, that the raw material countries are poorer than those where
manufactures flourish, that the former, if they will, can supply the lack “by proper use
of their raw materials,” and then can be more secure than the latter (8). Hence there
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down, and Hornick urges that this programme should take the form of total
prohibition of imports in case of silk, woolen, linen, and French manufactured
articles (22). Violations should be punished as treason (23). Then, in his judgment,
all the inconveniences of the transition period would be passed in a few years at
most. Many foreigners, who have hitherto supplied our market, will settle in the
country and continue their industry (21). The necessary amounts of capital will be
created of themselves, through discontinuance of the outflow of money. Inordinate
rise of prices for domestic goods could be prevented by the government, by
establishing scales of prices (24).
Hornick urges further that artists and great Verleger should be more honorably
treated by the state (28); and he argues that a maritime country without naval strength
cannot be powerful; while naval power without sea commerce is impossible (30). On
the utility of means of exhibiting the. resources of the state, on the harm of guild
abuses, the classification of traders into the publicly useful and the harmful, he is
quite in accord with Becher. Privilegia privata are to be regarded with suspicion;
their reasonable purpose, namely, control of consumption in the public interest, may
be better secured through prohibition of imports, and then free domestic trade (28).		
The third of the group mentioned in the preceding chapter was Wilhelm Freyherr
von Schröder.
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No writer in the cameralistic series has been portrayed in more conflicting colors.
On the one hand, he has been represented as an oracle of cameralistic wisdom, and
a model of civic righteousness. On the other hand, so long as his influence was
apparent, equally extreme depreciation of his character and doctrines was uttered.
This latter estimate is typified by the remarks in a private letter by Seckendorff
(quoted by Roscher, p. 294). Speaking of Schröder’s book, Seckendorff says:
“stultissimus liber, et pravis repletus opinionibus .... a homine perverso; et hos tamen
homines foment principes.”
In a certain sense this second type of appraisal of Schröder gives him an importance
which he would not have obtained if he had always been treated judicially. In spite
of his admirers, he occupies on the whole the place of a suspicious character in the
literature of the subject. To express it melodramatically, he is the heavy villain,
whose shadow ever and anon falls athwart the plot. Even if later writers do not refer
to him by name, ideas which were rightly or wrongly attributed to him, and which
were not indorsed by cameralists in general, constantly recur. They not only furnish
many texts on which the cameralists delivered homilies against tendencies to which
they might have given the name Schröderismus, but perversely enough, these more
or less imaginary faults of Schroder have come down to our time as peculiarly
characteristic of cameralism. The perversion, the exaggeration, the exception have
thus been reported as the rule. In order to reach an objective judgment of cameralism,
therefore, it is necessary to form a correct estimate of the man who has been used
more than any other to prejudice its reputation. With the help of the article by
Marchet, the necessary bibliographical details about Schroder may be summarized.
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There has been much inaccuracy in accounts of his life, especially throughAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 119
confusion of his career with that of his father. The latter represented Gotha in the
negotiations for peace at Osnabrück in 1643. In 1654 he took a prominent part in the
Diet at Augsburg; he became Kanzler and Geheimrath, and died, 1663. The younger
Schroder with whom we are concerned, is known only from the time of his entrance
into Austrian service. Possibly as early as 1663, not later than 1673, be became a
member of the English “Academy of Sciences,” and he maintained rather intimate
relations with England throughout his life. One of the faults in his writing was his
failure precisely to indicate the English sources which he freely used.
Schroder succeeded Becher as director of the Manufacturhaus at Vienna. Becher
had lost favor, partly because of his irascible temper and arbitrary manner, partly
because he was accused of conducting his office with an eye primarily to his own,
rather than the public, interest. Two years before Becher was removed, Schroder was
called upon to make a report to the emperor on existing manufacturing conditions in
Austria, and he took the opportunity to make propositions about expanding industries
and making them profitable for the treasury. Marchet says:
“With Becher and Homick, Schroder composed the triple constellation which from
the seventh to the ninth decades promoted the industrial advance of Germany and
especially of Austria. I should arrange the series in the order Homick, Becher,
Schroder. They used approximately the same means, viz., opposition to guild abuses,
especially through destruction of the guild monopolies, and the establishment of a
Manufactur Haus, high tariff on foreign industrial products, especially French goods,
the attainment of a favorable balance of trade, etc. Hornick was most aggressive, and
did not stop to think of his own interests; Becher and Schroder acted more cautiously,
and with more consideration for their own advantage. The means for attaining these
purposes was for all three the absolute prince. Schroder was in the most advanced
line in this respect, and swayed between the interest of the prince and that of the
people without a fixed point of attachment, although he always affirmed that the
prince can be happy and prosperous only when the subjects themselves are well
situated. With this conception of the paramount character of the princely power,
Schroder takes a rank far behind Seckendorff, and occupies the standpoint of Horn.
.... In spite of his subservience to princes, Schröder must count as one of those
persons who helped to lift Germany from that economic depression and national
decline into which the Thirty Years’ War and the predominance of the territorial
lords had plunged it.”Albion Small, The Cameralists, 120
A study of Schröder’s writings without previous prejudice leads to conclusions
somewhat different from either of those cited. We shall try to present a completely
objective judgment.
In the first place, Schroder took the doctrine of divine right, with an extremely
absolutistic interpretation of the right, literally, seriously, and as compared with most
of his successors, consistently. That is, instead of clinging to the essential doctrine,
while glossing it over with all sorts of disguises to conceal its extravagance, Schroder
frankly accepted conclusions along with premises. On the whole, we are bound to
feel a certain respect for this rugged type of intellectual integrity, in contrast with the
perplexed philosophy which insists upon primary theorems but balks at their logical
consequences.
It would be difficult to find in the whole literature of “divine right” a more compact
and uncompromising profession of the faith than in Schröder’s Disquisitio Politico
Vom absoluten Fürstenrecht.
116 In substance his position is this: 
It is the common madness of scholars to assume that all governments,
the monarchical included, are based upon certain compacts between
chiefs or rulers, and their subjects. They assume that the rulers arc
consequently bound to observe these compacts rigidly.
For my part, I fail to see who shall have bound this yoke on the neck of monarchical
government, since the same had its beginning not in a compact between the prince
and the people, because Saul was made king by the immediate declaration of God,
who also caused him to be anointed by his prophets before the people knew the least
thing about it. Moreover God had the jura and praero-gativ of this king and his
successors put on paper and proclaimed and published by the heralds (I Sam. 8:9).
And in order that such jura might not in the course of time be obsolete or weakened,
the same had to be put aside and guarded in the archivo for the Lord (I Sam. 10:25).
Moreover the Holy Ghost himself was so careful about this whole matter, that with
his own fingers he wrote the whole history and the first origin of the kings, with their
rights and prerogatives, in the great book of the unchangeable truth of God,
commonly called the Holy Bible, and he saw fit to substantiate the memory of the
same to the end of the world. Moreover the people voluntarily abandoned all further
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that when the king was once chosen, they would no longer be heard (I Sam. 8: 18,
19).
Such princely right now as God dictated to the pen of Samuel may be read in plain
and clear words, namely:
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿
“This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: 
“1. He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be
his horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots, and he will appoint him
captains over thousands, and captains over fifties.
“2. He will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his
instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots
“3. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks and to
be bakers.
“4. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the
best of them, and give to his officers, and to his servants.
“5. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his
officers, and to his servants.
“6. And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest
young men, and your asses, and put them to his work.
“7. He will take the tenth of your sheep; and
“8. Ye shall be his servants.”
With the puerilities of the exegesis and application we have no concern, beyond
recognizing the fact that Schröder simply voiced a certain contemporary orthodoxy,
both in the general practice of grotesque construction of biblical material into
evidence to support preconceptions, and in the particular doctrine of the divine origin
and quasi-absoluteness of princely authority. This latter datum itself, however, must
be put in its true relations with Schröder’s reasoning, and with cameralism as a
whole.
Schröder does not mince words in stating his inferences. He declares that, in
consequence of Saul’s appointment, all Christian princes and potentates derive their
position and right to rule immediately from God. Besides that, “most princely
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their prerogatives with the sword, and I therefore see no way in which this
contradiction that rulers are under obligation to some one or other, of which the
learned write, can have any basis whatsoever.” The author concedes:
There are few monarchs to be sure, who are not involved in a thousand
Capitulationen, transactionen, and recessen, but such arrangements cannot be cited
as a basis of royal rule. They are rather mere limitations to which rulers were
compelled to consent by force of circumstances. They can in no sense be regarded as
subtracting from the right which inheres in the royal office, and which is conferred
upon the prince by God, not by the people. They cannot prejudice the title “by the
grace of God,” since, as we have seen, God left the people no freedom by which they
were entitled to dispute with kings, or to hamper them with restrictions.
Consideration of misuse of royal power is reserved to the divine majesty, and God
has already announced the decision that the people’s complaint will be rejected,
according to the decree published by the prophet Samuel (I Sam. 8:18), “And ye shall
cry out in that day because of your king, and the Lord will not hear you in that
day.”
118 Consequently, although, through many successions, princes and their
posterity have consented and sworn to many things, no jus has been thereby created,
and no prince can be bound thereby, as though he had lost his original divine right.
Hence a sovereign prince is authorized, without violation of a good conscience, in
re-establishing himself, so soon as he has opportunity, in possession of his princely
right, in spite of previous compacts, oaths, prescriptions or whatever the limitations
may be called. This does not mean that a prince is released in his conscience from all
laws, and that he is not bound as a private person to his private contracts, and that he
may at will practice all sorts of tyranny without regard to God, and justice and
Christian love, for he is a man and has to deal with men, and like his subjects he is
a member of the body of Christ. In short, the prince must have respect to the rule
(Eph. 5:9), “know that your master is in heaven.”
The prince must recognize two great obligations as appertaining to his prerogative;
first, that he must administer justice among his people: to wit, according to Christian
love, and the principles and fundamental doctrines of Christianity; second, that he
must be the leader of his people in war, and expose his body and life to defend them
against foreign enemies.
The monograph concludes with this summary:Albion Small, The Cameralists, 123
These two obligations of a prince are truly hard matters, since a
prince, without violation of his conscience, cannot disregard them.
And just as a people, or the subjects, may under no pretext prescribe
laws to their prince and king, and as those which are thus de facto
made have no validity, and do not bind the prince; so on the other
hand a prince must so conduct himself in his government that he may
be able one day to give account to God alone; as David says, “Against
thee, thee only, have I sinned” (Ps. 51:4). And a prince must well
reflect with what a rigid law and severe tribunal he must deal, where
the judge himself is the accuser, and his own conscience must be the
witness against him, where no exception and no excuse can be made,
but where no other penalty will be decreed than eternal woe, torture
and pain.
In the Preface of the Schatz- und Rent-Cammer,
119 the relations of the prince to the
state, and thus the landmarks of the theory to be expounded in the book, are still more
tersely indicated. Having recapitulated the arguments of the publicists on the question
how a prince may best establish his power, viz., he must either (a) pin his hopes to
the powerful class; or, (b) he must make friends of the masses; or, (c) he should rob
and plunder, i.e., he should be a tyrant; the author cancels the last theory from
consideration, on the ground that it is essentially un-Christian, and of the remaining
two doctrines he says:
Between the two views it is not for me to decide, for each prince will
know best where to find support in his own case. For it seems to mo
that those people are very thoughtless who imagine that a prince can
do anything he pleases because he is a prince. Those who talk in this
way do not understand the difficulties of government. They judge
only from outward appearances. They do not know how many small
and large wheels belong in a clock. .... To cope with these difficulties
of government the statesmen rely upon four means, viz.: (1)
sapientiam summam in conslituendo leges; (2) minimum auctoritatem
ut etiam vita religiosa sit; (3) vitae diurni-tulem; (4) bonam fortunam.
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mark with two arrows: first with a standing army, second with plenty
of money in the chest. .... The army may be left to others, but I have
undertaken to write in this little book of the ways in which a prince
may get money. I have taken for granted throughout that the interest
of the prince will be joined with the interest of the subjects, and
accursed be he who intentionally separates the one from the other,
because they cannot prevail unless they are united, and those who
rightly examine the chain by which the members of a state are bound
together must acknowledge, in accordance with sound reason and
experience, that the prosperity and welfare of the subjects is the
foundation upon which all happiness of a prince as ruler of such
subjects is based. .... The common man is not satisfied with words.
He wants good subsistence, cheap times and protection. I have
accordingly shown in general all possible means and ways by which
a prince may make his subjects or his land rich and prosperous. In
order however that a prince, in exacting tribute and in ordering
institutions, may make no mistake, I have advised that he make his
demands where there is something to take, and where he who must
pay can afford it. To that end it is necessary that a prince shall be
informed about his land and his subjects, their occupations and their
gains. I have accordingly proposed the necessary schedules.
Schröder is half apologetic about his proposals (Vorrede, p. 14) and describes his
book as a Utopia. Apparently he does not use the word in quite the usual sense. He
means by it that while his scheme does not profess to correspond with actual
administration in Germany, it is on the other hand not impracticable, and should be
set up as an ideal to be attained. He reiterates his general idea in this way:
I think I have shown how the happiness of a prince is conjoined with that of his
subjects, and the prince himself may be made rich by ways and means which are
opposed neither to God nor to virtue, and that all Machiavellian maxims which are
based upon jealousies, mistrust, secret subtle tricks for oppressing the subjects, and
other tyrannies, should be avoided in all Christian governments, and in their stead
should be introduced, to the advantage of both prince and subjects, mutual
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conscience, and at the last great day of judgment would obtain for prince and subjects
the divine blessing.
Those who, after the common fashion, with Adoram who was over the tribute of
Rehoboam (I Kings, chap. 12), are accustomed to suck the life blood of the people,
may scoff as they will, and may think to gain by it; to me they are like the
geographers who measure off the whole world with their circles on paper, without
the least concern whether the surface of the earth is made of wood or straw, nor how
long it can last, Latronum, non principum est, omnia auferre. A robber strips off my
shirt. A prince does not even demand my coat.
With this preliminary survey of Schröder’s general conception of government, we
may attempt to do justice to the main argument of his book. The opening passage was
seized upon by later writers as containing a sinister meaning, and the whole book was
prejudged accordingly. The paragraph reads:
A prince who has no treasure in the chest, hut plans to rely upon the
good will of his subjects and lands, is walking on stilts: for the
tempers of subjects are lame dogs, with which one can catch no
particular hares. Consequently I cannot agree with those publicists
who so far neglect care for a full treasury and for accumulating a
common fund, that they believe, if a prince only puts himself in the
good graces of the subjects by great liberality, or by waiving all gifts,
he will always in case of need find abundant treasure among them.
Instead of finding a cause of offense in this passage, the historian who has any sense
of social values must give Schroder credit for wise prevision of the necessity of a
well-defined fiscal administration. The German states at his time were not yet fully
through with the process of evolution from the household to the civic type. The
publicists with whom Schröder took issue evidently preferred a regime of hand-to-
mouth patri-archalism to an orderly impersonal system of creating governmental
revenue. There was no issue between the two types of theorists about the
fundamental relations of prince and subjects. The question was simply whether the
relation should proceed upon the basis of a sort of happy-go-lucky plantation
improvidence, or whether there should be an attempt to anticipate fiscal needs by
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stultifying for anyone in our generation, who believes neither that the social process
should have halted with the big-farm type of rural civilization, nor that philosophical
anarchism pictures the structure best adapted to secure the utmost development of
diversified civilization, to decide against Schroder and in favor of his critics. If he
was a king-maker, he was more a Samuel than a Warwick. He cannot be made
responsible for the abuses of governmental power by arbitrary rulers. The things
which the people of the period most wanted required responsible and capable
governments. These governments depended upon relatively fixed sources of income.
The creation of such sources of income gave to rulers in turn power to oppress the
people. The exercise of this power presented problems with which subsequent stages
of civic experience had to deal. Meanwhile it would be hysterical to blame Schröder
for his meritorious work in planning the sort of civic machinery without which the
main purposes of the German peoples of his time could not have been promoted. His
critics were of the type who demand the miracle of arriving at ends without use of the
necessary means. While we cannot accept as general truth all the reasons which
Schröder assigned for his dissent from the policy of relying upon extemporized
popular generosity for governmental supplies, we must judge them in connection
with the state of opinion to which they were addressed. In other words, the whole
issue between him and his critics resolves itself in the retrospect into balancing of ad
hominem arguments. Briefly, the issue reduces to this: a quasi-absolute ruler being
by common consent assumed, and quasi-absolute rulers being inclined to aggression
upon other states than their own, thus constantly jeopardizing the peace and security
of all states, and each state assuming that its own ruler is more devoted to its own
interests than other rulers are, is it wise or not that the ruler should have control of
regular fiscal resources, so that he might act promptly and efficiently for the general
weal? In this connection it would be irrelevant to criticize these premises. Whatever
their merits or demerits, they were the presuppositions of all theorists who had an
appreciable influence upon the passage in political experience which we are
considering. None of the subsequent cameralists so much as hinted at a theory of
government which essentially modified these assumptions.
120 That being the case, we
are bound to conclude that chose cameralists who affected to regard Schroder as a
wicked partner impeached either their own mental competence or their sincerity.
Whatever room there was for difference of opinion about details, we can have little
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give him credit for foresight and service upon the constructive side of the issue—a
fiscal system vs. no system.
It has often been repeated to Schröder’s discredit, for example, that he made it a
part of the right of a prince to prefer his own welfare to that of his subjects, if they
came into collision. The fact is, however, that not a single man in the series, from
Osse to Sonnenfels, ever stated a fundamental theorem about the rights of rulers of
which Schröder’s proposition would not be a consistent and necessary corollary.
Some of them gave pathetic evidence of an unreconciled conflict between judgment
and sympathy, in opinions about specific acts or types of acts. To a modern man
some of these opinions would be utterly irreconcilable with an absolutistic theory of
government. In this connection the cameralists did not have the courage of their
sympathies, however, and they held to their absolutistic theories in general, while
incontinently uttering more democratic opinion about particulars. Even the free-
thinking Justi never ventured to deny in print the essential theorem which Schroder
put in the most uncompromising theological form, viz. (p. 7):
For that is the right of the prince in the empire of Christ which the
prophet David describes, when he says: “He has given thee the
heathen for thine inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for
thy possession,”
121 whence it is seen that the prerogative of kings is
a hereditary right [jus haereditarium], that it is a complete and
proprietary right [völlig und eigenlhümlich Recht], and not as it is
called by the Cromwellians in England, a royal office [officium
Regium]. It does not say, “he has given the heathen a king,” but “he
has given thee the heathen for a possession,” whereby the absolute
government of princes is evidently established. Accordingly it is
impossible that the interest of a prince will not sometimes differ from
the interest of the people. .... When therefore a prince, in order to
conserve his monarchical, not his private interests, must often use
means not agreeable to the people, he can in such cases surely look
for little help from them, and consequently it is not to be hoped that
a prince must rely upon his subjects.
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The discussion which follows, of the advantages of absolute over limited monarchy,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 128
differs in no essential from the views expressed at length, or implied, by all the later
cameralists. It is of course less finished in form than the identical philosophy a
hundred years later, and it has less sense of shame to hide under palliating phrase. It
is more frank than the same doctrine in later and sophisticated types, but no more
justly chargeable with subornation of oppression. The man who believed in the divine
origin and absolute right of kingship, and who tried to show what was necessary to
sustain such an institution, cuts a much more respectable figure in history than men
who still professed allegiance to the premises of the doctrine but hedged on its
conclusions. Even a democrat, to whom the dogma of the divine right of kings is a
childish superstition, but who prefers logical consistency to mental confusion, must
find something to admire in the Bismarckian ring of Schröder’s ultimatum (p. 12):
In order now that a prince may be independent of his subjects, and absolute in
himself, I regard it as safest and most profitable that he should have the hilt in his
hand and money in his chest, whereby he may put his demands into effect, and
prostitute neither himself nor his reputation, nor be obliged to put his subjects off
with fine words, because he is unable to act from lack of means. As Demosthenes
said, “Opus sunt opes.” .... With gold and silver we can work miracles.
If we fairly consider the civic problems of German states in the second half of the
seventeenth century, and if we give Schröder the benefit of his own explanations, we
can no more join with those who treat him as the black sheep of the camera-listic
flock than we can pass a similar judgment upon Alexander Hamilton for trying to lay
a firm foundation for American finance. On the contrary, we must number him
among the sane and wise builders upon the structure of German fiscal administration.
His second chapter, on the directorate of the income of a reigning prince, begins with
a keen analysis of the prevalent unwisdom of European governments in committing
both disbursements and the creation of revenues to the Cammer. The consequence
is, according to Schroder, that when the prince needs money, the tradition-bound
Cammer knows no other way than to hunt out some new objects on which a tax has
not been levied; or to grant some new monopoly; thus causing the subjects to sweat
blood because more of their support is taken away; or to exact a new loan; or to
demand the ox that has grown fat while working on the lord’s estate; or to sell the
claim to some future lucrative service for a large sum of money, or some such device.
By these means the cameralists have made themselves so hated and suspected in the
land that they have frequently been excluded from assemblies of the estates.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 129
“Moreover,” continues Schroder, “this point, so far as I know, has never been
touched. I must therefore dwell upon it, and express my unauthoritative opinion
about it.” The substance of this expanded opinion is that raising the princely revenues
calls for quite other persons and talents from those engaged in the work of
disbursement. Schröder accordingly elaborates work for a comprehensive system of
Policey, although it is not as definitely classified under that title as in most of the
other cameralists, and he does not draw sharp distinctions between measures that
other writers distribute between “Handlung,” “Policey,” and “Finanz.”
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A glance at Schröder’s table of contents would disclose that he was interested in a
wide range of industrial development, which would make both prince and people
richer. He simply concludes (p. 21):
It consequently seems highly necessary that cameral affairs, at present
so called, should be divided into two separate Collegia, the one of
which, as aforesaid, should have the income and the disbursements,
the other should be a Collegium which should have nothing else to do
but to raise the revenues of the reigning prince.
The remainder of the book is devoted to showing the different kinds of work which
such a bureau could do.
As Schröder saw the situation, the treasury officials, from preoccupation, or
ignorance, or both, rather than from evil intentions, were effective smotherers of new
industrial ventures An independent organization should therefore be established by
the prince, with the special duty of attending to the very enterprises for which the
treasury had no competence. Moreover this Collegium ought not to be hampered by
other bureaus. Hence it is properly to be called “summum & absolutum Collegium.”
The members should have large salaries, in order that they need not be forced by their
own pecuniary necessities to prefer their private interests to those of the prince.
Moreover a certain fund should be at the disposal of this Collegium, so that it might
carry out its plans (p. 23). Schroder cites, as an illustration of what he has in mind,
the “Courts of augmentations of the revenues, of the King’s crowone” (27 Hen. VIII).
He anticipates opposition to the plan on the part of the existing court functionaries,
but he sees promise of accomplishing the establishment of the proposed bureau in the
beginnings made “some years ago” by a minister, who is not named, but presumablyAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 130
an Austrian official, whose untimely death postponed the undertaking.
The only plausible hypothesis which remains to account for Schröder’s dubious
reputation among the cameralists is that the reactionary officials set a fashion of
misrepresenting his proposals. A reader of the present day, who should examine his
book without knowing the worst that had been said about it, would pronounce the
author first and foremost a zealot for establishing a stable fiscal system, but at the
same time, and with practically equal earnestness, a champion of popular interests
against official greed. The argument is, in the first place, a most judicial analysis of
the workings of previous systems of taxation. Schröder admits that the traditional
forms of taxation are necessary, and that in extreme cases the rate of the same must
be temporarily raised. He declares that they are inadequate for the needs of the state,
and that they can never be applied with impartial justice (pp. 29 ff.). The people who
rely on them are simply like tenants of the soil, whose only interest is to strip it,
regardless of those who must depend on it for their living afterward.
This is well illustrated, in the case of artisans, by the closing paragraph of chap.
xcii. The subject under discussion is the reasons for the deplorable depression in
German manufactures. The last reason assigned is:
.... the greed of the ruling classes and the consequent bad treatment of
laborers and artisans. For no sooner does a foreign or even a native
handicraftsman by his science, and art, in the sweat of his brow, earn
a better piece of bread than others can ordinarily gain, than the
government falls on him like crows on garbage, and tries to take all
it can. For it says such a fellow ought not to have more. He should
know that he owes his earnings to me as his ruler, who favors his
trade. He should divide with me. Oh! the great foolishness of such
magistracies! They have no idea what it means to have prosperous
subjects. All that they accomplish is to drive such people out of the
country, and at the same time to prevent others from entering.
In the chapter on “Saving as the Second Customary Device for Enriching the
Treasury,” Schroder shows that he had thought much ahead of most of his
comtemporaries in tracing out certain economic relations. His exposition of the false
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exposure of the penny-wise and the pound-foolish policies of certain penurious types
of officials is as merciless as it is just. Incidentally Schroder cites an unnamed
“world-renowned publicist” who blames the untimely parsimony of a treasury chief,
and adds that he “should distinguish between Oeconomiam Rusticam & Oeconomiam
Politicam.” The latter phrase is notable as apparently anticipating the nineteenth-
century conception of economic science. The context shows, however, that the
expression must not be taken in its full modern sense. It apparently connoted only an
undefined perception that rural management could not be taken in all respects as a
model for civic management. This part of the argument concludes with the resume:
Although frugality is a great virtue, it should be exercised with a
certain discretion, and indeed with a prudentia politica. Otherwise it
will be called greed or senseless miserliness. If it is greed, it is the
root of all evil and misfortune, and is more destructive than all
prodigality. If it is unreasoning miserliness, not only the reputation of
the prince, but also his interests will be sacrificed, for always to take
from the country, and in turn to consume nothing, makes the land
waste and barren, the subjects useless, and consequently the prince
poor instead of rich (p. 39).
The argument turns at once to an aspect of the situation which has greater interest
for its connection with another element in cameralism, viz., the so-called mercantilist
theory, of which more must be said later. The author continues:
Sound judgment shows also that when a prince without great reason
takes much money from his subjects, and locks it in his chest, and
guards it as a treasure, both prince and land must finally be ruined and
impoverished. .... The result would be that the country would be
stripped of money to fill the chest of the prince, and that not a
Groschen would be left for him to take from the country as revenue.
This would be reckoning without the host. Whence it follows that if
money, which is the pendulum of the state, which brings all inequality
in the life of the state [Handel und Wandel] into regular movement,
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and needy, and because the means [Ver-mögen] of the country must
then grow only from the soil, the fraction of the people, however, who
really support themselves from the soil and its produce is always the
smallest and poorest portion [Hauffen] in a country, the majority of
the inhabitants of the country, from lark of support, will depart, and
there will remain a barren land and a poor prince; for although the
prince has all that money stored in his chest, and alone preserves what
was otherwise divided among so many, he still cannot be called a rich
prince, although he is called a rich man. .... For common people are
rich in money: a prince, however, is to be regarded as rich only when
he has rich subjects (pp. 42 ff.).
This last passage calls for further preliminaries on the subject of mercantilism. In
no respect has tradition so grossly failed to understand the cameralists of the books,
in distinction from the cameralists of the bureau, as in this connection. The
cameralism of the bureau was a policy with reference to the paramount interests of
the princely treasury. The cameralism of the books was a theory and a technology of
government, with the needs of the treasury taken for granted as the norm of
judgment.
It would be useless to question the notorious fact that the policy called mercantilism
prevailed in Germany during the cameralistic period. It would be fatuous to question
the equally familiar fact that promotion of commerce, with calculation upon a
favorable balance of trade, was the most prominent factor in this mercantilist policy.
It would be quite futile to question the further fact that the cameralists of the books
were virtually unanimous in approving this policy. Our interpretation must take issue
with tradition, first, upon the precise meaning of this mercantilist policy, and, second,
upon the place which the policy occupied within the whole cameralistic theory of
politics.
In the first place, then, mercantilism was a policy, not a philosophy. Speaking for
the cameralists of the books only, because this investigation does not go into the
evidence about the cameralists of the bureaus, there was a political philosophy after
its kind within which the policy had its setting; but the interpretation of mercantilism
as a philosophy has the marks of a fixed idea in the modern literature of the subject,
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most urgent problem which the cameralists had to solve was that of raising revenues
for the prince. In their judgment, the line of least resistance, in cases where it was
practicable at all, was through development of commerce. Almost all the literary
cameralists, consequently, put more emphasis on the fiscal importance of a favorable
trade balance than upon any other single factor in governmental calculation.
Incidentally, their arguments treated money in a way which it has proved very easy
to distort into a dogma that money is the only wealth. They no more believed, nor
intended to assert this, than writers on the financial pages of today’s newspapers
believe and assert that the bank balances of the money centers are the only wealth of
the world. There is rather more prima-facie evidence that the congressional and other
debaters of the Aldrich-Fowler-Vreeland propositions believed in 1908 that an
“emergency currency” is the only wealth, or that the political economists of the
United States since the Civil War have believed that a protective tariff is the only
means of creating wealth, than there is to warrant the historical fiction that the
German mercantilistic theorists held gold and silver to be the only wealth.
In fact, not one of the cameralists generalized the concept “wealth” much more than
the ordinary man on the street does today when he uses the phrase “making money.”
To make the term Reichthum, as it was used by the cameralists, equivalent to the term
wealth in nineteenth-century abstract political economy, is an arrant anachronism.
The term was virtually a synonym of the more technical cameralistic phrase,
bereitestes Vermögen, or “ready means.” Instead of giving to gold and silver the final
and paramount place which tradition makes the cameralists assign to them, these
thinkers were rather remarkably clear in treating them as means to happiness, and
under the circumstances the most decisive means, but they did not raise the larger and
deeper problem. The whole cameralistic experience was an unconscious preparation
for the abstract question, What is wealth ? It was a progressively searching analysis
of the sources from which the people of a state may procure the means of subsistence,
and thus be in a position to turn a part of the output of their gainful occupations into
treasure for the support of government. The inquiry was on the whole so concrete in
its impulse that there was no apparent tendency to extend abstraction beyond the
range of practical transactions. Schröder is nearer than most of the cameralists to the
concept “wealth” in Adam Smith’s sense, however, when he uses the term surplus
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Respecting the surplus, whence it is derived, the same consists either
in rebus naturalibus, or rebus artificialibus, that is, first, it comes
from the natural fertility of the land; or, second, from the diligence of
the men which we make use of in trade when we bring something
from one place, and sell it to advantage in another place and thus
make trade in all sorts of foreign wares in our country; or third, from
the art of men, which is included under the general title manufactures,
each of which must be treated in particular.
Developing the idea of the former source of “surplus,” chap. lxx proceeds in this
vein:
Since then so much depends upon the fertility of the land, a prince should pay good
heed to the Curam Rei Rusticae, in order that the land may be well cultivated, and the
inhabitants may not only derive from it their food and drink but also something to
sell. .... By agriculture (sic) is to be understood not merely that which serves for
eating and drinking, but also the other things that grow out of the earth and belong
to manufactures or to trade.
The proposition is elaborated by citations of the experience of other countries, by
specification of particular products, which are profitable articles of cultivation, by
reference to the book Oesterreich über alles for additional particulars, and by special
emphasis upon silk-culture (Seiden-Oeconomie) as likely to be as valuable to
Germany as it had already begun to be to France. The paramount factor in the
calculation, namely, the conversion of resources into ready means, reappears in the
summary (§xii):
Here, as in the case of all other surplus which we desire, this principle
is to be observed, that the same shall be sought in products which our
neighbors need, and which we can best and with greatest gain convert
into money. Otherwise the surplus is of no advantage to us, but is
often even harmful, since from the same an abuse of the same may
arise.
124
Schroder must be given credit for dealing with the relatively concrete problem of
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must not be judged as though he had anticipated a century and had devoted himself
to the underlying problem of wealth in general. In the rough, the same proposition
applies to all the cameral-ists included in this study. To confirm this in the case of
Schroder, we must notice one of the passages which the traditional interpreters of
cameralism always find a conclusive proof-text, viz., chap. xxix. The title reads:
“Whence a Prince May Learn Whether His Country Is Gaining or Losing in Riches”
(Reichthum). Now it would be a waste of time to defend the chapter against the
charge of superficiality, if philosophical economists should prefer the charge. The
whole aim of the cameralists was on the superficial plane of practical efficiency, not
on the deeper level of economic philosophy. Their problem was the development of
a programme which would supply the prince with ready means. The general tendency
of thought which Schröder represented, and in which presently all the cameralists
more or less consciously joined, assumed that ready means for the prince either
caused or was caused by ready means for the people. Without analyzing these
alternative phases of the idea, we must allow Schröder to speak for his own practical
interest, and must not hold him to account for the meaning which his words might
have if he were discussing Adam Smith’s problem of the sources of wealth in
general. When the modern railroad president studies the problem of increasing the
net earnings of his road, he may use language which hypercriticism could distort into
expressions of belief that freight charges are the ultimate sources of wealth. No one
would take seriously an attempt to prove that a railroad president could see no
farther, if he should turn from practical business to economic theory. The cameralists
were not interested in wealth as a general concept, but they were intensely interested
in ready means as an efficient tool for everyday purposes. It goes without saying that
their theories would have been much more adequate if they had gone deeper into
economic philosophy; but our present purpose is to rescue ourselves from the errors
of that tradition which has treated them as though they did pry into that antecedent
philosophy and consequently propounded fantastic doctrines. The expressions which
have been distorted into the dogma that gold and silver are the only wealth are no
more properly liable to that construction than our railroad presidents’ judgment that
more freight is necessary for more dividends could fairly be construed into the dogma
that freight rates are the only source of wealth. Schröder says:
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country a country supports itself, to be sure, and becomes powerful
[mächtig], but it does not necessarily thereby increase in riches
[Reichthum; that is, in the sense of “ready means”]. For such traffic
with itself can properly be called only a commutation. .... Hence the
country becomes richer only in the degree in which money and gold
are brought into the land either from the earth, or from some other
source, and poorer in the degree in which money leaves the country.
For since by common consent of nations gold and silver are the
universal price of all things, and the value of the same is everywhere
in the world reckoned according to the value of gold and silver, for
which everything can be bought, we must estimate the riches of a
country according to the quantity of the gold and silver in the same.
Hence we shall name in order the means by which a land acquires
riches, and then those practices through which a land becomes poorer,
in order that a prince may promote the former and obstruct the latter
(chap. xxix).
The present argument is by no means an attempt to prove that the cameralists had
thought out precise economic concepts. They most certainly had not. It is absurd,
however, to hold them responsible for use of certain terms in the exact technical
sense fixed upon them much later, and thus by forcing an arbitrary interpretation into
their concepts to convict them of errors of which they were innocent. It is in principle
as unjust to the cameralists’ to infer from such language as that just quoted that they
regarded gold and silver as the only wealth, as it would be to interpret writers in the
London Statist as believing that the bank balances are the only wealth, while corn and
cotton and iron are not wealth. Schröder was talking about the species of wealth
which presented the most immediate problems to men who were primarily interested
in supplying the treasury. The very fact that he prefaced the passage with the
reservation about the occupations by which the country supports itself and makes
itself powerful shows that his apparent error about what is wealth and what is not is
largely a verbal matter. Not having thought through the concept denoted by the
English technical term “wealth,” he used a word (Reichthum) which we most
naturally translate “wealth” for the one species of wealth in which he was peculiarly
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justly represented by the phrase “ready means,” with the generic concept “wealth,”
which he had never found occasion to use at all.
Nor is our argument an attempt to show that Schröder, and the cameralists in
general, actually had a perspective of the relation of “ready means” to other wealth,
which adequately generalized the facts for all times and places. They certainly had
not. The point to be made is that we must abandon the myth that they attempted such
generalization. They were not economists in the nineteenth-century sense. They were
political theorists dealing incidentally with relatively concrete fragments of economic
relations. Those fragments called for generalization later. Meanwhile the cameralists
must be interpreted by the conditions of the exact technical task which they proposed,
not by the conditions of the subsequent philosophical task which they did not
propose.
It is very true also that Schröder did practically nothing to develop the theory of
extractive industries. This fact has been cited against him over and over again. It has
been interpreted to mean, first, that he did not regard agricultural products as
“wealth;” second, that he had no sympathy with the agricultural population, and did
not care how miserable its condition might be. However this misrepresentation of
Schroder may have come into circulation, a historian who should today assert that his
book confirmed this judgment would thereby prove either that he had not read it or
that he was incapable of reading it understandingly.
In the face of his explanation above Schröder might as properly be accused of
caring nothing for an army as a governmental recourse. The task which Schroder
undertook, in the volume upon which his reputation chiefly rests, was not unlike that
which Professors Winthrop M. Daniels and Henry C. Adams had in mind when they
wrote their books, The Elements of Public Finance, and The Science of Finance.
Because neither of these modern authors included in his volume on finance a treatise
on the improvement of agriculture, it has occurred to no one that they should be
accused of omitting agriculture from the sources of wealth, or of heartlessness toward
the agricultural population. The charge is equally absurd in the case of Schröder. He
evidently knew much less about details of agricultural conditions on the operative
side than the majority of the cameralists. So far as he betrays his state of mind on the
subject, he seems, it is true, to have had no idea that much could be expected in the
way of improving agriculture. Indeed he expressly says as much of manufactures and
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For the fertility of a country brings about cheapness of living, which is the spirit of
all trade, and for the reason that cheapness in eating and drinking causes cheap wages
for labor, and consequently makes manufactures and wares cheap, so that they can
be sold at a lower price than others offer, and hence the market can be held by
underbidding others, because everything follows after cheapness. From the examples
cited is to be seen what Austria could do, and how rich and powerful it could be if
through a good Policey it would combine the surplus of nature, with which more than
all other lands in the wide world it is endowed, with the diligence of men, and
through establishment of splendid manufactures and commerce would apply the
bounty of nature to its profit. Details on this subject are to be found in the little book,
Oesterreich über alles wenn es nur will. I despair of anything adequate in
manufactures and commerce in this country however. My reasons I have resolved to
set forth in a special tract entitled Oesterreichs entdeckte Wunden.
At the beginning of chap, xcii Schröder declares explicitly that Germany has both
the materials and the skill to excel England, France, Holland, and Italy in
manufactures, if the will were only present. With reference to agriculture as a source
of revenue, he was not so wrong as to general theory as he was incredulous about
feasibility of improving prevailing conditions. This would in part explain away the
traditional inferences from such a passage as the following (chap. lxxxviii):
The third surplus comes from manufactures, and the latter, if conjoined with
commerce, must be much preferred to the fertility of the soil, whence we see that
unfertile countries where manufactures and commerce flourish are richer than the
fertile countries, which have no manufactures. The matter is in itself as clear as the
sun. If we appraise a pound of iron in the mine where it originates, it will have very
little value. If however a watchmaker or similar skilled laborer takes this pound of
iron in his hand and works it according to his art, the pound of iron is worth a
hundred times as much as before, etc., etc.
It would be difficult to find in modern political economy a basis for impeachment
of the essential conceptions involved in such language. Schröder plainly
underestimated the relative importance of the extractive industries; but this was less
from misconception of their fundamental nature than from overestimate of the
subsequent processes of securing ready means which the endowment of nature made
possible, and especially from belief that it would be relatively easier to stimulate
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intensive cultivation of the soil.
Schröder’s position was that it would be unreasonable to expect much more public
revenue from the workers on the soil, for they were already as miserable as they
could be, without being driven out of the country or out of existence. Without taking
up the problem of improving the condition of agricultural populations, which was not
his division of labor, he insisted that a wise fiscal policy would drop the idea of
further exactions from this overburdened stratum, and would set about developing
more fruitful sources of supply.
On the other hand, the very expressions which have been distorted into evidence
that Schroder did not regard the soil as a source of wealth, and did not care how
much the rural folk were oppressed, are evidently, in the light of the context, first,
acknowledgments that agriculture is the first and obvious resource of a people and
a state, and second, protests against exhausting this resource.
It should not be necessary for an American democrat to guard himself by repeating
that he is not an apologist for the doctrine of divine right. It is no longer necessary
nor tolerable, however, for Americans to caricature the doctrine as it was actually
held by men in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In order correctly to
interpret the cameralism of the books, as a distinct movement in the development of
a technology of the state, we must do justice to Schroder, especially against
endeavors, prompted by a surviving civic formalism, to discredit his most worthy
ideas.
For example, separated from their context, the opening sentences of chap, vii, “How
a Prince May Have as Much Money as He Will,” are among the evidences which the
opponents of Schroder quoted to prove that he sanctioned unlimited extortion by
rulers. He says:
In a well-ordered state, neither metes nor bounds nor times nor seasons prescribe
to the prince how much money he shall raise from his country nor how often. For the
course of circumstances is uneven, and there is no regularity about the gains of
different subjects. .... Hence a prince must seek his interest with the parties who are
gaining, and are thus in a position to pay, and if a prince always gets a share of the
profits of those who gain, he will have a daily source of supply, for someone always
gains, and no one can find fault, because only a tithe is sought by the prince of the
gains which are made under his protection (pp. 61, 62).
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theorists of his time, and as we have said above, his cameralistic critics discredited
themselves by attempting to turn against him the very theory which they themselves
asserted. More than this, Schroder’s use of the absolutistic formula in this connection
evidently meant just what an expounder of the idea of eminent domain would mean
if he should say today, for the sake of emphasis, “in the last analysis there is no limit
to the right of the state to expropriate the private owner of land, with due
compensation, if the needs of the state require.” The latter expression in the mouth
of a modern lawyer would hardly be understood as committing him to a general
policy of expropriation. In the same way Schröder first stated in its extremest form
a principle to which all civic theorists of his class assented; but this statement was
merely to introduce the counterbalancing consideration that it would be fatal to the
prosperity of the state to carry the prerogative to this extreme. The whole
significance of Schröder’s book is in its attempt to show how the prince might get
revenues more successfully by promoting unexploited sources of supply than by
crushing the life out of the primary sources by extorting the last fraction which they
could be made to yield.
It would be disingenuous not to quote the most extreme expressions in which
Schröder seems to betray a quite different spirit. Perhaps the most difficult case is
chap, cviii, which consists of a single paragraph. The title of this chapter reads: “How
a Prince May Also Seize and Use the Capital of the Country, and Still Not Ruin the
Country Thereby.” The following is the entire discussion under that head:
Although I have demonstrated that a prince may hoard in his chest no
more wealth than the country has earned [erworben], yet I must say
something further, namely, how a prince without ruin of the country
and of business may also go farther and employ [angreif-fen] the
capital of his land. This takes place if a prince causes the subjects to
do business with his own capital. Since now this is one of the secrets
of a monarchy, I wonder that princes do not reflect more upon it,
because by this means they could gradually obtain an absolute
sovereignty, and could make the subjects virtually their body slaves,
when the latter in time would see their worldly goods in the hands of
the prince.
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His language in an earlier passage (p. 66) may be cited as a fairer index of the spirit
of Schröder’s theory and policy.
And this in my opinion is the inexhaustible treasure of a prince, by
means of which he may be a benefactor of the poor, a refuge for the
oppressed, a builder of fine cities, and fortifications, founder of many
churches and schools. This is the treasure with which a prince may
equip his capital city with qualified people, and may sustain the
magnificence of his court, with all of which the land need not be
ruined, as the common man thinks, but it will rather be made
prosperous. In all these things a prince has only to see that the money
so expended remains in the country. For in this way a prince does
only that which is fitting. Since he sees that gains in the country are
unevenly divided, he takes from him who seems to have gained from
others more than his social position or his merit justifies, and gives
it to another. In order, however, that the latter may not enjoy his gains
in idleness, he must in return do something which will either
contribute to the upbuilding of the land or to the pleasure and
magnificence of the prince. Thus I can with complete right call a
prince a great national Lord of Exchange, or as Aristotle expresses it,
Custodis et Dispensatoris communium bonorum. .... Accordingly a
prince may use the whole capital of the country, and as much more as
the whole capital is worth (sic), if he only soon consumes it and
causes it to course among the people; for a prince is the stomach of
the country, the assessments are the foods which it digests. If the
foods are not digested in the stomach, and the strength divided among
the parts of the body, the members will lose strength and die, but the
stomach will die with them.
Since we have said, however, that the prince should take where there
is ability to give, and where it can be spared, it follows that a prince
must know the means of each person in the country, together with his
manner of support and his earnings, in order that he may perceive
how the money in the land is divided, and in what direction it tends.
This, however, appears to be an impossible affair, and there is noAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 142
practicable proposition to make it possible.
It is not necessary to notice all the na’ive economic conceptions which this language
implies. Our attention may be confined to the main line of argument. The strategic
point in Schröder’s calculation is indicated by the title of chap, viii, “Whether a
Prince Can Know How Much Each Citizen Earns or Might Earn, in Order That He
May Know How the Money Is Distributed.” Schröder does not profess to have
discovered a perfect method of answering the question, but he thinks an approach
may be made to it that would go far to remove the existing chaos, and increase
fairness in demands for payments to the princely treasury. He begins by dividing the
population into nine sorts, each to be treated in accordance with their relative
abilities: (1) clergy; (2) nobility; (3) peasants; (4) artisans; (5) merchants; (6) court




The last section of the chapter presents a puzzle by naming four ways which each
of these classes have of gaining money, viz.: (a) finding treasure, whether in natural
deposits, or hidden or lost goods; (b) conversion of the unripe or imperfect metals
(sic) into good gold or silver; (c) inheritance; (d) presents. This schedule does not
seem to correspond with the subsequent analysis of the gainful occupations of the
nine classes. The clue to the discrepancy is, first, that the section is not, as might
appear at first reading, a resume of the ordinary sources from which these classes get
their incomes. It is an enumeration of extraordinary sources common to all of them.
The precise language is: “All these have still” (e.g., in addition to the resources
peculiar to each) “four means of getting money, or of becoming rich, which appertain
to one as well as to the others, viz.,” etc.
The more one reflects upon the use of language in such passages as this, the more
clear it becomes that tradition has forced into it associations which the words did not
carry in the minds of the cameralistic authors. As we have said above, it is an
unpardonable anachronism to make these authors discourse upon the antecedent
problems of wealth in the abstract, when they were discussing merely the most
available method of accumulating ready means for the individual or for the state.
Schröder goes on immediately to cite the schedules in use in the duchy of Gotha,
for the twenty years previous to his writing, for classifying the extractive industries
within the state, and for purposes of assessment.
129 It is not our affair to pass on the
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industrial census either for rural or urban taxation. The essential point is that what he
did in a relatively crude way became a matter of course with later cameralists; and
a large part of their work was devoted either to explanation of the routine methods
of assessment upon this basis, or to elaboration of other schemes along lines partly
drawn by Schroder. It is impossible to decide from the subsequent literature to what
extent use was made in practice of Schröder’s calculus of the relative value to the
nation of different branches of manufacture (chaps, xv–xviii). At the least, it was a
serious attempt to understand a division of industry which was rapidly assuming
firstrate importance in the reckon-ing of all German states.
Schröder’s conception of the functions of Policey are by all means as farsighted as
his fiscal perceptions. They do not even seem to be as comprehensive as Osse’s. They
did not go beyond emphasis of the need of governmental interferencc to prevent
neglect of duties by servants of all classes. The phrase, however, which Schroder
applies to Policey in chap. xxviii, viz., “die Grundfeste upon which all that has
previously been said must rest,” quite likely furnished the suggestion which gave
Justi the title for his most elaborate cameralistic volume, on Policeywissenschaft.
If we reach a clear understanding that Schroder, and all the rest of the cameralists,
when treating of their central fiscal problem, did not raise the later question of pure
economics, but were dealing primarily with problems of immediate application of
fiscal means to fiscal ends, and secondarily with problems of adjustment of the
people’s activities to the need of improved standards of life, whether principally in
their own interest or that of the treasury, this perception at once shows that as pure
economists or sociologists we have no immediate concern with their conclusions
about technological details. Our interest is primarily in the part which they played in
developing a general philosophy of society, and the particulars are of value to us only
as indexes of their relation to larger conceptions. Enough has been said, therefore, to
establish the position of Schroder in the cameralistic series. His main object was to
increase the ready means of the prince, while incidentally lightening the burdens of
the people. The general scope of his conclusions may be gathered by reference to his
table of contents, especially to the titles of chaps, xxx–cv.
Our analysis of Schröder may be completed by a reflection which has also some
measure of relevance to all the cameralists. We must distinctly note that the
cameralistic estimate of proportions between gold and silver and other goods, which
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civic values corresponding with contemporary judgments of relative civic needs. If
Schröder had been plied with Socratic questions about wealth, in Adam Smith’s
sense, after getting the concept denned, he would have been obliged to retract nothing
in principle which he had intended to assert before that more generalized term had
been brought to his attention. Maintaining his position, he might have restated his
views in this way: “I quite agree that we may give a common name to all the material
things which men want to use, and which they may exchange. If we call these wealth,
the agricultural products which feed people, the manufactured forms of those
products which clothe people, and the other manufactured forms which satisfy
people’s demands for convenience and comfort, are of course wealth, just as much
as the gold and silver which enable the prince to maintain the government, and the
people to make their exchanges. My contention is, however, that the need of making
the government strong is so pre-eminent that the wealth which satisfies this need is
beyond all comparison the most important wealth, and must be provided for whether
there is increase of other wealth or not.”
Here would be a plain contrast between the cameralistic and the modern scale of
social values. It would assign to money a higher ratio of value in the state than it has
in modern theory. The reason would be not that cameralism essentially varied from
modern theory on the economic principles of wealth, but rather that cameralism
varied from modern theory on antecedent political philosophy. It posited an order of
precedence between governmental strength and popular prosperity which democratic
theory has inverted. That is, the cameralistic theory was that popular prosperity
depends on strong government. Modern theory, at least in its democratic forms, holds
that strong government depends upon popular prosperity. Thus the cameralistic
theory, which systematized mercantilistic practice, did not so much assert
fundamentally incorrect economic principles as it transferred emphasis from more
to less ultimate principles, for the sake of supposed immediate political expediency.
The needed correction of cameralism was less new knowledge of the sources of
material goods than new valuations of the scale of ends to which material goods
should be applied. Along with the absolutistic major premise, “The fiscal needs of
the prince are the paramount needs in the state,” went the minor premise, “There is
more to be gained for the princely fiscus by exploiting other means of revenue than
by depending upon further exploitation of the primary natural resources.” This was
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of an economic principle in a particular situation. The subsequent development of
cameralism shows a marked increase of relative emphasis upon the value of the
extractive industries. This change does not reflect a revolution in fundamental
economic conceptions. It denotes on the one hand increased attention to the technique
of agricultural management, with correspondingly enlarged ideas of the maximum
resources of nature; and on the other hand, expansion of cameralistic science so that
its fiscal division was better balanced by variously classified divisions which brought
some of the neglected elements of the civic situation under equally systematic
analysis.
Of Schroder as a promoter of the practical economic policy of Austria it does not
fall within the scope of this book to speak. Whether his judgment was the wisest
under the circumstances, and whether the commercial expedients which he advocated
were in the line of general technological prudence, are questions which would be
appropriate in a more special study than our programme proposes. The foregoing
analysis sufficiently covers the most essential question about him. Objective study
permits us to accept the judgment neither of certain interested contemporaries, who
would have had Schroder regarded as a prophet of evil, nor of the schematic
appraisers of mercantilism in general, who represent all its theorists as teaching
grotesque doctrines. These vagaries appear to have been imputed to them first by
opponents of the mercantilistic programme, and to have come down to us in place of
the authentic opinions of a group of thinkers whose economic conceptions turn out
to have been much more valid than their views of political philosophy.
In this connection a few words must be said about four writers who, by general
consent of the historians, rank as satellites of the principal group discussed in this and
the preceding chapter. We name first the otherwise apparently unknown writer, von
Klenck.
130 His book may be called a shorter catechism of mercantilism. It contains
262 pages of large pocket-diary shape. It can be inserted in the vest pocket, and if
printed on thin paper, with flexible covers, would be conveniently portable. Roscher
says:
A book in many respects enigmatical is the Fürstliche Machtkunst ....
which I have been able to obtain only in the ninth edition, Frankfurth
and Leipzig, 1740, under the title: Tractat von Manufacturen und
Commercio. It is said to have been published in 1702 at Halle, or inAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 146
1703 at Weissenfels, by the well-known Heinrich Bode, professor of
law at Halle. The author, a certain Herr von Klenck, is said to have
suppressed it, after it had been severely attacked in 1704, in the
monograph, Das Gold des publiquen credits, welches der vornehme
Autor der fürsttichen Machtkunst und unerschöpflichen Goldgruben
durch Herrn G. B.’s Gütigkeit und Vermittelung beschauen lassen,
auf dem Probierstein der gesunden Vernunft zum Commercio
untauglich befunden von einem Lübecker Kaufmann (p. 303).
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Roscher also quotes the statement (p. 303, note), that Klenck’s book was
republished in 1773 as an appendix to the volume Klugheit zu leben und zu
herrschen.
Although Roscher finds in Klenck some slight variations from Schröder, and even
improvements upon his teachings (pp. 303, 304), they are not important enough to
require our attention. In his Preface the author expressly states that he wrote the book
in the hope that it would be more successful in attracting the notice of young princes
than the more pretentious writings on the subject. He apparently had some particular
prince in mind. At the same time he expressly disclaims the purpose of being
original, and declares that he has drawn his conclusions from the best authorities. The
book emphasizes and popularizes the best in the previous mercantilists. It is
especially clear and strong in its assertions that the strength and riches of the prince
must be based upon the strength and riches of the people, and that the ancient
prejudice against industrial and commercial pursuits as unworthy of the nobility must
give place to pride in those occupations.
Whether the author’s hope of appealing to young princes was realized does not
appear. References to his book by later and influential writers show that he actually
did have a share in winning respect for the views which he represented.
132 We need
note simply that Klenck leaves no room for doubt that he is a typical cameralist, as
described in our general formula. He begins his Vorrede with the observation:
All the world knows that in a few centuries France, England, and
Holland, not so much through force of arms, as through a special
princely art and science, have advanced to such a high power, that the
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to an exhaustless sea. To reflect upon such princely power, and with
it to serve the Fatherland, is demanded of every true patriot. I
accordingly devote this study to the art of princely power, and I feel
at liberty to call it a Studium Magnificum quod Magnos facit, whereby
in our beloved Fatherland hidden springs of gold may be opened. I
accordingly call this Machtkunst a science highly necessary for
princes, of so directing all gainful occupations that, ex Bono Publico
of the land, the princely treasury may be enriched, and the prince may
become powerful. The finis Primarius is thus the Bonum Publicum,
the riches and prosperity of the land, quo Reipublicae bene fit;
whence flows the Finis Secundus or Secun-darius, the power and
great might of the ruling prince, as from the proper source and spring.
If the same contains much water, the prince can also have much.
Hence the welfare of the prince is so closely bound up with that of his
subjects that the one without the other cannot come into being, and
still less be permanent.
The second of these lesser writers is Paul Jacob Marperger, 1656–1730. He made
an impression by his much writing, but he was the author of nothing of even second-
rate importance.
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The third in this minor group, “much less known by his contemporaries, but
intellectually much the superior of Marperger, was Johann Georg Leib.”
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While it is not certain that Leib added anything to the theory of his predecessors,
writers of his class are important for our purpose. They furnish cumulative evidence
of the spirit of the doctrine which they tried to expound. The Vorrede to Leib’s book
begins in this way:
There are many who have such a bad opinion of the Sludium
Cameralis  or  Oeconomiae Principis that they think it impossible to
raise the revenues of a great lord without adding to the tears and sighs
of their subjects. How mistaken this idea is may easily be shown by
the fact that the chief and only purpose of this study is to put the
whole body of subjects in a permanent condition of well-being, and
only from their surplus, and in a just manner, to increase the incomeAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 148
of the lord of the land, and to raise his power and repute; .... I cannot
deny that abuses which have entered into fiscal administration as a
common evil have been my sole reason for this writing, out of love
for the common good. Accordingly, I have attempted to show how the
welfare of the land, or the well-being of the subjects, is inseparably
bound up with the interest of the ruler, and this is the true and sole
principle of the whole cameralistic study. Moreover, my chief rule for
increasing the power of the land is to retain money in the country, and
to bring it from other countries. If this rule is observed, it follows
without dispute that the welfare of the land will be thereby promoted,
and the subjects will be made richer. And if the subjects are made
richer, then they can without harm and embarrassment pay to the lord
of the land, for the protection which is so profitable, an increased
tribute. Then the ampler treasure of the prince must put him in power
and repute with other rulers.
The whole book is an amplification of these propositions. Whatever may have been
the morale of the typical German government in this period, these theorists represent
the standards which the governments were supposed to respect.
Finally, we must select from others who might be named in this connection
Theodor Ludwig Lau.
135
If Lau was not personally a grievous ass, he went far out of his way to misrepresent
himself, not only in his dedication, but in his garrulous and “kittenish” Vorrede. The
one detail which is worthy of record about his book is that it made more than any
previous text of the classification of cameralistic science into the divisions which
were in general accepted to the end of the cameralistic period. That is, the
Aufrichtiger Vorschlag was divided into four books, treating respectively of (1)
Policey; (2) finance (Entwurff einer wohleingerichteten Cammer); (3) commerce
(Entwurff wohlregulirter Negocieri), in which the first part is entitled “Van den
Manufacturen,” and the second, “Von den Commercien;” (4) taxation (Entwurff
Wohleingerichteter Steuren). This main part of the volume occupies 324 pages. There
follows a monograph of 130 pages treating in detail certain practical phases of the
subject of the fourth part of the text. The title-page of this tract is notable for its
reiteration of the idea of community of interest between subjects and rulers.
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A still more complete account of cameralistic literature at this period would include
such writers as Gleichmann,
137 Gundling,
138 and a little later Schreber,
139 and J. A.
Hoffmann.
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Gerhard is of value in the first instance as a witness to the influence of Seckendorff.
His book is a mere tract of seventy pages.
141 It is notable for mobilizing the term
Staatswissenschaft as a synonym of the term Staats-Lehre used in the title; and this
fact evidently corresponds with an enlargement of vision which was widening the
outlook of German political theorists, and at the same time giving their views a more
coherent content. The author declares that his intention in writing the book is to
introduce beginners to the subject, not to address the learned. He also frankly states
that he wants the book, and the lectures based on it, to lead up to the study of
Seckendorff’s Teutscher Fürsten Staat. With the book and the lectures on it as a
preparation for his course on Seckendorff, he hopes to give his students an adequate
idea of “the whole studium politicum in general.” Gerhard was apparently a member
of the law faculty at Jena in 1713, and was among the academic men who were
smuggling the beginnings of cameralistics into the universities before special
professorships of that subject were founded.
Gerhard’s book consists of six chapters, with an appendix on Seckendorff’s
political writings. If it were to be judged by its size, it would be set down as a
negligible factor in the interpretation of cameralism. There is strong internal
evidence, however, that the author deserves more attention than he has received.
Roscher, for example, devotes to him less than a whole sentence.
142 He was not a
mere echo of Seckendorff. In the first place, as a lecturer at Jena, he evidently did
more to prepare the way for admission of civics, as Justi understood that concept, to
good standing in the universities than that writer imagined. In the second place, he
was a most instructive sign of the times with reference to currents of thought about
the whole range of subjects which we now refer to as “the social sciences.” His
prolegomena show that his general conceptions of scientific relationships were far
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of the more pretentious books. Quite likely this accounts for his inconspicuous place
as an author. Apparently he was a man whose insight and outlook surveyed wider
reaches of knowledge than he had the constructive power to control. He seems to
have had the talents of a scout rather than of a commissary-general. He detected
strategic points, but was not qualified to conduct campaigns. Dropping the figure, it
seems likely that Gerhard lacked the force or the equipment necessary for writing
books which would have accredited his methodological perceptions. It would have
required altogether exceptional genius and learning to compose at that time treatises
which would have filled out his classification of knowledge. He has consequently left
on record merely evidence of a certain precocity which must have affected his
students as a liberalizing influence, but he lacked the energy to make much
impression upon the slowly developing social ideas of the period.
Not because Gerhard’s direct influence can be traced in the later literature of the
social sciences, but because he gives expression to ideas which were gathering force
among the formative influences of his time, we must give him attention out of
proportion to the angle which his book subtends in the literature of cameralism.
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The first chapter deals primarily with very elementary matters of terminology. The
discussion turns upon the question, What is properly to be understood by the name
“Politicus”? The value of the chapter for us is in the light it throws upon the state of
mind at that time, both in the general public and among academic people, about
subjects which have since developed into the social sciences. The first
misunderstanding to which Gerhard addresses himself is that there is nothing in
common between scholars and Politici, and that there is no room in universities for
subjects in which Politici would be interested. This error, he declares, is a part of the
confusion which has come in with the practice of using the words Politicus and
Staatsmann as synonyms. People at court declare that politics can be understood by
courtiers alone; the universities should therefore at most explain languages and the
Institutiones iuris.
Gerhard’s reply is substantially the familiar academic exposition of the utility of
general training in theory as a preparation for acquirement of technical knowledge
and skill. Attempting to show in particular what sort of knowledge may be acquired
in universities as a preparation for practical politics, Gerhard distinguishes first
between “the rules of righteousness and love, and the rules of prudence.” The latter
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philosophy. Gerhard urges that this division of labor is not wholly wise, because
moral philosophy must be the foundation of civic prudence (Staats-Klugheit). He
says further:
If I may speak to suit myself, I may be allowed to distinguish between
civic science [Staats-Gelahrtheit] and civic prudence [Staats-
Klugheit], while at the same time I want to do justice to each. Civic
science is the affair of scholars, and shows the fundamental principles
upon which a proper civic prudence rests its observations. Civic
prudence, however, consists in skilful application of those rules
which are prescribed by civic science. Civic prudence must be learned
by grasp of affairs, civic science by appropriate reasoning. The latter
is as little the monopoly of the court as the former of the university,
although the one is more prominent at courts and the other at
universities (p. 9).
Gerhard goes on to say that he is not much concerned about mere matters of words,
such as Staats-Wissenschaft, Staats-Klugheit, Staats-Kunst, and Staats-Lehre. The
main thing for him is “that an upright teacher should not confuse distinct disciplines,
and that a right-minded statesman must not despise learning, while he exercises a
high degree of prudence in his daily duties.”
Advancing in the second chapter to more precise description of civic science,
Gerhard proposes at the outset the most compact formula of civic science as he views
it, viz.:
“A theory which presents in proper order of dependence the rules of
prudence, through which the community [gemeines Wesen] is kept in
a good state of welfare, and which have as their whole aim the
maintenance of the public state.” In expanding this definition Gerhard
urges that “civic science is thus obviously a constituent part of true
science [Gelahrtheit] in general, since genuine science is nothing else
than a theory through which human thoughts are set toward the
attainment and retention of permanent happiness, and moreover it
places definitely before the eyes of each this appropriate purpose.”Albion Small, The Cameralists, 153
The courage of the author’s convictions speaks further in the
assertion: “I conclude still more that no one has a right to claim the
name scholar who has not laid a reasonable basis of scholarship in
this very useful division of learning.”
In further analysis of science Gerhard proceeds:
The happiness of men is to be sought either in this or in a future life
of which God’s revelation gives us knowledge, and of which reason
itself gives us hope. In a word, it is either temporal or eternal. To the
latter we are led by die hochweise Erkennlniss der Wahrheit zur
Gottseligkeit, oder die Lehre der Gottesfurcht, which therefore is
called the science or knowledge of God. Temporal happiness,
however, may be sought partly in subjective contentment of mind,
partly in external repose and well-being, also health and a
competence; hence various treatments of these subjects have become
parts of practical learning (p. 15).
Accordingly Gerhard enumerates, with some indication of their respective contents,
the theory of virtue, the theory of health, “which cannot be given over entirely to the
art of medicine, but is also closely related with the theory of virtue,” the theory of
justice or natural law, the theory of morals, and the theory of the state, or of
prudence.
144 He adds:
Prudence is accordingly nothing else than a theory which equips man
with the rational keys with which he may skilfully and systematically
employ the means to his happiness which come in his common life,
whereby he may attain the indicated end.
And a little later he further explains:
Accordingly our civic science is chiefly concerned with finding out
good external and voluntary means, through which, without harm or
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that is, the permanence and security of the same, may be properly
maintained, promoted, and increased.
On the basis of this explanation the author goes into further details about the
various sciences he has named, and especially their dependence upon one another.
In this latter respect his views approach much closer to those of methodologists today
than his notions of divisions of labor among the sciences. He is especially definite
and sagacious in showing (chap, iii) how scholars in each of the faculties in turn,
theology, medicine, philosophy, and law, would profit by the study of social science.
It is hardly too much to say that these few pages read almost like a vision of the
development of sociological consciousness which has been manifest during the past
generation. Upon chap, iv, on “Abuses of Civic Science,” a similar judgment may be
passed. Although less sophisticated, it is very much in the spirit of Herbert Spencer’s
essay, The Sins of Legislators.
Chap, v, “On the Purpose, Content, and Sub-Divisions of Civic Science,” begins
with a proposition which in terms is two centuries in advance of the scientific
mediocrity of the author’s generation. Although we may not read into it all that we
should now imply by such language, we must not fail to recognize the notable
breadth of view which the most grudging interpretation would have to concede.
Gerhard says:
In order to realize the above indicated advantages, and to avoid the contrasted
abuses of civic science, it is necessary never to leave the purpose of the same out of
sight. The duty of every Politicus is contained in the rule: “Whatsoever thou doest,
so consider the end and the outcome of thy devising, that thou shalt nevermore do
harm” (p. 42).
From the context we can hardly conclude that this precept meant less in principle
to its author than was contained in one of Herbert Spencer’s wisest sociological
aphorisms: “The question of questions for the politician should ever be—‘What type
of social structure am I tending to produce?’ But this is a question he never
entertains.”
145 Gerhard’s next paragraph reads:
As above observed, all the care of civic science should be directed
toward the welfare of the state.
146 This consists principally in external
peace and satisfaction, so far as these can be maintained by naturalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 155
means, without illegal offense to others. It is not to be believed that
the first men who subjected themselves to a human scepter
surrendered their freedom which belonged to them by nature, without
this intention. If now worldly governments are not to be repugnant to
the law of nature and the eternal decrees [Ralhschlage] of Almighty
God, their counsels must also seek to maintain this intention. The
greatest emperors and princes have most laudably recognized that
subjects were not created for their benefit, but they for the subjects.
How much more must those who are appointed by them as servants
and watchmen of the common well-being [gemeinen Wohlseyns]
entertain no other thoughts?
In the next paragraph but one the author reduces these generalities to somewhat
more specific form in this way:
Everything which preserves, promotes, and makes permanent
common repose and peace with pleasing security in the Republique
in permissible and righteous ways, that must with all care and
attention be undertaken and put in execution. It follows, however, that
anything which is in any degree capable of hindering common repose
and peace must be omitted, prevented, and excluded. Whoever
reasonably meditates these two rules, he may arrive in his own head,
if he will only at the same time open his eyes and look into the world,
at a reflection of all civic science. Indeed, means will often thereby be
put in his hand, without his special attention, for putting this science
into useful application.
Then follow still more specific reassertions of the ends of civic society as
represented by the quasi-absolutistic state, and of the corresponding outlook of civic
science as it was coming to be defined in cameralism. Thus:
Since external assaults were probably the chief occasion for the first
raisonablen Republique, political sagacity must also make this its
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been given to the power of a prince. The power however consists in
adequate strength to protect the lands which belong to a state against
assaults of its neighbors. Since now, in the judgment of all, people
and money are necessary for this purpose, it cannot be denied that
where these things are in readiness the happiness of a country is
thereby quite visibly guaranteed (p. 45).
After referring at some length to the other side of the case, viz., “where there is the
greatest power, there it is easiest to do wrong,” Gerhard once more formulates the
essentials of civic policy as he sees it, in terms of “population, money, and
friends.”
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Returning to the subject of scientific method, Gerhard concludes, quite sanely:
If one is right on these matters, then it will amount to one and the
same thing whether one divides civic science into two or two and
twenty parts. .... There is no harm done if, for the sake of grasping the
concepts more thoroughly, one subdivides the matter a little. One
must however not imagine that the fate of the Holy Roman Empire
hangs on such subdivisions; and quarrels about such arbitrary matters
are ridiculous. Each is entitled to his own way of dealing with the
subject, and although it is well to fall in with the prevailing fashion,
yet there is no law to force such conformity upon us; if there were, the
fashions could not change so often. In my judgment, there would be
no harm in dividing civic science into a general and a special
division, for there are rules of prudence which apply to all men alike.
Each has on the contrary his own reasons of state, and the special
portion of civic science may have as many varieties as there are
orders of society in the world. ....
If God should grant me opportunity and sufficient experience to
develop in an orderly written form the thoughts on civic science
which I have thus far only communicated orally to my students, I
would first set in order the general rules of treatment. I would then
discuss the most complete society of the Republique in accordance
with its purpose, and finally I would point out their duties to theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 157
societies that occur in ordinary life, i.e., of married people, of parents
and children, of masters and servants, of intermediate rulers and
subjects. Especially would I picture to my dearly beloved students an
ideally organized student-state, and I should think that in so doing I
was discharging the duty of an upright teacher. .... As to the
subdivisions of the second (special) part of the science, they would
require many sections. It is however not necessary to anticipate them.
Whoever understands the science of making the subjects numerous,
rich, and moral, in accordance with what has preceded, will easily
find out for himself an order for the means thereto necessary. I will at
present say only this much: that to this end before all others the
didactic method of the incomparable von Seckendorff seems best
adapted. In his Fürstenstaat he affords so much opportunity for
profitable comment that I believe my independent efforts in
connection with this science may be long deferred.
Not only in the breadth of comprehension which these observations indicate, but in
the detail of seeing a place for a general and a special treatment of the science of the
state, Gerhard was well in advance of his time. Justi was most successful among the
cameralists in making use of this suggestion. Gerhard deserves credit for perceptions
about scientific technique which men of his type did not fully appropriate until a
century after he had put them on record. In so far he anticipated the established
practice of modern German scholars in all the social sciences.
It is also not too much to say that, in his brief discussion of the subjects which
should be studied in connection with civic science (pp. 53 ff.), Gerhard showed
breadth of intelligence, if not insight into detail, equal to that afterward exhibited by
Justi. Indeed, it is plain that the former had a much broader foundation for his special
programme of civic science than the latter. Justi furnishes no clear evidence that his
foundations were as strong as those on which Gerhard rests when he says: 
Accordingly it is right to say that civic science begins where moral
philosophy ends, and it sufficiently appears that the student of
politics, before he can become a statesman, must be a student of
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time, while the tree is still capable of being inclined, and thereby is
properly molded in justice, good manners, honor, and the fear of God:
if he otherwise has good understanding, will not find any portion of
civic science difficult. .... To sum up the whole matter: Whoever will
learn civic science to advantage, let him first learn to understand other
men, the forces of nature, and the established institutions of the
world. Then civic science can teach him besides nothing but the ways
in which he may best apply such intelligence (p. 57).
Gerhard may also be observed to advantage as an index of the extent to which there
was at his time a recognized camera-listic tradition in academic circles. Those who
wish to pursue the subject farther than our present limits permit, should read the
Appendix of Gerhard’s syllabus. It is a fair index both of the poverty and of the
progress of German thought in this subject at the opening of the eighteenth century.		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In a period which discriminated more carefully between dilettanteish and critical
writing, the subject of this chapter would hardly have attained prominence among
specialists. Because of the attention which was actually paid to him by a considerable
number of successors, he cannot be omitted from our account. Intrinsically he does
not deserve mention with cameralistic writers of the first rank.
Inama
148 furnishes a biographical sketch to this effect:
Julius Bernhard von Rohr was the son of a country gentleman
(Riltergutsbesitzer), Julius Albert von Rohr. He was born in 1688 and
died in 1742. His education was carefully planned. At the age of
seventeen he was sent to the University of Leipzig, where he studied
law, mathematics, chemistry, physics, and Oekonomik. After ending
his studies he went with his father to Hamburg, to get acquainted with
the business organization of that city. He became an attaché of the
delegation sent to Frankfurt for the imperial election of 1712. The
death of his father and the embarrassed condition of the estate
presently put him on a very limited income. He went to Halle to study
mathematics with Wolf; in 1713 to Holland; in 1714 he received a
position as member of the Stilts- und Erblands-Regierung at
Magdeburg; in 1726 was transferred to a similar position at
Niederlausitz; in 1731 became herzoglicher Landkammerrath; in
1732  Domherr zu Merseberg, but the position seems to have secured
his standing rather than to have furnished an occupation. He had been
on the waiting-list for this sort of ecclesiastical preferment since he
was two years old. He became a member of the Landkammer at
Merseberg, where he remained till his retirement in 1738.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 160
Rohr somehow managed to retrieve his financial fortunes to such an
extent that he accumulated a library for that time rather rich, and also
in 1720 acquired a landed estate between Dresden and Meissen,
where he carried on wine culture, horticulture, and agriculture. He
had troubled relations with a mistress, 1724–39. He married another
woman in 1739, and wrote his friends an elaborate explanation of his
domestic affairs.
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Rohr is credited with the authorship of twenty-nine published works, and of nine
others left in an unfinished state.
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According to Inama, doubtless because of the author’s remark on the second page
of the Vorrede to the Haushaltungsbibliothek, Rohr spoke of Hauswirthschaftskunst,
on the basis of natural science, as the chief task of his life. In his conception of
political science he was a devoted admirer of Seckendorff; in his more concrete
cameralistics he was equally attached to Schröder. “Under the influence of Wolf’s
eudaemonism he advanced in many respects beyond either.” Under the same
influence he escaped some of the poverty of the old Hausväterlilleratur, and on the
other hand his knowledge of natural science was a factor in promoting the
development of cameralism. In particular, he was of service in preparing the way for
academic cameralism, which Dithmar and Gasser were permitted to introduce into
the Prussian universities.
Roscher (p. 378) speaks of the Compendieuse Haushal-tungsbibliothek as Rohr’s
“chief work.” If there can be a “chief” among mediocrities, that designation can
hardly remain in this case where Roscher placed it. He does not seem to have been
acquainted with Rohr’s more pretentious works. The Haushaltungsbibliothek,
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in the “much enlarged “ third edition, is a small handbook of 692 pages. It uses the
word Oeconomie as synonymous with its general subject-matter. In the dedication to
Kreishauptmann Peter Freyherr von Hohenthal, the author says:
While writers on management [öconomische] have remained as a rule
unread by the learned, because they considered them too low, and by
housekeepers, because they found them too high, the useful
instruction which you [Ew. Hochwohlgebornen] have instituted
shows how many objects not only of important but also of ingeniousAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 161
investigation  Oeconomie  contains, and how little one who is
uninformed is competent to conduct with success occupations which
demand so much knowledge and reflection.
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The author’s Preface to the second edition, dated August 9, 1726, declares that the
first edition had been well received by the public, and that certain scholars in the
universities had done it the honor of lecturing upon it. The explanation of the
author’s intention in citing books which could actually be used in household and
agricultural management has an important bearing upon the myth which the critics
of mercantilism have propagated, that there was no attention to agriculture and no
thought of it. At this time there were not only many writings on the subject, but they
were not so very difficult to obtain,
153 and Rohr’s book refers to the most available
of them.
In the Vorrede of the third edition, 1755, the editor shows that in his mind the word
Oeconomie still stands for a very concrete type of technology, not for the sort of
generalization which later appropriated the term. He says:
If we think of Oeconomie, not as it is practiced by the lowest portion
of housekeepers [Hauswirthe], but rather as that which it actually is,
an art whose prescriptions are based upon knowledge of nature, and
which can be properly exercised and extended only by means of this
knowledge, then it deserves a respectable place among the learned
sciences. It requires also for its completeness the application of
various other parts of human knowledge, and the learning of that
which predecessors have done; that is, books must be read.
As a cameralistic book, in the proper sense, the Haushal-tungsbibliothek would not
deserve mention. As an index of the relation between the subjects known at the time
as Oeconomie and Cameralwissenschaft in general, it is highly instructive. A glance
at the Table of Contents would sufficiently fix this relation. A few sentences from the
text may be added without comment. The opening sentence of the first chapter
declares:
The art of managing the household [Haushaltungskunst] is a practical science (sic),
which teaches how one in a proper way may acquire money and goods [Geld undAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 162
Gut], may conserve and wisely expend what is acquired, for the promotion or
maintenance of one’s temporal happiness.
Sec. 2 of the same chapter continues:
The art of managing the household may be divided into the
Oeconomica  of princes and of private persons. In the former case it
is called Cameral-Finanz- und Domainenwissenschaft. It consists in
a prudence not only in administering his own means and revenues and
those of his land, and in maintaining the community, but also in
adding to the money and goods of the subjects. .... The house
management of private persons may again be divided into city and
country management [Stadt- und Landwirthschaftskunst]. Under the
former head I reckon knowledge of the coins, of transactions with
money, skill in keeping everything in order in the house, and in
placing the furniture in the rooms according to symmetry and use,
proper supply of the table, temperate use of drinks, wise control of
servants, etc. Such things occur also in the country, but because these
arrangements can be made without possessing estates [liegende
Güter], I will not attribute them properly to rural management, which
involves immovable landed property. Of this in general the so-called
housekeeping books [Haushaltungsbucher] treat, and the same
consists in knowledge of agriculture, of cattle raising, of fisheries,
hunting, forests, gardening, vineyards, etc. This latter is much more
comprehensive and difficult than the former, for whoever has the skill
to carry on management in the country can quickly learn city
management. On the contrary, whoever comes from the city to the
country, unless he has particular zeal and guidance, will find it hard
to adapt himself to rural management.
Both city and country management embrace three parts, namely skill
(1) to acquire money and goods, (2) to retain what is acquired, and (3)
wisely to expend it.
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As cumulative evidence on the general position of the cameralists, the opening
sentence of the second chapter is in order. It is the author’s definition of cameralAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 163
science, viz.:
Cameral science (Cameralwissenschaft) teaches princes not only well
to conserve and increase their means, but also to promote their
subjects’ happiness and to order their management (Oeconomie).
Then the motive of Schröder’s civic philosophy reappears in this form (chap, ii, §4):
The best means of enriching a land is to take care that many people
are drawn into the land, and also that all the subjects through diligent
labor may have their support and means of gain [Nahrung und
Erwerb].
These citations show the general character of this book of homely wisdom. After
Rohr had written this earlier book, his notions of his vocation seem to have become
more ambitious.
He did not confine himself to “management” in the narrower sense of his first
programme. We may therefore find an expansion of his ideas in another book.
Though it contains nothing original with the author, it won him not a little
recognition among later cameralists.
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Previous to publication of the books we have named, Rohr had neither academic
nor governmental experience to be compared with that of most of the cameralists;
and his forms of expression are visibly apologetic toward each of the classes by
which he was doubtless rated as an amateur. He writes rather as an essayist than as
a technologist. On the one hand the systematic method of the academic thinker is
lacking, and on the other hand the firm touch of the man accustomed to deal directly
with affairs. He can be included among the cameralists only as an evidence of the
impressions which the cameralism both of the bureaus and of the books had made up
to his date upon a university man of a rather refined type. Granting that he helped to
gain a hearing for cameralism in the universities, there is no evidence that he exerted
a distinct influence upon the development of the theory itself.
156 The Einhitung,
however, would be an extremely valuable collection of material for the student of the
culture history of the period.
The book is a compact volume of 1,474 pages, with a table of contents and indexAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 164
filling thirty more pages. The plate opposite the title-page represents a king upon his
throne, at his right female figures symbolizing Religion and Justice, at his left Peace
and Prudence, and below the couplet:
Wenn ein Regente will des Landes Wolfarth bauen, 
Mus er auf Gottesfurcht, Justiz und Klugheit schauen.
The opening paragraph reads:
Prudence [Klugheit] is an adaptability of temper by which actions are
directed with reason and foresight toward the promotion of true
happiness. It discovers means by which, without prejudice and
hindrance to others, one may most conveniently and easily attain and
preserve happiness. Because it aims at true happiness, it proposes first
eternal and second temporal happiness as its chief and subordinate
aim. It is otherwise called die Politie, and is either a true or a false
prudence.
The looseness of thinking in this paragraph may be taken as an index of the quality
of the book. The ambiguity that is involved in making the same word stand for
“adaptability of temper” and “Politic” is symptomatic of the style throughout. The
author is popular rather than analytic in his treatment. He can be accepted therefore
merely as in certain respects a sign of the times, but not as a factor in the
development of cameralistic theory or technology. This popular and uncritical quality
is even more apparent in the second paragraph, viz.:
The true prudence demands nothing except that to which it may
properly lay claim according to divine and natural law; it subordinates
the will, as much as possible, when it would go to excess, and for the
accomplishment of its purposes it uses permissible means. Its aim is
the well-being of itself (sic) and of other men (sic); yet it recognizes,
in case of collision between its own and its neighbor’s fortunes, that
the preference belongs to itself [!]. It [Kluaheit] sees from its own
experience and that of others that all temporal happiness, howeverAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 165
plausible, is associated with much unrest, is fluid and fleeting, and
that it quite unconsciously slips out of the hands of its possessors.
Thus while the book contains much that might have been instructive to certain types
of mind, in early stages of education, it is not to be taken seriously as a sample of the
academic or professional thinking of the author’s generation. It belongs in the class
once known as “edifying,” rather than among technological treatises.
Rohr distinguishes “the prudence of private persons” from “that of the reigning
princes” (p. 10). The former was treated in the book named above,
157 the latter is the
subject of the present volume. More particularly, the prudence of the reigning prince,
or civic prudence [Staats-Klugheit] is described as:
the adaptability of the understanding, by means of which rulers are
capable of promoting not only their own but all their subjects’ true
happiness (p. 11).
The division of civic prudence into general and special, which we find first clearly
stated by Gerhard, is adopted by Rohr, but whether or not he was in any way indebted
for the idea to the earlier writer does not appear. His distinction, while apparently the
same, is really not along the same lines as Gerhard’s. Rohr calls application of the
rules of general civic prudence to a given state “special civic prudence,” instead of
grasping the conception of more general and less general principles which may in
their way be applicable to all states. Indeed he does not seem to realize that there is
a place for general principles, other than religious doctrines or moral truisms, upon
which details of civic polity must rest. Instead, he assumes that one may be a
specialist in civic science by simply selecting a fraction of it as his task:
Just as it is impossible that a man, however diligent, should cultivate
all civic prudence completely: so it is well done if each should pursue
those parts for which he has inclination, talent, and opportunity (p.
33).
Rohr bases his essay without hesitation upon the idea of the patriarchal prerogative
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Just as a ruling prince presents two moral persons, first a private
person, who in many acts must conform himself to other private
persons, yet also is to be considered as a prince, who has to direct the
conduct of his subjects, he must consequently be versed in both
private and public prudence (p. 34).
That the book is rather rhetorical than technical is illustrated again in the next
paragraph:
The chief task of the prudence of a ruler consists in always seeking to
combine his happiness with that of his subjects, and in striving to
prevent them from becoming separated. The prosperity of a ruler
which is not founded on the weal of his land is of no permanence, as
is shown by many ancient and modern histories. He must have the
prosperity of his subjects in view in all his actions, and must
undertake nothing which is inconsistent with the same.
At the same time, Rohr quite as distinctly affirms the absolutism of rulers. Thus:
In case of a collision between his own interest and the welfare of the
subjects, from love for his land, in order to promote the common
interest [gemeinschafftliche Interesse] he must subordinate his own
interest. He thereby not only wins the love of his subjects, but he does
that to which he is appointed of God. And while sovereigns are not
bound to render account for their actions to anyone in the world, yet
they, as well as their subjects, have over them the supreme ruler in
heaven, to whom at the great day of judgment they must give answer.
While the author reiterates on the one hand the sonorous principle, “Solus populi
must be the law of the prince,” yet on the other hand he unconsciously betrays the
rendering which the spirit of the time tended to give to the principle, when he says:
The art of government is in fact an art above all arts; because it can
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can raise a sunken state to its former splendor, and through this rare
power of making a prince really great it proves itself the true
statecraft.
In the following section (p. 37) Duke Ernst of Gotha, Seckendorff’s master, is cited
as a type of the Christian prince, and as evidence that piety is necessary for the
success of a ruler. No mention is made at this point of Seckendorff, however, from
whom it is probable that Rohr derived the substance of his political ideas. For
example, the sections in which he describes the duties of a prince in general,
especially §§7–19, merely render Seckendorff’s views in slightly varied terms, and
with trifling additions of detail or illustration. It amounts to no proper
acknowledgment to the man who furnished the thoughts when at last, in §18, his
name is used in connection with the least important item in the whole programme,
viz., the recreations of the prince!
Since Rohr was not a cameralist, but merely a contemporary popularizer of
cameralism, we repeat that he is worth our notice merely as secondary evidence
bearing upon the impression which technical cameralism had made upon the thinking
of men at one remove from the more technical writers.
In a confused paragraph (p. 71) the author raises but does not distinctly answer the
question:
In case a reigning prince violates his fundamental pledges to his
subjects, have they a right to resist? Rohr first remarks, “It is well
known that those who withstand the divinely appointed authorities
resist the divine order,” and he draws the conclusion that a perfidious
prince should be left rather to divine justice than forcibly dealt with
by his subjects. Without much assurance that the next recourse is very
promising, he points out that the constitution of the-Empire calls for
judgment by imperial authorities upon a prince who disturbs or
threatens the order of the Empire by not keeping faith with his
subjects. Pushing the hypothesis to the extreme form, that “the
excesses of the prince make the life of a virtuous subject insecure,”
Rohr ventures the very cautious judgment that in such case one is
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goes only so far, however, as to devise against one and another
private person things contrary to God and to natural decency
[Erbarkeit], such subjects must rather depart from the country, or bear
the injustice with patience, than oppose the majesty of their ruling
sovereign with violence.” The whole discussion of contracts to which
a ruler is a party is conducted upon a shifting basis of theological
dogma, ethical generality, and amateurish legalism. In modern
vernacular, it amounts to a whitewashing report upon the political
status quo, under the form of an impartial inquiry into alternatives.
The fourth chapter (“Von dem Oeronomie Wesen”) is worth notice as a further
index to the current sense of the term Oeconomie. As we try to make evident
throughout this analysis, the readiness with which this and similar terms have been
translated from German into English words which were equivalent in appearance, but
not in sense, has been a serious hindrance to proper insight into the meaning of
German sociological evolution. The one point to be emphasized here is that nowhere,
in the “series of writers interpreted in this study, did any variation of the word
Oeconomie have the force carried by the English derivative from the same root in the
phrase “political economy.” In the whole usage of the cameralists Oeconomie was
primarily thrifty management, as measured by the prevailing standards of household
or public prudence. Oeconomie was literally housekeeping (Haushaltung,
Haushaltungskunst,  etc.), and this conception clung to it, whether the immediate
reference was to thrift in the household, on the farm, in artisanship, trade, or
government. Oeconomie was never, until the period of Smithism, generalized and
deepened into consideration of problems underneath rule-of-thumb wisdom. With
this in mind, we find in Rohr’s approach to the subject of Oeconomie-Wesen an
instructive guide to the plane of interests which held the attention of men of affairs,
both industrial and governmental, before the stage of critical and philosophical
interpretation of economics. He opens the chapter in this way:
Just as private persons fill their storerooms by orderly and reasonable
management [Haushalten], so that they can draw one supply after
another; in the same way with ruling princes, if they attend to their
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happiness not only of their own persons and of their families, but also
of their subjects, which must always be connected with their own,
will be promoted and secured. In the case of princely persons a
double Oeconomica must have place, .... first, the Oeconomica of
private persons. .... In this connection they must take care that the
sums which they lend [Capitalien] are securely invested and kept in
good circulation [rouliren]. They must administer their domains to
good advantage, apportion the outlays reasonably and see that they
are balanced by the income, and always take care that a margin
remains. That which God has given them they must conserve, in order
that it may not be impaired or lost, etc. In all this they must give exact
heed to the same rules and cautions which private persons must
observe. Beyond this there is, second, the Fürstliche Oeconomica,
since princes must not only pay attention to increase and preservation
of their private incomes, but also to enlargement and preservation of
the happiness and goods of their subjects.
Then follows non-technical description of the administrative machinery which the
cameralists had begun to analyze more precisely. Rohr explains the Oeconomie-
Wesen of rulers as an affair of two divisions, distribuendo et augendo, on the one
hand of applying the revenues, on the other of raising them. He uses the term
Cameralisten  for those officials who have the former division in charge, and explains
that a quite different body of persons should be employed in the other division. Thus
he thinks (p. 99) that Cameral-Sachen should be divided into two distinct collegia
— the division, by the way, not according precisely with the distribution of functions
proposed by the author a few lines before — the one, called the Cammer proper, to
collect and disburse the reveunes, the other exclusively to deliberate how to increase
the revenues. He claims that the usual union of these two collegia in a single Cammer
is harmful and costly.
158 Rohr goes into detail about cameralistic technique as though
he were an expert, but our purpose does not require attention to the technological side
of cameralism, and if it did we should be concerned not with the expositions of
amateurs like Rohr, but with those of men who could speak with authority.
A glance at Rohr’s table of contents would show that the personality of the prince,
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proceeds. While this at once condemns the book, from the standpoint of the modern
social theorist, it affords the very evidence which makes the book valuable to the
historical interpreter. This paramount value of government, and of the prince as
incarnating government, is fundamental in the whole cameralistic regime and theory.
It is the pass-key to the whole system. Cameralism as a technique and as a theory was
a means developed in the interest of an end visualized first and foremost in the
person of the prince, if never absolutely identical with the prince and his interests. In
respect to this one factor, the development of German civilization, not to carry the
generalization at this point beyond Germany, was a progressive realization of other
values in society besides those of rulers and governments, and progressive
readjustment of ratios between the several values. All the doctrines and policies of
the period which we are considering have to be interpreted in their connection with
the ruling presumption of the paramount importance of the prince, who may or may
not have been differentiated in thought from the government which he represented.
In either case, the ideas of prince and government as values in themselves, not as
functionaries and functions to be appraised according to their service for other values,
were foremost and decisive throughout this regime. We shall have occasion to ask
more than once, as we proceed, To what extent had some suggestion of another scale
of values begun to work in the minds of the Germans? It is not a part of the task set
for this volume to demonstrate the answer to the question. We shall be obliged,
however, to point out frequent incidental symptoms of the workings of more
democratic impressions.
Rohr expressly adopts that form of the social contract theory which presupposes
nature people contemplating an intolerable social condition, real or impending. To
escape or to avert this condition the whole number of individuals make over their
wills to one or more rulers. Thereafter the will of the whole community can be
expressed only by this single or multiple ruler, and the subject has no rightful
alternative but obedience. The ruler summarizes not only the will but the welfare of
the state, or of the individuals merged into a unique personality (pp. 248 ff.). By a
chain of reasoning which we need not follow, Rohr concludes further (p. 258) that
a Christian monarch is bound by divine and human law to take responsibility for both
the temporal and the eternal welfare of his subjects. This view of course furnishes the
basis for explanation of the ecclesiastical polity of Lutheran stales, and the author
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minutiae of parochial procedure, than with the more strictly cameralistic departments
of government. This leaning toward ecclesiasticism is shown in a most painfully
smug chapter on the proper course of rulers toward “dreamers, pietists, and new
prophets” (pp. 322–65).
It must be admitted, however, that if Rohr’s ecclesiastical views belong in a world
which Americans cannot understand, his views of the relation of the state to
education are at bottom identical with our own. So far as there is a difference in
principle it may be traced to his emphasis on the interest of the state in the training
of good citizens, while we are inclined to view the matter more from the side of the
right of the individual to education. The ecclesiastical factors in education which
Rohr had in mind were, both in subject-matter and in machinery, accidental rather
than essential variations of educational principles which modern democracies attempt
to apply with other details.
In the chapter “Von Academien,” Rohr partially antici-pates Justi in a plea for “ein
Professor Oeconomiae” at the universities. The chapter is entirely in accord with the
other evidence found in the writers of this group to the effect that their references to
“oeconomica” or any equivalent expression connoted something very different from
the implications of the same terms in the nineteenth century, and particularly
different from English versions of the terms. In the order in which the items occur in
the chapter, we may note, first, that the subjects which Rohr wishes such a professor
to teach are at once indicated by the phrase Stadt- und Landes-Wirlh-scltaft; second,
the principal reason alleged for failure to establish such professorships was difficulty
of finding men who had university training who at the same time possessed either
knowledge of these subjects or fitness to teach them; third, slightly varying the
second point, scholars had seldom given attention to Oeconomie, while skilled
managers (Haushaltungs Verstandige) had seldom done much with “studiis” in the
university sense; third, it ought not to be difficult to find here and there men with
experience in administrative offices who understand management (Wirthschafft) from
the bottom and could teach it passably; fourth, in answer to the claim that
Oeconomica, Politica, und morale ought to be taught by the Professori moralium,
and that accordingly increase of the number of professorships is unnecessary, Rohr
says it is true that diligent Professori moralium do not fail to introduce into their
political courses all sorts of economic observations, but it is impossible that they
could fully explain these three sciences;
159 fifth, quoting Dohler,
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prejudiced opinion prevails that a student should not concern himself with any sort
of Hauss-Wesen, that it is even a disgrace for a student to have anything to do with
such employments;” sixth, such being the case, it is high time that students in schools
and colleges should learn Oeconomie from artisans and even from peasants.
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From these citations it is evident that by common understanding among friends and
foes of “economic” instruction, the thing intended was technical, not philosophical.
It was even more remote from subjects then regarded as within the pale of
Wissenschaft than manual training is today in the minds of those who are least
inclined to welcome it, or its maturer continuations, into our lower and higher
schools.
Chap, xvi, “Von der Gelehrsamkeit,” develops the theorem:
Since good arts and sciences are fitted in no slight degree to increase
and to maintain the happiness of a land and of its ruler, it follows that
a ruler who has the weal of his provinces at heart has the best of
reasons for desiring that his subjects should be instructed in all sorts
of useful disciplines. The more learned and intelligent they are, the
more available are they, whether in peace or in war.
The discussion takes a turn which shows the limitations of the time with respect to
freedom of thought; that is, it dwells more on what should not be permitted in
schools, or allowed to appear in print, than upon promotion of unrestricted
investigation; but in one direction it calls for increased liberality. Sec. 12 opens with
the remarks:
In the case of political writings, people are in many places far too
scrupulous. State secrets are made out of matters which are quite
innocent, and sometimes people fear to make public anything with
reference to state affairs, although no good reason for such caution
can be found.
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Beginning with chap, xvii, “Von Lastern,” the book invades more and more
technical ground, but with the equipment of the essayist rather than of the specialist,
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mirror of the times, it would be of great value to a culture historian who knew how
to use such material. For our purpose it yields nothing which is not to be found in
more reliable form elsewhere.
Two exceptions to the foregoing must be noted. The first is a negative contribution
to our inquiry. In the twenty-first chapter, on the police system of cities, Rohr gives
one of the clearest testimonies to be found in the cameralistic or quasi-cameralistic
literature, that the police system as outlined later was only in a slight degree in
existence at the date of the book. The institution had yet to be developed to meet
needs that were felt before the means of satisfying them were created. Rohr quotes
“a certain unnamed author, who has described the well-organized state of the hitherto
much-sought but never-discovered kingdom of Ophir.” He is said to have expressed
himself as follows:
Because through observance of good Policey the divine blessing and
the prosperity of a land are best insured, certain Policey-Räthe should
be appointed. These should be efficient and learned men in
Moralibus, Politicis und Oeconomicis, and they should be used for
drawing up good police ordinances, and for zealously supervising
their execution. Their office demands requirement that agricultural
land should everywhere be well cultivated and sowed with the
necessary seed, that management [Wirthschaft] should be well and
thriftily [häusslich] conducted; impious, immoral, vicious, dissolute,
and infamous persons should nowhere be tolerated; that vagrants and
idlers should be made to work, the roads and ways be kept good and
secure, the streams be made navigable, cities and villages be provided
with good inns, traffic by water and land carried on fairly and
diligently, children and servants well trained and provided, the offices
properly filled, the unworthy expelled from civic stations, law and
justice administered, the wicked punished, the pious rewarded, and
the poor relieved. In short, that there should everywhere prevail
honorable, Christian and righteous life.
Rohr declares, however, that this ideal must be put in the class of piorum
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prerogatives proposed. His opinion is of no value to us. The important thing is the
evidence which the passage furnishes that the Policey Ordnung afterward introduced
was in a very rudimentary stage when he wrote. His ideas of the standards of conduct
which ought to be enforced by government seem to conform in spirit to the standard
quoted, and he goes into a mass of details, but the particular machinery recommended
by the anonymous author alone meets his disapproval. Rohr apparently felt jealous
for the prerogatives of the church in connection with these matters. The progress of
events realized more of the system foreshadowed in the quotation than its author
appears to have expected. Indeed more than half of Rohr’s book is occupied with
subjects which Justi afterward systematized under the rubric Policey.
The second exception to the general proposition that Rohr affords little light on the
cameralistic problem proper is found in chap, xxviii, on “The Riches of the Country.”
Recalling his earlier assertion that the interests of the prince are bound up with those
of his subjects, he premises in particular that the prince has every reason to do his
best that the subjects may be rich. Without mincing words, he frankly puts this
identity of interest between prince and subjects in the affluence of the latter on the
ground that if the subjects have money the sovereign always has means at his
command to get it from them. “On the other hand, if the subjects are poor, he can no
more get money from them than one can squeeze water out of a dry sponge.”
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After reciting some of the information which a prince must command, about the
wealth and sources of income of his subjects, that he may know the location and
capacity of the springs which he must tap, Rohr betrays his ideas of wealth itself, and
his expressions are rather remarkable. He says:
A prince must have care that his land may increase in riches. A land
becomes richer, in proportion as money and gold (sic) are brought
into it, either from its own mines or elsewhere, and poorer as money
leaves the country. For inasmuch as by general consent of peoples
gold and silver are the universal price of all things, and the worth of
the same in all places in the world is estimated according to the worth
of gold and silver, for which everything can be bought, one must
estimate the riches of a land according to the quantity of the gold and
silver in the same. Hence a prince must give his thought to means
whereby the land may become richer, and he must remove everythingAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 175
through which it becomes poorer (p. 844).
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Rohr is not content to let the matter rest with one statement. He repeats it in this
form in the next paragraph, almost in the words of Schröder, as indeed the previous
quotation was, viz.:
We find gold and silver in the mines, and this is the most certain
increment of the riches of the country, for as much as gold and silver
are found, so much has the country increased in riches.
Then follows an uncritical formulation of the theory of the balance of trade. At the
same time, without perception of its bearing upon the idea of the exceptional
character of gold and silver as riches, the fundamental necessity of making the
country as fertile as possible is urged as strenuously as though the author were the
extremest physiocrat.
In the chapter on mining (xxxvi), Rohr again falls back upon Schröder.
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theorem of the latter is:
A prince should cause the gold and silver mines to be worked, if they
yield anything at all, whether with a loss or a profit, for that matters
not to the country, since I have shown [chap. xxx] that this is the most
certain approach of a country to riches.
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The most direct evidence which we get of Rohr’s sources in the next chapter, on
forests, is his citation of von Carlowitz’ Sylvicultura, Oeconomica, yet he writes with
great confidence, and evidently from a larger range of direct observation than in any
other portion of the book, unless it may be the ecclesiastical sections. The essay style
and quality prevail in the remainder of the book, and it yields nothing farther that is
notable for our purpose.	"	 
We come now to the point at which cameral science was first officially designated
as a subject to be taught in universities. Whatever their scientific merits or defects,
the men who mark this event in the history of cameralistics are notable.
167
According to Inama,
168 Gasser’s father was Kurfürstlich brandenburgischer
Landrentmeister. The range of ideas within which the paternal duties were
discharged must account in part for the interests and limitations of the son. As Inama
further says, “he had a clear but extremely jejune intellect, with total absence of
higher philosophical, ethical and historical conceptions.” Gasser built upon
Seckendorff, but was far from appreciating the whole range of the earlier author’s
wisdom. For our purposes, the fact that Gasser was professor of law, and also a
member of the Schöppenstuhl at Halle, before he was appointed to the newly created
chair of cameralistics, is all that is necessary by way of introduction to his book.
Since Gasser was the first to occupy the economic professorship established at
Halle (1727), his book, published two years after beginning the new duties, would
deserve attention as a waymark, even if it contained nothing otherwise notable.
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The items in the book which mean most for our purpose are contained in the
Preface. They may be reduced to a very brief resume, but the process of extracting
this tincture from the fibrous rhetorical pulp which contains it is extremely
perplexing.
In the dedication to Friedrich Wilhelm I prominence is given to the statement that
the king had both excited the admiration and gratified the wish of many scholars by
taking the lead in establishing economic professorships. With respect both to the
“admiration” and the “many,” Gasser’s own account shows that our acceptance of the
record must be carefully qualified. All the evidence goes to show that the scholars in
Germany who looked with any favor whatever at this period upon the idea of
introducing economics into the universities were few and far between. It appearsAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 177
further that some of the credit for the innovation in Prussia is probably due to
Thomasius, the editor of Osse’s Testament, at that time rector of the University of
Halle.
In explaining the king’s objects in founding the new “economic professorship,”
Gasser incidentally betrays facts in the situation which are doubtless more apparent
to the present reader of his book than they were to his own mind. He states, first, that
the king wanted young men to get in the universities some of the elementary
knowledge which would make them available as civic employees. With the zeal of
a new convert he contrasts this desirable knowledge with the sort of thing which had
up to that time been the nearest approach to preparation—“juridical pedantries and
lawyers’ tricks.”
170 He rings many changes on this charge. He thereby shows, first,
that the subject which he represented was fighting for its life, and, second, that men
of his type had already formulated in their own minds, if they had not widely
published, some rather specific counts against the scholastic formalism of the law
faculties of the period.
The next item which we disentangle from the author’s labored and involved form
of explanation is that he felt himself on the defensive for delaying as long as two
years before publishing this book on the subject of his professorship! His explanation
is, in brief, that his duties required him to teach “from morning till five or six in the
evening,”
171 that his official duties “auf der Kammer und Deputation” consumed his
forenoons, that from six o’clock till late at night he had “enough duties connected
with the bureau, the faculty and other official labors to occupy two or three men,” and
that consequently there remained to him for work on economic subjects “only the few
morning hours up to eight o’clock!” Furthermore, he contemptuously describes
authorship in the legal faculty as a process of picking out passages from ninety-nine
volumes and scribbling them into a hundredth. On the contrary, “although a heap of
economic rubbish has been brought to light already, there are few if any pioneers in
this subject, but everything must be collected with much labor and reflection, also by
inquiries and collation.”
172 Gasser returns several times to the additional difficulty
that “the scholarly and efficient Hauswirthe and Politici are more at odds with one
another than any other scholars can possibly be.”
Returning to the reasons why economic professorships had not been established
earlier, Gasser quotes Thomasius,
173 first, on the proposition that the jurists had
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positions; second, that Oeconomie ought to be taught in the universities by professors
especially charged with that subject; and third, on the reasons for omission to supply
this need. Thomasius covers all the points on which we have already quoted Rohr in
this connection, and he adds the following reasons:
First, because Aristotle left us no economic books, and at the
founding of the first universities the monks knew nothing but
Aristotle; second, the belief has prevailed that the scholar should
concern himself with something different from that which the drudge
and common man understands; third, it has possibly been partly from
fear that the laity would discover the tricks of clerical Oeconomie;
fourth, scholars of the traditional sorts have little fitness to investigate
economic subjects, and so make light of them; fifth, the same, and
indeed all scholars, are apt to be poor economists in their own private
affairs; sixth, good economy would not tolerate monkish laziness, but
is based on the contrary belief that “man is destined for labor, and that
he who does not work is not worthy to eat.”
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The sense in which the king understood the term Oeconomie, and in which Gasser
undertook to use it, appears in part, though by no means fully, in the further
explanation by the author:
His majesty manifested in the beginning great displeasure at the bad
Oeconomie which young people were in the habit of practicing in
their own affairs, so that when they come back from universities and
tours, they are usually already so loaded with debts that they are
helpless, and especially those who have landed estates carry on such
thriftless management because of aforesaid debts, that they cannot
rescue even the most important estates from embarrassment when
they at last gradually get some insight into Oeconomie, especially
because the people who operate and superintend the estates can
defraud the uninstructed owners in countless ways.
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zealous to change the proportion of lawyers, who filled the country
and sucked it dry. He wanted young men to learn not merely the
elements of jurisprudence, but to add the elements of politica,
oeconomica  and  cameralia  (p. 8).
Gasser explains that in order to meet this demand, he devotes the first half-year to
lectures on Seckendorff’s Fürsten-Staat. He says that although this schönes
Tractätiein does not contain much about Oeconomica proper, yet it in general
corresponds with the royal intention in surveying the whole state, and thus in
furnishing a basis for setting the lawyers right. Gasser also mentions Rohr’s book as
a compendium oeconomicum, but he does not agree with the author that it would
form a useful basis for university lectures, because it contains too much that is
specific and practical in form, but not available until it can be reconsidered and
applied after adoption of fundamental rules. “Besides,” adds Gasser, “there is nothing
in the book in the way of correct formulation of the budgets.”
This latter remark is explained by a glance at Gasser’s categories of Anschläge for
all sorts of minor industrial operations. This estimate of the unavailability of Rohr
is apparently to be understood primarily by comparison with Seckendorff, because
Gasser shows that he is interested in quite as minute details as those presented by
Rohr. He finds in Seckendorff, however, the necessary statement of fundamental
principles upon which specific rules of management must rest.
After elaborating this claim at some length, Gasser cites “von Schroter,”
175 on the
difference between a rich man and a rich prince; to the effect that “much money
makes a rich man but not a powerful prince.” Gasser interprets Schröder as meaning
not that a prince should have no money, but that he should have both money and
power. Consequently, Gasser urges that the two supporting pillars of the princely
state are “revenues from the country and well-to-do subjects in the country,
particularly in the towns.” This theorem is the text for a somewhat detailed argument
upon the importance of promoting diversified industries.
The author’s Vorbericht closes with a promise to make his lectures as valuable
commentaries as possible, both by explanation and illustration, upon the contents of
the book. Although it is aside from our main purpose, we may quote the paragraph
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I propose also to set apart a designated hour on Saturdays in which
the work of those who commendably choose to attempt practice at
once will be examined, their mistakes pointed out and further
guidance given. For that purpose I shall assign to some the tasks of
drawing up the budgets [Anschläge] of estates, and of formulating the
special budgets of breweries, mills, brickyards, etc., belonging to
estates. Others will be required to draw up the customs schedules,
catastra, etc., on the lines indicated in the several chapters. When
these are read and discussed on Saturdays, other students will be
appointed as revisers and examiners, while the lectures will take them
up further, and they will thus be considered as it were in full session.
In a word, each student will be encouraged to do his best in the line
in which he shows most inclination, while by listening to the work of
all he may gain a general idea of the whole subject.
The body of the book is, in a very narrow sense, technical. As evidence of the
progress of administrative technology it would call for careful comparison with
previous and following handbooks. For our purpose its chief significance is negative.
That is, it shows that the horizon of cameralistic theory, as the author understood it,
was bounded by the rules of thrifty management, first of the domains of the prince,
and then of the various gainful employments, sometimes viewed as lucrative for the
individual citizens, and sometimes as having their chief importance as ultimate
revenue creators for the prince.
Even this modicum of meaning is to be found in the book only after patient
consideration. The opening chapters, first, on the meaning of domains in general, and
especially on the invalid distinction between Domainen-Güter, Taffel-Güter, and
Cammer-Güter, and second, on incorporation of new acquisitions into the domains,
have only the remotest visible connection with all that follows. They have every
appearance of having been revamped from the author’s old law lectures, and forced
into service in place of a general survey, which he could not extemporize. They are
an unkempt rabble of juridical archaeology, homespun philology, current legal usage,
and common-sense conclusion. To the modern reader, they are mostly unintelligible.
From the references to Seckendorff one derives the impression that, beyond these
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impotent preamble, was drawn from the Fürsten-Staat. One other obvious inference
is that the author regarded the word-splitting which he summed up in these two
chapters as a bad inheritance from the civilists and the canonists. While he was not
sufficiently emancipated from the futile controversy to ignore it, his opinion was as
frank in substance as it was Hibernian in form, viz., “If the French writers had not
broken the ice of the theorems of the spiritual and secular state, the papal and
glossarial yeast would have got the upper hand!” (p. 3).
Without making any visible use of these two chapters on the domains, the author
plunges, without a word to account for the abrupt change, into a series of chapters on
the most minute details of private thrift.
Chaps, iii–x inclusive begin with analysis of ordinary building processes, and end
with details of assessment of tithes and other tributes. Sixty-two pages are assigned
to itemized schedules of the cost of different sorts of construction, e.g., a tile roof;
a thatch roof; the carpenter’s work on a country house; estimate for a pigeon-cote
resting on posts; estimate of the cost of mason work; cost of wheelwright’s work;
cost of pottery, etc., etc. The logic which calls for these exhibits begins with the
major premise: “To avoid being cheated, you must know customary prices.”
Details of a corresponding order constitute the substance of the chapters just
referred to. The aim in the author’s mind is made plain again by the opening
sentences of chap, iv, “On the budgets of estates in general, and particularly of
agricultural lands in three classes, and how such budget is to be constructed,
according to the amount of seed furnished or otherwise.” Thus:
As Columella observed of his own time, that all sciences, such as
military service, scholarship, commerce, building, nautical art, even
music, dancing, and such things, have their own guides and teachers,
yet agriculture has neither pupils nor teachers. The same holds of our
time. It consequently comes about that the minority take occasion to
think for themselves, but whoever lives in the country, or has an
estate of his own, follows the custom of the majority, and what is still
wiser, if a specially good manager is in the locality, the rest observe
and try to imitate him.
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may not really be doing the same thing; because there is a failure to note the different
circumstances of adjacent tracts, and to conform treatment to the varying conditions.
Thereupon follows an attempt to analyze classes of soil and to show the processes of
culture appropriate to each. The following one hundred and forty pages contain
abundant evidence that technical and social administration of rural communities was
at this time a highly developed and conventionalized art, but at the same time it was
an art consisting of aggregated rule-of-thumb practice. It had no secure basis in
fundamental principles.
The chief difference between the first ten and the remaining twelve chapters of the
book is not in the method of treatment but rather in the fact that the former deal with
technique of more strictly private management, while the latter belong to a larger
degree in the realm of public management. In either case the author’s effort is to
describe actual administrative practice. He has before his mind the private or public
functionary, and he tries to schedule the kinds of information which proprietors or
managers of farms, or civic functionaries of various grades, from bureau clerks up
to the prince, would have occasion to use in their respective positions. All this was
Oeconomie,  as Gasser interpreted the term. It had the same relation to pure
economics, as we understand the term today, which instruction in the technique of
operating a gas plant or an electric street-railway or a telephone exchange would have
to foundations of economic theory.
In order to get at the full significance of the cameralistic foundations at Halle and
Franckfurt a. O. the writings of Thomasius would have to be more carefully
examined. As our space forbids this, we may merely call attention in passing to
another important factor in the movement, Ludewig, professor of law and chancellor
of the University of Halle.
On the occasion of the establishment of the new professorship Ludewig wrote a
quaint little book of 166 pages, explaining and praising the king’s purpose. The tract
is a document of firstrate importance as evidence sustaining our main thesis about the
center of interest in the whole cameralistic period. Indeed, excess of cynicism could
not justly be charged if one should conclude that for reasons of his own the writer
had seized the opportunity rather for laudation of the regime of Friedrich Wilhelm
I than to promote cameralistic science. At all events, the monograph is vivid
confirmation of our diagnosis of cameralism as fiscalism.
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The essay seems to ignore the promise of the title-page until forty-five of its fifty-Albion Small, The Cameralists, 183
six sections (one hundred and thirty out of one hundred and sixty-six pages) are
completed. The argument begins with citation of the alleged dictum of the Persian
King Cyrus, “A select army and good management [Wirthschafft] of the subjects
177
are the two chief and surest means of making a people rich and a land permanently
happy.” The authority of Socrates, reinforced by Xenophon, is inserted along with
that of Cyrus, “although they were heathen who must somehow have obtained divine
enlightenment,” to sustain this argument. Then follows, largely as an interpretation
of Columella, a justification of the dictum, chiefly on its economic side, from the
experience of the Romans, including the Eastern emperors. As a transition to the
immediate application of the theme, Ludewig remarks (§9) that it is very difficult to
find in ancient or modern history a ruler who is equally great in war and in promotion
of management (Wirtschaft). Possibly Henry IV of France is one of the few
exceptions. After reciting at some length illustrations of that monarch’s wisdom and
prudence, Ludewig continues:
But why should we pause so long upon a foreign and past exam ple?
Through a brave and wise king, God has placed this truth before the
eyes of our own times and subjects (sic). Wherefore we could and
should daily admire, honor and thank the perfect [grund-güten] God,
for such a blessed government of his anointed. So long as the world
has stood, as may easily be proved from the authentic history of all
realms, no region of the earth has seen an army to be compared with
that of Prussia, etc., etc. (§10).
Having continued this eulogy in some detail, Ludewig specifies and partially
describes in turn, as items in the excellence of the Prussian system:
the administration of charity (§14); the workhouses and penal
institutions (§15); the homes for veterans (§16); medical and sanitary
institutions (§17); colonies (§18); the establishment of many
industries, and regulation of the same (§§10–24); settlement of
boundary disputes (§25); redemption of waste lands (§26);
construction of water-ways (§27); development of salt works (§28);
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capable young men as subordinates in administrative offices (§30);
written ordinances and laws for all functionaries (§31); revision and
promulgation of the code of private law(§32); standardizing of
weights and measures (§33); transformation of feudal tenures into
complete property (§34); introduction of money commutation for
cavalry service (§35); removal of capitation, property and other taxes
(§36); reforms of the currency (§37); establishment of the office of
comptroller (§38); careful signing of royal decrees (§39);
administration of justice and expediting of legal processes (§40);
consequent improvement of the royal finances (§41); simplification
of ceremonial (§42).
Without notice of transition from eulogy to exhortation, Ludewig ventures to offer
three cautious suggestions, viz.:
That it would be well for the government to provide administrative,
and especially the Policey, bureaus with national and special maps
and diagrams visualizing the conditions of the country at large, and,
in more detail, of the respective administrative divisions (§43); that
certain feudal burdens should be removed (§44); that the military and
fiscal administration should in certain features be reorganized (§45).
After this introduction, which occupies more than three times the space reserved for
the ostensible purpose of the discourse, Ludewig turns to the supposed theme of the
monograph in this way:
But this should be enough about the details of good Oeconomie and
Policey, which by divine grace and blessing are daily before our eyes
in these lands. And as we have rendered ourselves liable to all sorts
of perverse judgments about this writing, which flowed so easily from
our pen and good heart, we will now set forth the motives for the
same, instead of offering excuses. For since his royal majesty, our
most gracious king and lord, in founding at Halle a new professorship
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first in the learned world to take such a step; and since he most
graciously decreed that the intention and use of the same should be
made public; I have believed that neither the new Oecono-mic-
Professor  could receive a greater impulse to his labor nor the students
and apprentices [Lehrlinge] greater zeal for such courses, than if they
should turn their thoughts especially in aforesaid Came-ral, Policey
und Oeconomie-Lehren, to the example of the great and wise founder,
in his kingdom, provinces, and lands; if they should enlarge upon
what I have said, and correct that in which I have been in error, and
especially if they should add the larger part which I have been obliged
to leave untouched. Besides this, I must call to mind that, along with
my administrative duties, the founder of our Friedrichs-Universität
conferred upon me, along with the professorship of history, the
calling of a royal historiographer, in which capacity I felt a strong
impulse to use the present occasion for a contribution to einer
Oeconomie- und Policey-Historie. And as a matter of fact great lords
may-well be pitied for the money and appointments which they
bestow upon historiographos. The latter either use their salary for
their own enjoyment in learned idleness, or, if they do any work, fall
upon obsolete times and forget their founder. .... This may be partly,
indeed, because the archives are closed to them. .... Another
extenuating item is that if the historian happens to make a mistake
about current affairs, certain people at once seize the opportunity to
discredit him at court. Moreover, if anything is written about recent
times, it is mostly about wars and rumors of wars, and the great deeds
at home [zu Hauss und im Lande] are seldom mentioned. Finally, it
is urged by the unintelligent that there is no use in writing down what
is known to everybody in the land. These do not consider that
subsequent times consume and erase the preceding, and that what is
now before our eyes and in our hands fifty years hence will have
become a secret and forgotten, if not made a part of history. Such
being the case, great lords are unfortunate to labor only to be
forgotten, and the praiseworthy, wise and tireless princes who have
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successors so many examples, have no advantages over worthless
rulers. .... (Sec. 46 elaborates still further the theme, “Make the
history of good princes while they are living.”)
Sec. 47 goes somewhat more into detail about the developments that led to the new
professorship, but in substance it repeats Gasser’s account above (p. 208). Sec. 48
discusses the relation of the new professorship to the chairs of “practical philosophy,”
“ethics,” and “politics.” Incidentally this section exhibits in the most explicit way the
content of the term Oeconomie, as officially sanctioned in Prussia in 1727.
Expanding the proposition that, while Oeconomie at last belongs within the
departments named, yet it requires special attention as a subject by itself, Ludewig
says:
It is easy to guess the secret why hitherto professors have taught
Oeconomie who were in doubt whether to look for ears of corn on
trees or in the ground. For the sponsor [Aristotle.] to whom they refer
deals in his economic books almost wholly with the morality of
father, mother, children, and servants. As to arable land, meadows,
streams, forests, gardens, plants; how to treat cattle in the stall; how
to increase the supply of manures; how to brew grain and to sell the
product; what a manager has to do and what to leave undone every
day in the year; what provisions he must keep in store for fire-
protection, for food, in storehouse, in kitchen, and in cellar: of all
these things Aristotle has not a syllable. Hence his creatures, the
Oeconomie Professores, up to the present time, have not concerned
themselves with these things, but they have considered themselves
masters when they could explain the “commandments” which the
children recite. This is the reason why among the hundred
philosophical books which treat of Oeconomia there is not a
wholesome and practical line, and thus this name conceals the
greatest fraud.
With this indirect definition of the scope of the new professorship we have the
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presently we shall find intentional or unintentional echoes of these reflections upon
belated Aristotelianism. The points to be noted particularly are, first, that the concept
carried by variations of the term Oeconomica at that time did not by any means make
it identical with the scope of contemporary Cameralwissenschaft; second, that the
term was equally contrasted with the nineteenth-century term economics and its
variations; third, that the foundation of the Prussian professorships of Oeconomica,
etc., was of less immediate significance, either for cameral science in general or for
economic science as we now understand the term, than was assumed by the men
directly interested, and even by later writers. The horizon of economics in a
comprehensive sense dawned on the view of the Germans in a way somewhat parallel
with that by which the sociological outlook in our time has widened from attention
to certain remedial problems to survey of the entire social process.
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Justus Christoph Dithmar was born March 13, 1677, and died on the anniversary
of his birth in 1737. We need to know of his personality simply that he was professor
of history, then of Natur- und Völkerrecht, at Frankfurt a. O., and was designated to
the chair at Frankfurt corresponding to that of Gasser, practically at the same time
with the appointment of the latter. Both began their new duties October, 1727.
Roscher remarks:
While Gasser took his point of departure from jurisprudence, Dithmar
passed from history to cameral science. It may be due to this
circumstance that he (Dithmar) is as far behind his colleague in
practical economic insight as he is superior to him in general
culture.
179 (p. 431).
The two books which bear their names being taken as the sole basis of comparison,
Roscher is justified in his estimate of the relative merits of Gasser and Dithmar.
Roscher is clearly in error, however, both when he says that the division into
“Oeconomie, Polizei- und Cameralwissenschaft” originates with Dithmar, and when
he credits him with the distinction between the “land- und stadtwirthschafttiche
Zweige der Volks-wirthschaft.” Both divisions are discoverable in Gasser.
180 The
latter is plainly formulated by Rohr. It is true that Dithmar is the first to use these
distinctions as titles for subdivision of a cameralistic syllabus.
181 Inama seems to have
repeated Roscher on these points, without examining the evidence. Neither seems to
have noticed that Stisser confidently attributes to P. Fischer the distinction between
Land and Stadt Wirthschaft.
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Although Gasser and Dithmar began the work of their cameralistic professorships
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apology for delay in publishing on this subject. The book which appeared four years
after he assumed his new duties is a mere skeleton of academic lectures.
183 In the
Preface he gives virtually the same account of the king’s purpose in establishing the
professorship which we have already drawn from Gasser and Ludewig with reference
to Halle. Dithmar speaks in much more terse and confident terms. He takes it for
granted that since “the welfare, power, and repute of a state rest on a well-ordered
economic, police, and cameral system,” and since people versed in statecraft have
long wished that studious youth might be introduced to these subjects before entering
the employment of the state, the king’s action in providing such instruction settles the
matter, so far as the academic rights of the professorship are concerned.
It is more notable that Dithmar says, “since no introduction to such sciences
existed.” This is a significant reflection upon Gasser, not to mention the earlier
writers whom we have noticed. It goes far as a sign that Dithmar perceived the
provincialism of previous writers, and had a broader conception than they had shown
of the necessary scope of cameralistic theory. He confesses that his Part IV on
Policey-Wissenschaft takes the police ordinances of Prussia as the material to be
explained, with certain notable features of the civil law of other states.
Schreber’s Preface to the fifth edition is in some respects more instructive for our
purposes than the book itself. The editor says that he has been careful merely to
correct the text and to insert such brief notes as would menace neither the size of the
book nor the publisher’s price. He used Dithmar’s book as the basis of his own
lectures, probably first at Halle, later at Butzow, then at Leipzig (vide Stieda, p. 38).
His estimate of the book is expressed in the judgment:
To the sainted author belongs this honor, viz.: Of the study which he
undertook to teach, the mistaken opinion prevailed, that it could not
be compressed into certain fundamental theorems, and could not be
taught in universities; yet he was a path-breaker in the subject, and he
showed, not only that both things were possible, but that they were
useful. In spite of its faults, his introduction retains the value of the
most convenient reading book on the sciences of which it treats, and
is used in various, including Catholic universities.
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I do not deny that since the book first saw the light we have had more
profound and elaborate introductions to the cameral sciences. .... I
know the writings of a Gasser, Zschackwitz, Stisser, Hofmann,
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Justi, and others, and I would not detract in the least from the credit
due either to them or to the eminent merits of Herrn Hofraths Zink
(sic), who was the first to go deepest into these sciences, when I
nevertheless declare Dithmar’s Einleitung the most available of all for
the purposes of academic lectures.
Schreber states that the day before writing the Preface he had for the third time
completed in a half-year the course in which he used Dithmar’s Einleitung as a
syllabus, and he had found no other book with which he could cover the ground in
the same time. The technical aims of his instruction appear in his explanation of his
pedagogical method. He kept in mind the training of clerks for bureaus.
185 He closes
with the advice: “To those who desire detailed instruction in Kauf-
mannswissenschaft,  either Lau’s Entwurf wohleingerichteter Negotien, or another
system, about to appear in print, is recommended.”
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Of the syllabus itself little can be said without going into the technical details by
means of which comparisons might be possible with those presented by earlier and
later writers. Such comparisons are excluded from our plan. In general it may be
noted that Dithmar furnishes abundant evidence that analysis of the relations
concerned was becoming both more objective and more systematic. The scientific
plane which author and editor had reached may be indicated by a few citations.
The first section proposes the following definition:
Economic science (die Oeconomische Wissenschaft, oder
Hauss-wirthschafts- und Hausshaltungskunst) teaches how, through
proper rural and city occupations, support and riches may be gained
for the promotion of temporal happiness.
The editor adds the following leading propositions:
Economic science is not an art.
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to preserving and applying, temporal income.
The difference between general and special Oeconomie must here be
shown.
It should be observed that the definition, and apparently the editor’s comments, put
the subject of Oeconomie quite distinctly on the side of private interests. The public
aspects of Oeconomie appeared to Dithmar rather under the other two divisions of
his subject.
After admitting that opinions differ greatly about Policey-wissenschaft, Dithmar
expresses his own view in this form.
It teaches how the internal and external nature [Wesen] of a state is to be
maintained, with a view to general happiness [allgemeine Glückseligkeit], in good
condition and order, and accordingly that the supreme magistracy of the country must
have a care that their subjects shall not only be kept in good numbers, God-fearing,
Christian, honorable, and healthy life and conduct, and that their support and surplus
of temporal goods shall be promoted by flourishing rural and town occupations; but
also that a land shall be improved with well-laid-out cities, country districts and
towns, and all kept in good condition. Hence Policeywissenschaft is a part of
Staatsklugheit, but it can be taught conveniently with the economic and cameral
sciences, on account of its close connections with both (§§viii, ix).
Dithmar’s definition of Cameralwissenschaft runs: 
It teaches how the princely domain and regalian rights [Regalien] may
be well used, and from them, as well as from the payments
[Prästarionen] due from subjects, and other public funds, the princely
revenues may be raised, improved, and applied for the maintenance
of the community [gemeines Wesen].
The editor adds:
The difference between Finanz- and Rentwissenschaft must here be
explained (§x).
Dithmar accounts for the neglect of these three important sciences in very nearly theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 192
same terms used by Gasser and Rohr, especially in the counts referring to Aristotle
and the monks, to the class pride which had relegated knowledge of
Hausshaltungswesen  to the vulgar herd, and he repeats the arguments that all three
of these sciences consist of details which must be learned by practice, or by
association with experts. Dithmar contends stoutly that the principles of these
sciences may be taught to advantage in the universities, while he recommends
observation of actual practice in the fields which they severally occupy (§xvi).
Having compressed his main propositions on these general relations into the brief
space of twenty-four pages, Dithmar proceeds with the subject of Landöconomie. His
emphasis is less on the side of manual operation than Gasser’s, and more on
managerial technique. In his way, he restricts himself as closely to technical details
as his predecessor. This remark applies also to Part III, “Von der Stadtöconomie.”
This Wissenschaft is said to teach “how, through the occupations of citizens,
sustenance and riches may be gained for the happiness of each and of the whole.” It
would be easy to point out curious combinations between the “science” so marked
off and the Policeywissenschaft of the same system, but it is enough to remark that
these pioneers were not yet much troubled about consistency of classification. They
were chiefly concerned with concrete particulars. Dithmar defines cities as “those
societies which have Stadt- und Bürgerrecht, and are authorized to carry on city
occupations [Stadtgewerbe] or pursuits that furnish support for citizens” [bürgerliche
Nahrungen] (§i). The analysis deals consequently with the actual situations only,
without attempting anything more fundamental than description of existing urban
arrangements.
In the introduction to Part IV, on Policeywissenschaft, Dithmar says:
The Policey is grounded in civic society, in consequence of which it
is competent for the ruling prince to control the conduct and affairs
of his subjects, for the maintenance of the community [gemeinen
Wesens] (§v).
He continues:
Policey may rightly be called the life and soul of a state, and the
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grievance that the same has been neglected! In the Middle Ages the
Romish clergy were at fault for this. For their purposes good Policey
was not desirable, and consequently Policeywissemchaft was
suppressed by them along with other disciplines (§vi). In modem
times there is no lack of political books, but little about Policey-
wissenschaft is to be found in them, without doubt because economic
and cameral sciences are lacking, with which Policeywissenschaft is
closely connected (§vii). Such science is to be gained by knowledge
of the police systems of ancient and modem states; by meditation
upon what might be good for a state in view of its circumstances; by
associating with experts in police affairs; and by personal experience
(§§viii, ix).
Instead of attempting to pass upon the value of Dithmar’s specific views in this
connection, we shall allow Justi to stand for this part of the cameralistic system.
Dithmar again indicates his conception of Cameralwissenschaft
188 in the proposition
(p. 242):
It teaches how the revenues of the reigning prince may be raised, from
time to time augmented, and so applied to maintenance of the
community [gemeinen Wesens] that a surplus may remain annually.
As a mere outline of the subjects which belong under this head, the syllabus puts
its author in wholly respectable comparison with Justi. Of course it is impossible to
compare his knowledge of details with that of the later writer.
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On the whole Dithmar must be regarded as in certain very important respects more
typical than Justi of German cameralistic scholarship at the middle of the eighteenth
century. He represents both its weakness and its strength. The stage of evolution
through which this division of German social science was passing may be
characterized as a struggle for emancipation from a priori, deductive methodology,
into the freedom of empirical, telic discovery. Dithmar was evidently much more
conscientious in every way than Justi. He was extremely respectful toward the past.
He was cautious about encouraging innovations. He was the first of the cameralists
to present a respectably classified bibliography of the subjects which they treat;
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the groups of writers scheduled, ranging from Xenophon, Geoponica, Cato, Varro,
Vergil, and a score of other writers on agriculture, to his immediate contemporaries,
on subjects which were creating a new literature, vividly reflect the unconscious
adjustment that was going forward between authority on the one hand and
observation and analysis on the other. Dithmar has fortified the text of his little book
with more references to sources than are to be found in all Justi’s writings. Still
further, there is a perceptible contrast between his mental attitude and that of the
legalistic publicists who had no way of determining how to drain a swamp or work
a vein of ore, unless a precedent could be found in the law books. On the other hand,
Dithmar was no such man of the world as Justi. He could draw upon no such varied
experience with affairs. His judgments were those of a scholar rather than of a
business man. He was therefore relatively modest and conventional, though evidently
intelligent and progressive; while Justi was forceful and self-assertive, partly for the
reason that he had a much more restricted historical and literary outlook than
Dithmar. The bolder and more aggressive type better visualized the active factors
which were expanding administrative theory. The less demonstrative type more fairly




No author, in the whole series which this study includes, is more difficult to
interpret and appraise than Zincke. The most obvious reasons for this are, first, that
he was a somewhat voluminous writer, even if we take into account his cameralistic
publications alone. Moreover, his books do much less than is usually the case to
throw light upon one another. On the contrary, his variations of terminology and
classification from book to book are bewildering. It is hard to decide whether there
is consistency and unity in the successive volumes, or whether they are so many
distinct trials at a baffling task. In the second place, although Zincke presents his
material in highly analyzed form, his style is elusive, and his divisions, subdivisions,
and cross-classifications mystify more than they elucidate.
It is also to be said that Roscher has conspicuously failed to place Zincke in his true
perspective. While it is necessary to use Roscher in getting back to the facts about the
cameralists, he is in this case a stumbling-block as well as a stepping-stone.
From the sketch by Zimmermann,
192 the most salient points in Zincke’s checkered
career may be summarized as follows:
Georg Heinrich Zincke was born in 1692, and died in 1768. His father
was a preacher, and both father and mother seem to have done their
best to induce the sort to adopt the father’s calling. The boy twice
interrupted his school career to enter the army. After he had become
Unterofficier he was captured and taken to France as prisoner of war
(1709), but escaped, and went to Jena, ostensibly to study theology,
biit he gave quite as much attention to the legal sciences. He was
made Master in 1713, and was allowed to lecture “on German and
Latin style, morals and Gelehrtengesckichte.” After a short
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to Erfurt, and acquired the right to offer courses and to preach.
Presently, “because of love for the law, and a throat trouble,” he went
to Halle, where he both lectured on his old subjects and attended
courses in the legal sciences by Ludewig, Bohmer, Thomasius, etc. In
1720 he received the degree Dr. juris at Erfurt. Returning to Halle, he
was in turn “Ordentlicher Advocat; Secretar und Syndicus bei den
Coloniegerichten der Pfälzer daselbsl, und bei Commissionen in
Cammersachen beschdftigt;” later, “Fiscal der Kriegs- und
Domanenkammer im Saalkreise und im Mansfeldischen, dann
wirklicher Commissionsrath und Criminalrath.” The latter position
he retained till 1731, when he was called to Weimar with the rank of
Hofrath.  He gained unusual favor with the Herzog, and exerted
influence much beyond his proper sphere. Whether this actually
injured the Herzog and the country, Zimmermann declines to judge.
At all events, Zincke made such enemies that a judicial investigation
followed, with the result that Zincke was imprisoned for three
years.
193 Ill, and weakened by prison life, he was taken up by Herzog
Christian in Saalfeld, and after his health was restored he was on his
way to take a teacher’s position in St. Petersburg when he was
persuaded to change his plan and to remain in Leipzig, offering
courses in the Rechts- und Cameralwissenschaften (1740). Thereupon
Zincke developed very influential literary activities. His Allgemeines
ökonomishes Lexicon (1742) was re-edited in a fifth edition by
Volkmann (1780), a sixth by Leich (1800), and Roscher speaks of a
seventh in 1820. The scientific reputation which he gained thereby is
said by Zimmermann to have been the occasion of his removal to
Braunschweig at the end of 1745, to accept an appointment as Hol-
und Kammerrath und ordentlicher Professor der Rechte und
Cameralwissenschaften am Collegium Carolinum, and soon as
Mitcurator  of that institution. In Braunschweig Zincke did not acquire
great influence. He was charged with certain functions in the
administrative bureaus, and he lectured on Cameral- und
Policeywissenschaft.  The control of the academic administration was
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criticism of the management in 1748, but Jerusalem replied and was
sustained by the highest authority. Zincke appears, in consequence of
this rebuff, to have abandoned further administrative ambitions. For
at least another decade, or till his sixty-seventh year, he continued to
be productive as an author.
It is difficult to fix upon an order of treatment which will most clearly represent
Zincke’s contributions to cameralistic literature. To what has already been said about
Roscher’s work at this point, we must add that he really dodges the “Zincke
problem.”
194 He quotes only the earliest and least mature of Zincke’s cameralistic
books;
195 his reference to the most pretentious of his books is inaccurate, and
provokes the suspicion that he knew it only through a catalogue.
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We must remark, second, that Roscher’s account of Zincke is virtually a description
only of the journal which he edited.
197 This emphasis deprives Zincke of his full due.
At the same time it calls attention to an important factor in the development of
cameralistic theory. Possibly Zincke’s influence as editor may have been more
effective than the rest of his literary labors. However that may be, his part in the
development of cameralistics would be very inadequately represented if we should
accept Roscher’s showing as sufficient. His account should be read by every student
of the period.
198 Letting that contribution to the subject count for what it is worth, we
must introduce further evidence which at least widens the basis of judgment.
Stieda has presented a much more sympathetic view of Zincke in a compact sketch.
A free rendering of the passage will furnish a proper introduction to the later
books.
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In spite of the fact that he did not reach his aim, for he was never Professor der
Oeconomie, although he read lectures on this subject at the University of Leipzig
from 1740 to 1745, Georg Heinrich Zincke nevertheless belongs in this connection.
His views must have had considerable influence upon the further development of the
Wirtschaftswissenschaften as subject-matter for lectures in universities. In the year
1741 or 1742 he published a Programm von practischen Collegiis
juridico-politico-cameralibus,  the purpose of which was to recommend the lectures
which he proposed to give. Since these four sheets met with approval he followed
them up, in the year 1742, with a Grundriss einer Einleitung zu den
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with the question how young men should be instructed theoretically in these sciences,
and how they might be introduced to the application of them. Zincke had at first the
intention of using Dithmar’s Einleitung as his text, and after the death of the latter
negotiations were begun with Zincke, looking to his undertaking, as editor, to bring
out a revised edition. For unknown reasons the plan failed. Zincke had come to the
conclusion that there were serious gaps in Dithmar’s Einleitung: e.g., that it omitted
too many necessary subjects, that it afforded insufficient explanations to give
thorough knowledge, etc. Probably the author himself, if he had lived longer, would
have improved the book in these respects. At all events these imperfections made
Zincke feel the need of publishing an outline of his own.
There are but very few, declared Zincke, who at the present time devote themselves
with special diligence and with persistent effort to the economic sciences. Most
people regard their elementary principles as merely minor considerations. This being
the case, there should be a use for the outline. Its aim is the common weal [das
gemeine Beste], not the advantage of each individual manager. All the doctrines
which it presents are connected with the Policei or with the public arrangements for
support [Nahrungseinrichtungen] in a country. In Kameralwissenschaft the special
relation and purpose of all these doctrines appears in their application to the
management [Wirtschaft] of the state and of the prince. The total Polizeiwissenschaft
as a system of management is, however, arranged really with reference to the public
and general weal.
It was Zincke’s intention to present these sciences in the universities after the
following manner. In the first place he would offer every half-year a general
fundamental course on the entire science, and second on special portions. Third, he
wanted to supply guidance in the application of the science, i.e., a practical course.
In the latter it would naturally be impossible to impart to the future official all the
technique of economic transactions. Excursions in actual application could be made,
however, and the students could be incited to prepare documentary exercises in
economic and Policei procedure. Zincke had the plan of proposing a subject, of
having the same worked up, part by part, through assignments to individuals, and
then of having it presented and discussed by the students as a group. In other words,
these details show that Zincke was planning essentially the seminar method, and he
hoped thereby to make the new subjects particularly attractive. He probably leaned
upon Gross, Entwurf cines mit leichten Kosten zu errichtenden SeminariiAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 199
oeconomico-politici.
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In the year 1746 Zincke accepted a call as professor and Kurator of the newly
opened Kollegium Karolinum in Braunschweig. With his entrance into the service
of Braunschweig-Lüneberg he gave up the realization of the plans contained in the
above-mentioned programme. Yet he considered his ideas so important that he hoped
they would be generally adopted. Hence in 1746 he returned to them in the Leipziger
Sammlungen, which he had begun to publish in 1742. He put them in more general
form as Gedanken und Vor-schläge von einem auf Universititäten auf die
Cameralwissenschaften einzurichtenden besonderen Collegio Statuum Europae
Camerali,
In this discussion he begins with the explanation of a Politicus. He goes back to a
concept with which we have become acquainted in connection with Christian
Weise.
201 He would not have the word understood to mean a crafty man acting a part
to the hurt of his neighbor, but rather a man who possesses the talent, not only in his
private station, but also with respect to the common weal, to live justly and wisely.
A Politicus is thus a statesman. No one can attain this character who is not intelligent
about the state and has not carried on political studies. To be sure there are different
kinds of knowledge necessary for a chancellor, a civic employee, a minister of war
or of finance. All these, however, find something which concerns them in the
political sciences. Hence they must in the first place learn the whole in its general
principles and rules. Every political function, high or low, has in its affairs a definite
relation to the welfare and happiness of the state in general. The state, however, has
no other purpose than to improve and perfect all that constitutes the temporal weal
of its members. The Politicus must learn whatever sciences, talents, and preparation
are necessary for the attainment of this purpose.
For this end it is not enough to have the mere knowledge of the laws from the
pandects and the theory of civic processes. Rather is it one of the most important and
necessary sciences of a Politicus to know, in a way that is applicable to practice, how
to make a land progressively richer, how to make improvements in the application
of the riches to the security and need and convenient life of the members of the state,
etc.
The most general theorems and rules of this science are found in the theory of
general civic prudence [allgemeine Staatsklugheit]. But this great portion of political
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in this general theory. This is done in the Kameralwissenschaften, which are
composed of General- und Special- Oekonomie, of the Polizeiwissenschaft, which
is based upon them, and of the science vom Finanz-und Kammerwesen der Fürsten.
For further details Zincke refers to his Grundriss, in accordance with which he had
lectured and intended to continue his lectures. Since however not everybody has the
patience in detail, but people rather content themselves with a historical concept and
at the same time with other fragments of knowledge in political and civic affairs, that
course in general civics is particularly to be desired. He urges, moreover, after he has
argued for the study of Kameralwissenschajt in general, still another course “de
notitia statuum,” in which, for the sake of general culture, the needs of those shall be
supplied who do not purpose to make a career in the departments for which he
speaks. He cites Gundling’s Zusland der Europäischen Staaten, and wishes to add
statistics as an enlargement of the study. In this course, which apparently was to have
been of a more popular character, the possible and actual condition of a state would
be treated, and the relations of the Policei and the financial system.
Passing these preliminary and elementary forms of his theory, we must take into
account the evidence afforded by Zincke’s work upon the second edition of Stisser’s
Einleitung.
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Stisser (1689–1739), could be passed over with a few words, if further reference to
him were not necessary in order fairly to report Zincke. Stisser was a student of law
and philosophy at Jena and Halle and might have gravitated into an academic career
if he had not evinced notable administrative talent.
While in practical employment at Jena (1734–35), he was allowed to lecture in the
university on the economic sciences, and the Forst- und Jagd-Wesen der Deutschen.
Besides the book just mentioned, Stisser published in 1734 Ein Programme, von
der Möglichkeit, dass die oekonomischen Wissenschaften in eine Lehrart gebracht
werden können, massen ein elendes Vorurteil vormahls auch die grossten Gelehrten
von der Unmöglichkeit dieses Vornehmens eingenommen hatte. In 1737 the work
appeared which is rated as the most meritorious of his writings, Die Forst- und
Jagd-Historie der Teutschen.
It appears from Zincke’s testimony that the publication of the two books which
marked his professional residence at Jena was the occasion of speedy termination of
Stisser’s academic career. The book on forestry and hunting was dedicated to the
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author’s knowledge of affairs, as evinced by both this and the Land- Wirthschaft, that
he called him to Berlin, in order to test his information and judgment orally. As a
consequence, Frederich Wilhelm I gave him an appointment at Stettin.
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It was Stisser’s plan to write a second volume, Stadt-Wirthschaft, and a third,
Wirthschaft grosser Herren. In explaining his relation to Stisser’s book, Zincke says
(p. 14):
As I began to lecture upon the Cameral-Wissenschaften to the
students at Leipzig, I looked for a complete hand- and reading-hook
which would present the subject in brief and systematic form. I found,
to be sure, the sainted Herrn Dietmar’s Einleilung, which surveyed
the whole field, but in its special divisions consisted merely of a few
scattered observations, with defective fundamental ideas, or none at
all, and in many cases employing far too general theorems. The
sainted Herm Stisser’s Einleilung was in many respects, especially in
organization of the material, more according to my taste. It contained
more complete conceptions, and united the Policey-Wesen with
Oeconomie in a practical way. At the same time it treated only
Land-Wirthschaft and Land- Policey, and was consequently not
complete enough to serve me as an outline of all
Cameral-Wissen-schaften.  Beyond that, moreover, I valued highly the
practical and still compact arrangement of this little book: yet I was
told that it lacked much on the systematic side of pedagogy, that the
sainted man was neither a good methodologist nor an adequate
philosopher, and that a teacher of these sciences should be both. I was
told that certain fundamental ideas might be better defined, and that
various of Stisser’s particular opinions were not accepted by all
specialists in Wirthschaft and Policey. For these reasons I could not
use the book for my purposes. Hence I decided to publish my
well-known  Grund-Riss einer Einleitung zu denen
Cameral-Wissenschaften,  in two parts, 1742 and 1743. In the first
part I presented the general and special principles of the Land- und
Stadt- Wirlhschafft of the Germans, and of Policey, with a view to
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use. In the second part I presented die Wirthschafft grosser Herrn
oder das Cammer- und Finanz-Wesen. Yet this was a mere sketch of
a much larger work and of a much more complete treatment which
would be of no use for beginners. .... Before coming to completion of
this larger work I fell back upon Stisser’s Einleitung .... which I
thought I could make useful for beginners, at least in certain parts of
.... Land- Wirthschaft and Land-Policey. ....
In his Preface Stisser says that Christianus Thomasius was the first, so far as he
knew, to give his hearers a collection of brief propositions, as an accompaniment of
his lectures. Then Gentzke, Bierling, Beyer, Gundling, and many others imitated him,
including Professor Diethmar at Franckfurt and Herr Hofrat Schmeizel at Halle.
Apparently he meant to say that these theorems were in German, for he emphasizes
the fact that after some hesitation, he decided to follow the lead of Thomasius, and
present the substance of his teaching “in honest German garb.”
After a quaint discussion of the current overvaluation of the advantages to be gained
by foreign travel, he urges that Germans may profit most by studying the
accumulated practical wisdom of their own country, the ways and means of industrial
thrift first of all.
He joins in the discussion of the question why this important subject has had so
little attention in the universities, and curiously enough he puts the chief blame on
the students. He says they prefer to give their time and money, Veneri et Baccho, to
learning what would enable them to earn their bread. At all events, they regard it as
disgraceful and beneath their dignity to soil themselves with “low-lived economic
sciences.” Against this prejudice Stisser stoutly maintains:
These sciences are parts of the greatest Staats-Wissenschaft, yes the soul in the civic
body, and have the special use of showing how a great lord may bring his land and
people to prosperity. ....
According to Zincke’s explanation of his editorial work on Stisser’s book, it would
be unsafe to pass judgment upon the author, without comparing the original edition.
Nothing appears in evidence, however, to show that he was in any way in advance
of Gasser in the particular respects with which we are concerned. We may therefore
dismiss him from consideration, and turn our attention again directly to Zincke.
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plan of Stisser’s book. As he states it in his Preface (pp. 20, 21), this modification
consists in presenting “first the Cammer-Wissenschaften, then in outlining
Oeconomie  in general, of which the Land-Wirthschaft und Policey of the Germans
is only a special part.” Then Zincke explains that he has assembled “the most general
rules of management (Wirthschafftsregeln), and has furnished an introduction to the
study of oeconomischen Wissenschafft itself, in a form which is adequate preparation
for these subjects.” Certain of the details in the introduction are important way marks
for our purpose. Beyond these, the book is devoted entirely to rural management. We
should note, however, that Zincke has enriched the book with references to
authorities to such an extent that the authors’ index fills twenty-four and a half
double-column pages. If we had found no evidence of a similar sort in the earlier
writers of this group, Zincke’s bibliography would alone be enough to demonstrate
the absurdity of the tradition which von Mohl repeats in the passage quoted above.
The most significant propositions of the introduction may be epitomized as follows:
The subject of the book is the rural management of the Germans
[Land- Wirthschafft der Teutschen]. This is a special part of the
management [Wirthschafft] of this people in general, and this depends
to a certain extent upon the whole. It also presupposes various general
ideas of Wirthschafft and Hausshaltung (§1).
The word Wirthschafft is sometimes used in a very comprehensive,
sometimes in a very restricted, sense. Thus, (a) for
Wirthschaftts-Geschafte  themselves; (b) for the ways and means of
managing (Wirthschafften); (c) for a family, considered as managing
(die da wirthschafftet); (d) for Land-Wirthschafft in particular; (e) for
the science and art of understanding one’s own or another’s
management [Haushaltung]; (f) for the theory and instructions [Lehre
und Anwei- sung] which lead to prudent ordering of
Wirthschaffts-Geschäfte.  This last is the meaning which the word has
in this book. In the same sense the words Hauss- Wirthschafft,
Oeconomie,  and  Hauss-haltungskunst  are in common use (§2).
Wirthschafft is thus a practical theory or Wissenschaft, in which,
according to their wisdom, prudence, and art, almost all learned
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only necessary and comfortable subsistence, but also a surplus for
pleasure or need [zu Liebes- und Noth-Fallen], may be gained (§3).
Accordingly  Wirthschafft  in general is a science which teaches
prudence in pursuing the callings which provide sustenance and thus
justly and prudently not only to gain means of subsistence, but also
prudently to hold, expend, and apply the same (§4).
Wirthschafft  is variously subdivided: especially into general and
special theory; this latter again into offentliche Landes-Wirthschafft
and  Privat-Wirthschafft;  or in other words general and special
Policey-Wissenschaft,  which teaches how to order and to promote for
their several purposes, through good police laws and institutions, the
Wirlhschaffts-Geschäfte of a country, a city or of an office (§5).
Privat-Wirthschafft teaches how each individual member of civic
society may conduct his Wirthschafft wisely (§6).
Privat-Wirthschafft is sometimes divided according to the strata and
persons that manage (wirthschafften), sometimes according to the
things which are the objects of management, sometimes according to
the basic theorems of the processes concerned, sometimes according
to nations (§7).
In the first case we have the Wirthschafft (a) of princes, rulers, and
great lords, with their Cammer- und Staats-Revenues, i.e., die Hof-
Staats- und Militair- Wirthschafft; (b) of subjects, since peculiar
managerial relations spring from the social stratum and
circumstances. These are consequently peculiar rules of Wirthschafft
for (1) the greater and lesser nobility: (2) soldiers; (3) travelers; (4)
citizens of high and low degrees; (5) scholars, at schools, universities,
in church, school, and political offices; (6) rural populations of higher
and lower degree and peasants; (7) the male sex, e.g., married and
single persons, boys, young men, adults, and aged; (8) the female sex,
in parallel classes; (9) the poor; (10) the needy; (11) the middle class;
(12) the rich; (13) the servant class (§8).
It would be an endless affair to treat of the Wirthschafft of each of
these strata in detail. Hence, with respect to differences of stratum
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considered. In the theory of Cammer- Rent- und Finanz-Wesen,
however, their particular maxims will be shown after the basis has
been laid in Oeconomische Policey-Wissenschafft. And precisely
therein consist today the so-called Cameral-Wissenschafflen in which
one learns Wirthschafft chiefly with reference to the best common
good [das gemeine Beste] and for the service of great lords, the
Privat- Wirthschafft of all others, who live as subjects or as obscure
persons, is shown along with the first part of Oeconomischer
Policeywissen-schafft  (§9).
Conformably to the objects and transactions of Wirthschaftl, the same
is divided (1) in accordance with the chief branches of business in
Europe, into the theory of (a) Land-Wirthschafit, (b)
Stadt-Wirthschafft,  which division was first made by P. Fischer; (a)
in respect to the collateral processes (§10).
We may briefly describe Land-Wirthschafft as that part of
Wirth-schafft  which teaches how one may carry on the cultivation of
the earth, both upon and below the surface, especially upon estates
and in connection with the appertaining rights, also cattle feeding and
particularly cattle raising, so wisely and prudently that one may by
appropriate means gain all sorts of profit and advantage, retain the
same, and turn it to thrifty application [hauswirthlich anwenden]
(§13).
Die Wirthschafft consists of various doctrines [Lehren]. It contains
especially general theoretical and practical theorems, which are final
rules. These consist either of fundamental theorems from other
sciences, or of fundamental theorems and rules peculiar to
Oeconomia generali.
204 The former are derived especially from (1)
general and special Rechts-Gelehrsamkeit; (2) Natur-Lehre, Chymie,
Anatomie,  and  Artzney-Kunst; (3) Mathematics, especially
Rechen-kunst, Geometrie, Mechanique, and Baukunst; (4) general
Staats-und Privat-Klugheit (§14).
Die Wirthschaftl consists further (2) of special theorems and rules
pertaining to the chief objects and transactions of Land- und
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Wirthschafft of this and that sort of persons. Here we present the
theorems about the principal and subsidiary phases of Land-
Wirthschafft  and about the persons engaged in the same. This belongs
under the head Specialia (§15).
Finally belong to Wirthschafft (3) Singularia or the most particular
observations and devices. Moreover we must mention (4) the
Wirthschaffts-Termini  or  Kunst- Wörter, Redens-Arten, and
explanations of the same.
205 (§16).
Die Wirthschaf/t varies also with respect to nations or peoples, and it
is certain that the former [Wirtkschafft] vailes as widely as the latter,
their soil and climate. Not to speak of the uncivilized peoples outside
of Europe, the Land- und Stadt- Wirthschafft of the civilized
Europeans, for example of the French, Spanish, Italians, English,
Dutch, Poles, Swedes, etc., differs, in respect to very many
Wirthschaffts-Geschäften,  especially in respect to particular
arrangements, purposes, and objects, from that of the Germans, and
indeed the latter varies not only by contrast between the ancient and
the modem, but also by contrasts between the various German
peoples and localities at present. Thus there are the differences
between the Ober-Sachsen, der Nieder-Sachsen, der Schwaben, der
Schweitzer, etc. Herr von Rohr accordingly, and not without reason,
made a plea for more information and cultivation of oeconomia
harmonica.
206 Meanwhile it is the duty of Germans to pay special
attention to the most common features of the Wirthschafft of
Germans, and to understand it according to the manner, customs,
usages, laws, and civic organization of their own country. This book
is specially devoted to that purpose (§17).
This passage is at once symptomatic of the whole cameralistic conception of
economic problems, and it is a rather exceptionally clear and unequivocal expression
of the conception. It is thus one of the crucial exhibits in the body of evidence which
sustains one of the principal contentions of our argument: viz., the theories of the
cameralists were formulations of different sorts of utility with reference to relatively
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civic relations, because universal relations of these orders had not roused their
attention or interest in an appreciable degree. They were virtually attempts to answer
the question: “Situated as we are, and being what we are, individually and politically,
how can we use our opportunities so as most to further our particular purposes?” A
stage of experience characterized by this range of generalization must be taken for
granted, and accepted just as it was. We turn the reality of experience into myth and
fable if we interpret back into such intermediate experience the states of mind which
emerged at later stages. In brief, we must interpret the cameralists as they were, not
as nineteenth-century economists. We do not satisfy this requirement merely by
pointing out that their conclusions differed from those of nineteenth-century
economists. That way of stating it covers up and compromises the crucial distinction.
In an essential sense, the cameralists were not concerned about the same problems
that engaged the nineteenth-century political economists. This experience of the
cameralists has value for modern men; and historical scholars must find and utilize
the value. The experience has been shorn of its value by growth of a tradition which
vitiates our interpretation in advance by ignoring the radical contrast between the
Smithian and the pre-Smithian attitude of mind toward economic relations. The
introduction continues:
Whoever would thoroughly learn Wirthschafft in the special
department of Policey- und Cammer-Wesens must gain the
knowledge through instruction and experience. The instruction must
consist in part of coherent oral discourse upon Wirthschafft as a
whole, and afterward upon a portion of the same upon which one
proposes to place the chief emphasis; in part through oral instructions
incidental to practice itself, and through association with experienced
lluiiss- wirthen, and in part through the reading of good
Wirthsclniffts-Bücher  (§18).
Whoever will thus study Wirthschafft must have learned previously
(1) to write and reckon well; (2) to form a good concept; and the
rudiments of (3) der Moral; (4) Natur-Lehre und Historiam
naturalem; (5) die Chymie; (6) die Geometriam, architecturam
civilem,  and especially die Mechanique; (7) something of Medicin;
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attempt, through the grace of God, to put oneself in the situation in
which one can actually exercise the first general Wirthschaffts-Regel
of the Christians: “Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his
righteousness, and all these things shall he added unto you “ (§19).
Beyond this, all depends (1) on very careful consideration and
investigation of the wirtfischaffitlichen Objecte, Zwecke und
besonderer Geschafte, and especially upon understanding and choice
of the persons concerned: through all this, moreover, upon cautious
decisions in wirthschafftlichen Dingen; (2) upon a diligent, careful,
energetic, and industrious carrying-out of the precepts and
applications in general, to the end of gaining good returns from the
occupation, of caring well for them through frugality and
watchfulness, without greed. Finally, upon applying to those ends all
temporal means according to God’s law and according to
wirthschaf/tlichen Klugheit, and especially upon so ordering outlays
that an annual surplus will remain (§20).
We now return to Zincke’s own hooks. Most important for our purpose is, first, the
Cameralisten-Bibliothek.
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A general description of these compact little volumes would afford but a vague idea
of their contents. It will not be possible to present an adequate outline of Zincke’s
system, because that would require as much space as can be given to the author who
may on the whole most fairly be taken as an epitome of cameralism, viz., Justi. To
differentiate Zincke’s system from Justi’s, it would be necessary to go into
comparison of technical details in the two authors; and that would be foreign to our
purpose. Without attempting to pass upon the delicate question of the relative merits
of the two men, we must confine ourselves here to certain specifications which show
that Zincke was among the formative factors in the social science of his period.
Indeed, there are more evident motions in the direction of Smithism, in Zincke’s
most general methodological observations, than in any other writer in the series. He
perceived, in a vague, abortive, fashion to be sure, that the details of cameralistic
policy required a center in more fundamental philosophy. His attempts at foundation
of such a philosophy are rather pathetic, but on the other hand his contemporaries did
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penetrated cannot be known. At all events he published his ideas much more
extensively, and it is plain that his mind was maturing in the direction of such
problems as Smith afterward proposed. Zincke’s place in the cameralistic succession
may best be indicated by a few characteristic details.
Zincke was the first German writer, so far as I have been able to discover, to insist
strongly upon a sharp distinction between vulgar and learned economic theory.
Beginning in the Introduction (pp. 7, 8), and continuing through the classifications
in the bibliographies, he tries to show the difference between the folk-lore of familiar
occupations, and “learned” theory. His impulse was respectably scientific in its
conception. He had not gone very far in his analysis of the kinds of research which
would be necessary before “learned” theory could establish a relatively secure base.
Zincke maintained valiantly, against the overwhelming academic prejudice of his
time, that the subjects properly included within the scope of cameralistics were
capable of organization into a group of sciences as methodical and respectable as
those which had already won academic recognition.
In supporting this thesis, Zincke argued (pp. 16, 17) that a system of cameralistic
science must rest upon applications of doctrines accepted by philosophical,
mathematical, legal, and other sciences. “In so far as those theorems are truths
established by other sciences, we may take them for granted in cameral science.” The
list of such truths which he cites as the philosophical antecedents of cameralistic
science hardly impresses the modern reader with the solidity of the support, but such
as it is we may reduce it to this:
A means [Mittel] is something in which the sufficient ground is
contained through which to reach a given end. We all have a natural
longing for welfare. That is an end which all men by nature seek. All
our lives we strive for this condition, which we call happiness
[Glückseligkeit]. Progress toward this condition we call temporal
happiness, and the things which contribute to it may serve either our
bodies or our souls or both. Such things we call our goods. A stock
of such temporal goods we call temporal means [Vermögen].
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Transactions with these means, or the actual use of the same for the
above specified end, we call, in a somewhat narrow sense to be sure,
livelihood [Nahrung].
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It need not be argued that the need of using these temporal means for
gaining our happiness makes it both the right and the duty both of the
individual man and of whole societies, especially of those heads of
societies to whom the citizens have intrusted the supreme power over
themselves, in order to insure temporal happiness, to apply these
means in every proper way to gain the happiness of all. We have then
the three most general kinds of transaction in all management
[Wirthschaft], viz., the gaining, the guarding, and the applying of
temporal means. These three kinds of transaction are explained in
General-Oeconomic (§13).
In the same portion of cameral science this principle will be
demonstrated, viz., a prince, as the ruling head of a civic society,
whether the same consists of a physical or a moral person, for the
maintenance in part of his sovereignty, his house, and his own exalted
person, partly the common good [gemeinen Bestens] of his state, must
strive to gain, keep, and apply a proportional amount of ready means
[bereitestes Vermögen] (§14).
210
The keynote of cameralism is struck by Zincke in the next paragraph:
The more a prince, by observance of this duty, is able to promote his
own and his country’s welfare and more complete condition (sic), the
greater will he be. For herein is to be found the true ground of the
external greatness of a prince. The greater he becomes, however, the
more must he have ready means, and consequently the more must he
endeavor to procure, to guard, and to apply the same (§15).
All ready means, and consequently those of a prince, consist of
income [Einkünften]. Hence there must be sources from which it is
derived.
211 An irrefutable and indubitable truth is therefore: That a
prince is bound [schnldig und verpflichtet] to recognize the first
general and permanent source of his ready means, and to establish the
same upon that source (§16).
Where then is this source to be found? The source of the ready means
of the whole human race is well known. Created animate andAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 211
inanimate nature, especially however the earth with its creatures, its
forces, all men themselves, and created things outside of them, are the
sources from which they derive everything to be used as means
[Vermogen].
212 God himself is indeed the first founder of this source,
through his wise and beneficent creation, preservation, and care of
men. All powers of bodily movement and of the exercise of the soul
are to be included in this source. But each individual, and each
smaller or larger society, controls only a certain portion of this source
of ready means. This control is exercised partly by virtue of the native
power of the individual or the society, partly through the two chief
natural (sic) institutions of the world, namely, property and rulership
[Eigenthum und Herrschaft]. Accordingly no one can bring the whole
source under his property or rulership, and it is therefore impossible
and consequently foolish to make the attempt (§18).
The portion of the earth controlled by a collection of men must then
be the immediate source of their ready means (§19).
Since endeavor after secure and comfortable life has made it
necessary for such collections of men to unite their property and
powers in the single will of a ruler, and to a certain degree, with
respect to these two chief matters, to subject themselves to the same,
and thus the concept state or civic society arises; it follows
unquestionably that the immediate source of the ready means of a
ruler in general can be no other than his land and people, or so-called
Territorium (§20).
In order to show the local and temporal shading of this idea in the cameralistic view
the next section is translated in full:
I assert with zeal that this is the immediate source of ready means in
general. For since lands, and the people in the same, in spite of all
this, according to the great law of God respecting the social
helpfulness with which human welfare is bound up, are in a certain
interdependence, and hence each land and people can and must at the
same time make use of the means of another land and people for theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 212
welfare of the former, and conversely can and must with its own
means and powers help the other land; so one may say that to a
certain extent, and in an indirect or distant way, by virtue of this
interdependence of lands and peoples, the means and the powers of
the same are and must be of assistance as a source of ready means for
a ruler over land and people. Moreover one of the most important
portions of the cameralistic sciences is that which shows the ways in
which other lands may rightly and wisely be made into sources of all
sorts of revenues and profits (§21).
Speaking now more precisely, the source of the ready means of a ruler
is to be found not merely in land and people, with all their
interconnections, but rather in a land and people placed in a
constantly flourishing condition of their means of livelihood. Hence
follows the principle: A prince who would better establish, maintain,
and preserve his ready means, must devote all his effort to put his
land and people in a constantly more flourishing condition of gaining
the means of livelihood, and must thus secure for them increasing
prosperity. Accordingly, the more services, things of money value,
money, and credit increase, the greater and richer is the source and
ground of the ready means of a ruler (§23).
Using means of livelihood is called managing [wirthschafften]. When
the produce provides not merely the wants and conveniences of
physical life, but also that excess which we call riches, we call it good
management. If the means of livelihood for a land and people are to
be nourishing, good management must prevail among and over them.
It follows that the ruler, or those who assist him in these important
matters, must have the knowledge necessary to insure good
management, and must exert the utmost endeavor to secure the
application of this knowledge throughout the land (§23).
This is necessary not only for the sake of promoting good
management in the land, and to put the people in the way of ready
means, but it is necessary in order to secure the sources of the
prince’s own ready means (§24).
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name we mean those who possess fundamental and special
knowledge about all or some particular part of those things which are
necessary in order that they may assist the prince in maintaining good
management in the state (§25).
A land can be put in a flourishing condition of the means of
livelihood only through good Policey-Gesetze und Anstalten.
Whoever would serve the prince well at this point must not only
know the existing Policey-Gesetze, but he must understand how to
invent and introduce such laws and institutions. For this purpose he
must also understand the nature and structure of the means of
livelihood, or Wirthschaft. For the Policey-Gesetze und Anstalten
have the task of directing and improving the means of livelihood and
the management of a people. Hence it follows that the science of
making police laws and institutions can neither be learned nor applied
without the science and knowledge of management, which is properly
called  die Oeconomie in distinction from der Oeconomic, which
means the actual application.
213 Whoever, finally, would administer
the ready means of rulers, not merely prudently, but in close
connection with the constantly improving conditions of livelihood,
and with superintendence of the same, which a wise ruler exercises
through good police laws and institutions — he must have thorough
knowledge of Oeconomie and Policey (§26).
After rehearsing the argument that all this cannot be left to pure empiricism, but
must be reduced to expert knowledge and practice, Zincke compresses his case into
this proposition:
Cameral-Wissenschaft is a learned and practical science, first, of
inventing, improving, and introducing all sorts of good police laws
and institutions drawn from the nature and conditions of the means of
livelihood of a land; second, a science partly resting upon die
Oeconomie,  partly upon special rules and maxims which set forth the
rights and duties of a ruler, of wisely, prudently, rightly, and skilfully
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comfort, and riches of a land, and at the same time and thereby the
ready means needed by the ruler for the good of the state and its ruler
(§29).
Zincke explains, half apologetically, that this description, and the book itself, were
written not for the learned, but for beginners. He proposes the following as an
alternative form:
Cameral-Wissenschaft is a learned and at the same time practical
science, having as its object thorough understanding of all means of
livelihood and on that ground the introduction of good Policey, to the
end of rendering useful services to states and rulers in cameral and
financial affairs (§30).
Elaborating the idea that Cameral-Wissenschaft consists of various Wissenschaften,
Zincke continues:
In my Grundriss I presented die Oeconomic and
Policey-Wissen-schaft  in the composite form of wirthschaftliche
Policey-Wissenschaft. I made Cameral- Wissenschaft the first main
division, and Cammer-und Finanzwissenschaft the second. I have
reconsidered, however, and this book will have three main divisions:
(1) Die Oeconomic; (2) die Policey-Wissenschaft; (3) die Cammer-
oder Rent- und Finanz Wissenschaft (§32).
From the redundant and perplexing variations upon this explanation in the most
general part of the work, we abstract only the following items:
Oeconomic attempts to teach the poor how they may advance in
means to the middle class, the middle class how they may become
rich. Policey-Wissenschaft shows not only how to decrease the
number of the poor, but also how to promote the interest of all other
strata, so that each in its way may enjoy advancing prosperity (p. 60).
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class, or everybody to be made rich. This is quite as incorrect as the
other hateful idea of certain leaches, who teach that all, especially the
peasants, should be reduced to the barest necessities of life. It means
that all are to be put in the way of gains in prosperity proportioned to
the lot of each (pp. 61–63).
The first and most general principle of a good finance system is that
the administration shall aim to insure the ready means of the ruler by
such arrangements as will at the same time promote the best good of
the state. That is, neither (1) the interest of the ruler, nor (2) the
interest of the state must be allowed to infringe on the other (pp. 68,
69).
The work as a whole compels the conclusion that Zincke’s methodological interests
excessively handicapped his cameralistic interests. To use a different figure, his stage
machinery is so conspicuous and so intricate that it conceals the play. At the same
time it is evident that he was thinking ahead of most of his academic contemporaries.
His perceptions were indistinct enough, but his attempt to find a firm basis for
cameralistic theory and to organize its parts into a coherent system entitles him to a
place with the most intelligent of the series. In one respect he is easily foremost
among the cameralists. He published the first bibliography which made a systematic
attempt to classify the literature, not merely according to subjects, but according to
degrees of scientific merit. He had a code of letters indicating the two main classes
of (a) “learned,” (b) “unlearned” books, and in each class the grades, (1) good (2)
very good, (3) moderately good, (4) bad, (5) very bad. Besides this gradation, there
are numerous quasi-critical and other notes. The bibliography of the first part of
Cameral-Wissenschaft, or Oeconomic, contains 975 titles, of which 295 are on
strictly agricultural topics, and 172 more relate to other extractive industries (Part I,
pp. 192–304); the second part, “Policey-Wissenschaft,” contains 502 titles, of which
164 refer to agricultural administration
214 (Part II, pp. 441-565); the third part,
“Cammer- und Finanz- Wissenschaft,” has 570 titles (Part III, pp. 780–916); and in
Part IV (pp. 1071–1134). There are 243 bibliographical notes as addenda to specified
sections in the body of the work.
At the end of the text (p. 1134), is the devout ascription, which flippant critics
might render, to be sure, in a way that would have an appositeness quite undesignedAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 216
by the author:
“Gott meinem Schöpfer allein die Ehre.”
The existence of this bibliographical monument passes into a curious historical
problem, when we encounter the contrast presented by the books of Justi and
Sonnenfels. We cannot go into the problem here, but must be content with simply
calling attention to it.
Passing to Zincke’s more elaborate work,
215 we find another version of the
Cameral-Wissenschaft,  which however, as the author says (I, p. 7), amounts to the
same thing as the formulas quoted above, viz.:
It is a learned and practical science, devoted to thorough
understanding of all occupations that procure livelihood, to
introducing, in pursuance of this knowledge, good Policey, and to
making the livelihood of lands increasingly prosperous, to the end
however not merely of better establishing, maintaining, and
righteously and wisely increasing the ready means of rulers and states,
but also, by means of wise income and expenditure, to secure good
administration.
The judgment expressed above must explain why it would not be profitable to
attempt a digest of this expansion of Zincke’s Grundriss. The author gives so much
space to protestation of what the different branches of cameral science should
properly teach, and why, and how, and by what means, and to what ends they should
teach it, that it is easy to see how his contemporaries may have lost their patience
before they found out whether the science, as he advertised it, actually did any of
these things. So far as attention could be held at all at this time by systematized
cameralistics, the subject had to be presented with details in the foreground. Very few
people cared for the more general methodological settings. Zincke’s books give
ample evidence of profounder and more comprehensive views of the science than can
be credited to Justi. The former, however, was far too cameralistic to win his way
very widely with the traditional academicians, while he was much too academic to
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cameralism. His books cover the whole field of cameralism in a way which was
related to the interests of practical cameralists very much as a treatise on the logic of
ethics would affect the typical modern legislator. This is not to say that they were on
a plane altogether remote from actual application. They contain much, on the
contrary, which is at the other extreme of the tediously commonplace; for example,
the twenty-three fundamental rules for obtaining “means.”
216 As a whole, however,
they are emphatically books of and for the study rather than the bureau, and it is not
surprising that they failed to make an impression proportioned to their intrinsic
worth. As a general proposition, no one engaged directly in any division of the
activities which Zincke discusses could fail to be so well informed, or to have such
sources of information among his associates in the occupation, that the author’s
treatment of his interests would seem superfluous. On the other hand, to most of the
scholars of the time Cameral- Wissenschaft was as much of an impertinence as
sociology has seemed to the majority of the same class during the past
quarter-century. In the Vorbericht to Theil II Zincke seems partly aware of this
situation, and to choose his course in spite of it.
217 He declares that he is not writing
for the great masters in their subjects, whose pupil he is willing to call himself, nor
for those who want a handbook of technical practice, still less for those self-satisfied
people who imagine that these subjects are too trivial for their superior minds. He
believes that the book will be of use to the students who have listened to his lectures
for twenty years, and he also expresses the hope that German rulers, from whom
ministers who disagree with the author do not contrive to keep the book (sic!) will
find in it something to approve and apply. Lastly, he speaks as though he had definite
expectations that his work would be used as a text by tutors charged with the
education of young princes.
To sum up the case for Zincke, one can hardly study the cameralistic sources
without astonishment that this writer has been allowed to fall into such an
inconspicuous place in the history of German social science. His merit is far above
his reputation. His more solid qualities have been obscured by the more brilliant and
audacious Justi. There is plenty of internal evidence in the books of the latter that he
was both jealous and afraid of Zincke. He might well have been. With all his
versatility, his scholarship was not of an order to gain by critical comparison with
that of his less showy and apparently less successful contemporary. Stieda has
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concludes (p. 31):
Under all the circumstances Zincke seems to have been a very
respectable thinker. To be sure he sticks too closely, on the one hand,
to details of the particular gainful occupations, and as contrasted with
the general principles of national economy he excessively emphasizes
Praxis.  Nevertheless, what he was after was a study of economic
relations, and he wanted it to be systematic and thorough. It would
surely have been to the advantage of the University of Leipzig, if
instead of allowing his migration it had put him in a professorship of
the economic sciences, which he would certainly have occupied with
all zeal.
In closing his discussion of the economic policy of Frederick the Great, Roscher
very aptly remarks:
Whoever would characterize a great general must use, for completing
the picture, proportionate details about the qualities of his most
important subordinates. Hence something must be said about a group
of writers of the second and third rank. ....
For the same reason, in order properly to shade our picture of cameralism in
general, we must mention briefly some of the less important writers at the middle of
the eighteenth century. First in order, we may name Kottencamp.
218 The most obvious
fact about this mere tract of sixty-four pages is that it is a eulogy of Frederick the
Great, from the point of view of a military man, to be classed with the similar eulogy
of Frederick’s father, by Ludewig, speaking as an academician. In the second place,
the tract is notable as an apology for the benevolent despot in contrast with the
Machiavellian type of prince. Without asking whether Kottencamp understood
Machiavelli, we find in him a very graphic sketch of the type of government which
cameralistic theory presupposed.
219 If we were confined to this piece of evidence, the
picture of the cameralistic regime which could be reconstructed from it would exactly
correspond in tone with the account we have thus far given; and there would be more
than a suggestion of the main divisions of technical detail which are presented by theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 219
text-writers with whom we are chiefly concerned. Kottencamp undertakes to show
that the principles of true statesmanship are equally distant from Machiavellianism
on the one hand and from theological ethics on the other. Dismissing at once the
assumption that government can be conducted on a prayer-meeting basis, he declares
that while “honor, uprightness, and virtue in general must everywhere be bound
together with sound politics,” yet self-preservation, “which is the natural impulse of
all men,” is “the plumb-line to which all doctrines of statecraft must conform,” and
“the actual interests of the state must therefore be placed at the foundation of all civic
maxims.” “If the precepts of state adopted by cabinets often seem severe, and in
outward appearance to insult virtue, they are nevertheless justified by grim necessity
in this imperfect human life.” It is easy to read between the lines of this essay
unrecognized major premises which would in less than a century dictate
revolutionary conclusions. In form the monograph rests without question upon the
divine-right presupposition. In fact, princes are judged and classified by strictly
functional standards.
220 We shall find cumulative evidence of this conflict between
old and new standards of value in Justi and Sonnenfels. Men at this time still
expressed their belief in princes in terms of divine right. They were already
unconsciously learning to form their working estimates of princes by the criterion of
their benefit or injury to their states. Kottencamp formulates the first great
commandment of statecraft in the precept: “Seek to maintain thyself and thy state,
and to promote the best good of thy state.”
221 While the first clause was still
paramount both in political policy and in political philosophy, the great dynamic fact
in this period was the feathering force of the second clause. Rulers and their advisers
regarded it as the formula of a gratifying incident of absolutism. In the retrospect we
can see that it was a revolutionary principle, destined to supplant absolutism.
The prevailing assumption of the universal enmity of states is presented in the essay
as a matter of course. “To tell the truth, it is with peoples and states as with the
animal kingdom. The stronger overcome the weak, and grow still stronger by
devouring them” (p. 20). Therefore, “a prince never transgresses justice if he only
restrains his desire to oppress others and to appropriate their powers; and on the other
hand has only the purpose of his own preservation in all undertakings against his
neighbors” (p. 30).
Turning to principles of government Kottencamp bases political wisdom on three
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A prince must rule his realm according to its own genius and the
disposition [Gemüthsart] of the people, and must understand how to
stop the sources of all internal unrest and disturbance (p. 33).
Then internal concord provided for, the prince has the comparatively
easy task of dealing with foreigners. Therefore, second:
A prince must always put himself in such a condition as compared
with his neighbor that he is at least his equal in resources and power,
or, if this is impossible, that the inequality may be offset by alliances
and other arrangements, so that he need not fear destruction or
subjugation by his neighbor (p. 34).
In the third place, a prince who would provide against his own fall
and the destruction of his realm, must in his prosperity moderate his
desires and not covet more than he would be able in a natural manner
to protect and permanently retain (p. 37).
The thesis of the second part of the same chapter (iv), on the question, How may
a prince become great? is:
The true greatness of princes is inseparable from the prosperity and
growth of the fortune and welfare of their lands (p. 39).
To modern republicans such propositions are platitudes. Their historical importance
consists in their demonstration that the times were generating essentially republican
energies while the absolutistic regime was superficially unquestioned.
Again, Kottencamp voices a deeper political philosophy, rather than the creed of a
governing class, when he defines the interest of the state:
The interest of the state .... is whatever belongs to the growth,
prosperity, and welfare of a state (p. 43).
To be sure, the Germans had not yet fairly entered upon that stage of their political
education in which a thoroughly rational content was to be given to the concepts
“growth,” “prosperity,” “welfare,” and the like. The meaning of these forms of
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would suggest to modern men. We argue from them here no more than that men were
well on their way toward abandoning the will of the prince as the last norm of
political desirability. They were learning to set up more essential popular values as
the valid ends of civic action.
A second minor writer of this period is von Loen.
222 Roscher says:
The extent to which at this period (1747) popular feeling had adjusted
itself to police guardianship may be seen from M. v. Locn’s Entwurf
einer Staatskunst, worin die natürlichsten Mittel entdeckt werden, ein
Land mächtig, reich und glücklich zu machen (1747, III. Aufl., 1751).
The author recommends freedom as the first means of promoting
population, “this essential ground of all the power of the prince and
happiness of the state.” Freedom is “the true happiness of a state, the
most precious possession of man, a part of his life. He cannot be
robbed of it without violation of justice and violence to nature” (pp.
3 ff.). Yet according to von Loen much constraint is consistent with
this freedom. Tradespeople, for example, “should not be allowed to
bring any foreign wares into the country which are unnecessary and
useless, and on the other hand drive money out of the country.” The
manufacture of too much gold and silver and of too much liquor
should be forbidden; likewise the founding of too many printing
establishments, because “most books are good for nothing, but merely
make the common people discontented, turbulent, and confused” (pp.
6ff.). A marriage bureau should forbid marriages “whenever the
parties are not suited to each other” (p. 23). There should be
sumptuary laws regulating the costumes of the various social strata (p.
154).
Von Loen died in 1776. His best-known book is the novel, Graf
Rivera, oder der ehrliclte Mann am Hofe, Its motive was the
improvement of life at courts.
The third writer to be recalled in this connection is Philippi.
223 This exponent of
Prussian civic ideas is of the same general class and type with Kottencamp. He adds
nothing to the theory of cameralism, but he is good evidence of the kind ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 222
commonplaces which had become orthodox tradition in the quasi-absolutistic states
of which cameralism was the theory. Philippi’s books contain not a little material
which goes much farther than he imagined in throwing light upon details of political
opinion as held in Germany at this time. Our limits permit only a few indications of
points in his argument. The fundamental proposition is:
Everyone is bound to take care for the improvement of his temporal
circumstances and princes especially for the righteous
aggrandizement of their states.
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The essay calmly takes for granted that the temporal happiness of subjects depends
more upon providential care by the prince than upon any other human means, and it
is therefore primarily a discussion of this cardinal factor. “The first means of blessing
and aggrandizing a state is a good prince.” It is also presupposed that there is divine
guarantee of good princes in hereditary succession, while there is no such guarantee
in an elective monarchy. Next to a good prince, true and wise counselors and
administrators  promote the aggrandizement of a state (chap. ii). Chap, iii begins with
a typical formula of the factor of population, viz.:
The great author of the anti-Machiavelli says with the greatest justice:
“He is not the greatest and most eminent who possesses the most
land. If he were, many an owner of agricultural land would outrank
a counselor of state, but on the contrary, we may say with certainty
that he is the richest prince who has unlimited sovereignty over the
most subjects.” Accordingly, for the aggrandizement of a state, all
legitimate means must be used to maintain a constant increase of the
population.
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Next in importance for upbuilding a state is the maintenance of armies (chap, iv);
after these essentials, important means are freedom of conscience (chap, v), freedom
in gainful occupations (Handel und Wandel), except possibly to the Jews (chap, vi),
promotion of commerce through promotion of agriculture (chap. vii).
226 The
remaining chapters on taxation (chap, viii), the judiciary (chap, ix), the treasury
(chap, x), the improvement of higher and lower schools (chap, xi), and Policey (chap,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 223
xii) contain nothing which calls for comment.
The second of the essays mentioned is merely a variation of the first.
227 The date of
the Preface is May 21, 1759. Although, as it proved, the third Silesian war was to
drag along nearly four years more, this Prussian militarist wrote in an exultant tone.
The second essay may be called an I-told- you-so version of the first. The chapters
are the same in number as in the earlier essay with the exception of an added
thirteenth in the later, “Gedanken über die Kameral- und Finanz-Wissenschaft;” they
treat of the same topics; but now the point of view is no longer prospective, it is
retrospective. The recommended means for aggrandizing a state had been used a
half-dozen years longer by the great Frederick, and Prussia was now the already
aggrandized state. This view of the situation furnishes the occasion for elaboration
of the eulogy upon Frederick’s régime, which had been more moderate in the earlier
essay. At the same time, there is reason for the suspicion that this confident tone was
merely a rhetorical device. The author wanted to do his part toward keeping up the
courage and stimulating the ardor of his fellow-Prussians. Whether the essay was
merely a specimen of the “point-with-pride” type of campaign literature, in which the
pride is often in inverse ratio with its real occasion, or a genuine expression of belief
about the assured results of Frederick’s rule, it has the same value for our purposes.
It is the credo of a mediocre man, in which we find such a man’s reflection of the
doctrines taught by more eminent authorities.	"	#%
Roscher speaks of Darjes as “undoubtedly the most important of the cameralistic
professors patronized by Frederick the Great” (p. 419).
Like many Germans at this period who afterward gained eminence in other spheres,
Joachim Georg Darjes (1714–91) devoted a considerable portion of his attention as
a university student to theology. He even preached a short time after gaining his
Master’s degree. Turning, however, to jurisprudence he received the degree of Dr.
der Rechte (1739), offered courses on the Institutes and Pandects, and in 1744 was
made ordentlicher Professor der Moral und Politik, with the title Hofrath. According
to Richter (All. d. Bib., in loc.) Darjes’ academic success was so great that in his
twenty-seven years at Jena, he had more than ten thousand hearers. On the invitation
of Frederick the Great, he migrated (1763) to Frankfurt a. O. as Königl. preuss.
Geheimrath und ordentlicher Professor der Rechte. Here he founded the Königliche
Gelehrte Gesellschaft. He did not, however, acquire the same influence as a
university lecturer which he had enjoyed at Jena. He became (1772) Direktor of the
university, Ordinarius of the law faculty, and the ranking professor of law.
228 Richter
says: “Darjes was of great service to the cameral sciences by introducing them into
university instruction.” (Richter doubtless meant at Jena.) “As an author Darjes does
not stand particularly high. He lacked thoroughness, precision, and talent for clear
presentation.”
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This estimate by Richter is by no means to be accepted as final. Indeed, if we recall
Zincke for the sake of comparison, we experience a deep sense of relief in passing
from his much less perspicuous, if more profound and comprehensive books, to
Darjes’ clear and intelligent outline of cameralistics.
230 Roscher further says (p. 419):
Darjes was an eminent pupil of Wolff, who wanted jurisprudence,
medicine,  Wirthschaftslehre,  etc., to prevail only as appliedAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 225
philosophy, but on account of his severely demonstrative method of
exposition J. J. Moser contemptuously labeled him “Modephilosoph.”
With respect to the fundamental concepts of national economics
Darjes had learned much more from Hume than the majority of his
contemporaries in Germany.
Roscher cites only the second edition of the Erste Gründe, published after the
author had moved from Jena to Frankfurt.
231 In his estimate of Darjes’ rank Roscher
evidently did not include Justi in the group of “Frederick’s professors of
cameralistics.” He doubtless classed Justi as an administrator or author, rather than
as a professor.
Darjes’ own account of the origin of his book, as contained in the Vorrede, is
substantially this: He says that from boyhood he had been eager to search into the
secrets of nature, to find out how natural forces work, and thus to learn what must be
done when the attempt is made to imitate nature by art. Following this impulse, he
found frequent occasions, in the course of lectures on other subjects, especially
morals and politics, to introduce practical reflections upon rural and urban
management. His hearers recognized the importance of such considerations, and at
length a petition came from them for a separate course on the subject.
In adopting the suggestion, Darjes selected as his guide, first, Dithmar’s Einleitung.
He pronounces the book admirable [schon], but finds it somewhat too “remote” from
the aspects of the subjects which he wants to treat. That is, he regards it as not
sufficiently concrete. “It describes things which occur in all departments of these
activities [i.e., Wirthschaft, Policey, Cammer], but he does not explain how they are
to be carried out and improved.” Then followed “the excellent work which bears the
title, Klugheit zu leben und zu herrschen.”
232 He says:
I have more than once lectured with profit upon this work, and I
doubt if anyone can read it attentively without becoming more useful.
It lacks nothing except more specific explanation of the grounds on
which the activities of rural and civic management must be judged.
Darjes says that he had also several times used Schröder’s Fürstliche Schatz- und
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length he was prevailed upon by his students and the publishers to print his own ideas
in systematic form.
The author’s views of the instruction in cameralistic subjects most appropriate to
universities, and consequently to be introduced by such a book, call for treatment
midway between abstract methodology on the one hand and details of administrative
routine on the other. He points out very clearly that it would be an endless task to
describe in detail each of the separate processes that occur in the different divisions
of management. He is equally clear in his judgment that such detailed description
would be undesirable if possible. He declares that many managerial processes must
be comprehended under a common idea; that the important thing is to understand this
fundamental idea, in a single typical case, and then anyone capable of independent
thinking can find for himself the relation of other cases to the same idea. He also
draws a very definite distinction between the science of management and actual
management itself, and he adds:
Those who carry out operations are often incapable of comprehending
the science fundamental to the operations. They simply do what they
arc told, and their reasons for doing it do not extend beyond the fact
that they are told. Those who have charge of operations, however,
must necessarily understand the science of the same.
Accordingly, Darjes calls his book “philosophical introduction to Wirthschaft” and
he explains that his purpose is: 
to dwell on the connection of truths which will make us capable of
judging all questions that would arise in practice, on their real
grounds, and to form clear and intelligible ideas of everything which
occurs in Wirthachaft. .... The science of Wirthschaft should make us
capable of making an orderly Wirthschaft possible where it has
hitherto been impossible, and of guiding the same to the advantage of
human society. If we add that wisdom has its purpose in promotion
of the welfare of men, and second, that a great part of the welfare of
the state is founded in an orderly Wirthschaft, we have the motives for
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from the constitution of the state those means by which the
establishment of an orderly Wirthschaft in it is possible; second, to
describe those means through which an orderly Wirthschaft will be
capable of promoting the prosperity of the state. The first of these
purposes is treated in the first and second parts of this book, the
second in the third part, the third in the fourth part.
Darjes concludes with the specification:
The source from which I have drawn the special ideas is experience.
Hence I may rightfully demand that the ideas be judged not in
accordance with the conceptions which others have constructed, but
in accordance with experience. That which experience teaches us I
have combined with general truths, partly in order to establish a
correlation, partly to confirm rules, the observance of which will
conduct us securely toward attainment of the end which we have
proposed.
As we have intimated before, this appeal to experience, particularly in the sense of
personal observation, may be taken as one of the authentic finding marks of the
cameralists. Beginning with Osse, we find increasingly evident tendencies to break
away from mere repetition of tradition and precedent, and to consider state policy as
means to certain rather clearly defined ends not contained in conventional definitions.
With exceptions, and with varying degrees of emphasis on this phase of their
reasoning, the men whom we recognize as cameralists have exhibited this trait. They
were not equally aware of the importance which they actually assigned to the
empirical element in their systems. Darjes is notable, however, as one of the most
outspoken in this respect.
But we must judge Darjes still more specifically. The succession of cameralists
furnishes several marked cases to point the moral that reputation is not always in
accordance with an objective measure of merit. If we were to make out from the type
of evidence now under review the most exact estimate possible of the growth of
scientific consciousness among the cameralists, the most significant signs would by
no means always be found in those writers to whom tradition, as we have it, has
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In spite of the phrase quoted above, readers of Roscher who do not compare the
authors discussed will hardly gain the impression that Darjes marks a distinct stadium
in the development of German economic insight. My own judgment is that the Erste
Gründe contains the most striking evidence to be found in the cameralists thus far
reviewed, that attention was turning toward economic relations conceived
approximately as in Adam Smith’s formulation of economic problems. A casual
reading of Darjes’ book would detect in it merely insignificant variations in form and
content from the analysis and treatment of previous cameralists. More careful
scrutiny discovers such differences of precision and clearness in the perception of
relations, that one feels bound to credit Darjes with having advanced a long distance
toward the standpoint of positive science. Not only is his style more direct and
business-like than that of most of his class, but clear and objective thinking furnishes
a substantial content for his language. Nor is progressiveness the only trait for which
Darjes is notable. His epitome of the aims and outlook of cameralism is remarkably
concise and comprehensive. No single writer in the cameralistic succession gives a
brief account of the scope and purpose of their discipline which better reflects the
genius of the whole movement.
Although it may not be immediately apparent that it is more than mere repetition
of ideas which had become stock properties among the cameralists, we should leave
a serious gap in our outline of the development of the subject, if we failed to present,
in a faithful rendering of his own words, a digest of Darjes’ introduction. He first
pays his respects to three objections, already familiar to us, urged by his
contemporaries against Cameralwissenschaft or Haushaltungskunst, viz.: first, it is
useless to try to make a science out of these subjects— they must be learned by
experience; second, whether worth while or not, a science of these subjects is
impossible, because so many contingencies are concerned, which cannot be foreseen,
and cannot be brought under general conceptions; third, it is beneath the dignity of
scholars to concern themselves with subjects which are matters for peasants and plain
citizens.
In answer to the first objection Darjes forcibly maintains the proposition (§2): “All
works which men carry on for the advantage of human society become at once, if not
perfect, at least less imperfect, if they are ordered and controlled by those who have
a science and a philosophical understanding of these works.” In support of the
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difficult to prove this theorem, both from reason and from experience. Reason draws
this conclusion: a thing is perfect when it is arranged according to its nature and its
idea. If then we are not to expect that a work shall be perfected by blind chance, its
completion must be governed by those who are skilled enough to investigate the
nature and idea of this work, and from this understanding distinctly to conclude what
determines the perfection and imperfection of the work. This is the idea of a science
and of a philosophical understanding. Is not this enough to furnish conclusive support
for the thesis: A science and philosophical understanding of Cameralwissenschaft,
or of Haushaltungskunst, in the general acceptance of that word, is not only
necessary, but also profitable?”
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To the second objection Darjes replies (§4): “People who say that
Cameralwissenschaft  is impossible fall back on a prejudice created by those who
have proposed untenable conclusions in the name of such science. The answer must
be given: We must distinguish the grounds from inferences drawn from them. The
alleged grounds are not to be repudiated completely. In the first place it is true, and
I can prove it from my own experience, that in the application of economic science
[öconomischen Wissenschaft] many circumstances emerge which we could not have
foreseen and which demand that we must, if not completely abandon, at least in
certain particulars modify our plan. Among such circumstances I count the various
states of mind and capacities of men, by means of which our project must be carried
out; the various sorts of soil, determined partly by their inner constitution, partly by
their location; the various accidents due to weather conditions, etc. In the second
place, it is true that in various writings which purport to treat Haushaltungskunst
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scientifically, matters are included which partly contradict experience, and which
partly, although they may be possible, are impracticable. .... This does not prove that
a scientific treatment of Haushaltungskunst and the cameral sciences is impossible.
On the contrary, the following causes compel rejection of such a conclusion: first, no
one who acts intelligently rests his judgement of a thing upon the mistakes of those
who represent it. Second, mistakes made by the intelligent deserve special attention.
They may show how to discover what has been concealed, and how to make that
which was well known more useful and applicable. Who can make use of such
mistakes, however, but he who already has a science of such things ? Such mistakes
then are no proof of the impossibility of the science now in question. They may rather
extend and complete the science. Third, he who possesses no science in the art ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 230
management (sic)
235 must conform to old tradition, and it will be hard for him to
adapt himself to unexpected and altered circumstances. If things go well in such a
crisis, it is his good luck; if they go ill, it is his misfortune, and the essence of it is his
own stupidity. Whoever on the other hand has a philosophical understanding knows
how these unexpected circumstances are to be considered, how one may compare
them with the nature of the matter, and thus determine the general theory more
exactly, and thereby make it more useful. What then is proved by this addition of
special circumstances? That a philosophical science of Haushaltungskunst is
impossible? It rather confirms the contrary, and the necessity of such a science. This
may then be concluded that without experience a philosophical science of
management [eine philosophische Wissen-schaft der Haushaltungskunst] cannot be
made sufficiently definite and applicable.” Darjes assents to this conclusion, and
declares that his book will be composed accordingly.
To the third objection the answer is substantially this: The people who regard
attention to Haushaltungskunst as beneath the dignity of the learned, appear to have
a very great soul but a very petty mind. They call themselves learned, but do not
know what learning [Gelehrsamkeit] is. They have perhaps forgotten that the true
learning is that which proves itself profitable among men and in human society, and
that the eminence of this learning depends upon the quantity of this advantage.
236 To
put it briefly, a philosopher constructs general concepts, he infers from these the
qualities of things, and he consequently builds up a correlation of truths which
represents the essentials of all particulars which are to be treated in this special
division of learning. A philosopher will then become practical if he determines his
general understanding more accurately through history and experience, and this is the
natural way of building the special sciences.
Thus one determines one’s ideas of what is right and wrong through the customs
of peoples and through the decisions of rulers, and one becomes a jurist. The
philosopher determines his understanding of the forces of things through learning
how the human body is put together, and through that which he is taught by
experience in this connection, and he becomes a physician. Another philosopher
determines his understanding of the nature and workings of things through that which
experience in affairs [“Beschäftigungen”] teaches him, and he becomes a manager.
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Why now is the dignity of the scholar more in question in the last case than in the
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state and of its inhabitants less useful to the state than he who makes himself skilled
in preserving the health of people, or he who learns how to decide what is right and
wrong in the quarrels between people? The external welfare of men is related to three
factors, to riches, to the enjoyment of rights, and to health. Each who is zealous so
to determine his philosophy that it may be useful in promoting any of these purposes
(sic) is thereby zealous in promoting the welfare of human society. Is it not a clear
proof of confusion and prejudice if one looks upon one of these factors as opposed
to the dignity of a scholar? That which is really beneath the dignity of a scholar is to
deal in confused ideas, and to draw conclusions from prejudice.
But, continues Darjes, I may have misunderstood these men. Perhaps they merely
mean that plowing, manuring, brewing, baking, etc., are not proper occupations for
scholars. If that is their meaning, I have misinterpreted them, but it is their fault. Of
course we do not have these practical manipulations [wirthschaftliche
Handthierungen] in mind when we speak of a philosophical science.
We turn then from these objections to a positive description of cameral science
(§9). In the first place we must define certain uses of terms. The chief theorem is this:
Whoever wishes to count upon a certain annual income, must look out for the source
from which the income may flow. The theorem is supported as follows: Our yearly
incomes flow either from an established source, or they depend upon chance, and are
thus beyond our control. Since it is self-evident that in the latter case we can make
no certain calculation upon the yearly revenues, wisdom demands that we look out
for a source that is capable of producing our revenues. In a note Darjes explains that
he uses variations of the word “certain” or “assured” in this connection in the general
sense in which such terms are employed in the theory of morals and prudence; that
is, not complete certainty, but a high degree of probability is the meaning.
There are two possible sources of annual income (§10): (a) skill in the application
of our powers, or (b) an already secured “good” which is capable of producing a
yearly profit. This latter is called in a special sense the source of annual revenues, the
fund [Fond], the capital.
“I am uncertain,” says Darjes, “whether to give precedence to the former or to the
latter of these sources, or whether they are equivalent in respect to yearly income
(§11). Thus A has a capital of 10,000 Thaler and this yields a yearly profit of 500
Thaler. B can earn with his skill 500 Thaler. Accordingly the one has as great an
income as the other. For many reasons it might be inferred that in respect to yearlyAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 232
income the two sources are indifferent.
On the other hand it is urged that a capital is exposed to various vicissitudes. We
may lose it by fraud, fire, flood, and other accidents. Our skill on the contrary is
secure against these attacks. Persons of the opposite view reply: ‘We can earn
nothing with our skill if we are sick; moreover it depends in many ways upon the
opinions of other men whether we shall be able to apply our skill. It is not always
within our power to rouse the necessary opinions. A capital, however, may show
itself effective whether we are sick or well, and whether men are of one opinion or
the other.’”
Most people would conclude that capital and skill should be combined (§12).
Darjes expresses his own judgment, however, that between capital and skill the
former is the more secure source of revenue, and for these reasons: The greater the
number of accidents which may interfere with the sources of our annual revenues, the
more easily these accidents may operate, and the more independent they are of our
control, the less securely can we reckon upon our yearly income. This uncertainty is
greater in the case of skill than of capital. Hence we can more securely count upon
a yearly income from capital than from skill.
In a note (§13) the author specifies that he uses the word “capital” not in the
narrower sense in which it is applied to a sum of money which we borrow for the
sake of making a profit, but in the general sense, of those acquired means which we
assume to be permanent, so that they may annually be efficient for our advantage.
This use of the word, he says, is usual in all writers on Haushaltungskunst whom he
has read. “If there is no objection to the term, I prefer to use the word Fond. I have
no objection to any freedom which others desire in this respect.”
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The foregoing must be applied to the revenues of a prince (§14), It is known from
the law of nature that the prince, as a member of civic society, must he distinguished
from a prince as such.
239 In the latter character the prince must be considered in his
relation to the state and the subjects. This gives us a ground for dividing the yearly
revenues of the prince into the personal and the princely income.
The capital or the “Fond” of the princely revenues is the riches of the state and oj
the subjects (§15).
Whoever attempts to increase his yearly revenues either draws upon his capital, or
he seeks to increase his capital and make it more fruitful (§16). The former means is
unreasonable, because it either defeats the purpose or makes permanent attainmentAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 233
of the purpose impossible. Hence the theorem: The increase oj yearly income is
unreasonable when it is brought to pass by impairing the capital.
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In order that our attempts to increase our revenues may be reasonable they must aim
either to increase the accumulated capital or to make it more fruitful (§17).
To appraise the riches of the subjects, we must determine either “the sum of their
already accumulated capital, or the amount of their yearly revenues. It, accordingly,
we understand that the capital of the princely revenues is the riches of the subjects,
these revenues are taken either from the capital, which the subjects have already
acquired, or from the yearly revenues of the subjects. If the former method be chosen,
the income of the prince each time impairs the capital of the subjects. This is
unreasonable. If one will accordingly follow reason, one must assume in this case
that the capital or the Fond of the princely revenues is the yearly income of the
subjects. Hence the general rule (§19): The first care oj him, whose task it is to raise
the princely revenues, must be to discover how the yearly income oj the subjects may
be increased. Accordingly a prince is a rich prince when he has rich and skilful
subjects.
In the Middle Ages the word Camera designated the place where the princely
revenues were kept (§21). Hence it occurred that men understood by Cameralwesen
those ordinances which defined the Wirthschaft of a prince. An orderly Wirthschaft
consists of three chief points (sic) viz.: the maintenance, the raising, and the
administration of the yearly revenues. This is enough to show why we understand by
Cameralwissenschajt that science which shows us the reasonable way of preserving,
raising, and applying the annual revenues of a prince. There may be some who
disapprove the separation of these purposes, instead of combining them in one
expression. To satisfy them we may define Cameralwissenschaft as a science of the
reasonable Wirthschaft of a prince.
A cameralist is one who understands Cameralwissenschaft (§22); more particularly,
he must be able to solve the following problems: (1) How may an established source
of the yearly revenues of a prince be preserved? (2) How may the yearly income of
a prince be reasonably raised? (3) How is a reasonable application of the yearly
revenues of a prince possible?
Cameralistic technique consists then, first: (a) in finding means capable of realizing
the riches of the state and of the subjects; (b) in bringing the yearly incomes of the
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possible (§23); second, in finding reasonable ways of raising the annual revenues of
the prince, and consequently (sic) of making the subjects richer and more skilful
(§24).
Our yearly revenues are either direct workings of nature or the output of the latter
is based upon our occupations, which in turn presuppose a certain skill which we
have acquired by our efforts (§25). These occupations either put nature in a condition
to accomplish that which is possible for her, or out of natural products they produce
other things which are useful for the human race. This taken for granted, it is clear
that in respect to the second point, a true cameralist must understand: (a) the true
qualities of natural objects, and what can be brought to pass by means of them; (b)
how nature can be made more skilful in bringing forth what is possible for her; (c)
how other things for the use of men may be produced from the yield of nature. And
the author adds in a note: “We speak of ‘the use of men’ not in a moral, but in a
political sense, according to which everything is useful for the human race which
may bring about its preservation, happiness, and the improvement of welfare. The
science with which we are now concerned demands that we should attach such a
meaning to the word.”
It is hardly necessary to point out that we have here a seed of the sort of thinking
which developed later into pure economics of the nineteenth-century type. The
argument continues:
By these signs we may distinguish between a true cameralist and a
despoiler of the country [Landverderber] (§26). There are people
devoted to raising the revenues of a prince, who either through
wantonness or stupidity are restrained from taking the way which
wisdom prescribes, i.e., the way oj increasing the yearly revenues of
the subjects. They think they have fully discharged the duties of their
office if they find schedules which would increase the annual
payments of the subjects. These people increase the annual revenues
of the prince by weakening the capital. This increase is of no
duration. The subjects and the state must eventually grow poorer.
This is enough to show that such people do not deserve the name
cameralist. They are the plague in the state, and for this reason are
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On the contrary (§28), the true cameralist proposes to increase the
yearly incomes of the subjects. The subjects must accordingly not
only be put in a situation in which it is possible for them to increase
their incomes, but their will must lead them to the necessary
occupation. This latter demands an awakening of their zeal for labor.
The former demands, first, an understanding of the possible increase
of revenues; second, possession of those means through which the
understanding may be skilfully applied; third, removal of all those
circumstances which might obstruct the execution of this purpose.
Accordingly, in respect to the second main task, a cameralist must
further understand how the state is to be arranged (sic) in order (a)
to rouse in the subjects a zeal for labor; (b) to enable the subjects to
gain adequate understanding of the possible increase of incomes; (c)
to insure to the subjects adequate provision of means and opportunity
skilfully to apply the acquired understanding; (d) to guard the subjects
against hindrances to convenient disposal of the things which they
have produced.
The reason why a cameralisl concerns himself with these points is to
raise the annual revenues of a prince (§29). This is the principal
occupation through which he is distinguished from another scientific
manager [Wirth]. But this peculiar occupation demands that he shall
observe more than one rule. It follows immediately that he must
understand (a) how a prince may raise his yearly revenues from the
yearly incomes of the subjects, without weakening the source of the
same; (b) how, through the reasonable use of the yearly revenues of
a prince, the yearly incomes of the subjects may be preserved and
increased.
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We come then to the third main task, viz., the reasonable use of the
annual revenues of a prince (§30). Whoever manages wisely brings
his revenues and his outlays into certain classes. He distinguishes the
necessary outlays from those that are less necessary. He compares the
outlay with the income, and designates for each class of outlays a
particular class of revenues. Hence, in respect to this third task, a
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into certain classes; (b) how to determine the yearly outlays of a
prince, and how these are to be divided in certain orders; (c) how to
compare the annual outlays of a prince with his annual revenues, and
how a special class of the revenues may be assigned to each sort of
outlay.
It follows that an introduction to Cameralwissenschaft must first
outline the operations of nature. Accordingly we have as the first part
of the science, Landwirthschaft [Oeconomia rustica] (§31).
A note upon this section offords another instructive sign of the progress of analysis
in this field. Darjes says:
Many who treat of Oeconomie interpret it in a moral sense, since they
regard us as in an interdependence of those rules in accordance with
which a reasonable Wirthschaft must be arranged, and we have made
a brief sketch of these in the philosophical theory of morals. The
cameralist presupposes this treatment, and he goes farther. He
investigates how these general rules can be applied to the works of
nature. For this reason he busies himself with Oeconomie in the
physical sense, yet not as a peasant, but as a philosopher. He works
out a conception of the workings of nature, of the natural causes of
these workings; of completeness in the workings of nature, and of the
means of making these causes capable of rendering the workings
complete. From these conceptions he deduces general theorems
which serve him as rules in a specific case, and hereby he becomes a
philosophical  Land-Wirth,  who is able to regulate the
Landwirthschaft  in a country, and to make it more complete for the
profit of the state.
The passage calls for the observation that the development of thought in Germany
at this time, upon subjects afterward differently allotted among nineteenth-century
social sciences, was by no means confined to the cameralists. We must remember,
while analyzing cameralistic thinking, that this was merely one of the factors in the
whole thought-movement of the time, within the range which we may call in generalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 237
sociological.
Darjes accordingly classifies the first part of Landwirth-schaft in three divisions,
dealing respectively with (a) the workings of nature and the means of making them
more complete; (b) agriculture; (c) cattle raising (§32). He calls the second part of
Cameralwissenschafl, dealing with those things which may be produced by artificial
control of the workings of nature, Sladtwirthschaft or Occonomia urbana (§33), and
its subdivisions deal with (a) Gewerken in which the forces of nature are employed
in producing certain goods, such as beer, alcohol, and starch; (b) Manufacturen und
Fabriquen, which produce things which nature by herself could not produce (§34).
Darjes makes Policeiwissenschaft the third part of Came-ralwissenschaft, and he
explains:
The Greeks understand by the word {
} those laws of a state
upon which its beauty and well-being rest.
242 The state is accordingly
beautiful, and its well-being is assured, if its subjects have flourishing
means of subsistence. This is sufficient to show why the name has
been given to this third part of Cameralwissen-schaft. This part of the
science is concerned with: (a) the population of the state; (b)
establishment of schools and universities; (c) political establishment
of the ecclesiastical system: (d) incitement of subjects to labor; (e)
arrangements of the state preserving the health of subjects; (f) beauty
of the country; (g) promotion of security; (h) care of the poor, etc.
(§36).
The cameralist must finally apply the sciences thus described to the
Wirthschaft of a prince, as prince (§37). This application makes the
fourth part of Cameralwissenschaft which has appropriated the name
Cameralwissenschaft in a peculiar sense. Its subdivisions are: (a)
determination of the various sources of the princely revenues; (b)
devising of ways and means to draw from these sources; (c)
description of the regular application of the annual revenues of a
prince.
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We are not concerned with comparative techique in any part of the cameral
sciences, and we may allow this general description to represent Darjes’ professionalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 238
equation in the cameralistic group.
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Since we have referred to Seckendorff as the Adam Smith of cameralism, we may
carry out the conceit by calling Justi the John Stuart Mill of the movement. In each
case, however, the analogy rests upon points of resemblance which would be rated
as trivial after critical investigation. It is true, nevertheless, that, as a pioneer in
reducing an administrative programme to literary expression, Seckendorff occupies
very much the same relative position in the development of cameralistic theory which
Smith occupied later in the evolution of an abstract theory of wealth. It is also true
that Justi organized the cameralistic technology which had been developed up to his
time into a system of theory which correlated the different phases of cameralism, very
much as Mill gave to the doctrines of classical economics their most impressive
rendering. It would hardly be profitable to pursue farther the quest of likeness or
unlikeness in either case.
The original plan of this book proposed to present Justi alone as the type of
cameralism in general. Further reflection led to change of the plan to the programme
here followed. The principal reason was that, if the first intention had been carried
out, it could not have forestalled the criticism: “One case cannot justify a
generalization. Nothing appears in evidence to prove that Justi was not an exception
rather than a type.” Since the literature by which this objection is removed is so
inaccessible to Americans, mere assertion that it exists,’ or even copious references
to particular passages, would fail adequately to present the cameralists to English
readers. The alternative chosen was an attempt to survey the whole cameralistic
period and to divide attention in proportion to the relative importance of the principal
writers.
The most convincing biographical study of Justi has been made by Frensdorff. We
follow his conclusions in reducing to the lowest terms such details as are necessary
for our purpose.
245Albion Small, The Cameralists, 240
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, son of the Gerichthalter Georg Heinrich Justi,
was baptized December 28, 1717, in the evangelisch-lutherische Kirche at Brücken
an der Helme (Regierungsbezirk Merseburg, Kreis Sangerhauseri). The story that he
was born on Christmas eve of that year is thus not improbable. Of his earlier years
little is known. The traces of his university career are rather dubious. The most
reliable of them are at Wittenberg. Partly within his student period he had some army
experience. “Although Justi’s military period was no longer than his academic career,
it left traces which may be observed for a long time in his writings. He often made
use of observations collected (1741–42) during the war of the Austrian succession”
(Frensdorff, p. 363). Justi credited the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment to which he
belonged with turning the course of his life to legal and scientific pursuits.
Justi’s first publication was Die Dichterinsel (1745), a combination of Utopia and
satire feebly resembling Swift’s Gulliver. At about the same time, Justi began, to
publish in Dresden a monthly magazine, under the title Ergetzungen der vernünftigen
Seele aus der Sittenlehre und der Gelehrsamkeit überhaupt. During the remainder of
his life Justi seemed never content unless he was addressing the public through one
or more journals of various types.
In the course of the year 1747, Justi removed to Sanger-hausen, where his name is
known first as Advocat, then as Rath der verwittweten Herzogin von Sachsen-
Eisenach.  Although the term Witthumsrath, used in flippant allusion to this incident,
seems to indicate that the sonorous title was not everywhere taken seriously, on the
other hand, perhaps without exceeding the privileges which at the time went with any
title whatsoever, Justi evidently regarded the designation obtained from the Herzogin
as an available asset, and he made good use of it as a help to something better.
Justi’s next step toward distinction was the composition of a monograph on a
subject calling for review of Leibnitz’ theory of monads. The subject was proposed
for a prize contest by the Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, and the prize was
awarded to Justi in 1747 (Frensdorff, p. 371).
Presently Justi changed his residence to Vienna. Of this episode Frensdorff says (p.
375):
The period of his stay here is the most important of his life. From this
point dates the turning of his mind to the science which was to give
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with his facile journalistic pen—polite literature, philosophy, history,
jurisprudence, etc. He now began to cultivate the economic sciences.
His removal to Vienna had much to do with this transition. Justi
arrived in Austria at precisely the time when Maria Theresia had put
her improving hand upon all departments of the inner life of the state.
The system of taxation and the organization of civic functionaries
were reconstructed, so that the government was independent of the
estates, and a central control of internal affairs was possible. These
reforms reached their most definite expressions through Haugvvitz,
head of the political and cameral administration. .... The reforms
which he introduced in general administration were also beneficial to
the educational institutions founded at the same period. Both the
Theresianum, founded in 1746, and the Savoysche Ritterakademie
proposed to furnish a training for aristocratic youths which would
provide the state with more competent servants both civil and
military.
No sufficient explanation of Justi’s initial success at Vienna has been found. At all
events, he was appointed, August 31, 1750, to the “Professura eloquentiae
germanicae” in the Collegium Theresianum. In connection with this professorship,
Justi was instructed to offer lectures entitled “collegium oeconomico-provinciale,”
which included “Finanzen, Handel, Contribu-tionale (Steuerwesen)  und
Manufacturwesen.” The immediate occasion for this course, which was incidental to
a larger educational porgramme, was similar to that which had led the king of
Prussia, a quarter-century earlier, to establish the cameralistic chairs at Halle and
Frankfurt a. O., viz., the desire to supplement the traditional courses at the university
by instruction which would be direct preparation for official service.
The document which marks Justi’s entrance into the tameralistic series was in the
nature of a report to the empress (1752), containing a prospectus of cameralistic
study.
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At particular command of the empress, Justi was commissioned to deal specifically
with the subject of mining. Thereupon he gave his attention not merely to the theory,
but to the actual development of the mineral resources of Austria. This particular
element in his activities may have had much or little to do with the brevity of his stayAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 242
in Vienna. At all events his connection with mining administration proved to be his
final undoing. For reasons which are as confused as the explanations of his coming
to Austria, among them friction with the ecclesiastical authorities, Justi returned to
North Germany in 1753. Stieda thinks (p. 33) that he did not even begin his lectures
on cameralistics in Vienna. Frensdorff, on the contrary, is quite sure he was the first
teacher of the economic sciences in Austria (p. 389). Unless we presume that Justi
had forgotten the facts in less than eight years, or that he deliberately lied, his own
assertion, which Stieda seems to have overlooked, is decisive.
Light is thrown on Justi’s reasons for leaving Vienna by his hints that the Jesuits
were hostile to him, and had spies at the doors and windows of his lecture-room.
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He also says that the rector told him flatly, “There is no need of Cameral-
wissenschaft and Policei; Austria has been prosperous a long time without anything
of that sort. If people are only pious and say their prayers, God will bless the country
without such stuff.”
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Reviewing the Austrian passage in Justi’s career, Frensdorff says (p. 389):
Brief as was his stay in Austria, the time was not lost for Austria nor
for himself. As one line leads back from him to the most eminent
representatives of Volkswirthschaft under Kaiser Leopold I, so
another connects him with those who followed. Justi continued the
work of Becher, Schröder, and Hornick. .... Each had at heart the
question how Austria might be made more prosperous by means of
Landesoekonomie  or  Volkswirthschaft.  They solve the question
according to the principles of the mercantilists; and the difference
between them and Justi is his more abstract procedure. He is not
concerned in the first instance with a particular country. He tries to
lay down principles of universal validity, and while they handle their
material in a popular way, Justi puts his in the form of a dogmatic and
schematically complete exposition.
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Justi left Austria during the year 1753. On New Year, 1754 at Mansfeld, he signed
the prospectus of a new monthly journal;
250 he appears to have been for a short time
in Leipzig, but in 1755 he appears in Gottingen. The reasons which account for these
movements remain unexplained. In Gottingen Justi combined the activities ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 243
Polizeidirector with the academic function of lecturer on cameralistic subjects.
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June, 1757, however, Justi left Gottingen. Again the reasons are largely matters of
conjecture. The action for divorce brought by his wife doubtless had something to do
with the brevity of his stay. He next appears (1757) as Bergrath in the service of the
king of Denmark. This Danish episode lasted less than a year. He moved to Altona,
then to Hamburg, where he made the acquaintance of the Prussian resident von
Hecht. From this time to the end of the Seven Years’ War, Justi did a great deal of
political writing. He affected a manner which purported to set the issues of the day
in the light of a comprehensive political philosophy.
Justi appears to have remained in Hamburg until some time between 1758 and
1760. From the spring of the latter year
252 his books are dated at Berlin, and the title,
“Kgl. Gross-britannischer Bergrath,” disappears.
Justi’s occupations and status in Berlin are extremely uncertain up to 1765, when
he was appointed Berghauptmann. From this vantage ground he secured the notice
and favor of the king, who indorsed rather extensive plans for the development of
mines. On the other hand Justi seems almost immediately to have made enemies.
These were partly personal creditors, partly bidders for the opportunities which his
office controlled or influenced. Presently more serious trouble came. Questions were
raised about Justi’s financial administration. The outcome was judicial investigation
which resulted in his arrest and confinement at Küstrin (February 9, 1768).
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time of his death, probably from apoplexy, he was carrying on the legal fight for
release. He maintained that the whole case was trumped up by enemies, and
according to his daughter’s statement, he expressed his confidence, the evening
before his death, that the process would result in his favor. Although it is possible,
and even probable, that in the whole matter Justi was “more sinned against than
sinning,” we must admit that the incident at best deepens the impression left by the
most favorable version of his earlier life. With all his intellectual versatility, Justi
never shows a sign of moral strength.
Returning to our main interest, viz., the cameralists as authors, not as individuals,
we are obliged to disentangle Justi’s cameralistic works from a mass of
miscellaneous writings. Meusel’s Lexikon schedules forty-eight works which he
published between 1741 and 1771, many of them in several volumes. They fall into
six groups: (1) aesthetics and belles lettres; (2) philosophy; (3) natural science; (4)
history; (5) law and statesmanship; (6) cameralistics in the wide sense. Most of hisAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 244
books were dashed off with genial carelessness, and with notorious disregard of the
literature of the subjects treated. He despised all science which could not be turned
to tangible uses, philology, mathematics, astronomy; in the latter case showing his
ignorance by sneering at the inaccuracy of astronomical opinions.
254 Such reaction
against earlier one-sidedncss probably had a certain value. At the same time it
became itself very plain one-sidedness when, for example, Justi admitted the right
to kill in self-defense, but merely to preserve one’s own life, not however “to
preserve those chimeras and absurd treasures which we have constructed out of
honor, and property, which is probably not in accordance with the will of God, or out
of female virtue, and perhaps even of virginity”
255 (Roscher in Archiv für Sachs.
Geschichte, Bd. 6, pp. 77 ff.).
One might read Justi’s cameralistic books a long time without happening upon
express recognition that anything worth notice had previously been written on the
subjects treated. Tardy and grudging references to other authors occur, but they do
not by any means give due credit for Justi’s drafts upon his predecessors. He
succeeded in eclipsing them partly because he had rather unusually acute political
instincts. Besides this, he was a skilled organizer of literary material. If he was not
a plagiarist in the strict sense, he was a persistent absorber and purveyor of other
people’s ideas as his own. While this fact foredooms certain tendencies to idealize
Justi as an originator in the social sciences, it indicates his value as a summarizer of
previous social science. Justi repeatedly excuses his omission to cite other writers,
on the ground that such references merely serve to parade an author’s learning.
256 He
has a euphemistic substitute for frank confession in the following passage:
257
I have never owned a book which I have not read entirely through,
and my memory was so strong that in case of all notable passages I
not only knew the volume in which they were to be found, but also
the chapter and usually the page. Indeed, I have often introduced into
my writings from memory passages many lines long without again
referring to the book. This extraordinary memory has been growing
weaker for several years, and I am learning the value of good tables
of contents.
Our plan requires a review of the most important of Justi’s cameralistic books, asAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 245
nearly as possible in their chronological order. We shall find at least the elements of
all his subsequent books in the Staatswirthschaft.
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We must give more than passing notice to the strategic force of the expression on
the title-page, “which are requisite for the government of a country.” The phrase at
once puts to the front the purpose and viewpoint of cameralism, viz.:
first, the paramount state—whether the princelingdom of Reuss or the
kingdom of Prussia, is immaterial—a dominant conception of what
belongs to thrifty state- housekeeping, and Staatswirthschaft as the
tradition of the technique which accomplishes that species of thrift.
We must set it down as a fixed fact that this is an element in the historical
development of German social science, and of German government, which accounts
for certain of the typical contrasts with English theoretical and practical tradition.
In order to obtain a general conception of the range of Staatswirthschaft as Justi and
others taught it, and as most of the higher civic officials in Germany learned it, till
a more modern organization of science was brought into vogue by Rau (Lehrbuch der
politischen Oekonomie, 1826, etc.), the Table of Contents should be examined.
The first impression which the book would make upon any fairly intelligent person,
who happened upon it with no previous hints about its contents, would be that it was
intended as a digest of knowledge useful for civic functionaries. The primary thesis
which the book and all the other writings of Justi on related subjects justify is that
social problems presented themselves to the author principally as problems of civic
administration. That is, the autonomous, patriarchal petty state was the ever-present
working assumption. Justi is thus strictly in line with camcralistic tradition as we
have made it out from the beginning.
Since Justi’s work is in effect a recapitulation of cameralism, we are justified in
reproducing rather fully his own review of the state of camcralistic knowledge at the
time of writing. The Preface to the first edition of Staatswirthschaft clears the ground
in this way:
The economic and cameral sciences are very old in the world. The
application of them occurred indeed the moment property was
introduced among men, and republics came into existence.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 246
This delightfully unconstrained style of historical freelancing at once illustrates
Justi’s irresponsibility to authorities. Yet it would be unfair to treat him as
exceptional in making hearsay a sufficient basis for historical generalization. Europe
was still in its age of fable. It was half a century after the writing of this preface when
Niebuhr’s first volume on the history of Rome marked the dawn of the era of
historical criticism. If Justi felt at liberty to spin historical formulas out of his
imagination, he was exercising a liberty which was at his time under no serious ban
of disrepute.
It is important to notice that the word “republic” in Justi’s vocabulary is not an
anachronism. It is merely the unprecise term in frequent use at the time to denote any
civic society.
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Justi goes on to say that:
People have always been obliged to observe appropriate rules in
exploiting their estates, and rulers of republics have found themselves
constrained to adopt expedient measures both for organizing the state
and for thrift and order in the same. This is the essential in the
economic and cameral sciences.
Then Justi cites Aristotle as evidence that theoretical treatment of these subjects
was very ancient, and we need not challenge this phase of his retrospect. He proceeds
to bemoan the neglect of this branch of science:
All other sciences have workers in superabundance. To these alone
have they given little thought, and if we had not been able to collect
certain practical observations from people active in these pursuits, but
little devoted to learning, these sciences would be everywhere barren
and empty. There has been scarcely a thought of teaching these
sciences in the universities, and, although teachers in excess have
been provided for all other branches of knowledge, centuries elapsed
after the founding of these institutions before it was found necessary
to devote a single chair to these sciences.
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we have quoted above (viz., the books of Gasser and Dithmar, and possibly the tract
of Ludewig); but his readers would find no hint of these means of verifying his
statements. For the contents of the passage in addition to the data given above, Justi
offers no evidence beyond his own assertion. He says (Preface, p. xii):
It was thirty years ago when the former king of Prussia, who was
himself a really great manager [Wirth], who appraised learning
wholly according to its use to the state, and consequently had no very
high ideas of the scholars of his time, set the example of establishing
in his universities chairs devoted to the economic sciences. This
occurred in fact in Frankfurt a. O. and in Halle. That at Halle remains;
and in this case the king was so fortunate in his first appointment as
to find as an incumbent Privy Counselor Gasser, who really had much
talent for these sciences, although he did not think with enough order
and system to develop them thoroughly. The king thought so much of
his teaching that a Prussian subject stood little chance of promotion
if he could not show a certificate from Gasser that he had regularly
attended the tatter’s lectures. This example of the Prussian king at last
drew the attention of other states to the advantage of economic
professorships. Similar chairs were accordingly founded in Upsala,
in Göttingen, and some other German universities, as well as in some
academies, as in Vienna and Braunschweig.
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Justi expresses himself as highly dissatisfied with the results of this movement. In
the first place, cameralistic chairs were still too rare. In the second place, when they
exist they treat “only Haushaltungskunst und Landwirthschaft with less incidentally
about Policey, and the Regalien.” That is, to express the idea in today’s idiom, Justi
regretted that the emphasis had been placed on the operative rather than on the
managerial side of gainful occupations. He supported this judgment by referring to
the textbooks which Gasser and Dithmar had published in connection with their
lectures.
261 These are the only text-writers whom Justi mentions here by name,
although the vague reference to “others” shows that he knew more than he cared to
tell or was willing to make exact, about path-breakers in the subject. Enlarging upon
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these fractions of Cameralwissenschaft and to neglect the rest.
Indeed [he exclaims], thanks to such samples, the statesmen and
practical cameralists have the idea that in these sciences no orderly
system of theory is possible, and this opinion has been uttered to my
face. On the other hand, the students find little that is important in
such books, but discover that they have to do mostly with rural
economy, which they expect to learn by experience, if they have
occasion for it. They therefore look upon these sciences very coldly,
and conclude that they can get along without learning them.
Justi adds that another obstacle in the way of these sciences is found in the teachers
themselves. They are apt to be people not trained for university careers, and taken
from the administrative service. They accordingly are seldom good instructors (p.
xiv). On the other hand, the trained scholars of the academic type who are charged
with teaching these subjects do not know enough about them in detail to make their
instruction valuable.
At the same time Justi finds a brighter tint for the picture. He thinks there is no
doubt of the superiority of the Prussian bureaus to those of other states, and some of
this excellence is due to the teachings of Gasser and his colleagues. The
establishment of cameralistic chairs had also been accompanied by more publication
on the subject, and in most parts of Germany there had been an evident increase of
interest in cameralistic science. The same appeared to be true elsewhere, notably in
Sweden, and Justi credits Sweden with more progress than Germany in this field. He
draws the inference that progress in these respects would everywhere have been still
more creditable if instruction in the universities had been more adequate, and the
remainder of the Preface is devoted to expansion of this proposition.
Justi goes about his task of establishing the claims of cameralistic science in a way
that is quite in accord with the methodology of the time. At first glance it seems not
unlike the general argument of Adam Smith. It is impossible, however, not to infer
that the preliminary moral part of the argument sits more lightly upon Justi than upon
Smith. In the case of the former, it has rather the effect of an argumentum ad
hominem addressed to people whose conventional views were inhospitable toward
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claims. He begins with the proposition that there are different kinds of knowledge
appropriate to the different uses of life (p. xvi). If we refuse to cultivate the kinds of
knowledge necessary for the fulfilment of our diverse duties, it is just as though we
had deliberately declined to perform the duties themselves (p. xvii). Included in this
necessary knowledge are “natural and revealed religion, morals, or the theory of
virtue, and the science of civic law, which shows us our duties in our various
stations.”
Dividing knowledge into the “necessary,” the “useful,” and the “attractive,” Justi
urges that the “economic and cameral sciences” should be recognized as belonging
in the first class. “They give us precisely that insight which we most need for the
purposes of civic and social life (p. xix). The government of republics cannot endure
without them, and there is no social institution or class or mode of life which could
do without them entirely.”
Advancing to another premise of his argument, Justi predicates of the universities
as follows:
It will be enough if we attend to their ultimate purpose. This, in so far
as they are public foundations of the state, can be no other than that
of affording to youth properly prepared in the lower schools adequate
instruction in all intelligence and science which will be needful for
them, in order that they may some time, as servants of the state and
upright citizens, render useful services to the commonwealth,
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be in a position fully to discharge their duties (p. xx). It follows from
the foregoing reference to the ultimate purpose of the universities that
it should be one of their principal efforts to teach the economic and
cameral sciences (p. xxi).
The argument is then developed by going into detail in expanding the proposition:
There are very few positions of responsibility in the state in which
expertness in the economic and the cameral sciences would not be the
chief matter, if the duties of the position were fulfilled and good
service to the state performed (p. xxii).Albion Small, The Cameralists, 250
We get something like a direct view into the state of thought at the time by finding
that it was necessary for Justi to argue against the idea that, while instruction was
necessary in law and medicine, civil servants could pick up casually all that they
needed to know about economics and cameralistics. While we have a precise parallel
with this situation in many universities today in the case of sociology, the academic
conditions against which Justi argued have been transferred, in England and America
more than in Germany, to business and government. That is, the universities are now
eager to teach these subjects, but the practical men are skeptical whether the
universities can teach anything about them which cannot be learned better in practical
life.
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Justi’s estimate of the part played by knowledge of the Roman law in German
civilization, and as substitute for more specific cameralistics, is also instructive. He
says (p. xxv):
The recovery of the Roman law, and provision for teaching it, was the
first step which Providence allowed us to take, in leading us out of
the thick fog of ignorance which everywhere surrounded us. We
therefore owe deep gratitude to Roman legal learning, and it is
remarkable that for several centuries it was believed that all human
wisdom was to be found in the body of Roman laws. To knowledge
of these laws it was chiefly due that we became intelligent enough to
begin the extermination of barbarism. Today’s fortunate organization
of states according to the fundamental principles of economic and
cameral science is by no means old. Less than two hundred years ago
there was no knowledge of a cameral system in Germany, and at that
time men could scarcely have believed that the prosperity
[Aufnahme
264] of the trading classes, the encouragement of the classes
producing raw material, and the administration of the revenues of the
sovereign could occur in accordance with permanent principles and
methods. Consequently nothing was known of cameralists. The most
eminent magistrates [Justisbedienten] of the prince at the same time
managed his revenues; or the matter was held to be of such slight
account that the consort of the prince took charge of it, just as today
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good arrangements in the police and other bureaus, which we now
find in most states, came only gradually into being, perhaps more
through accidental suggestions than in pursuance of coherent
principles of the governmental sciences. The organization of states is
itself perhaps not yet brought to perfection, and perhaps it is only a
beneficent fruit of our enlightened century that we at last perceive that
the great housekeeping [Wirth-schaft] of the state, in all its economic,
police, and cameral institutions, rests upon coherent principles, which
are derived from the nature of republics, and incidentally are veritable
sciences.
Justi at once reiterates the moral that these sciences are now worked out in
somewhat complete shape, and consequently it would be a dereliction in high places
if there should be further delay in making them the subject-matter of university
instruction (p. xxvii).
One of the passages in the Preface indicates that Justi’s idea of cameral science
pictured it as a social polytechnic, and the cameralist as an all-around expert in this
complex science of government. Thus he says (p. xxxi):
We may admit, to be sure, that a merely practical cameralist, if he has
good natural intelligence, and industriously makes himself acquainted
with the institutions of other lands, may become a good particular
cameralist (sic) in this or that branch of civic administration, but he
can never become a good universal cameralist (sic). From lack of
coherent basic principles he will never walk with secure steps. At
every unusual occurrence he will waver and seize upon questionable
decisions. If he thinks he has introduced important improvements in
this part of the administrative organization, he will at last come to the
perception that he has thereby caused disproportionate injury in
another part of the great housekeeping of the state, because he did not
sufficiently understand the correlation of this great system and the
influence which all circumstances of the entire system have upon one
another. What can however be more indispensable to a state than
perfect universal cameralists? The welfare of the state rests heavilyAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 252
upon them. Most lands appear in this respect to be seriously
lacking.
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Justi frankly puts the sciences of civic administration, as professed technologies, in
direct antithesis with “the other sciences which merely serve to enlarge the human
understanding” (p. xxxiii). He urges, however, against the contrary opinion of some
scholars, that the former would not interfere with the latter, but on the contrary, “the
more we discharge and respect our duties to the state, the more shall we be inclined
to improve our understanding.”
But Justi is not content with arguing that the universities should undertake
instruction in cameralistics. His argument is so cogent in his own mind that it carries
him much beyond his premises. Apparently inflamed by a zeal that is kindled in the
course of his discussion, he demands still wider scope for his science. He concludes
the first branch of his arugment as follows (p. xxxiv):
In my opinion I have sufficiently shown that it is necessary to teach
the economic and cameralistic sciences in the universities. This
theorem has the corollary that we must prepare youth for such
instruction in the lower schools, and there can be no doubt that every
new academic citizen
266 should bring with him at least .the general
theories of Haushaltungskunst
267 as the basis for all the sciences
which are necessary for promoting the great housekeeping of the
state. Indeed, in the very meanest schools, in which the children of the
lowest rabble are instructed, at least the most comprehensible
precepts should be taught, and the duties which they at some time, as
citizens and inhabitants of the state, and as fathers of families, will
have to observe. In the case of institutions of this class, we seem
never to have thought that it is not less needful to educate good and
useful citizens than good Christians.
Justi then passes to a second consideration, viz., the proper organization of
cameralistic instruction. His proposal is worth quoting at length (pp. xxxv ff.):
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sufficient to teach the economic and cameralistic sciences in
universities. At least two teachers should be appointed, of whom the
one should deal chiefly with police and commercial science, the other
with economics and finance. For if these sciences arc to be taught
completely, fundamentally and to real purpose, each of these
professors must have time to treat of this or that portion of his
sciences in detail in separate courses of lectures, in order that each
may have opportunity to make himself proficient in that branch to
which he proposes to devote himself. Some will want to make a
career in the manufacturing system, some in the bureaus of taxation
and revenue, some in forestry, or the forestry bureau, and all must
have opportunity to get detailed instruction in the selected specialty.
The traditional professorship of politics in the universities should be
so filled that future ambassadors and ministers could profitably hear
the occupant discuss statesmanship, and so that the doctrines taught
would not seem ridiculous to actual ministers and statesmen. The
professor of chemistry should be of such a character that he would be
prepared to teach Probier- und Schmelzkunst, and should not give his
time merely to the theory of compounding medicines, which any
apothecary’s boy can learn without trouble. Likewise, the teacher of
mechanics should be prepared to explain the machinery of mining
operation and construction, and the professor of natural science
[Naturkunde] should be able to impart adequate knowledge of ores
and of fossils in general. These six professors, to whom we might add
the professor of civil and military engineering [bürger- lichen und
Kriegsbaukunst], if talented, experienced, and expert men were
chosen, would compose a faculty that would be uncommonly salutary
for civic life. It would amount to an oracle which could with great
advantage be called upon in many affairs of state for which it is now
often necessary, at great cost, to procure advisers from foreign
countries.
In respect to instruction in the economic and camcral sciences, there
is first of all needed a Collegium Fundamental, in which all these
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in order that young students may get an insight into the whole, that
they may gain a coherent idea of all contrivances in the great
housekeeping of the state, and may be filled with correct principles
derived from the nature of republics. When they have laid such a
ground they will never be entire strangers in any part of the
housekeeping of the state, although it may be their intention to
emphasize some particular part of civic administration. This will
under all circumstances accrue to their advantage, because all affairs
of state have an inseparable influence upon one another and an
interconnection with one another. This course should properly be
heard by every student, unless he is determined not to become a
member of the civic organization. Should we not get acquainted with
the structure and nature of the civic body in which we live? Should
we not make ourselves acquainted with our obligations toward the
republic, and is there a scholar to be found who does not need at least
the rules of Haushaltungskunst?
The many-colored naïveté of this passage gives it a high value. The cross-lights
upon the state of knowledge in general, though not directly in the line of our inquiry,
are altogether worthy of attention. The observation most immediately pertinent is
that, although Justi’s range of effective vision covered only the operations of a
system of bureaus developed in the service of an obstinately statical type of state, yet
the soul of truth in his contention has gone marching on. We now see that adequate
social science presupposes analysis of all the processes within which government is
a mediate process, until we have a survey of the whole cosmos of human purposes
in the whole complexity of their activities. In other words, we have here an
outcropping of the social logic which had never been generalized in its present form
until the last half-century. The perception that we need to understand the social
activities of which we are factors permits no stopping-place until we have compassed
the whole range of activities within which there are traceable connections of cause
and effect in human lives. Our primary interest with the cameralists, however, is in
tracing the progress from their preoccupation with a mere administrative technology
to an economic theory which would have the same relation to such technology that
the science of physics has to civil engineering.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 255
Justi goes on to say (p. xxxvii) that the first part of his Staatswirthschafl is for use
as a textbook in such a Collegium Fundamentale.
It contains in a coherent system the chief principles of all economic
sciences. First of all the chief theorems of statecraft [Staatskunst
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are presented. Then the police administration is explained, which in
a broad sense includes the science of commerce. These two sciences
occupy the first book. The second book teaches principally the
immediate duties of subjects, in which duties are involved the
grounds of financial science, and then follow the general rules of
management, with the chief theorems of agricultural science.
Justi thinks that this part of the book can be covered in the university in a semester
(p. xxxviii).
This fundamental course taken for granted as an introduction, Justi would proceed
to develop the involved particular sciences. First of these he says is “Oekonomie,”
and the term is thus put in the place of a specific designation under the generic terms
“Staatskunst,” “Staatswirthschaft,” “Haus-haltungskunst,” etc. Justi at once explains
his use of the title “Oekonomie”:
It includes not only the general rules of management [Hans-haltung],
but also the theory of municipal management, and especially of
agricultural management. It is necessary to begin the special sciences
with these two, because they in turn are fundamental in this field (p.
xxxviii).
Again we must make the comment that the apparent validity of this position is
shaken by the fact that the “Oekonomie,” as Justi knew it, was systematized rule-
of-thumb. It was the procedure which had become the routine of the traditional
bureaucratic state. Its foundation was the sand of assumption that this state was the
universal state. “Oekonomie” was thus essentially stereotyped usage, while “political
economy” as proposed by Adam Smith was essentially an inquiry into principles of
economic relationship antecedent to usage, and destined to control usage. We must
admit that usage on a different plane set bounds to Smith’s objective analysis,
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the contrast between the two systems was at bottom this: Justi was formulating usage,
Smith was referring usage to underlying principles. Each procedure had justification
after its kind. Neither procedure has yet come to its full fruition. On each side
criticism has both brought out incompleteness and found approach to correlation with
the opposite procedure.
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Of this first fundamental science of the second order, “Oekonomie,” Justi adds (p.
xxxviii):
It not only affords adequate ideas of the subject-matter concerned in
all these specific sciences, but its theorems are at the same time an
epitome of all the measures which are necessary in the great
management of the state. The great management of the state rests
virtually upon the same rules which other management must
observe.
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In both establishments the ultimate purposes are to acquire “means”
[Vermogen], to assure what has been acquired, and to use reasonably
the goods possessed. The housekeeping of the state is merely of
incomparably greater extent than that of a private person. A student
who wants to learn the economic and cameral sciences thoroughly,
and at the same time wishes to end his studies early, might therefore
hear the Oekonomie while also hearing the Collegium Fundamental,
yet it would always be better if he would begin the more special
courses after completing the more general. The course on Oekonomie
may also easily be completed in a semester.
Next to the economic lectures [continues Justi] should follow in order
the course on police science. This is also the first part of the great
Oekonomie (sic) of the state, since it includes the chief measures
intended to preserve and increase the general means of the republic.
All the methods whereby the riches of the state may be increased, in
so far as the authority of the government is concerned, belong
consequently (sic) under the charge of the police.
272 The science of
police is consequently the more immediate basis for the cameral and
finance sciences proper, and the expert in police science must sow, as
it were, in order that the cameralist in turn may reap. Since thisAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 257
science is very comprehensive, the lectures on it will demand a whole
year, if one treats the subjects involved with the proper thoroughness
and completeness.
Then cameral and financial science proper completes the series. This
is, as it were, the second main division of the great Oekonomie of a
republic, since it deals with the reasonable use of the means of the
state, and the entire internal housekeeping. .... This science also is so
inclusive that it can hardly be covered properly in less than a whole
year.
All these sciences are demanded if one is to attain thorough
knowledge of them, and to become a universal cameralist. But if one
is destined to become only a particular cameralist, one or the other of
these sciences may, if necessary, be dispensed with. For instance, one
who purposes to give his attention chiefly to the commercial system
may omit the Oekonomie and Cameralwissensckaft, and after the
Collegium Fundamentals may turn immediately to police science, etc.
(p. xl).
Another specification shows that Justi’s perceptions were in more than one
direction prophetic. He adds (p. xl):
It is not to be denied that it would be of great advantage if one would
begin this study with a course on the history of the police,
commercial, economic, cameralistic systems. This sort of history,
however, is not yet at all worked out, with the exception of a slight
beginning at Berlin, and there is a special lack of a suitable textbook
for this purpose. Meanwhile, each of the above-scheduled courses
should begin with a brief history of the subject. Thus in the lectures
on police one may introduce a discourse on the police arrangements
of ancient times, and of the rise and fall of countries and cities; in
commercial science one may rehearse the history of shipping and
trade, and similarly in the case of the other sciences.
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in the paragraph in which he begins to discuss the limitations under which instruction
in these sciences must proceed. His first proposition may be rendered in modern
academic jargon, “It is of course impossible to conduct these courses by the
laboratory method” (p. xli). And he continues:
For in these sciences practice would not amount to much if it
consisted in preparing cameral documents or acting as a commission
in cameral affairs. That is perhaps not the hundredth part of the
practical labors in these sciences. In the case of each main division
there are numerous side applications. If one were to give specially
practical lectures, one would be drawn into repetition of exposition
and explanation which would amount to a review of the whole body
of science, and a series of years would not suffice for such a course.
Consequently every course on a special economic science must be
planned in a practical way, especially the courses on police,
commerce, and finance, and so soon as the instruction has reached the
end of a main division the instructor must exhibit pieces of work of
the sort that apply what has been explained. He must require the
students to imitate these samples, and he must pass judgment on them
publicly. This should be the practice at least with the more diligent
students, who have an interest in getting thorough mastery of the
subject. It would be impossible to treat in this way all the exercises
that might be submitted.
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At the close of the Preface (p. xliii) Justi again refers to Gasser and Dithmar, and
expresses the hope that his work will be found superior to theirs. He thinks these
latter are too defective to be used with advantage. Then occurs the phrase, “a new
cameralist,” already noted. Justi says that so far as extent of material is concerned this
writer is measurably complete. “But it would not be in accordance with the truth if
one should attribute to his work an organization firmly based upon the essence of the
subject.”
In the Preface to the second edition, less than three years later than the first, Justi
says that the first edition was exhausted a year and a half before the time of writing.
He betrays a rather innocent idea of the growth of science, when, in apology forAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 259
enlarging Part I, he says that an author ought not to publish a book until he has
reached his limit of ability to treat the subject, so that changes will not be necessary
in later editions. He ought at most to publish additions as appendices, but in separate
sheets, so that the owner of the first edition could use them with it. He conformed to
this requirement in part by making the changes chiefly in the notes (p. iv).
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Before entering upon an analysis of the text of Staats-wirthschaft, mention must be
made of the syllabus which preceded it. The main outline is identical with that of
Siaats-wirthschaft, and the latter evidently incorporated the substance of the lectures
given on the basis of the former. The most notable feature of this outline is the
prompt and definite statement of its fundamental thesis: viz., after declaring (§2) that
the ultimate purpose [Endzweck] of the economic and cameral sciences is the
common happiness [gemeinschaftliche Glückseligkeit], Justi declares (§3):
Hence follows the first and universal principle, namely: all the governmental
activities of a state must be so ordered that, by means of them the happiness of the
state may be promoted.
Our interpretation of this principle must be deferred.
275 In accordance with his
theory, Justi begins Staatswirthschaft with a “short history” of the financial systems
and commerce of all peoples. It occupies twenty-six pages. The status of its
historicity may be inferred from a note on the second page, in which Whiston’s
estimate of the population of the antediluvian world is cited as proof that navigation
must have been practiced during that epoch, because without it a population twenty
times as numerous as that of the modern world could not have been supported!
The character of the historical propositions is seen in the following samples:
The Phoenicians carried on extensive trade both on land and sea; ....
because her finances were not well administered, this powerful
republic in consequence, and also because of party spirit, at last
suffered total destruction; .... there were at the time [of the first
Ptolemies] in Egypt 33,339 flourishing cities (p. 7); .... the Romans,
as the rest of their constitution was wise and excellent, had also a
well- ordered constitution of the financial system (p. 7), etc.
Justi mentions Livy, Josephus, Suetonius, the Capitularies, etc., but not in a way
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furnish evidence of the authorities behind the statements in the text, but add
illustrative or cumulative material backed by nothing but the author’s assertion.
In the sixth section (p. 10) Justi declares:
The Roman commerce declined, just as this realm tended toward its
fall, on account of the bad administration of the emperor; and
although the Roman Empire in the Orient, especially in
Constantinople, in the beginning had a considerable trade, yet this
declined in proportion as the realm was weakened by the Arabians or
Saracens. On the other hand all commerce passed over to these
peoples, especially after they had conquered Egypt.
Then in a note upon this paragraph Justi continues:
Not the division of the Empire, as many writers on history believe,
caused the fall of Rome, for both empires remained after the division
stronger than the most powerful realms. We must seek the true cause
of the fall of both empires in the insecure occupancy of the throne and
in the irregular succession, etc.
These platitudes and generalities are below the standards of a modern “finishing
school.” They are mere space-fillers in a book ostensibly introducing young men to
practical governmental careers. It is hard to believe that they could have been
regarded by their author as more than rhetorical flourishes.
Coming to the period of discovery and colonization, the information vouchsafed
contains this item concerning the English possessions in America:
They possessed there Virginia, Carolina, New England, Scotland (sic)
besides several other lands and islands (p. 17).
The more serious and practical purpose of the book might be inferred, perhaps,
from the points to which Justi calls attention in the case of Germany. He says (p. 24):
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hundred years. Only at the end of the last century were manufactures
to some extent re- established through the Protestant French refugees,
and the former king of Prussia, who was himself a very great
administrator [Haushalter], by good management, increased his
revenues by one-half, and he gave equal attention to manufactures.
The present great and wise Prussian monarch has not only retained
the former management, but by forming great maritime trading
societies he has laid the foundations for sea commerce, etc.
A note to this paragraph declares:
In the Middle Ages, when almost all the revenues of the German
princes were derived from the crown estates, which produced little
enough, as a rule the consort of the prince, or the prince himself, took
charge both of the income and of the expenditure, without the help of
bureau employees. In modem times, and even within 200 years,
questions of justice and finance, neither of which bulked very large,
were dealt with by one and the same body of officials. Landgrave
Philipp of Hesse, as appears from his will, had for all his
administration two dignified officials, each of whom received fifty
florins salary. Elector August of Saxony (1526–86) is, so far as I
know, the first of the German princes to have organized an orderly
cameral system.
So far as a serious scientific or practical purpose may be supposed to have
stimulated this “historical” survey, so far as it is to be regarded as something more
than a mere rhetorical embellishment, there appears to be but one object which it can
have served. It advertised the importance of administrative thrift. It did this not by
analysis of cause and effect which was above the grade of puerility, but merely by
calling attention to the matter-of-fact elements of ways and means which romantic
or speculative or heedless tradition had formed the habit of neglecting. Perhaps the
present state of mind in the United States on the subject of forestry may be cited as
the most instructive parallel. Until very recently it was almost impossible to make
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of forest preservation. It was regarded as a matter that would take care of itself, or if
not, it was no concern of people whose chief interest was in taking care of
themselves. Justi’s public was in a somewhat similar state of mind about national
revenues. Evidently there was a reason for this in the fact that public revenues were
not in the same sense “public” that they are today. They were the revenues of the
prince and of his government. While there had been great changes in the technique
of administration, and while the problems of productiveness of different sources of
revenue had been systematically calculated by the governmental bureaus, it was about
as hard, apparently, to create non-official interest in these subjects, as with us at
present in the subject of forestry. People then said, “It is the prince’s affair; let him
look out for it;” just as we now say, “What has posterity done for us? Let future
generations look out for themselves.” Accordingly, this historical retrospect, utterly
without value as a contribution to knowledge, for it was merely a recital of scrappy
hearsay, was a bit of homiletical practice. It was an appeal to the suggestibility of
hearers, and an attempt to put them into a receptive attitude toward the technological
considerations which were to follow.	"'(
&)*+,
It is now in order to summarize Justi’s epitome of cameral science, not with
reference to its technological details, but especially with a view to the larger scheme
of purposes which these details, and cameralism as a whole, presupposed. In this
résumé much reappears that has been said or implied either by Justi or his
predecessors.
The argument begins with assertion of the necessity of starting the
teaching of any science by laying down fundamental principles (p.
29), as distinguished from the programmes of teaching merely
through examples, or practice, or memory.
The importance of basing a system of teaching on principles is
peculiarly evident in cameralistics (p. 30). The forethought of a wise
government must extend to a thousand sorts of matters which are
most intimately connected with one another. If then one lacks a
general and connected idea of these governmental affairs, one will in
many ways cause injury to the body politic [gemeines Wesen], when
one attempts to be of use.
Again Justi implies, without dogmatically asserting it, that these affairs of state
have never yet been treated in a single book as details growing out of fundamental
principles. His note on this proposition still more clearly reflects the situation as he
saw it. He says (p. 31):
We cannot assert, to be sure, that there has been a lack of books along
these lines. If we consider both home and foreign countries, we may
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which attempts to teach one or more of these sciences on the basis of
their correlations with the whole subject. Even the Compendia are not
exceptions. Usually they treat somewhat of economy and of the royal
revenues. If they are very ample, there will be a few sections about
the police, but in the fragmentary fashion and disorderly arrangement
in which they accidentally occurred to the author. I am by no means
inclined to blame others, and I therefore refrain from mentioning
names. The facts however are open to the eyes of everyone. Without
doubt the reason of it is that, through some ordering of destiny which
I do not understand, philosophical minds have paid no attention to
these sciences which so intimately concern the welfare of social
life.
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We call the sciences dedicated to the government of a state the
economic as well as the cameralistic sciences, or the economic and
cameralistic sciences.
277 Economics or Haushaltungskunst has for its
aim to teach how the means of private persons (sic) are to be
preserved, increased, and reasonably applied. What economics
attempts to do in connection with the goods of private persons, the
governmental sciences aim to do in the case of the total means of the
state. Hence they properly bear the name, the economic sciences.
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We give them the name cameralistic sciences, however, because the
high collegia which the sovereigns have established, to manage the
preservation, expansion, and use of the means of the republic, are
usually called Cammern or Cammercollegia (p. 32).
Our times are so fortunate that almost all rulers are eager to secure for
their states a nourishing trade, and for their subjects all kinds of
subsistence and temporal welfare. I do not venture to say that this
providence always springs from genuine sources, that is, from love
for the subjects and from paternal impulse to make them happy.
Self-love is here and there the chief motive. Yet there is rather
satisfactory consciousness on the part of princes in general that they
cannot be great and powerful if they have a land that is poor and
resourceless. All courts accordingly use language consistent with the
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in order the principles of these governmental sciences, which the
nature of things, truth, and sound reason demand. These principles
must be derived from the ultimate purpose of the state. What then is
a state, and in what does its ultimate purpose consist? (p. 33).
It is evident that Justi is to a certain extent aware that he is proposing ideal
principles rather than those which are actually accepted by the ruling classes. It is not
so plain that he saw the inherent antagonism between contemporary political policies
and abstract principles. He was apparently concerned with generalizations primarily
as a rational basis for existing practice, and only secondarily, if at all, as a leverage
for change of practice. Yet the moment one begins to formulate human society, in
general, or a state, in particular, in accordance with rational categories of whatever
sort, one inevitably initiates a reconstructive impulse. The problems are thereby
presented: Why does not the actuality conform to the theory? and, What is to be
done, either to the actuality or to the theory, in view of the discrepancy?
Justi answers his own question in this way (p. 33):
It is usually asserted that republics have been derived from fear of
incursions. It is more probable that they grew out of the governing
skill of families; that is, the patriarch must necessarily have had a
certain prestige and power over his children and servants, which
descended at his death to his eldest son, until in the course of time it
amounted to a real rulership. We have many evidences that this was
the fact, but of course they do not account for great empires, which
have always been formed by force of arms.
With no further fact or theory or criticism as a basis, Justi proceeds to the following
definition (p. 34):
A republic or state is a unification of a multitude of people under a
supreme power, for the ultimate purpose of their happiness; or we
may say, a republic consists of a multitude of people who are
combined with each other by means of a general interdependence and
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under a superimposed supreme power, to promote their common
happiness. Republics are accordingly distinguished from
Gesellschaften  or  Societaten,  which, to be sure, have a certain best,
and sometimes happiness in general, as their aim, but have never
subordinated themselves to a supreme power. The supreme power in
the state accordingly originates without doubt from the people; a
principle which today is as universally recognized as true as it was
formerly regarded as dangerous by little minds.
Hamlet’s reflection, “What a piece of work is man!” might be parodied from the
opposite point of view, with such generalizations as the foregoing as the point of
departure, With what Pickwickian states of mind do men fool themselves! In a
political society in which government was primarily of, for, and by the sovereign, a
theorist could still suppose he was dealing with realities in basing a technological
system on the presumption that the power of the sovereign is derived from the
people. Perhaps the anomaly is most striking when inverted. Sovereigns could persist
in acting as though they had absolute rights as sovereigns, for generations after men
of thought had discovered that the powers of sovereigns come from the people. The
wonder is not so great as it seems, because the anomaly does not by any means last
so long after the discovery as appearances seem to indicate. It is altogether
improbable, for instance, that to Justi the formula, “The power of sovereigns is
derived from the people,” meant what it means to us. Nor did it have precisely the
psychological sense in which it is a truism. It had rather a vague, dreamy, mixed
sense, made up in part of purely idealized notions of the relation, partly of the
historical hypothesis above expressed. The thought-medium in which this idea was
carried, however, was a strong tincture of superstition about some sort of
foreordained fitness of certain hereditary lines to be the repositories of these powers
over their fellow-men; and accordingly it carried an energetic presumption that the
well-being of these multitudes was to be thought of in terms of the pleasure of the
sovereign, rather than of the wants of the subjects.
Yet Justi seems to be very much in advance of his time when he continues (p. 35):
The ultimate aim of each and every republic is therefore
unquestionably the common happiness. .... It is unnecessary to enlargeAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 267
upon the proposition, therefore, that the subjects do not exist for the
sake of the ruler.
But it was precisely this principle which was to be the bone of contention between
sovereigns and subjects for the next hundred years. The system which Justi was
trying to interpret, and for which he wanted to train recruits, was historically an
assertion of the contrary principle.
As previously in the Grundriss, Justi formulates as “the first and universal principle
of all economic and cameralistic sciences” the following proposition (p. 35):
All the administrative transactions of a state must be so ordered that
by means of them the happiness of the same (i.e., of the state) shall
be promoted.
To what extent we have here a clue to the conflict of ideas in Justi’s mind, and in
the civilization of the time, it would be unsafe to infer with much positiveness. The
confusion is notorious, both in abstract thinking and in the current social practice.
Neither the psychology nor the logic nor the sociology of it is our immediate concern,
beyond mere observation of the fact. We are at present interested in tracing the
development of scientific consciousness out of this situation. Merely as a symptom
of the situation, as a sign of the lack of precision and consistency of view, we may
note that in the previous paragraph Justi had been talking about the well-being of
subjects, as the end for rulers to subserve, or “the common happiness.” In the formula
which he now constructs to embody that idea, the center of attention is the happiness
of the state. No long argument is necessary to show that there was room for endless
incongruity and inconsistency in theory and practice so long as such variable
common denominators were used as “subjects,” “the common happiness,” and “the
happiness of the state.”
In other words, there was not yet a precise and consistent analysis of civic relations.
Conceptions of civic relations were fluid and shifting. As Hegel might have put it:
Experience was only partially self-conscious. Theory was accordingly in many ways
in contradiction with itself and with practice. Both theory and practice were
unsystematically feeling their way toward precision and consistency. Justi bravely
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a universal principle, and to be the source from which all doctrines of the state and
of government may be coherently derived (p. 36).
Then Justi classifies all “republics or forms of government” (sic) into the three
types:
(1) The monarchy or autocracy, in which the power resides in one
alone; (2) the aristocracy, or the government of the better class
[Vornehm]; (3) the democracy, or the rule of the common people.
Then there are mixed forms.
This whole type of analysis, not yet by any means outgrown, makes form of
political structure the decisive matter, and does not press back to the psychological
or even the sociological meaning of the form. Commenting on the analysis, Justi
adds:
It is easy to prove that the monarchical form of government is far
preferable to all others, in consideration of the rapidity with which it
can grasp the means of happiness of a state, and became many
domestic disturbances and discords are thus prevented. It is also
certain that a single good monarch can do more good than free
republics could bring to pass in centuries (p. 38).
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Since the monarchical form of government is taken for granted in this
book, it is necessary to consider the various constructions of the
monarchical form: viz., (1) with reference to succession of rulers; (2)
with reference to unlimited or limited power; (3) with reference to the
connection of realms and territories which belong to a monarchy (pp.
30–43).
The analysis under these heads is of the most elementary and obvious sort, and
dynastic convenience is throughout the principal test of value. Thus Justi says that
there are ample grounds for the conclusion that women are not fit to govern a state;
yet he adds that the same reasons would exclude an incompetent or ignorant man
from the succession. Without saying it directly, he implies that the fixed succession
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In a note he makes a remark which throws light on the preconceptions which lead to
this judgment:
A realm is in its essence nothing but an estate [Landgut], which might fall into the
hands of an alien heir (p. 39).
The discussion is so general in its character that it is a famous object-lesson in the
futility of deciding upon social arrangements by means of academic generalizations.
Whether a monarchy, limited or unlimited, an aristocracy, or a democracy is the best
government, proves to be a question quite co-ordinate with the problem whether a
saw or a hat or a loaf of bread is the best piece of property. There is no universal
“best” in either case. The historical judgment in both cases, that is, the actual
working judgment, the judgment that holds, is the judgment not of types but of
workings. The academic method thus illustrated by Justi must always sooner or later
give way to the pragmatic method best illustrated on a large scale by British history.
At the same time it must be admitted that there was much more pragmatism in fact
than in form in Justi’s theories; and this is almost universally the case with social
philosophers. That is, he dealt with universal propositions, but they were universals
of which particular cases were given in the current problems of German states, and
more than he was aware he was really asking: “Which of the possible alternatives
will work best in this situation?” Questions of checks upon the ruler, of succession
to the throne, of relations between territories politically connected only through a
common ruler, were everyday affairs. The judgments passed upon them, both by
practical and theoretical reasoners, were in this form: So and so works best with us
just now: ergo, so and so is a universal principle. This type of fallacy is long-lived.
In slightly less naive shape it underlies the Smithian political economy. Adam Smith
knew, yet he did not know, that the capitalistic order of society in which he lived was
merely a stage in historical evolution in the same series with community ownership,
and with feudalism. He believed, however, that the social division, landlord,
capitalist, and proletarian, worked well. Hence he canceled the historical factor and
concluded that the stratification, landlord, capitalist, and proletarian, is eternal; and
he proceeded to draw all further conclusions with this premise reckoned as a finality.
The judgments which Justi expresses are defective in a much more elementary way,
because they are based on a presupposition of a much more precarious type. The
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(1) The fixed form of succession is necessary to the happiness of a
state, because otherwise the state can expect nothing but unrest, wars,
and disruption; (2) the territorial possessions, and the freedom of
those classes that are not harmful to the welfare of the state must be
preserved; (3) no new liberties and privileges must be conceded
which interfere with facile control of the means of happiness of a
state (pp. 43, 44); (4) various realms and lands belonging to a
monarch must be combined in a union and a general organization,
because separation hinders the use of the full powers of the state,
prevents complete employment of means of revenue, especially in
commerce, and leads to antipathy and jealousy between the different
territories.
In qualifying this conclusion Justi betrays the opportunism that is really decisive in
all his judgments (p. 46).
Further light falls on the standpoint of the whole system in the elaboration of these
clauses. Thus Justi observes that some states seem to assume as a principle the
opposite of (2), i.e., liberties are suppressed as much as possible. Thereupon he
remarks that “there are weighty considerations making for the conclusion that a
monarch does no wrong in adopting this policy: for usually such liberties are no good
to the state, but are merely for the benefit of individuals.” The two terms, “state” and
“individual,” here brought into comparison, were relatively unanalyzed concepts; and
judgments between them were necessarily rough. The leaning in favor of the state as
contrasted with private persons is, however, plain and characteristic. When Justi puts
into German the familiar Roman epigram in the form: “The happiness of the state is
its highest law,” we must understand him to mean not what a Roman tribune would
mean, nor what an American democrat would mean. He meant: “The successful
carrying-out of the policy which the ruling power in the typical German state sets up
as its aim is the paramount consideration.” It is impossible to determine precisely
how much his frequent partial formulations of more popular standards should modify
this proposition.
The nature of the presuppositions on which Justi’s system rests appears further in
his analysis of the monarchical factor in the state. Thus he begins with the definition
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A monarch or ruler [Regent] is the supreme head of the state, or of the
republic, who possesses the highest power in order that by means of
it he may take care of all the affairs of the community and may apply
efficient means for promoting the common happiness.
These words could of course be fitted out with an utterly democratic meaning. Their
connotations at the time were at best patriarchal, and as a rule the patriarchalism was
of a sort which inverted the personal relations actually concerned. That is, state
policy was incarnated in the ruler, whose success was identified with “the happiness
of the state;” while the individuals subject to the ruler were in the last analysis not
regarded as having any well-being which deserved to weigh against “the happiness
of the state” so conceived. This appears always only in part, in formulas of the royal
character or powers. These theorems are never perfectly clear either way. They
contain elements of contradictory views. They can be interpreted correctly, therefore,
not by mere linguistic rules, but by the light of the conduct in which they were
applied. Such partially ambiguous propositions follow, e.g.:
The chief duty of the monarch consists therefore in guardianship of
the happiness of the subjects.
But in the next sentence the other conception reappears, viz.:
We should form a very erroneous idea of the monarch if we thought
of him as an administrator or superintendent of the supreme power
and of the affairs of the community. In this way we should make of
the monarch merely the servant of the state, and place the republic
over him, so that he could not be distinguished from a Staathalter.
This is the false notion held by the Monarchomachi, from which so
many harmful and dangerous conclusions follow.
In the note to this paragraph, the idea is made still plainer, viz.:
The enemies of the supreme power, and especially of absolutism,
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chief principle the theorem that the whole people is above the ruler,
and hence may either call him to account for acts prejudicial to the
welfare of the community, or may resist him. From such damnable
principles came the unhappy tragedy of the unfortunate Charles I of
England, and from the same cause Henry III came to his death in
France. Nothing is more detestable than these ideas which are
evidently contrary to the nature of a republic and open the doors to all
sorts of uproar and disorder (p. 47).
Here then we are dealing with the familiar fallacy of passing judgments first on
fragments of situations, and then promoting those judgments to the rank of principles
with universal validity. With such beginnings, modern social science is still not too
far along in the juvenile grades of its education.
The supreme power [die hochste Gewalt] is next denned as consisting “in the use
of the total means and powers of the state in order thereby to attain the ultimate end
of the same, viz., its common happiness” (p. 48).
Again we must not take these eighteenth-century words as indicating twentieth-
century ideas. Every shade of meaning has to be challenged, to be sure that the real
thought is detected. The clue to the difference between the earlier and the later
conceptions is in the antithesis between the conception of the monarch and the state,
as incarnations of the community in a sense which left the people in a status of
tributary externality, and on the other hand, the conception of ruler or chief
magistrate as merely the representative and the agent of the state, which is simply a
name for the people in their political relations. If this latter idea were forced into
Justi’s further explanations, they would in a general way command present assent.
But the other idea has to be understood in connection with the words, and they then
describe what actually was in German states at the time, but has to a considerable
extent been revolutionized out of them meanwhile. Thus Justi says (p. 48):
We should limit the supreme power much too narrowly if we should
make it consist merely in laws, ordinances, penalties, etc. To the
means and powers of the state belong not only all sorts of goods, both
fixed and movable, within the boundaries of the country, but also all
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reasonable use of all these things, then, and the prerogative of such
use, is therefore the supreme power.
The judgment passed above on Justi’s generalization of particular utilities into
universal principles, in the case of the monarch, would have to be paralleled if we
went into particulars about his opinion of the relations between the lawgiving, the
judicial, and the executive departments of government (pp. 49–50).
Following these most general observations about the organization of states, Justi
returns to the fundamental proposition which dictates the divisions of his book, viz.:
The business of a ruler falls into two great divisions, to wit: (1) the
preservation and expansion of the means of the state; (2) the wise
application of these means, both in use and in thrift.
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sciences concerned with the government of a state fall into a twofold
division. The first contains statecraft, Policey, and commercial
science, along with economy (Oeconomie), all of which aim either to
preserve or to increase the means of the state. The second comprises
the cameral sciences proper, which teach how to use these means
wisely and in promotion of the happiness of the state.
Since the paramount aim of the state is to preserve and extend its
means [Vermögen], this purpose must be regarded as the chief
responsibility of rulers, and Justi accordingly deduces the following
theorems (p. 53):
1. The monarch must make use of means and measures through which
the resources of the state may be preserved and expanded, and his
subjects may be made happy.
2. The subjects must facilitate these measures by their obedience and
diligence [Fleiss].
From these principles another follows, viz.:
3. The welfare of the ruler and the happiness of the subjects can never
be separated, and the one without the other can never permanently
exist.
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It is true in the same sense in which the familiar classical economic dogma about the
unity of interest between employer and employee is true; and it is false in the same
way that this economic dogma was false. If there were some infallible arbiter of the
interests concerned in either case, the formula might be so construed as to express the
truth. The well-being of subjects is by no means necessarily harmonious with the
well-being of rulers, when the rulers have power to determine both; any more than
the interests of employers and of employees are necessarily one, when the employers
have the power to pronounce upon both.
Justi’s note on Machiavelli at this point is instructive (p. 54). He cannot understand
how his Italian predecessor can possibly have meant some of his doctrines seriously;
and therefore adopts the theory that The Prince was a heavily veiled satire. The more
probable alternative from our present point of view is explanation of Machiavelli and
Justi on precisely the same grounds. Each was a product of his environment, with a
sufficient force of variation to betray innovating impulses that looked toward a
modified environment. Contradiction and inconsistency were in both cases an
inevitable part of the situation.
That Justi mixed much sentiment and idealism with his programme of objective
analysis, may be illustrated by citation of the next paragraph (p. 55) viz.:
From the combined welfare of the ruler and the subjects alone springs
the real strength of a state. This strength consists principally of the
reciprocal trust and love which the wise ruler and the fortunate
subjects of a considerable state have for each other, while they
endeavor with united energies to preserve and extend the resources of
the state. For neither the well-filled treasury and the formidable army
of the ruler, nor a land living in riches and abundance makes this
strength. Such a condition, however happy it appears to be, is by no
means sufficient against all accidents. History is not empty of
examples of the most powerful and flourishing realms which
unexpectedly came to destruction. A monarch has accordingly met
with a great loss if he no longer enjoys the love and confidence of his
subjects.
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to his own tediously repetitious style of exposition. We have already had occasion to
notice two or three variations of his general scheme. We come now to still another
explanation which we may reproduce in brief. Of the sciences to be treated in the first
part of the Staats-wirthschaft, Justi says (pp. 60–62):
The chief purpose of Staatskunst is to assure complete security for the
community, both against external and internal dangers. The
immediate reason for this purpose is that these dangers threaten the
common welfare, and weaken the resources and powers of the state.
Statecraft thus obviously seems to preserve the resources of the state.
Policeywissenschaft  is concerned chiefly with the conduct
[Lebens-wandel] and sustenance [Nahrung] of the subjects, and its
great purpose is to put both in such equilibrium and correlation that
the subjects of the republic will be useful, and in a position easily to
support themselves.
The name “commercial science” is applied to two distinct sciences.
The one teaches the ways and means of conducting commerce, and
the composition of goods with which commerce is carried on. The
other treats of the measures by means of which commercial
enterprises may be established and made to flourish, so that as a result
the sustenance of subjects may be more ample and the resources of
the country may be increased. The latter presupposes knowledge of
the former, so that it is not dependent merely on the reports of traders
themselves, and it (the latter) is peculiarly appropriate for those
persons who are charged with the government of the state.
Accordingly it may be called, in distinction from the first,
civic-commercial-science [Staatscommercien- wissenschaft].
Fundamentally it is a subordinate science of Policey, and it is a
subject which we shall presently discuss. It is evident that this
science, too, ends with extending the resources of the state.
Management [Haushaltungskunst] is particularly devoted to showing
how the resources of private persons may be preserved, increased, and
well used: and since rural thrift is of great importance to the state, this
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special attention to the ways and means of cultivation. The more
thrifty the private persons, the greater and securer the resources of the
state. Again there can be no doubt that the science of management is
tributary to the preservation and extension of the resources of the
state.
Since the co-operation of ruler and subjects is necessary for these
ends, the subject-matter of these sciences involves two chief
considerations, viz.:
1. What means and measures has the ruler to adopt, in order to
preserve and increase the resources of the state, and thus to promote
the happiness of his subjects?
2. What duties have the subjects in order to lighten the
respon-sibilities of the ruler?
The treatment is divided into two books in accordance with this latter subdivision.
As a special introduction to the former of these subjects, civics, or statecraft, on the
side of the ruler, Justi attempts to define the concept “happiness” [Glückseligkeit],
which is the goal of statecraft (pp. 65 ff.). He distinguishes it in the first place from
the philosophical concept, “happiness,” which he describes as “perfection of our
moral condition, and the consequent felicity of the soul.” On the other hand, the
happiness here in question is either the perfection of our external condition, or some
specially advantageous occurrence which could not properly have been expected
from our situation. More definitely expressed, Justi means by the happiness of
subjects in the present connection:
such good arrangement and structure of a state that everyone may
enjoy a reasonable freedom, and by his diligence may be able to attain
those moral and temporal goods which the demands of his social
station make necessary for satisfactory living.
In spite of himself Justi includes much more than material goods in this concept,
yet the moral elements which he inserts in the specifications have to be scrutinized
with great care to distinguish them from the concepts which the same terms now
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indispensably necessary to their happiness,” yet the whole treatise is in principle and
in detail a definition of relations between ruler and subject to which our generation
would deny the predicate “freedom.” We must emphasize our previous observation
that the essence of the situation of which Justi was a symptom must be formulated
as an effort to express, in theory and in practice, the purposes involved in the
situation in terms of the paramount governing factor of the situation. This is a social
solecism. Social logic is a progressive demonstration of the fallacy. The interaction
of the interests represented by these two terms, ruler and subject, or more generally,
social control and individual initiative, is the process actually going on, so far as
these two terms at any moment are active factors of the process. Justi accordingly had
in mind a relatively local, temporary, provisional phase of the social process, and he
virtually attempted to generalize this transient situation as a universal condition, and
to lay down the laws of its equilibrium as laws of universal equilibrium. When we
have pointed this out, we have really closed the rational verdict upon the system, and
upon all others of which it is a type. But we are at work upon something more than
the mere appraisal of a piece of archaic philosophy and technology. Our main interest
in it is as it functions as a term in the evolution of social science in general. With this
purpose in view, we must continue the analysis. We must try to discover how the
fallacies of attributing a static character to the evolving, and a universal validity to
the particular, progressively discredited partial science and forced more valid
representation of reality.
Justi specifies “freedom, assured property, and flourishing industry,” as the three
chief factors on which the happiness of the state and of the subjects depends.
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specifications completely omit the factor which modern democracies have placed at
the head of the list, viz., government of, for, and by the people. The cameralistic
conception of the state was that of a population free to conduct their private affairs
for themselves, but not presuming to have thoughts or actions about public affairs
except as they were dictated by the ruler. This arbitrary distinction between private
and public interests could not withstand the wear and tear of the social process; but
before the artificiality of the distinction was discovered civic life had to struggle on
a long time under the embarrass ment of the provisional absolutistic theory and
practice.
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more must be understood under this head than the condition of the
subjects in which, freed from all violence and fear, they may
peacefully enjoy their goods and pursue their vocations. The state
itself must be in such a condition that, without fear of a stronger
power, it may make use of all means and measures which it finds
necessary for its prosperity and for the happiness of the subjects. The
fact that such danger to the state itself may come from either external
or internal assault, makes it necessary to develop the theory of state
action with reference to each type of contingency. This gives the
classification of the material of this division into two sections.
We come then to the specific teachings of the book. Since Justi is much more
significant as an epitomizer of the whole cameralistic movement than as an original
contributor to the theory, it is necessary for our purpose to present the most complete
survey possible of his principal doctrines. We have therefore compressed the most
important sections in the volume into a series of brief propositions, viz.:
1. A republic enjoys external security when it is fortified against
conquest and even against the excessive power of a neighboring state
(p. 72).
2. Interest is the moving spring of all actions of states, and when two
peoples insist on their irreconcilable interests war is the consequence
(p. 72).
3. Hence two things are necessary: first, discreet conduct toward other
free powers; and, second, a sufficient army (p. 73).
4. Discreet conduct toward other states involves: first, knowledge of
all other European states; second, adequate knowledge of the home
state, its physical and personal make-up (p. 74).
5. A state must perfectly understand the nature of its relations to other
states, the previous history of those relations, etc. (p. 76).
6. The so-called “balance of power” in Europe is an academic
invention. If there were such a system no one would have less cause
to conform to it than the house of Austria (p. 77).
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duties toward other states (p. 78).
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8. A state must seek to discover the movements and intentions of
other states (p. 79).
9. For the foregoing purpose the most able and discreet men must be
selected as ambassadors (p. 80).
10. But no pains must be spared to get the necessary imforma-tion by
secret means (p. 81).
11. No state should invent schemes for the disadvantage of others
which would be disgraceful if discovered (p. 81).
12. When a state discovers such secret machinations, it often
performs a good service by informing the court of the country in
whose interest the plans are made, that the plot is known. This usually
leads to abandonment of the scheme (p. 82).
13. When the plan is abhorrent to natural and international law, or to
fidelity and faith, it may be made known at other courts (p. 82).
14. Discretion demands that the blame be put on the ministers, not on
the sovereign (p. 82).
15. A state must be particularly on its guard against another state in
which such a plot has been discovered, even though it was dropped.
The same animus is likely to hatch another (p. 82).
16. Measures for the foregoing purpose consist usually in
advantageous alliances, which are of two sorts, offensive and
defensive, each of which requires its own sort of consideration (p.
83).
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17. Allies against a hostile power must be sought among those whose
interests and policies are identical with ours (p. 86).
18. Guarantees, and other treaties, by which free powers promise aid
in stipulated cases, are also means of security for a state (p. 89).
19. Another protection against outbreak or extension of war, is the
treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of a given territory (p. 87).
20. Frequently some European power, under a particularly energetic
prince, threatens to subordinate the rest of Europe. Then a wise
monarch is both privileged and bound to adopt means to keep such a
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21. Such measures vary according to circumstances, but they must not
include treachery (pp. 88–90).
22. Discreet conduct toward the other free powers is not a guarantee
of external security, but other means of defense will be required (p.
92).
23. The chief of these is an adequate army (p. 92).
24. Recruits from the inhabitants of the state are preferable to foreign
mercenaries (p. 93).
25. The army must be in constant readiness for war (p. 95).
26. There are three ways to make an army brave and invincible: (1)
By honors and rewards, together with appeals to love of country, after
the example of the Romans; (2) by granting license to plunder and
ravish, as in the case of Tamerlain, Attila, etc.; (3) by maintaining
discipline through fear of punishment. The third only is to be
recommended (p. 97).
27. In a well-ordered state the military budget must take precedence
of everything else (p. 98).
28. The monarch should be commander-in-chief of the army (p. 99).
29. Fortifications are another means of security (p. 100).
30. Maritime nations also require a fleet (p. 101).
31. Incidental to these latter, various munitions of war must be
collected (p. 102).
32. Resort must be had in extremes to troops furnished by allies, and
to mercenaries (p. 103).
33. It is most advantageous when the allies make separate invasions
of the enemy’s territory (p. 104).
34. It is a question whether subsidizing revolt in an enemy’s territory
is a permissible means of security (p. 105).
35. It is permissible to destroy an enemy’s trade and commerce (p.
106).
36. Non-permissible means of defense are: assassination of the hostile
monarch or his ministers; bribed incendiarism, murder, or similar
treacherous violence; poisoned weapons; violation of truce.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 281
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37. The domestic security of a state consists in such a well-ordered
constitution of the same that all parts of the civic body are held in
their appropriate correlation, and in the consequent repose, while the
persons and property of individuals are protected against all injustice
and violence (p. 108).
38. For the above purpose each class in the state must be required to
keep its appropriate place (p. 108).
39. The relation which subjects must observe toward the state, as well
as toward each other, is based on a moral foundation. A wise
government therefore will have a care for the religious faith which the
people profess (p. 109).
40. The state must care for the administration of justice (p. no).
41. The state must protect the subjects against frauds and violence (p.
111).
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42. No one should be permitted to gain so much power and wealth
that he might be dangerous to the state or to his fellow-citizens (p.
112).
43. The ruler has nothing to fear from the wealth of his subjects if it
is not too unequally distributed (p. 113).
44. The ruler must first of all give his attention to securing the best
talent for the high offices of state and of the army (p. 114).
45. No officer should be allowed to gain enough power to be
dangerous to the state (p. 114).
46. Hence no officer should be intrusted with lettres de cachet (p.
114).
47. Offices should not be hereditary (p. 114).
48. Neither at court nor in the state should there be different parties
(p. 115).
49. No special class, family, or single person should be allowed to
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be safe (p. 116).
50. No one should be permitted to possess fortifications or maintain
an armed force (p. 116).
51. Subjects should not be allowed to attach themselves to foreign
powers (p. 116).
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52. No privileges should be permitted to subjects which are harmful
either to the state or to other subjects (p. 117).
53. No class should be permitted to monopolize the riches of the
country (p. 119).
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54. The ruler must not disregard the feelings of the subjects toward
himself or his ministers (p. 120).
55. The ruler must use all the wisdom possible in governing his
conduct in case disorders arise (p. 121).
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56. The moral condition of the subjects must be such as will accord
with the welfare of the state (Wohlfahrt des Staats), and promote
internal security (p. 122).
57. The ruler must not allow his own religious opinions to be the sole
criterion of the goodness or badness of the religion of his subjects;
but he must always treat that religion as true which has been
introduced by the fundamental principles and constitutions of the
state or by the treaties of his predecessors (p. 123).
58. The regent must nevertheless attempt to establish unity of faith
among his subjects (p. 124).
59. On the other hand the welfare of the state must be preferred to
unity of faith (p. 124).
60. The ruler must prevent the introduction of opinions about religion
which are blasphemous and disgraceful, and which tend to demoralize
the character of the subjects (p. 125).
61. For the forgoing reason, a censorship of books must be
established (p. 126).
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62. The ruler must try to stimulate the intelligence of his subjects (p.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 283
128).
63. The ruler should use the thousand means which are at his disposal
to put premiums on personal virtues of all kinds (p. 128).
64. Yet the ruler must not go so far as to pry into the family life of
unsuspected persons (p. 130).
65. The ruler must not deny the subjects innocent pleasures
(p. 131)
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66. The supreme power must adjust strife between subjects over
property, pursuits, and transactions, and the decision must rest on the
constitution of the republic and on the principles of morals (p. 132).
67. The administration of justice is to be distinguished from the
science of law. It belongs partly to statecraft, partly to Policey (p.
132).
68. The laws must correspond with the condition of the community,
with the character of the various groupings of the subjects, and with
the particular purposes which a wise government proposes (p. 133).
69. The laws must be plain and intelligible (p. 134).
70. The laws must be brief and simple (p. 135).
71. Good laws will be in vain unless the government selects men of
high character for judges (p. 137).
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72. Even then the judges cannot be trusted without careful
supervision (p. 138).
73. Before all things the administration of justice must be
non-partisan (p. 139).
74. The judicial procedure must be prompt and brief (p. 139).
75. It would promote justice if the costs of court procedure should be
defrayed by the state and not by the litigants (p. 140).
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76. Domestic security demands that the persons and goods of subjects
shall be safe (p. 141).
77. This safety must be assured both against domestic and foreignAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 284
violence or fraud (p. 142).
78. Nations frequently regard the traders of another nation as
legitimate booty (p. 142).
79. Nations sometimes kidnap, the subjects of other nations for
soldiers (p. 143).
80. Nations sometimes encourage special sorts of lotteries, or other
fraudulent schemes for obtaining the property of the subjects of other
nations (p. 144).
81. The worst sort of domestic violence is nocturnal robbery and
murder, whether on country roads, the streets of cities, or in private
houses (p. 145).
82. If we seek the sources of these evils, they are to be found chiefly
in the defective education of youth, and in the consequent excesses of
adults, the scarcity of food in the country, or the defective impulse to
perform remunerative work, the oppression of the land under heavy
taxation and other wrongs of government (p. 145).
83. A wise ruler would not have much difficulty in adopting measures
which would remove these conditions (p. 146).
84. Meanwhile the minor civic officials must be required to keep
sharp watch of criminals (p. 146).
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85. Frequent visitations of roads, forests, and suspicious houses, and
the use of the militia on country roads and at night in the streets of
towns, are advisable. Also the closing of public houses at an
appointed time, and sharp watch of them after that hour, while the
watchmen themselves must be subject to the severest punishments,
if they take bribes to allow criminals to escape (p. 147).
86. Thieves are on the whole more dangerous to security than robbers
and murderers, and must consequently be zealously traced and
punished (p. 147).
87. Vagabonds of all sorts must be driven from the country (p. 148).
88. Watch must be kept at the boundaries against such classes, and
householders must he required to report the names and circumstances
of the people who lodge with them (p. 149).
89. It is a question whether a wise government should tolerate Jews.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 285
They surely cause much harm by their usury and sharp practices. Yet
it is also a question whether they have not been forced to these and
even criminal practices by the policies of governments toward them.
Probably if they were admitted to all means of gaining a livelihood
they would be as useful to a land as other subjects (p. 150).
90. A wise government must finally punish with severity all other
kinds of violence, such as duelling, outbreaks of apprentices, and all
ways of taking private steps to supplant the law in meting out justice
(p. 151).
91. To prevent these evils, the law itself must efficiently treat the
conditions which they are intended to correct (p. 151).
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92. Besides security, sufficient wealth is necessary to the happiness
of a state (p. 152).
93. By the wealth of a country we understand a sufficient supply of
goods to satisfy the needs and conveniences of life, and by means of
which the subjects by diligence and labor may find adequate
sustenance (p. 152).
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94. Such being the nature of wealth, if a land yielded an abundance
of such useful things, and had no trade relations with other lands, we
might call it rich, even though it contained no trace of gold and silver
(p. 152).
95. Because of international transactions we need a ware [Waare]
which is rare, to which all peoples assign equal value, which is
durable and easily carried, to be used as a universal means of payment
(p. 153).
96. Gold and silver possess these qualifications. Consequently a land
cannot be regarded as rich today unless it possesses a sufficient
supply (genugsame Menge) of these metals (p. 153).
97. Token currency is in no proper sense an addition to national
wealth, although it may be a means of increasing wealth (p. 154).
98. If a ruler could circulate token currency at will, he could gradually
absorb the whole national wealth (p. 155).Albion Small, The Cameralists, 286
99. Such currency ought not to be used unless a definite term is fixed
for its redemption (p. 155).
100. We must distinguish (a) the wealth of the ruler; (b) the wealth of
private persons; (c) the wealth of the land (p. 155).
101. Gold, silver, and costly ornaments stored in the treasure-chests
of the monarch are of no use to the country and would not alone tend
to remove the land from poverty (p. 155).
102. The same is the case if there are many rich persons in a country
who either hoard their wealth, or keep it in foreign banks (p. 155).
103. The true conception of national wealth then is that it consists of
an adequate supply of money, distributed among the subjects,
employed in gainful pursuits, and constantly passing from one hand
to another (p. 156).
104. In order that the people may be able by labor and diligence not
only to support themselves but to supply the needs of the state, the
ruler must see (a) that all measures are taken which secure the
necessary means of increasing wealth; (b) that all necessary means are
used to insure the constant employment of this wealth in gainful
ways, and the circulation of it from hand to hand (p. 156).
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105. A state cannot increase its wealth without guarding what it
already possesses. The first rule of a wise government therefore
should be to prevent by all possible means the unnecessary removal
of money from the country (p. 157).
106. This involves stopping, by the court, of purchases of foreign
goods and discouragement of customs which tend to take the money
of private persons out of the country (p. 157)
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107. The second fundamental rule of a wise government must be that
there should be constant effort to increase the wealth of the state, for
a land cannot be too rich (p. 158).
108. On the other hand riches must not be increased at the cost of
oppressing other peoples, for such means of obtaining wealth
demoralize those who so obtain it. The chief cause of the fall of theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 287
Persian and Roman monarchies is to be found in their disregard of
this principle (p. 158).
109. There are three chief ways of increasing the wealth of a land: (1)
the increase of population; (2) foreign commerce; (3) mining.
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110. Increase of the population increases the means of a country both
because the newcomers bring goods into the country, and because
they stimulate circulation of money (p. 160).
111. It is thus certain that large population makes a state prosperous
provided its constitution is beneficent.
292 The talents of the persons in
the republic, indeed the persons themselves, are among the resources
of the state. The larger the number of people living in the country
therefore, the greater will be the means and power of the republic.
Hence the duty of the ruler to promote increase of population (p.
160).
112. It is often asked whether a population cannot become too great,
so that some will obstruct the happiness of the rest. Nothing is so
unfounded as this objection. Given flourishing commerce,
manufactures, and trades, with well-administered police and
government in general, and there is no good reason why the
population should stop at any particular point. Holland and China are
evidence to this effect (p. 161).
113. There is no reason to fear that population could overtax the food
supply. Europe could feed six times its present population (p. 162).
114. If we had wise police and economic administration, there would
be no need of allowing emigration to America (p. 163).
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115. To encourage increase of population the government in the first
place must be beneficent and mild (p. 164).
116. As a particular under this generalization, reasonable freedom
must be permitted to the subjects (p. 165).
117. The growth of population is scarcely possible unless the ruler
permits complete freedom of conscience (p. 165).
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freedom of religious liberty. The latter is to be granted only under
approved conditions. The former, consisting of rights of belief and
household worship, should be allowed in so far as it is not harmful to
the state (p. 165).
119. A wise ruler will not leave the food supply and employment of
subjects to take care of themselves, but will see that they are
systematically made abundant (p. 167).
120. Still further, the government must encourage the immigration of
rich and talented people of all kinds, and may resort to titles, honors,
positions, and privileges as premiums to them (p. 168).
121. So far as possible, the government should relieve newcomers
who wish to build, of the taxes, building-permit fees, etc. (p. 168).
122. Special encouragement must be given to skilled foreigners who
wish to introduce into the country desirable industries (p. 169).
123. The ruler should see that the laws are favorable to the marriage
relation (p. 170).
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124. A wise Catholic ruler will try to limit the growth of the clerical
orders, for they arc largely responsible for the unfavorable contrast in
population between Catholic and Protestant countries (p. 173).
125. A wise ruler will consider seriously the point of view of
population, before entering into war. He will especially encourage all
means of diminishing sickness and of preventing plague (p. 173).
126. A wise government will check drunkenness and other
demoralizing vices (p. 173).
127. The art of medicine must be brought to the highest efficiency
(p. 174).
128. Surgery, midwifery, and pharmacy must for the same reason be
encouraged and regulated by the government (p. 175).
129. Provision must be made for assuring purity of foods (p. 175).
130. The cleanliness of cities must be assured, and this requires
attention to the building regulations (p. 176).
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131. Commerce is transactions in means of sustenance in which theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 289
goods and wares are exchanged with advantage either against gold
and silver, or against other wares, and by this process the needs and
conveniences of human life are satisfied. This explanation includes
everything which belongs to the nature of commerce and to
comprehension of it (p. 177).
132. Only foreign commerce can increase the wealth of a land (p.
1?8).
133. The first principle of commerce must be that more gold and
silver shall be brought in than carried out by it (p. 178).
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134. The first distinction to be made is between goods produced at
home and those obtained from abroad (p. 179).
135. When commerce is carried on with domestic wares, the wealth
of the land always gains something by it, but this kind of commerce
may nevertheless be very disadvantageous to the state; for if the
wares are carried from the country in the raw and untrans-formed
condition, or are drawn from foreign nations, the land loses
considerably from the earnings and support of subjects which might
have been enjoyed from the same (p. 180).
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136. When commerce is conducted with foreign wares alone, this is
either because these wares are to be consumed at home, or because
they are to be traded, with profit, to other nations. The first sort of
commerce is wholly harmful to a country; for although the special
traders, certain commercial cities, and the tariff and excise accounts
of the ruler may temporarily profit, the land as a whole cannot gain
anything by such trade. On the contrary, if it has no other sources of
wealth, it must gradually lose all its gold and silver, and this harmful
trade must at last stop from lack of means of payment (p. 180).
137. The second sort of foreign trade is incomparably more profitable
for the state (p. 181).
138. There is a great difference in goods with respect to the source,
or the lands from which they are derived. The trader must know all
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from the first, second, or third hand, and where they can with profit
be sold. The cameralist, however, must know them so far that he can
judge what sorts are most advantageous for the entire system of
commerce, and for domestic manufacture, or with which kinds the
land may most easily carry on profitable trade (p. 182).
139. Another difference in wares springs from their essential nature
and composition. That is, they may be rough or fine, useful or useless,
superfluous or necessary, genuine or spurious, fresh or spoiled, etc.
Of all these differences, a trader must be fully informed. A civic
official in the commercial department must also be somewhat
intelligent about these things, in order to promote the transportation
of the wares, and properly to assess the duties and excises (p. 182).
140. There are also differences with respect to their external and
accidental condition; i.e., packed or unpacked: to be counted,
weighed, or measured; salable or unsalable and contraband—the
latter only temporarily and in time of war forbidden. Both merchants
and cameralists need to be informed about these details (p. 183).
141. These various sorts of goods occasion many sorts of trade; e.g.,
the customary classification is: (1) Cloth; (2) Silk; (3) Spices; (4)
Groceries [Materialien]; (5) Hides and furs [Rauck- und
Pelz-handel]; (6) Gold, silver, or jewels; (7) Books. This however is
merely an approximate classification, for there may be as many sorts
of trade as there are separate sorts of wares. Indeed it is advisable for
a trader not to deal in too many wares. If he dares to confine himself
to a single one he can more effectively master the conditions of that
trade. Small traders who have to look out merely for cost and sale
may carry a miscellaneous stock (p. 183).
142. Trade comprises two chief types of transactions: (a) obtaining
the wares; (b) marketing them (p. 184).
143. All domestic goods come either from cultivating the earth, or
from stock- breeding, or from industries [Gewerben]. As to
agriculture, a wise merchant will either himself engage in it, or by
advancing loans, storage, and favorable contracts will seek to get the
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cash payments, by courteous conduct and minor attentions [eine
kleine Ergötzlichkeit], get the good-will of the shepherds and other
country folk who have such things for sale. The wares, however,
which come from the trades, are procured best through the
establishment of manufactures and factories. Sometimes advances to
the manufacturers and hand-workers will secure the goods. A wise
government, on the other hand, will always see to it that all these
domestic wares are supplied at the required quality and price, in order
that the favorable balance in other countries may be retained (p. 184).
144. As to obtaining foreign wares, they come either by wagon or by
boat from neighboring lands, and in such cases the factors involved
are essentially those just named; or they are brought from long
distances across seas. For that purpose the merchant must either have
ships of his own, if commerce is free to all, or he must buy shares in
trading associations, or in the great auctions he must provide himself
with the needed wares (p. 185).
145. By “shares” [Actien] we understand those participating parts
which a great privileged trading society at its organization sells at a
fixed price, in order thereby to bring in the sums which must be used
in the trade of the society. These shares, which thereafter may be
resold, rise or fall in price, according to the success of the society (p.
185).
146. Since seafaring is beset with many dangers, a wise merchant will
never risk his whole resources, or a large portion of them, at one time
upon the waves. Consequently it is not only customary for many
merchants to join in fitting out ships, but many forms of contract have
been invented, such as shares in ships, insurance, etc. The most
important of these is insurance; that is, another party undertakes to
assure the cargo of a ship for a payment of 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, or more
per hundred, according to the degree of danger to be feared, and in
case of loss to make it good (p. 186).
147. The second chief type of transaction, sale, depends principally
upon good correspondents, who protect the merchant by giving him
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affect his trade. A good merchant must be able to distinguish between
a correspondent who can be relied upon to serve his employer’s
interests and one who is seeking chiefly his own advantages. The
bourse, a house where in great trading centers the merchants daily
meet to transact business, is very prolific of such reports, but they
cannot be regarded with much confidence (p. 187).
148. Actual sale is of various kinds: e.g., for cash payment, on credit,
on instalments, on exchange, on venture, or on speculation [a
I’aventure ou en I’air], or by means of commission merchants,
factors, fairs [Messen] or similar devices. A merchant must be well
instructed about these different sorts of trade, together with the cost
of transportation, tariffs, probable dangers, and the prices to be
expected, in order that by weighing these items over against one
another he may be reasonably assured of profits. He must also assure
himself about the reliability of the persons intrusted with the
transportation, also concerning the warehouses and other
circumstances of the towns and roads through which the goods must
pass (p. 186).
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149. To keep all these things straight, bookkeeping is necessary. It is
customary to use the following books: The inventory book; the
manual, or memorial, or chief book; the journal; the debt book; the
credit book; the treasury book; the secret book; the stock book; the
expense book. All of these must be kept in the greatest order, and
they must exactly correspond with one another. For this reason, in
large concerns a special bookkeeper is appointed (!) (p. 188).
150. The ultimate purpose of all these transactions is, on the side of
the republic, to export goods produced in the country, and not needed,
and therefrom to gain increase of wealth, as well as to provide the
land with all those goods which are required for the needs and
convenience of human life. On the side of the merchant, however,
gain is the single purpose of all his endeavor. In view of the service
which he renders to the state, of the danger which he incurs, and of
the labors which he undertakes, we should not begrudge his gains.
They consist in the increase of his goods and of his means. TheAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 293
amount of his goods depends entirely on the value which they have
in terms of gold and silver. Consequently the single aim of the
merchant is to increase, his resources in gold and silver, or in goods
which in comparison with these metals have a great value (p. 188).
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151. Gold and silver is also in fact the ground (sic) of all commerce
298
carried on in the world or at least among civilized or somewhat
intelligent peoples (p. 189).
152. Because merchants have constant occasion to transfer gold and
silver to one another, a large number of devices have been invented
to serve their purposes. Thus the important exchanges, and the system
of bank credits, whereby gold and silver are transferred only in
imagination, yet with the same advantage to the merchant as though
the metals were actually delivered. The essence of the matter is that
one gives to a third party notice that the sum due can be drawn at a
certain place. This simple and natural way of payment is then by the
laws, by the different moneys, and other circumstances, surrounded
with a multitude of formalities and special details, which today
compose a considerable part of the science of commerce, not only for
the merchant, but also for the cameralist (p. 189).
153. A bank is a public institution of the state in which merchants and
other private persons may at will securely deposit sums of money, in
such a way that they may withdraw the same any hour, or may use
their deposits for payment to other persons by means of the
bank-credit system. Banks of this sort are called deposit [Giro] or
exchange banks, in distinction from loan banks (p. 190).
153A. It must be repeated that not money, but gold and silver, is the
chief price and the universal means of payment for all goods. Money,
so far as foreigners are concerned with it, is in fact itself nothing but
a ware worth just what the gold and silver in it will bring (p. 191).
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154. Those rulers who coin depreciated money miss their calculation
in expecting to gain by it. Foreigners will take it only at its true value,
and even something less. The bad money therefore returns to the land
that coins it. It is paid back by the subjects into the treasury of the
ruler, and he deceives himself if he supposes he has in the treasuryAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 294
more than the actual gold and silver. This flattering idea disappears
as soon as the attempt is made to purchase abroad. Meanwhile the
subjects who have received the money from the ruler at the imaginary
value, and who must make foreign purchases, suffer (p. 191).
155. The persons engaged in trade are either principals, subordinates,
or auxiliaries. The duties of each of these classes must be treated in
the special textbook on commercial science (p. 192).
156. The fundamental principles of merchants must be distinguished
from the measures and purposes of the government. While the
merchant aims only at gain, and is not always concerned whether his
gain corresponds with the advantage of the state, a wise government,
on the contrary, must give the chief attention to this latter
consideration. Hence the merchants may be much dissatisfied with
the regulations of trade. Domestic manufacture and trade are far less
inviting to them on this account than the welfare of the state demands.
It is not to be assumed, however, that the advantage of the whole state
is incompatible with the prosperity of the merchants. The former may,
however, require that the advantages enjoyed by the latter shall be
less than at some other periods. Even in this case the merchants may
offset the restrictions by interesting themselves in promoting mining,
manufactures, etc. (p. 194).
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157. No European country is entirely without foreign commerce, but
some of it is very harmful, and cannot continue without adequate
increase of wealth from other sources (p. 195).
158. The establishment of commerce presupposes that it will obtain
a condition which promises permanence with advantage to the state
(p. 195).
159. The founding of commerce is not a mere matter of appointing
and encouraging fairs and markets (p. 195).
160. If at these markets more foreign than domestic goods are sold,
then they are only a great vortex from which more gold flows out than
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it consequently holds on to its advantage as long as possible, in spite
of the general poverty of the country (p. 196).
161. Prohibition of the exportation of money does not secure
profitable commerce. In the first place it cannot be effective, in the
second place it would deprive the subjects of many things which their
present standard of life requires, and in the third place it could
accomplish nothing of itself in the direction of establishing commerce
(p. 196).
162. The first principle of advantageous commerce with foreign
nations is, that more gold and silver shall come into the country as a
result than goes out, and on this principle must all measures for
establishing useful commerce be founded (p. 198).
163. Since commerce must be carried on either with domestic or
foreign goods, and since the mere importation of foreign goods
cannot possibly constitute an advantageous trade, there follows
naturally another principle, viz.: The value of the domestic products
exported must exceed the value of foreign wares imported. The
inferences from these two principles will give us all the measures
necessary for the establishment of commerce (p. 198).
164. The excess value of exports over imports can be secured in only
two ways: first, the quantity of imported foreign wares must be
diminished; or, second, the gaining and exportation of domestic
products must be increased (p. 198).
165. In fact these two methods must be combined in order to assure
the result (p. 199).
166. For this purpose a wise ruler must inform himself precisely
about the exported and imported wares and their aggregate values.
These facts must be exhibited in tables drawn from the tariff and
excise registers, so that they can be reviewed at a glance. For greater
exactness the contents of the tariff and excise registers may be
tabulated separately and compared with each other. To be still more
certain, all merchants, artists, manufacturers, and artisans may be
required to report what kinds of wares they imported during the
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three processes together the facts may be somewhat exactly
ascertained (p. 199).
167. We call this casting the general trade balance. The special trade
balance is a similar showing of the imports and exports between the
home and a specified foreign country. A wise government will every
year keep both accounts (p. 200).
168. A wise ruler or his ministers will study these tables to discover
whether among the imports there are any which could be produced at
home, and thereupon it must be made a fixed rule that nothing which
can be produced at home shall be imported. The necessary measures
must then be adopted to promote production of those wares (p. 200).
169. In this connection all kinds of textiles call for attention, since
they are for clothing and are accordingly necessaries of life. Every
land either has materials for these, or can easily get them.
Silk-weaving is also possible in northern countries. Wool may be
grown everywhere, and the fine wool to be mixed with it may be had
through trade, as the English importation of Spanish wool. Hence
such manufacture ought not to be omitted (p. 201).
170. Yet foreign trade in such fabrics is not to be expected. Our
neighbors, England, Holland, France, and Wales, have already too
long start of us. But it will be advantage enough if we check the
import of foreign textiles (p. 201).
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171. The only variation from the last conclusion is in case we can
invent such improvement in the fabrics, that we can make foreigners
our debtors (p. 202).
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172. The same principle holds in the case of every sort of ware which
might be produced at home. As everything cannot be done at once,
beginnings should be made in the case of those wares which are most
used at home, and for which the largest sums are now sent abroad (p.
203).
173. A second rule must be kept in mind along with the first, viz.,
preference should be given to those industries which would employ
and support the most men (p. 203).
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industries for which the raw materials arc produced at home (p. 204).
175. On the other hand, those industries must be stimulated which
will produce goods that foreign nations need (p. 204).
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176. In order to exploit these resources it is necessary for the
government to rouse a commercial spirit among the subjects.
303
177. No monopolies in such domestic products, and no similar
privileges should be granted (p. 209).
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178. Assuming such measures for promoting domestic production, a
wise government must give its attention to measures for inducing
foreigners to take the wares. Two factors must be assured: (1) The
wares must have the desired quality; (2) the price must be
satisfactory. It may be added that the beauty of the wares is also a
factor (p. 211).
179. In order to insure the quality of wares, the government must not
merely promulgate certain ordinances and rules, but it must also
appoint certain inspectors who will examine the completed wares,
and will mark with a distinguishing sign those which conform to the
standards and those which do not. In case, as is certainly advisable,
complete freedom from tax shall be permitted to exports, this
immunity should extend to those wares only which satisfy this test (p.
212).
180. It is also often necessary to stimulate production by certain
prizes and rewards, and when the court learns that science or skill is
lacking for the production of certain wares, every effort must be made
to attract people with the necessary qualifications, or by the necessary
money payment to get the lacking information from a foreign artist,
since everything may be had for money (p. 212).
305
181. If the wares are to be supplied at a favorable price, not only must
the articles requisite for supplying the necessities of life be
purchasable at moderate prices, for on this depends the amount of the
wages of the laborers, but the raw material of the wares must also not
be dear. The ruler must accordingly take all possible care that not
only agriculture but all the industries that supply the neccessities of
life shall be in good order, so that no scarcity shall occur, as oneAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 298
industry always sustains another. Before all things, however, those
crafts which deal with the necessities of life must be held under strict
supervision, in order that they may not raise prices by charging
excessive profits, or by buying up the supply, and other underhanded
means (p. 214).
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182. When so much has been done for stimulation of domestic
production, it is time to establish fairs and great markets (p. 214).
183. But flourishing commerce must be described as something more
than enough to sustain fairs and markets established under the
foregoing conditions. The expression is properly used only when
flourishing trade in all sort of wares is carried on with all parts of the
world. This is hardly to be thought of unless it is in connection with
extensive merchant marine and foreign trade
(p. 215).
184. Assuming that the land borders on the sea and has good harbors,
or at least the possibility of making them, or is crossed by a navigable
river which is at the command of the country to its mouth, the
beginnings of sea-trade may be made by the formation of a great
trading society, which can collect the guarantee or the capital for its
transactions by the sale of a certain number of shares (p. 216).
185. In order to induce both natives and foreigners to take shares,
either very great privileges must be granted to the society, or the bad
condition and management of foreign companies must furnish the
necessary stimulus, or the court must offer the company material
support.
186. The success of such a company depends principally upon I good
management of its affairs. The court must consequently do; its best
to insure the election of directors whose insight, talent, diligence, and
integrity are grounds for confidence; and the minister of commerce
and marine, who should possess all these qualities in the highest
degree, must know how to lead these directors in accord-: ance with
his purposes (p. 217).
187. Such a company must be guarded against dangerous enterprises
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the company, but it will be much harder for the state afterward to
bring about the formation of a new company (p. 217).
188. The power and prestige of the monarch go far toward the success
of such a company. Other nations that carry on foreign trade look
with jealous eyes on such a company, and try in every way to put
obstacles before it. The power of the monarch, however, restrains
them within such limits, that they cannot openly antagonize it (p.
217).
189. It is proper that possession of a certain number of shares should
be a condition of sitting and voting in the meetings of such a
company. It is not so certain that a similar condition should hedge
election of directors, because it is not at all certain that wealth enough
to own shares is combined with the necessary qualifications for such
an office (p. 218).
190. It is a prime condition of success that such companies start with
sufficient capital for large operations (p. 218).
191. It must be insisted that the predominant effort of such companies
should be to sell domestic goods in foreign lands. If they only bring
in goods directly from foreign lands which have previously been
bought from middle-men, a saving of middle-men’s profits and of
transportation charges of foreign ships is made, to be sure; but
nevertheless the money to defray the first cost of the goods goes out
of the country (p. 219).
192. Such a trading society must not count on founding
establishments in distant lands at once, but must plan to gain them
gradually; i.e., not until they can pay good dividends to the
shareholders, and until there is a comfortable capital in reserve, so
that the cost of foreign establishments may be covered out of the
reserve without diminishing the dividends (p. 221). Such gains take
large fractions of the capital; societies formed by other countries, and
already operating there, conduct minor warfare with competitors, and
the monarchs cannot regard their quarrels as sufficient grounds for
actual war. If one such society is ruined under these conditions, it is
all the harder for subsequent ones to succeed (p. 219).
307Albion Small, The Cameralists, 300
193. When the trade of such a commercial company becomes
flourishing it is possible to organize other companies to operate in the
same territory in particular lines of goods. It is preferable, however,
to sell more shares and expand the operations of a single company.
This prevents harmful jealousies, cross-purposes, and manifold loss
of advantage by the home company (p. 223).
194. After all, such companies are not absolutely essential to the
promotion of foreign commerce. Even if they have been used to
establish trade, the time may come when expansion of trade will be
best assured by opening it freely to all mariners and merchants (p.
233).
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195. First of all we must name among the conditions of promoting
commerce, a mild government, and reasonable freedom of conscience
and action, as in the case of domestic prosperity.
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in foreign trade must for special reasons enjoy these immunities,
because they have special facilities for withdrawing their wealth from
the country (p. 225).
196. Second, a wise ordering of the tariff and excise system is the
principal means by which a wise government can guide foreign
commerce according to its purposes. Instead of being detrimental to
trade, since traders always have their own interest in view more than
that of the state, and it would be ruinous to leave the ways and means
of commerce to their enterprise, no trade can be carried on in a way
that is advantageous to the state which is not in this way guided,
controlled, and to a certain extent promoted (p. 226).
197. For purposes of tariff and excise, wares are of three classes: (1)
for export; (2) for import; (3) for transport. Wares of the first class are
either fully manufactured, or in raw or partially manufactured
condition; those of the second class are either indispensable or
dispensable. Accordingly the tariff and excise laws must take account
of five classes of wares, and this makes five primary rules necessary
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198. RULE 1.—All exports of manufactured goods must be burdened
with light imposts. The one profitable kind of trade consists in
commerce of this class, and a wise ruler must not merely take care
that the goods themselves are of high quality, but he must see that
foreigners are stimulated to take them. It is poor encouragement to
foreign buyers to lay a tax on such goods. The exportation is of itself
such an advantage to the state, that it is unnecessary to burden it with
imposts which make against the ultimate use of exportation (p.
227).
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199. The only exception to this rule is in case the home products are
so cheap, or transportation is so cheap and easy, that the exports can
undersell competing products of foreign countries. Even in this case,
export taxes should not be imposed on articles the home production
of which is capable of indefinite expansion. It is better to give the
home merchants the opportunity to make the profit, so that they will
be stimulated to increase the volume of trade to the utmost (p. 228).
200. Another corollary from this rule is that very low imposts should
be placed on raw materials when they are moved from one part of the
country to another for the purpose of being manufactured (p. 229).
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201. RULE 2. — Export of raw material which is a home product
must either be heavily taxed or entirely prohibited (230).
202. RULE 3. — All imports of dispensable wares must carry heavy
imposts; for if they are really dispensable the importation brings the
country great harm by useless foreign expenditure of money (p.
231).
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203. RULE 4.—Imports of indispensable wares should bear only light
imposts.  Tariff and imposts should not be the ordinary way of
collecting tribute from the subjects. They are justified as a source of
revenue only by some subsidiary purpose. Their main purpose should
be to direct the course oj commerce (p. 231).
204. It follows that foreign raw material needed for chief or
subordinate purposes in home manufacture should be free of import
duties (p.. 232).
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the exception of trifling tolls (p. 232).
206. The only exception to this rule is when the carriage of an article
through the country takes a market away from a home product, in
which case we must be sure that imposition of high taxes would not
lead to reprisals (p. 232).
207. All the servants of the taxing system must be held under strict
discipline, both against peculation, and against needless vexation of
travelers (p. 233).
208. Commercial treaties with foreign countries are the next most
important means of promoting commerce (p. 235).
209. Next in order are good harbors and roads, and passable rivers
and canals (p. 236).
210. A well-organized system of posts, boats, and land carriers is a
further desideratum (p. 237).
211. The coinage is an essential factor of flourishing trade (p. 238).
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212. Unpartisan and prompt rendering of justice in all trade litigation
greatly promotes business (p. 240).
213. To this end special commercial courts, both original and
appellate, should be organized. They should be composed in part of
legal experts, in part of merchants, capable of bringing the most exact
technical knowledge to interpretation of the laws (p. 240).
214. The most flourishing commerce is hardly possible unless the
ruler organizes a special bureau of commerce. This must be
composed of members who, along with proved integrity, fidelity, and
wisdom, possess complete knowledge of trade, and especially of
civic-commercial science; and it is particularly advisable that no
merchants should be members of the bureau, because their purposes
are often different from those of the state.
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a special subordinate bureau may be organized for manufactures. In
this bureau former merchants and mining experts may be useful. In
both bureaus individuals must be placed in charge of divisions of
operations with which they are particularly acquainted, and
consequently only the most important and general matters should be
handled by the whole body. In every important seaport or commercialAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 303
center there should be at least one commercial councilor, to supervise
commercial and manufacturing relations at that point under the
provisions of the two bodies (p. 240).
215. Finally, a wise government must take care to remove all
obstacles which may embarrass commerce. These may come either
from foreign or domestic causes. Thus, under the former head, war
between other powers, with incidental hindrances to our commerce;
secret machinations of other powers against our foreign traders, etc.
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Among domestic hindrances may be named: Scarcity of materials for
shipbuilding and other production; lack of capital in the country;
existing privileges of certain lands and towns in the matter of imports
and exports of staples; the envy and jealousy of certain lands and
towns toward one another, etc. (p. 241).
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The plan of this study excludes, as far as practicable, consideration of opinions
about merely technical, administrative, or operative details. We are concerned with
the main problems which cameralism proposed, and the relation of the formulas and
solutions which cameralism offered to the development of social science in general.
In order to fix with certainty the meaning of the essential theories, we must admit
much evidence that is contained in subordinate details. The importance of these
minor applications in the routine rules of the cameralists diminishes from this point,
as we have already epitomized the cardinal doctrines which reflected the peculiar
circumstances of the period, and which were modified after the circumstances
changed. At the same time, we have seen in these characteristic theories some of the
presumptions, both theoretical and practical, which have retained, and in some ways
have gathered force in later German thinking. These views have encouraged
tendencies in German policy which, for better or for worse, have produced evident
contrasts between the civic and economic systems of Germany on the one hand and
of England and America on the other. It will not be necessary to reproduce the
remainder of Justi’s system as fully as the sections have been represented thus far.
It is in point however to translate in full the opening paragraphs of the portion
devoted to mining. The redundancy of statement is a fair index of Justi’s usual style.
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We come now to the third chief means by which the riches of a
country may be increased, viz., mining, whenever the natural
resources of the country include mineral deposits. In Germany these
resources are by no means rare. Few states of any size in our
Fatherland are without them. Yet the population of most parts of the
country lacks inclination to develop the mines, and the governments
have not taken adequate interest in this source of riches. Nevertheless
this is almost the sole way in which well-founded hopes may be
cherished of increasing the riches of the country. Germany has at only
a few points facilities for navigation. In this respect, as well as in
manufactures, our neighbors have such a long start of us, that we
should he very foolish if we reckoned on more through these means
than merely retaining our money at home. Since, moreover, the
neighboring countries are giving more and more attention to keeping
their rich inhabitants at home, our mining operations are in fact the
only probable means by which riches in the various states of Germany
may be increased.
Since in our enlightened times the intelligence requisite for the
government of states has greatly increased, almost all European states
are exceptionally alert to prevent the outflow of money from the
country. In France, England, and Holland, careful reckoning is kept
of the wares annually sold to foreign nations, and of the wares bought
from the same nations. If attention to these subjects continues, in fifty
years it may easily occur that commercial treaties will set limits to the
amount of goods that a nation may annually take from another. The
same foresight will be used with reference to the other ways by which
money is drawn from the country. Thereupon the mines will be the
only means of increasing the wealth of the country. This resource
alone is completely in our power, and no counter-enterprises of
foreign peoples can restrict us in exploiting the same, or can make it
valueless.
The mines not only increase the treasure of the country with respect
to the amount of gold and silver which they extract from the earth, but
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establish advantageous foreign commerce. In addition to this the
mines will support a multitude of people, and this will have further
an important influence upon the plane of living in the whole
population. Especially will the mountainous regions be populated and
exploited to the benefit of the revenues of their districts and of the
whole state, while the same districts, without mines, would usually
have a barren and empty appearance. All this, it seems to me,
furnishes more than superfluous proof of the great utility of the
mines.
Who then can doubt that the mines deserve the special attention of a
wise government? So soon, therefore, as minerals are found in a
country, or as good evidences of them appear, or when information
is at hand that in earlier times mines had been operated there, a ruler
who is really concerned for the best good of his state will make it a
principal rule to establish mining and to develop it to the utmost. To
that end he must seize upon all useful and efficient measures. I shall
now do my best to show what such measures must be.
Propositions more summary in form than those in the series up to this point will
sufficiently indicate the scope of the discussion, viz.:
216. Precious metals should be mined with the aid of governments
even at a loss (p. 246).
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217. This is not a loss for the state as a whole. The sums expended
remain in the country and support many people. The country as a
whole will be richer by the amount of gold and silver that is taken
from the earth (p. 246).
218. In case of the other metals, even a small profit should justify
mining. By furnishing material to be sold abroad they add to the
nation’s wealth as truly as the mining of gold and silver.
219. The measures to be adopted by rulers for promoting mining fall
into three groups: (1) for stimulating the population to engage in
mining; (2) for standardizing the operation of mines; (3) for
promoting mining science (p. 247).Albion Small, The Cameralists, 306
220. Although all mining rights belong to the ruler, yet he cannot
work them, because that would too greatly enlarge his budget, and
make his income uncertain. The first requisite, then, is proclamation
of free mining rights, subject to the laws of the land, at least to
citizens, with reserve of the rightful royalties to the government (p.
247).
221. The ruler should give assurance that he will not himself, or
through his ministers, engage in mining (p. 248).
222. The ruler must take care in many ways that those who operate
mines shall be free to carry on their enterprise under the most
favorable conditions (p. 249).
223. The government must assist unprofitable mines, by remitting
dues, etc. (p. 250).
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224. Many changes in the mining laws are necessary, especially
because the introduction of machines, etc., has changed conditions
(p. 251).
225. An area of “at least two miles” should be assured for the
operations of a new mine (p. 252).
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226. This plan is recommended only for the precious and base metals
(p. 253).
227. For salts, coloring matter, and clays, commercial societies are
preferable (p. 254).
228. Schools of mines should be founded to train future managers of
mines (p. 256).
229. It will be useless to count on mines as a permanent source of
wealth unless provision is made for keeping up the supply of wood.
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230. It is not enough that there should be wealth in the country, but
the ruler must take care that this wealth is constantly active in the
trades, and that it passes from hand to hand, for the true wealth of the
country depends wholly upon this. In this way the subjects are put in
a position not merely by diligence and labor to provide for their need
and comfort, but also bear their share toward supplying the needs ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 307
the state. In fact it is quite natural to represent a republic under the
figure of a human body. Wealth is the blood, the trades are the
arteries, and the government is the heart, into which from time to time
the wealth circulating in the arteries flows, and thence again pours
into all parts of the civic body through the outlays of the state. We
have now to treat of the means by which this circulation is promoted
(p. 259).
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231. The chief means of promoting circulation of money in the trades
are four, viz.: (1) that the sources of subsistence shall be kept in good
correlation; (2) that the land shall keep its credit high; (3) that
manufacture and artisanship shall be kept prosperous; (4) that
idleness and beggary shall be abated (pp. 259–330).
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One or two incidental symptoms occur among the technological rules, in these
sections. For example, while reiterating the precept against allowing money to flow
out of the country, Justi adds: “A flourishing condition of the occupations by which
the necessities of life are gained is, however, the real strength and health of the state.”
This perception again challenges the current reputation of mercantilism.
Justi denounces abstract science, and demands that the learned class shall abandon
profitless refinements and devote itself to the useful arts. He would also have the
government weed out the student ranks by examinations difficult enough to reduce
the numbers of would-be scholars (p. 274).
After discussing at length the desirability and means of preventing idleness and
luxury, he adds a qualification which is symptomatic of mercantilism in particular
and of the prevailing economic naïveté in general. He says (p. 328):
I will go further, and assert that the government has no need of
prohibiting extravagance and luxury. According to all rational
principles it is entirely a matter of indifference to the state in whose
hands the wealth of the country rests, if it is only in the country and
is distributed in proper proportions among the different classes and
orders of the subjects. Moreover, if the things with which
extravagance is practiced are not imported from foreign countries, it
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the contrary the circulation of money and the support of the citizens
are promoted by it. Everything therefore which the government needs
to care for, is that those wares and things which arc used in
extravagance shall be produced at home, not imported from abroad.
A state composed wholly of misers, or frugal people, and in which no
luxury existed, would necessarily be the poorest, weakest, and most
miserable state under the sun. It would not be able to employ and
support a fourth part of the population of present states. How many
occupations would remain if we should restrict ourselves strictly to
necessities? Luxury in the use of domestic products, if it is conjoined
with industry, is the natural heat and fire in the civic body, which
gives it activity and vitality. Very few cases will be found in which
repression of luxury is required in the interest of the welfare of the
state. I have treated these cases in the Grundsätzen der Policey.
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232. The nature of a republic necessarily involves common and
harmonious obligations, for when the subjects have placed over
themselves a supreme power (sic),
321 from which they demand that it
shall promote their happiness, they are naturally bound to conform to
those arrangements which that supreme power adopts for their
happiness, and to promote them in every way, otherwise they would
obstruct their own ultimate purposes (p. 333).
233. By subjects we understand all those who enjoy the protection of
the state. This brief proposition gives us the clearest idea of the
essential characteristics of a subject, and in fact no more essential
finding mark can be determined than the enjoyment of protection (p.
334).
234. The right cannot be denied to a ruler to demand that all those
who possess estates in his land shall either be permanently domiciled
upon them, or shall sell the estates to some person agreeable to him
(p. 340).
235. Subjects owe their duties to an unlimited monarch only when heAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 309
docs not act as an enemy of the people. This situation may never have
occurred, because even the greatest tyrants had apparent excuses, and
it is consequently never quite clear that an autocrat is acting as the
enemy of his people (p. 345).
236. Under mixed forms of government the subjects owe duties not
to the monarch alone, but also to the whole state, and to the
fundamental laws of the same. Consequently duty to the monarch is
not a valid plea in extenuation of action harmful to the estates (p.
347).
237. Duties of subjects are accordingly of two classes: (a) immediate
duties to ruler or state, springing from the essential nature of the
relation of subjects; (b) mediate duties toward ruler and state, i. e.,
such as subjects owe primarily to themselves, and thus secondarily to
ruler and state.
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238. The immediate duties of subjects toward ruler and state are those
which are necessarily connected with the ultimate purposes of the
republic and with the relation of subjects, and which subjects owe to
the supreme power in the state alone (p. 349).
239. These immediate duties fall into three chief classes: (a) exact
obedience to the laws, commands, and ordinances of the supreme
power; (b) unimpeachable loyalty to the same; (c) contribution
according to ability to the support and best welfare of the state (p.
349).
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240. Loyalty [Treue] consists of complete devotion, attachment, and
reverence toward the supreme power, with careful endeavor to avoid,
and so far as possible to assist in preventing everything which might
be harmful to the external and internal security of the state and of the
person of the ruler (p. 376).
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241. Subjects are released from loyalty to a ruler (1) through
absorption by conquest or otherwise into another country (p. 393); (2)
when the ruler abdicates (p. 397).
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242. In order to treat at length of the mediate duties of subjects, weAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 310
must elaborate the whole housekeeping art [Haushal-tungskunst]
since the obligation to operate well with our resources can be fulfilled
in no other way than through the rules which this Haushaltungskunst
teaches. But Oekonomie
325 belongs in the system of the sciences
which we have undertaken to expound, because through the exercise
of the same the resources of the state are maintained and increased.
On that account it is the more evident that all the sciences pertaining
to government and to the large management [Wirthschaft] of the state
hang together most exactly in a single system. Attempting therefore
to treat of Haushaltungskunst completely and thoroughly, so far as the
limits of the present work permit, we shall in the first place present
the general doctrines of the same, then we shall treat particularly the
two chief topics of Oekonomie, viz., urban economy and rural
economy,  and shall apply to them the general rules (p. 435).
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243. The name Haushaltungskunst or Oekonomie may really be
applied to two distinct sciences. When we speak of the Oekonomie of
the country, or of the great management [Wirthschaft] of the state, all
the sciences are involved which we treat in this book. When we talk
of Oekonomie or Haushaltungskunst simply, we mean that science
which we are now about to explain, and which is concerned with the
goods and with the gainful occupations of private persons.
Haushaltungskunst  is, however, a science of so ordering the gainful
occupations and the thrift in town and country that means [Vermögen]
will thereby be preserved, increased, and reasonably used, and the
temporal happiness of private persons will be promoted; or more
briefly expressed, it is the science of applying our “means” to the
promotion of our temporal happiness (p. 437).
244. One sense of “means” [Vermögen] signifies everything that is
within our power, or that which we are able to bring to pass. In
ordinary thinking “means” signifies all goods and aptitudes which we
possess and which we may employ in order to provide for ourselves
the necessities and conveniences of this life. In the narrower sense we
understand by “means” the possession of a sufficiency of movable or
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position and make-up [Beschaflenheit], all the conveniences and
advantages of life. When we here use the term “means,” it is in the
two last senses, principally in the third (p. 438).
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245. Except through accident, no obtaining of “means” is possible
unless our aptitudes and already-possessed goods are the beginning
and ground of the acquisition (p. 439).
246. By “goods” we understand in Haushaltungskunst only those
things which have a certain value and use for the need and
convenience of human life, and which at a certain value or price can
be transferred to others; i.e., things that have a money value (p. 440).
247. Credit is to a certain extent to be reckoned among goods, for it
can be used as the ground and beginning of “means” (p. 440).
248. By “aptitudes” we understand those acquired capabilities and
skills by which we may be useful to others and to ourselves in
business and trades, or in social life in general (p. 441).
249. All “means” must be gained either by services [Dienste], or by
trades [Gewerbe]. The former require only “aptitudes;” the latter
require “aptitudes” and goods together (p. 441)
250. Services are a certain compact between the principal and the
servant, by which the latter, in return for a certain salary or
compensation, promises to apply his “aptitudes,” in certain assigned
occupations, for the benefit of the principal. These services are either
honorable or menial; they are also morally legitimate or illegitimate
(p. 442),
251. The two great classes of gainful occupations are (1) those that
procure livelihood in the town; (2) those that procure livelihood in the
country (p. 443).
252. From services or trades come “earnings” [Gewinnst]. This is the
advantage which accrues to us from a thing after deduction of our
applied outlay and effort. The justification of earnings must have at
its basis the revenue which the other can, and probably will derive
from the thing, for we are surely entitled to demand that the other
shall allow a just portion of the return to accrue to us which he would
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253. In order to gain “means,” one must first of all make a plan of his
mode of life, and of the ways by which he is to acquire earnings. In
this plan account must be taken of his aptitudes and goods. Most men
make the mistake of making no plan, and of seeking their fortune in
a merely haphazard way. Still others fail because they draw back in
fear from every obstacle (p. 453).
253A. Before all things we must so apply our “aptitudes” and our
goods that they will actually promote our purposes (p. 455).
254. Further it is necessary to know all the details involved in the
success of our plan (p. 457).
255. This knowledge will enable us to choose the necessary means for
carrying out our plan (p. 457).
256. It is further necessary to combine these means in a skilful way
(p. 458).
257. By this skilful combination of “means” it is often possible that
one may at the same time accomplish several sorts of purpose, and
earn in several ways (p. 458).
258. But one will not acquire “means,” either by service or trade, if
one has not learned to save (p. 460).
259. In order to exercise this great art of saving, the first thing in
every establishment must be a budget or correct estimate of income
and outlay (p. 461).
260. The savings must then be used further to increase “means” (p.
464).
261. After all, the increase of “means” will be a tedious process
unless one takes some reasonable chances, and occasionally exposes
a part of his “means” to the hazards of fortune (p. 465).
262. Those who make such ventures should first possess considerable
“means,” so that they could lose what they risk without being reduced
to want (p. 466).
263. Then the anticipated gain should be in proportion to the danger
to which one is exposed (p. 467).
264. The reasonable use of “means” is the chief purpose of
acquisition and of Haushaltungskunst.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 313
265. “Means” contribute not a little to the end of a social happy, and
virtuous life. One is thereby much more qualified for service to the
community, and one can fulfil the duties of social life in a much
higher degree than those who have no means (p. 471).
266. The reasonable use of means depends upon three chief rules: (1)
The “means” must be so used that the substance (sic) of the same will
not be impaired (p. 471); (2) one must apply one’s “means” to the
support of one’s life and to the promotion of one’s temporal
happiness, according as the social position and constitution of each
demand, and as the condition of one’s “means” permits (p. 481); (3)
besides using our “means” for our own needs and the convenience of
our life, we must devote them also to the use of our needy neighbor,
and to the advantage of the republic (p. 485).
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267. The life of towns has the most intimate connection with human
society and with the constitution of the republic. The towns both form
the bond of connection between the rural sustaining system and the
whole sustaining system of the country, and in them quite unique
occupations are pursued, which have immediate influence on the weal
of the state. The fundamental rules of management can be applied
here therefore only in a general way, because otherwise it would be
necessary to discuss each particular occupation. In the case of rural
management, on the contrary, there must be specific application of
the general rules (p; 490).
268. A town is a combination of societies, families, and single
persons, who live in a guarded [verwahrten] locality, under the
oversight and direction of a police bureau, or other persons charged
with administration of the police system, in order with better success
to maintain the operation and co-operation of those gainful pursuits
which are immediately demanded both for the needs and
conveniences of the country and for the unification of the whole
sustaining system. The protection [Verwahrung] is the essential
finding mark of the town, without which no locality can be called aAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 314
town, however large and well built it may be (p. 490).
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269. The essential difference between towns depends therefore on the
fact that one kind must be guarded by art, that is, by walls and
ditches, another kind by nature, that is, by oceans, seas, rivers, and
inaccessible mountains, so that entrance may be had only at certain
places called gates or portals expressly designated for that purpose.
Otherwise the requisite police arrangements for the chief purpose of
the town are not available (p. 493).
270. Towns must accordingly be classified in various ways: (1) Into
(a) commercial towns; (b) manufacturing towns; (c) mining and salt
towns; (d) brewery and distillery towns; (e) market towns; or (2) into
(a) residence towns (i.e., of the court); (b) university towns; (c)
fortified towns; (d) border towns, etc.; or (3) into (a) large; (b)
medium; (c) small; or (4) into (a) capitals; (b) provincial towns (p.
496).
271. At bottom there are two principal types of occupation for towns;
first, the assembling of persons capable of carrying on the various
pursuits; second, the accumulation of all sorts of wares and goods,
and to this end all their establishments, measures, and endeavors must
be directed (p. 497).
272. Since we are here exclusively concerned with the economy of
private persons in towns, we have to do principally with two subjects,
viz.: (1) What the general rules of management have to say about
management and organization of the sustaining occupations; (2) how
management itself, without reference to occupations in the town, may
best be conducted (p. 497).
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273. Rural management is a complex of sustaining occupations’ to
the end that through agriculture and stock-raising the resources of the
soil may be best used, and that all sorts of raw wares and materials
may be extracted from the same for human need and convenience.
The rural sustaining occupations consequently differ from those of
towns principally in this: in the former the effort is to produce raw
wares and goods, in the latter men are chiefly engaged in
transforming the raw wares and materials. While this latter purposeAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 315
requires unified societies and efforts, with police supervision, the
former can be carried on by separate families either scattered at
considerable intervals, or living in village groups”
330 (p. 523).
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On the Reasonable Use of State Revenues in General 
On the second title-page of the second part, or volume, the clause is inserted, “in
which cameral science proper is treated.” It is not our present affair to debate with
Justi the insufficiency of his economic foundation, nor to go into details about the
overlapping and confusion of economic, cameralistic, and police problems as they
appear in his system.
331 We are attempting to present this typical cameralist just as
he was, and to show how cameralism as a so-called science reflected the immaturities
and prejudices of the type of state in which it was developed. We come now to a
portion of the system in which actual administration had worked out a technique that
was relatively precise. In so far as such a technique, not guaranteed by a conclusive
economics, can have a value for science, it is the most important part of Justi’s
system. We must repeat, however, that the problem of cameralism was not yet
consciously the problem of modern economics, and still less the problem of modern
sociology, viz.: What is the value of all mediate processes for the trunk-line process
of promoting the evolution of persons? The problem of cameralism was merely the
ways and means problem of the quasi-absolutistic governments of that period, viz.:
the quasi-absolutistic type of state being given, in which, in effect, the state is the
government, and the government is the prince, how may the resources of that type of
state be so managed that its perpetual motion will be assured?
We shall show this in further detail by continuing the series of propositions
condensing Justi’s argument.
274. To recapitulate: The common happiness, the ultimate purpose of
all republics, for attaining and realizing which the supreme power
exists in states, demands that the care and endeavor of this sovereign
power shall be directs] chiefly toward two great activities, viz.: first,
securing and increasing the “means” of the state; second, the
reasonable and wise use of the “means.” The great management of theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 316
state consists then of these two chief employments. Part I having been
devoted to the former of these, Part II will deal with the latter (II, 3).
275. The “means” of the state consist not merely in all sorts of
movable and immovable goods, possessed primarily either by the
subjects or by the state itself; but rather in all talents and skill of the
persons who belong to the republic. Even the persons themselves
must in a certain sense be included, and the general use of these
means of the state constitute the supreme power.
332 All ordinances of
the supreme power have for their object therefore the wise use of the
means and forces of the state for the realization of the common
happiness (II, 5).
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276. In the widest sense, the reasonable use of the “means” of the
state includes all the rules laid down in Part I. In the special sense we
understand by the reasonable use of the “means” of the state the wise
measures of the ruler, to the end that the general “means” of the state
may be made to yield certain revenues, and constantly available
resources, without impairing the “means,” and in accordance with the
demands which from time to time the essential needs of the state may
enforce (II, 6).
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297. The first condition of reasonable use of the “means” of the state
is adequate knowledge of them (II, 6).
335
298. The wise ruler has a conception of a true happiness of the
subjects and of the state constantly before his eyes, and he has a
correct judgment of the relative proportions of the different needs (II,
15; vide I, 66–69).
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299. The wise ruler must take no steps for the welfare of the state
without taking care that “means” enough are devoted to the purpose
to insure its success (II, 17).
300. For the purposes of the state, great sums must be expended.
These “means” are mostly in the hands of private persons. The
portions necessary for the purposes of the state must be obtained from
the individuals in ways which will not impair the substance of their
“means,” i.e., they must be taken from earnings [Gewinnste]. Enough,
however, must be left so that the subjects can live from their earningsAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 317
(II, 8).
301. The “means” so obtained must be at all times available in the
form of money, and we call it then “the readiest means” of the state
(II, 20).
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302. This “readiest means” of the state is the great subject-matter of
cameral or finance science proper, in so far as the same is regarded as
a subordinate science under all the economic and cameral sciences
required for the government of a state. All measures and transactions
of cameral science have to do merely with this “readiest means,” and
have for their aim either the systematic raising of the same or wise
application or administration. Otherwise expressed, Cameral or
finance science is an adequate knowledge and facility [Erkenntniss
und Geschicklichkeit] in those transactions whereby “the readiest
means” of the state, for promotion of the common happiness oj the
same, are well and economically managed (II, 21).
303. We easily see that cameral science is closely connected with all
other economic sciences which are treated in this book. It teaches not
merely how to use wisely and for the good of the state those “means”
of the republic which are founded, preserved, and increased by
Staatskunst, Policey, die Commercienwissenschaft und Oekonomie,
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but in the great management of the state it conducts, so to speak, the
internal management, to the effect that without its co-working no
governmental business of any kind can be undertaken; because for all
such undertakings “readiest means” are necessary. In short, cameral
science is absolutely indispensable to the happiness of the state,
because the greatest “means” of the state would yield nothing,
without skilful administration. Hence it has its ground in the common
fundamental principle of all the sciences which pertain to the
government and general management of the state. It is particularly
based however on die Staatskunst und Policeywissenschaft, since it
must derive its chief working principles from them. Moreover it must
make use of Haushaltungskunst and jurisprudence as principal
auxiliaries. The former will furnish the elementary rules of managing
“means,” the latter will guard against unjust procedure (II, 23).Albion Small, The Cameralists, 318
304. The fundamental principle of cameral science is this: “In all
transactions with the ‘readiest means’ oj the state, the aim must be
to seek the common happiness of the ruler and the subjects” (II,
24).
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305. The rules of raising the revenues without harm to the subjects,
and from current earnings, must also be applied to provinces, so that
the chief division of the state will not be favored at the expense of
minor divisions (II, 30).
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306. The theory of cameral science may be divided into three chief
parts. We accordingly divide this second part of the Staatswirthschaft
into three books: (1) On the raising of revenues; (2) on the
disbursements of the state; (3) on the organization and administration
of cameral business. This classification leaves nothing lacking which
is necessary for a beginner in cameral or finance science, and in
general about the reasonable use of the “means” of the state (II, 39).
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307. A state often finds itself in need of resources which are not
supplied by the rules already given for raising the “readiest means.”
This book is devoted then to the problems which those extraordinary
requirements involve (II, 40).
308. The problems of cameralism accordingly fall into three chief
divisions: (1) The establishment of the “readiest means”— which
calls for the greatest skill and strength of the cameralist; (2) the
raising of the regular income of the state from the sources that are
common to almost all states; (3) the raising of emergency funds (II,
42).
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309. Establishing the “readiest means” of the state depends first upon
developing a populous land, with the maximum amount of wealth
circulating in the gainful occupations (II, 44).
310. A second and more immediate foundation is necessary, viz.,
either certain estates the proprietorship of which belongs immediately
to the state and to the ruler, and the whole revenue of which accrues
to the “readiest means,” or certain rights reserved to the supremeAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 319
power. The proper name of these rights is the regalia (II, 45).
311. The foundation of the revenues of the state is laid then, first, in
good management of the estates immediately appertaining to the state
or to the ruler (II, 45).
312. In the case of the regalia, the desideratum is a reasonable use of
the rights, in consideration of the common “means” of the state, and
of the common welfare of the ruler and of the subjects (II, 46).
342
313. The best standard of taxation is the persons of the subjects in
general, according to a just proportion of their immovable “means”
and industry, and especially the laborers and assistants employed in
such gainful occupations. In such case the commerce, the industry,
and the freedom of the subjects would not suffer the slightest
hindrance, as the number of the persons employed could not possibly
be concealed (II, 52).
314. It is possible for the state to raise so little revenue by taxation
that the total “means” of the state will fall far below the normal level,
and the welfare of the subjects will be harmfully restricted (II, 53).
315. The Regalia should be so administered that the welfare of the
state and the convenience of the subjects would remain the first
consideration, and the revenues the second (II, 54).
316. A reasonable cameralist will accordingly follow two rules: (1)
Direct management by the administration of complicated economic
processes must be avoided by arranging with competent
Entrepreneurs  (sic) to carry on the enterprises at their own risk, at a
certain rate of dividend on the proceeds; (2) all needless extra
expense, such as unnecessary employees, must be avoided (II, 56).
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317. Subsidies from foreign rulers are not to be rejected, especially if
they do not entail more costs than they amount to (II, 61–63).
318. The best and surest increase of the revenues of the state comes
from encouraging the laboring class [Nahrungsstand] (II, 63).
319. A cameralist should at the same time be a police expert and an
economist (II, 63).
320. The first care of the cameralist must be for the development and
cultivation of unimproved and thinly populated sections (II, 64).Albion Small, The Cameralists, 320
321. A considerable budget must therefore be annually at the disposal
of the bureaus (II, 66).
322. Even without such capital the domains may by good
management be made to yield large revenues (II, 69–74).
323. Returning to the Regalia—the most harmless increase of
revenues through extended use of the Regalia occurs (1) when they
are used in places where they had previously not been enforced.
Hence the intelligent cameralist must be on the watch for such
undeveloped sources of revenue (II, 75); (2) through improvements
of public works affected by the Regalia (II, 76); (3) through increase
of the rate of impost and of prices of products covered by the Regalia
(II, 77).
324. The problem of increasing the revenues of the state in the form
of contributions, taxes, and other payments by the subject can be
solved only by improving the condition of the laboring class, and by
increasing the population (II, 81), but this just portion of revenue
should be collected only when the needs of the state call for it.
325. The only exception is when a new impost may restrain or cure
a police evil, or may evidently benefit and enlarge the laboring
class.
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326. The second chief responsibility of the cameralist is the raising of
the ordinary revenues of the state.
345 By the ordinary revenues we
understand the established arrangements for covering the ordinary
needs of the state by levies upon designated objects (II, 88).
327. Following the Roman law, it has been customary in Germany to
distinguish between Fiscum and Aerarium. Under the former are
classed the revenues of the cameral estates and of the Regalia. These
are supposed to be for the support of the person of the ruler and of his
family, court, and servants, with all other expenses necessary to
maintain the princely dignity. It is the traditional idea that the
cameralists were to deal especially with these revenues, and they are
accordingly known as cameral revenues. The revenues of the
Aerarium  are supposed to be especially for the protection and security
of the country, and for promoting the general welfare of the state (II,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 321
89).
328. This distinction is groundless (II, 90).
329. Knowledge of the distinction is necessary, however, in order to
understand certain existing survivals and consequences of the
distinction in the present cameral organization (II, 92).
330. It is best to divide the revenues of the state according to their
four chief sources, viz.: (1) Those from the crown estates, the cameral
estates, or the domains (as they are variously named); (2) those from
the Regalia; (3) those from payments by the subjects, in general
taxation; (4) those which indirectly accrue in the course of attaining
other chief purposes (II, 95).
346
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ &￿(￿￿￿￿#
This portion of the Staatswirthschaft is also chiefly technological, and thus not
primarily germane to our purpose. Since policies of taxation have their roots,
however, so deep in social philosophy, and since the theories of taxation occupy so
prominent places in the social sciences, we present a digest of Justi’s more general
opinions.
331. The three chief sources of the necessary income of the state are:
(1) the contributions; (2) the taxes; (3) the excises paid by the
subjects. The domains and the Regalia are not sufficient to cover the
expenses necessary for the welfare of the state, especially in the
present armed condition of Europe. The magnificence of courts has
also greatly increased. To cover these costs the subjects must
contribute from their private means (II, 306).
332. There can be no doubt that the subjects owe this contribution to
the great expenses of the state. In so far as all subjects, in respect to
their common welfare, are in close unity with one another, and
represent a single body, or moral person, their private means are at
the same time the general, although mediate “means” of the state (II,
307, vide I, 415, Prop. 239).
333. It is a fundamental rule to seek such ways and means of levying
the taxes now in mind, that the subjects will pay them with willingAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 322
and happy hearts, and at their own initiative. This is possible even in
monarchies, if wise use is made of the passions of the subjects; e.g.,
if the people, with the exception of nobility and scholars, are divided
into classes, according to the amount of tax which they pay; or, if
certain lucrative occupations are permitted only to persons who pay
a certain minimum tax, as is stipulated for example in the case of
brewers in Frankenhausen, Schwarzburg, etc. (II, 309).
334. A second fundamental rule is that the taxes must not interfere
with the reasonable freedom of human conduct, with the credit of
merchants, with the trades, and shall in general not be oppressive to
the industrial system or to commerce (II, 311).
335. A third rule is that the taxes must be levied upon all subjects
with righteous equality, since all are equally under obligation in this
connection, and all share in the protection and other benefits of the
state. Yet the application of this rule must have due respect to the
second, for, although all subjects should pay taxes in just proportion
to their means, yet the nature and purpose of the different species of
goods does not permit that all objects can bear equal rates of taxation
(II, 312).
336. A fourth rule is, that the contributions and excises shall have a
sure, fixed, and unfalsified ground, and consequently should be levied
upon objects not only upon which they may be promptly and certainly
collected, but in connection with which fraud and concealment is not
easy for the subjects, nor peculation for the officials (II, 313).
337. A fifth rule is, that the taxes shall be based on such objects as
will permit limitation of the number of collectors’ offices, and
therewith of officials (II, 314).
338. The sixth and last fundamental rule is that payments must be
made as easy as possible for the subjects, and hence must be divided
into convenient parts, and made payable at appropriate times (II,
315).
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339. It is not easy to hit upon an impost which satisfies all these
requirements. Vauban, Schröder, and others have proposed a royal or
general tithe, which should combine all desirable qualities. Tested byAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 323
above rules, however, the plan will be found wanting. Others have
proposed a combined poll and income tax, etc. (II, 316).
340. The nearest approach to application of the rules will be through
selecting three classes of objects for taxation, viz.: first, immovable
goods; second, the persons of the subjects; third, the gainful
occupations (II, 318).
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341. The propriety of taxing land rests on two facts: first, it is
mediately a part of the general property of the state; second, the
revenues from it are least concealable. Nor is there any hardship in
liability of the land for a portion of the expenses of the state (II,
320).
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342. Lands of the different kinds, e.g., meadows, vineyards, forests,
etc., must be divided into three classes, good, medium, and bad; and
houses must also be classified as large, medium, and small. Again,
the regions in which the lands lie must also be classified, and in like
manner the towns which contain the houses. A calculus of these
different factors will give the rate of taxation (II, 324).
343. The productiveness of the land must be precisely reckoned, and
the tax must be levied accordingly (II, 324).
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344. The revenues of the houses should also determine the amount of
levy upon them; and it should correspond with the just rate upon the
interest which would be derived from the selling value of the same
(II, 325).
345. An important duty of the bureaus relates to remission of the
taxes in case of providential losses by fire, flood, storm, drought, etc.
(II, 333).
346. It is a mistake for the ruler to reward services by grants of
freedom from taxation (II, 335).
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347. The second chief taxable object is the person of the subjects
themselves. Not all subjects possess immovable goods. All areAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 324
however members of the community, and enjoy its benefits; all
consequently owe something in return. Personal payments to the state
even by those who also pay land taxes are therefore proper, if they are
rightly graded (II, 340).
348. The personal tax may be the chief tax of a country, virtually
summing up all the forms of income tax, or it may be an accessory of
the principal forms of taxation (II, 341).
349. There is no adequate standard of personal taxation (II, 343).
350. Personal taxes may be regarded as a means of collecting a
portion of their dues to the state from subjects who otherwise would
be wholly or partially exempt from taxation (II, 344).
351. Poll taxes on Jews are to be specified as one of the forms of
personal tax. They are levied at the same rate upon rich and poor
alike, and they are left to equalize the matter among themselves.
Usually the whole Jewish community is held responsible for payment
of an aggregate sum reckoned in proportion to the numbers. Since it
is the choice of this unfortunate race to remain aliens among us, we
need not bother ourselves about strict propriety and exact justice (II,
346).
352. In some countries protection-money [Schutzgeld] is paid by
those subjects, or aliens, who possess no immovable goods. It is
sometimes reckoned by families, sometimes by polls. In either case
it is to be reckoned as a personal tax. This is an undesirable levy in
addition to a poll tax (II, 347).
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353. Various other taxes have been levied as personal, which are
really occupation taxes or excise (II, 348).
354. In the same way, salt and tobacco taxes have been levied as
personal taxes (II, 348).
355. The chief duties of the cameralists in connection with these
personal taxes consist in so administering the same that the system
will be reasonable, conducive to the welfare both of the subjects and
of the state, and duly respective of the equality of the subjects. In this
respect a cameralist has an opportunity to show great skill and
wisdom. Decisions must be rendered as to cases in which personalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 325
taxes should be remitted. The ground for this concession should be
services.
351 Particularly must the cameralists take care that personal
and other taxes are collected by the same officials, so that the expense
of separate employees shall be saved (II, 351).
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356. Since immovable goods can be burdened with taxes to the extent
of only one-fourth or one-third of their earnings, and since no very
considerable sum can be raised from personal taxation, the gainful
occupations must be the next source of revenue (II, 352).
357. Occupations may be taxed (a) on the materials which they use,
and on their output (excise); or (b) directly, according to the extent of
their operations (II, 353).
358. The former method is almost universal in Europe (II, 353).
359. The latter has a minor place (II, 353).
360. Various causes contribute to the vogue of excises in Germany:
thus (a) the limitation of tariffs by the laws of the Empire gave
occasion for excises as the most convenient and productive substitute.
Again (b) it was observed that large industries were growing up in the
towns without paying much into the national treasury; (c) they are
means of getting revenue from individuals who have no immovable
goods (II, 355).
361. It is not true that the owners of real estate can make the taxes
which they pay fall upon other subjects, because customary price
defeats this shifting of the incidence of the tax (II, 355).
362. A further reason for the use of excise is that it gives the ruler a
much freer hand than in levying land taxes (II, 356).
363. Excise is either universal—falling upon all articles without
exception which are used for the support of life or come into the
channels of trade; or particular—falling upon selected articles of
consumption or wares (II, 356).
364. Excise does not conform to the rules above given for taxation;
for (1) it limits the reasonable freedom of human action (II, 358); (2)
it is detrimental to crafts and commerce (II, 359); (3) it does notAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 326
spread the burden of taxation equally (II, 361); (4) it has no secure
basis, since fraud and peculation are afforded large scope (II, 362); (5)
its collection requires many officials and large expense (II, 364).
365. The claims for excise are insufficient; viz.: (1) It puts a share of
the common burdens upon all; (2) by limiting his expenditures each
may ease the burden at will; (3) it calls for only a fraction of earnings
a little at a time; (4) but almost without the knowledge of the subjects
it increases the “readiest means” of the state; (5) no sheriffs’ process
(execution) is required to enforce it; (6) aliens must bear their share;
(7) it is a means of controlling the commerce of the country, and of
promoting manufactures (II, 365).
366. Since immediate abolition of excise is hopeless, the rules for its
employment must be stated, viz.: (1) All the rales previously laid
down in the case of tariffs, etc. (II, 288–300); (2) excise rates must
respect the rate of earnings of the different occupations, and must call
for only a small fraction of the earnings of those that deal in the
necessities of life (II, 368); (3) in order that moderation of excise be
not misused for unwarranted increase of profits, the police must
interfere and fix the price of necessities (II, 369); (4) larger demands
may be made upon luxuries (II, 369); (5) but the three grades of
luxury must be respected (II, 369; vide. I, 231); (6) excise is surely
excessive when it amounts to more than the remaining earnings of the
craft, or when it amounts to a half or two-thirds of an article on sale
(II, 369); (7) excise must vary according as the transactions are first,
second, or third hand, and whether a craft contributes or not to the
completion or improvement of a thing (II, 370).
367. Occupation-taxes [Gewerbe-Steuer] might be introduced, in
harmony with the fundamental rules of taxation, and to the advantage
both of ruler and subject (II, 373).
368. The essential principle of this type of tax is adjustment to the
scale of income of the occupation (II, 374–92).
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369. These revenues may be called accidental in a double sense: FirstAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 327
the sovereign power finds occasion to raise certain revenues without
making the revenues themselves the ultimate purpose, and at the same
time without prejudice to the actual ultimate purpose of the state;
second, these revenues may be called accidental because they are
based merely on accidental arrangements and certain incidents, either
of the whole republic or of the supreme power; or of those subjects
who contribute to these revenues. Such occasional circumstances are
so various that some of them are likely to be present always, and their
revenues consequently aggregate an appreciable sum (II, 400).
370. These accidents may be grouped in five classes, and we may
arrange them in the order of their probable value in yielding revenue,
viz.: (1) Revenues from overlordship of the state over certain
properties, to be distinguished from the Regalia (II, 401–11); (2)
rights of revenue that are incidents of the administration of justice (II,
412–16); (3) the revenues accruing through administration of the
police system (II, 417–21); (4) revenues incidental to the war-making
power, including subsidies (II, 422–25); (5) revenues from
sovereignty over the ecclesiastical system (II, 426–29).
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371. In case of war, or other crises, exceptional demands for money
arise. It is not for the cameralist to decide whether the occasion
actually demands the exceptional sums, but if the ruler has so decided
it is the task of the cameralist to find the ways and means. These are
chiefly two: (1) Extraordinary contributions of the subjects; (2) the
credit of the ruler and of the country (II, 430–33).
372. There are two ways of levying extraordinary contributions, viz.:
(1) By increasing the rates of ordinary contributions and taxes; (2) by
levying a new sort of contribution. The preference is to be determined
by the circumstances of the state. If the sums to be raised are not too
great, if there is no need of instant payment, and if the ruler can
assure the subjects that the increase will be only temporary, the
former method is preferable, because the technique for raising such
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however, be at such rates that they do not absorb one-third of
earnings, or the other form must be adopted (II, 435).
373. The best form of extraordinary levy is a tax on social position
[Würdensleuer], that is, all subjects, lay and clerical, are to be
arranged in classes and subdivisions, and the higher the social rank
and dignity the higher must be the rate of this tax. Thus the levy falls
to a considerable extent upon persons who were not burdened before,
and who have the ready means of payment (II, 443).
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374. One of the first rules of a wise government must be to preserve
its credit, and this depends, first, on integrity in its transactions;
second, on prompt payment of interest (II, 452).
375. The establishment of a bank is also a useful means of obtaining
control of extraordinary sums (II, 455).
376. Another means is the provision of annuities, the capital of which
falls to the state on the death of the annuitants (II, 455).
377. So-called “Tontines,” invented in France, and named after their
originator, Tonti, are also to be considered (II, 456)
378. Lotteries may also be used when exceptional sums are needed
(II, 458).
379. Scruples about the fundamental morality of annuities, tontines,
and lotteries are not sufficiently valid to estop the state from losing
them (II, 459).
380. Although it is impossible to exclude aliens from investment in
annuities, tontines, and other forms of state debts, yet so far as
possible subjects should be preferred as investors, so that the interest
will not go out of the country. Whether money should be borrowed
abroad for the sake of winning other nations to our interest is another
question which belongs to Staatskunst (II, 461).
381. When the credit of the country makes borrowing difficult, then
one of the more common devices is to farm out certain fixed
revenues, and to obtain advances from the parties to whom they are
farmed (II, 461).
382. A similar device is to make over certain domains or other
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383. A still more desperate device is the pawning of domains or even
provinces (II, 463).
384. A cameralist will today scarcely recommend the absolute
alienation of territories and people for the sake of money (II, 465).
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385. The second chief responsibility of the cameralist is with the
disbursements of the state, and this is quite as important as
responsibility for the revenues (II, 469).
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386. Instead of being expended for the common happiness, the means
of the state are (1) often wasted; (2) used with shortsighted
niggardliness; (3) applied at the wrong point for the best results; (4)
unsystematically administered (II, 471).
387. In order to avoid these errors, the rules laid down in the
introduction must be applied, viz.: (1) Outlays must be in accordance
with the circumstances and revenues of the state; (2) the “readiest
means” of the state must be used for no other purpose than the best
good of ruler and subjects (II, 473).
388. From the previous fundamental principles we derive the first
rule of wise expenditure, viz., No outlay must be undertaken without
the most thorough previous consideration, and estimate of the
involved cost, and of the income likely to accrue from the same to the
state (II, 476).
389. The second rule is, that the outlay should never exceed the
income (II, 478).
390. Rule three.—For all outlays the “readiest means” must be already
in hand, and in no case should a start be made with a debt (II, 479).
391. Rule four.—All expenditures of the state must be made certain
(II, 480).
392. Rule five.—No outlay should be made which tends permanently
to diminish either the available or the total “means” of the state (II,
481).
393. Rule six.—So far as possible, outlays should be so ordered that
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circulation in the sustaining system of the country (II, 482).
394. Rule seven.—The importance of every proposed outlay must be
measured by the amount of income that it is likely to return for the
welfare of the state (II, 484).
395. Rule eight.—Outlays must be arranged in the order of their
usefulness for the common good of ruler and subjects (II, 486).
396. The great management of the state bears much similarity to the
housekeeping of private persons; hence the rules that are valid in
private housekeeping apply, with changed details, to the use of the
“means” of the state (II, 487).
396A. Rule nine.—The necessities of the state must take precedence
of all other demands, and necessities must be reckoned in the
following grades, viz.: (1) Those on which the stability of the republic
depends; (2) those which are of qualified necessity, i.e., from
omission of which the community would suffer great harm, such as
loss of industries through failure of proper promotion; (3) those
which might be omitted without positive injury, but without which
the maximum happiness of the state cannot be reached (II, 488).
397. Even expenses of the first grade should not be covered so
extravagantly that outlays of the other grades would be impossible (II,
489).
398. Rule ten.—Only when all the necessary expenses are provided
for can the means of the state be appropriated to con-veniencies (II,
490).
399. Rule eleven.—After all outlay is provided for which is required
for the needs and conveniencies of the state, attention may be given
to comfort, dignity, display, and ornamentation (II, 491).
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400. Rule twelve.—The aim should be to put the finances of the
country in such condition that not merely the necessities and
conveniencies, but also the comforts and elegancies may be secured
(II, 492).
401. Rule thirteen.—If the government is to be in a situation to make
fair appropriations of all kinds, it must in all its outlays observe
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402. Rule fourteen.—Care must be taken that economy be not turned
into greed, especially through contempt of the ruler for certain needs
of his subjects, while his passions lead him to favor other outlays (II,
495).
403. Rule fifteen.—The finance bureau must constantly have the most
exact information about the condition of all the funds (II, 499).
404. Rule sixteen.—No disbursements should be made except upon
strict account (II, 500).
405. Rule seventeen.—Entrepreneurs should be used in all cases
which involve employment of a large number, and many minor
outlays (II, 501).
406. Rule eighteen.—Nothing which can be obtained with a lump sum
should be subject to several charges (II, 305).
407. Rule nineteen.—The persons expending the money of the state
should not themselves make additional costs necessary (II, 504).
408. Rule twenty.—Everything must be supplied at the proper time,
with foresight and advantage, and by cash payments; and when it is
profitable stocks of goods needed by the state should be kept.
409. Rule twenty-one.—Strict accounts, in perfect order, must be kept
of the outlays of the state (II, 507).
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410. After provision for the military budget (II, 527–57), and for the
court budget (II, 560–86), the cameralistic expenses proper may be
divided into eight groups: (1) Moneys for the civil-list and dowries
(II, 588); (2) appropriations for the various administrative expenses
(II, 589); (3) the expenses of levying and collect-ing the revenues, and
of maintaining the sources from which they are derived (II, 592); (4)
the salaries and pensions of all civil servants in the state, finance,
police, and justice bureaus (II, 597); (5) the expenses of bringing land
under cultivation (II, 602); (6) the expenses of buildings for the use
of the state (II, 607); (7) the support of the ecclesiastical and school
systems (II, 609); (8) expenses for the comfort and adornment of the
country (II, 613).
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411. The organization and the correlation of the cameralistic system,
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elements in the government of a state. The whole management of a
community rests upon it, and to a certain extent its whole internal
constitution rests upon it. The administrative police institutions of the
state are a part of the cameral system. At all events the two are
inseparable, because the former constitute the ground of the “readiest
means” of the state and must in turn be supported by the same. In this
most general signification of the cameral system, it comprehends not
merely all police institutions and measures, and consequently the
commercial and agricultural administration, but also the
administration of justice, at least so far as concerns the technique of
the same, and the nature [Beschaftenheit] of the laws, as well as the
management of the military system. There remain therefore only
foreign affairs, which may be contrasted with cameral business, and
which constitute the second essential element in the government of
the state. Important as the constitution of the cameral system is then
in itself, it is especially so on account of the peculiar traits of our
times. Since the European powers have placed themselves on a
constant war footing, since they have made it a part of their
programme to encourage commerce and manufactures and the
sustaining class, as well as the general culture of their countries, the
cameral system has taken on a quite other form. Those states in which
the rulers two or three hundred years ago either left the finances to
their consorts, or intrusted them as a minor duty to a privy council or
court, now have various great and important bureaus for the
administration of the same, and meanwhile the revenues have




As we have seen from various points of approach, cameralism was not primarily a
philosophy, nor was it an economic theory in the modern sense. It was a technique
and a technology. In so far as it rested on a basis of principles, they were primarily
political rather than economic generalizations. That is, political purposes were chiefly
in view, and economic means were enlisted in the cameralistic technique to promote
those purposes.
If would be easy to cull out of Justi’s books sentences from which we might infer
that he was, in the last analysis, a full-fledged democrat. Such an inference, however,
would be as unwarranted as the contrary conclusion that he manifested no democratic
opinions or sympathies. The plain fact is that his thinking had, so to speak, special
apartments for as many different orders of opinions, which would have treated one
another roughly if they had met face to face. Occupying separate quarters they could
ignore actual incompatibilities.
In his apartments devoted to the most general aspects of life, the conspicuous motto
on the wall was: “The Happiness of Ruler and Subjects.”
In the apartments assigned to the primary necessities of life, the fireside talk was
a ringing of changes upon “Earn and Save!”
In the apartments reserved for plans and programmes of political life was an
undertone, always audible, droning variations of the constant theme: “The clue to life
is a good king, with well-trained civil servants and docile subjects.”
Now, it would be folly to class a house as “disorderly” simply because its tenants
were of such diverse types, but the moment it becomes necessary for the lodgers to
decide upon a common standard the problem of harmonizing these conceptions is
imminent. It by no means follows that their different outlooks upon life are
essentially incompatible. In composing them, however, it is inevitable that different
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one of the main conceptions will dominate the others. Men will ask one another,
What is happiness? How is it composed? What does it involve? Is it one and the
same thing for everybody, or does it vary from man to man, from time to time, from
place to place? To what extent is it simply our own affair, and to what extent does
it depend on other people? Again, they will ask, How many ways are there to earn
and save? What do these ways have to do with one another? How do they depend on
one another? What advantages has one over another? How far may the arts of earning
and saving be developed beyond present methods? To what extent may we discover
more fundamental and inclusive principles of earning and saving and of guaranteeing
to each all that he earns and saves ? Still further, men will ask, What proof have we
that kings are essentials to life, any more than stone hatchets, or bone fish-hooks?
Why may not kings and paternalism be outgrown, just like wooden plows, and bows
and arrows, and flint and steel? When are kings and kingcraft good and when are they
bad? What recourse have men when kings and kingcraft fail?
Men need not have asked all these questions by any means, nor others equally
obvious, before they would be capable of seeing that Justi’s system, however useful
for its purpose, was very far from a conclusive science of the things with which it
was concerned. It contained rudimentary moral and economic and political
philosophies but neither of these philosophies had been thought through, and the
relations between them had been subjected to no critical analysis whatsoever. In
effect it was plans and specifications of the best paternalistic government that could
be devised, with the reservation that no questions were to be asked about the finality
of that paternalistic government as an irreducible minimum. It was accordingly a
system of operating the paternalistic type of state, first and foremost, so that it could
maintain itself in the rivalries of similar neighboring states, through systematic
superintendence and stimulation of approved thrift, without prying behind the
precepts of commonplace prudence, and with such resulting happiness to the people
as was to be gained in the course of making the permanence and power of the
paternalistic state the supreme end. In other words, so far as Justi’s type of
cameralism held the center of attention, it postponed all larger questions of social
science, and substituted for them a catechism of the routine to be observed in
governmental bureaus, of the attitude which the ruler would maintain toward
government and subjects if his views agreed with Justi’s, and of the attitude which
the subject should maintain in any event toward ruler and administration. OtherwiseAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 335
expressed, all the social science there was within the sphere of cameralism was first,
as we shall see presently, a more or less explicit political philosophy, then a
managerial ritual, with no positive provision either for revising the ritual itself or for
reappraising the purposes which the ritual was supposed to serve. It had the same
relation to the problems of society in general that a book on tactics would have to
statesmanship.
360 In applying the term “ritual” to Justi’s cameralism, I do not mean
to assert that it was necessarily arbitrary in detail. On the contrary, the larger number
of its precepts were eminently reasonable. The ritualism came from its relation to the
major premise, viz., the finality of the paternalistic state. As items in the operation
of such a moral economy as present analysis discovers in human experience, these
same precepts might be no more ritualistic than valid rules of hygiene.
This appraisal of Justi’s system may be varied as follows: It was an undigested
mixture of judgments about means and ends. It did not consciously encounter the
previous question, viz., How shall we know when such means as the type of state,
and ruler, and bureaucracy which we now take for granted, and which are at present
assumed to be indispensable for the types of ends which we also take for granted,
lose their value as means, to such an extent that we can no longer take them for
granted as approximate ends ? The parallel question would also have challenged the
authority of Justi’s system, but it had not appeared above his horizon; viz., How may
we know when the types of ends which we take for granted cease to satisfy the
conditions of life, and consequently impeach the means on which we have relied for
the conduct of life ? That is, the autocratic state and ruler and bureaucracy had so
imposed themselves on the thoughts and feelings of the time that they were virtually
valued as both means and end of human purposes, and criticism of them to discover
how far they were merely provisional means to mediate ends was marking time in the
cameralistic technology. Meanwhile, such larger social philosophy as ventured to
show signs of life within or around this technology was in its primary characteristics
more prominently political than economic. We shall attempt to justify this judgment
by an examination, first, of the Natur und Wesen der Staaten, and second, of the
Grundriss einer Guten Regierung.
Of these two books, which we shall notice not in their chronological but in their
logical order, we may first observe in general, that they merely elaborate themes
which were contained in Staatswirthschaft. Indeed that volume in principle exhausts
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which was implied, if not expressed, in the earlier synoptic book. We shall therefore
be able to do justice to these volumes, as expansions of Justi’s system, without the
detailed analysis which was necessary in presenting his general survey.
We turn to the more fundamental of these special treatises.
361 If this book had been
written for the purpose of supporting our main thesis about cameralism as essentially
a political rather than an economic theory, it could hardly have been more
unequivocal.
362 For our purposes the Preface is most important, because the body of
the book merely enlarged upon principles which are sufficiently prominent in our
account of Staatswirthschaft.
The contents of the Preface may be summarized in this way:
Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois is in many respects an exemplary
book, but it contains certain errors which should be corrected.
This book may be regarded as an alternative treatise on the spirit of
the laws [Geist der Gesetze]. “After I have discussed the essence and
nature of states, and have pointed out the errors of Montesquieu in
this connection, I come to the essence [Wesen] of the laws, which are
the means through which states must attain their essential purpose,
namely, the common happiness [gemein-schaftliche Glückseligkeit],
which means can be derived nowhere else than from the essence and
nature of states as their chief source.”
“It will easily be seen that this book contains the fundamental science
of all the economic and camcral sciences, and that it constitutes, so
to speak, a sort of political metaphysic for all the governmental
sciences. For there can be no doubt that all these sciences must be
based upon the essence and nature of a (sic) state, and therefrom
alone, as from their fountain-head [Hauptquelle], must be derived.”
We have inverted the order of Justi’s paragraphs, so as to place his more general
propositions first, without affecting his thought. The more specific reason which he
assigns for writing the book is in the earlier paragraphs of the Preface, viz.:
I made the plan of this work five years ago.
363 Meanwhile it has
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general idea which I have meanwhile formed. The necessity of such
a work was evident to me from the time that I began to write upon the
economic and cameral sciences.
All these sciences, and all those which are required for the
government of a state, must in a word be derived from the general
nature and essence of states, and nothing can be securely established
in them if one does not constantly look back to the nature of civic
institutions [bürgerlichen Verfassungen].  If accordingly I would
justify this or that principle or rule in Staatskunst, in Policey, in
Finanz- Wissenschajt, and the other economic sciences, I had to trace
the grounds of the same very remotely [weilläuftig] from the essence
and the nature of states; and when this principle or rule emerged in
another portion of these sciences, it was necessary to repeat the most
important grounds, in order to show the harmony of the same with the
essence of civic institutions. I judged accordingly that a special
treatise on the essence and the nature of states would serve my own
as well as my readers’ convenience, since I would not then be under
the necessity, in all my subsequent works, repeatedly to show the
correspondence of my fundamental propositions with the nature of a
state.
Thus we have Justi’s own direct testimony that all the sciences embraced in the
general sense of the term cameralism were, in his view, deductions from a
fundamental political philosophy. Moreover, all activities in civic society were to
find their rationale in this a priori, viz., the presupposed “essence and nature of
states.” This concept served in Justi’s thinking as the finality back of which analysis
could not penetrate. A large part of the difference between this type of thinking and
modern sociological inquiry is a consequence of penetration by the latter into the
social processes antecedent in time to the existence of states, or more general in
content than civic activities. The resultant perception that states are but one of the
many variations of means by which men seek to accomplish their purposes displaces
the concept “essence and nature of states” as the ultimate term in explanation of civic
activities, and substitutes the essence and nature of associating persons, whose
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The argument of Natur und Wesen may be compressed into the following résumé:
First, the assumption of an original condition of “natural freedom”
(chap, vii). Justi’s particular version of “natural freedom” need not be
analyzed in detail. While he does not arrive at a plausible hypothesis
of reconciliation between the notion of the freedom of individuals and
freedom of groups, within which there was no freedom, he satisfies
himself that there is enough in the idea for a major premise, and he
proceeds to build upon it.
Second, the derivation of social life from an inborn “social impulse”
is denied (§5). On the contrary, perception of advantage from social
reciprocity, i.e., in the last resort, reason [Vernunft], is the cause of
social life (§6). With the development of circumstances, and
corresponding development of wants, the utility of extending social
combinations appealed to developing reason. Fear was one of the
tributary motives. Some more intelligent men began to see the
advantage of using compulsion upon weaker men, subjecting them to
their laws, and making them serve their own advantage and
conscience. Thus the condition of compelling or being compelled, the
condition of war. took its origin. Hence come consolidation of related
societies into larger societies, in order to offer more resistance to less
closely related societies (§7).
364
Third, these aggregations of people in societies do not yet constitute
republics. Mutual aid [Beystand] is the purpose of societies, but
republics have an incomparably greater purpose. In these societies all
men lived still in the state of natural freedom. Each was subject to his
own will and laws in so far as he was not constrained by others. Since
they had not yet merged their will, the will of each was entirely free.
It was within the free choice of each to make use of the advantage of
reciprocal support, or to forego the same and to live each for himself.
This freedom to step out of society at will is common to all societies
which have no overlord, or which do not live under the laws of a
republic. Particularly, however, the difference between societies and
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while the former have not. When therefore the societies compel one
of their members to conform to their purposes and to the social
compacts, this occurs according to the laws and the condition of war,
not however according to the nature of a supreme power (§9).
It may be asked whether it were not possible that men could have
lived in the condition of natural freedom in such societies, without
creating republics. In my opinion that is precisely the question which
is put in theology when is is asked whether it were not possible that
men might have continued in the state of innocence, .... (§10).
Rather is it probable that increasing vice and license, which disturbed
the internal peace of these societies, was the immediate cause of
adopting civic laws and institutions. When such disorders occurred
the most reputable and reasonable must naturally have set themselves
up as arbiters, in order to abate the evils and to restore peace. .... This
was a way to laws, or a beginning of them. The approach to civic
institutions became closer and closer, while people were probably not
conscious of it. ... (§11).
The actual institution of republics was probably not after one fashion,
but (1) through the growth of patriarchal power into actual
overlordship (§12); (2) through the respect and eminence which
certain men gained in their societies (§13); (3) through instruction of
the people by skilled and experienced men, in the ways of attaining
the comforts of human life (§ 14); (4) the leaders of new colonies
have thereby at the same time founded states (§15). .... The earliest
states were small monarchies, these being the most natural transition
from freedom to civic institutions (§16). All these little monarchies
were very mild and differed very little from the condition of natural
freedom. .... The people in their assemblies always retained the
law-giving power in their hands. .... The kings and princes had only
the right to propose and to convince by argument (vide Tacitus,
Germania, chap. xi). Only in time of war had the magistrates,
according to the testimony of Julius Caesar (de bello Gal., lib. vi),
right over life and death. This however was demanded by the nature
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this slight removal of the first states from the condition of natural
freedom, as well as from the unobserved growth of the civic
organization, it follows in my opinion indubitably that men never
chose to subject themselves to a severe form of government. This
intention of the peoples is also founded in the nature of the case. Men
would have been the most insane fools if they had been willing
deliberately to exchange their most precious possession, freedom, for
a government under which they would be slaves. The will of the
peoples, upon entrance into republics, was thus doubtless this: that
they would surrender their natural freedom and subject themselves to
the government and laws of another only in so far as necessary for the
ultimate purpose of the republics. Who however would deny that this
will of the peoples must not be regarded in each and every
government?
365 Besides this, the impulse to dominate over others is
not grounded in human nature. It is merely a consequence of a
mediocre understanding. Men undoubtedly presuppose that they wish
to be Riled by a perfect understanding. This advantage, this quality,
can alone move them to intrust to another the government over
themselves. Indeed, since finally God has put us in the world with
equal freedom, dignity, and rights, I derive from all this the
conclusion that it is the duty and obligation of every government to
limit the natural freedom of its subjects, only in so far as the ultimate
purpose of republics requires, and that always the best government is
the one which without interference with the ultimate purpose of
republics most nearly approaches natural freedom. This conclusion,
which follows from the origin of republics, I regard as a fundamental
principle, which I shall often use in treating the sciences of
government (§18).
Justi appears to have entertained no doubt of the cogency and conclusivcness of this
patchwork of guesses and irrelevancies and non-sequiiurs. In contrast with Schröder,
Justi had exchanged the theological for a pseudo-rationalistic major premise. There
is no change in the finality, for practical purposes, of the pseudo-absolutism which
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believing that an adult accustomed to reflection could ever have rested content with
the puerilities of either argument. We flatter ourselves, however, by underestimating
the capacity even of the sophisticated mind for self-deception. The psychological
situation, in the case both of Schröder and of Justi, was first the unquestioned
concrete datum, the existing absolutistic state; and second, the problem, to find a
thread of association which would act as binding-twine and hold together with this
datum the remaining assortment of ideas in the minds of the authors themselves and
of their contemporaries. The effectiveness of the notions which proved to serve this
purpose was evidently derived, not from logic but from suggestion. The datum
“absolutistic state” was no more deduced from Schröder’s or Justi’s premises than
the earth was deduced from Atlas. A plausible justification for the cameralistic state
was set up, not so much in the uncritical explanation of its origin, as in the
presumption that it was supernaturally devoted and adapted to its purpose of serving
the general interest.
Throughout Justi’s writings the idea of the common good, as the ultimate end of the
state, repeatedly recurs. The implications of the idea are indefinite, but it
unquestionably contains elements which went into the structure of later democratic
conceptions.
366 A suspensive veto, so to speak, was held over these democratic
elements by the inveterate assumption that the government was actually conforming
to its destiny of preternatural wisdom and righteousness in the interest of all
concerned, whatever might be the immediate appearances to the contrary. Thus the
actual order of thought in Justi’s political philosophy was, first, the state as it is must
be accepted as the ultimate human recourse for promotion of temporal happiness;
second, the details involved in the conception “temporal happiness” must be learned
by experience; third, rulers must be relied upon to show the wisdom and
righteousness requisite for setting in operation, in due time, the measures which will
secure their subjects temporal happiness.
In a later paragraph (§23) Justi emphasizes the crucial conception in this
philosophy, viz., the merging of the wills of many free individuals into a single will.
This conceit was not the democratic idea of a constantly re-established consensus
between the members of the state. It was a notion of transference of the individual
wills to the ruler, and their fusion in him into a transcendent will. This occurred once
for all. Subsequent generations had nothing to do but accept the arrangement. The use
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third chapter, as follows:
The merging of many wills into a single will is the first moral ground
of republics, and that which chiefly constitutes the civic condition. If
many wills are to be consolidated in a single will, they must all have
one and the same paramount purpose, and this chief purpose of each
must include all their special and incidental purposes. In short, those
who merge their wills must all have a common paramount purpose
which leads all their transactions. The question then is, Wherein does
this paramount purpose consist which produces the merging of the
wills in the founding and building of republics? This ultimate purpose
can be no other than the universal best [das allgemeine Beste], the
welfare of each and every one of the families which as aforesaid
merged with one another, in a word the common happiness
[gemeinschaftliche Glückscligkeit] of the whole state.
At this point a single comment will be sufficient. If Justi’s conception of the general
welfare had actually been the prime consideration in his reasoning, he would have
been forced to make it the major premise of an objective critique of the competence
of absolutism to attain the involved results. This plane of reasoning was beyond Justi.
It turns out that, in effect, the perpetuation of the absolutistic state is the ultimatum
in his system, and that the general good comes to its own only as a secondary
consideration, in so far as it can subordinate itself to the actually paramount interests
of the quasi-absolutistic governments which posed as embodiments of the welfare of
their peoples. The striking peculiarity of the transitional type of thinking which Justi
represents was not its insistence upon the welfare of the people as the ultimate aim.
It was rather its constant resort to the assumption that actual governments were more
inerrant in their pursuit of this end than any other available civic system could
possibly be. Herewith we have in principle the whole of Justi’s political philosophy.
His elaboration of it, on the institutional side, in the remainder of this volume is
merely an expansion of the corresponding sections in Staatswirthschaft. We shall
find more explicit description of civic well-being itself, as Justi conceived it, in the
second of his volumes on political philosophy.
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A general estimate of another factor in Justi’s thinking is pertinent at this point;Albion Small, The Cameralists, 343
viz., the evident line of cleavage between the technological and the idealistic
elements in his books. Justi was apparently only half-conscious, if even so much, of
the mixture of elements. On the one hand he was systematizing the actual technique
of governmental administration. On the other hand he was describing the spirit and
details of governments as they should be. If one were to read him without this
distinction in mind one might reach utterly unwarranted conclusions about the
modernness of his philosophy. The reservation must always be remembered that his
theory had no place for an ultimate appeal beyond the authority of the constituted
government, as the last resort of peoples. The government was the final moral arbiter,
against whose decrees the citizens had no recourse. This was not merely the working
condition, but the philosophical theory supported the conditions. At the same time,
parallel with this theory and practice, a body of ethical judgments was taking shape
which constituted a standard of political attainment destined presently to hail existing
rulers before the bar of a more highly evolved justice. This more far-seeing justice
shows itself in Justi’s accounts of the purposes and technique of administration. The
dilemma presented by these two elements had not yet been frankly admitted. The
French Revolution first brought it into distinct view. In a word it was this: The proper
moral standards of governments are such and such; the actual moral standards of
governments are much inferior; there is no recognized means of compelling
governments to adopt the higher standards; does the logic of the civic relation then
require men to leave moral standards at the mercy of governments, or have men a
deeper right to enforce subordination of governments to the higher sovereignty of
morals?
In the philosophy which Justi represents this inevitable conjunction of ideas had not
been reached. The two antithetical, yet necessarily related conceptions and their
corollaries were in existence side by side, but they had not been reconciled, and the
need of a reconciliation was not yet distinctly formulated.
The book just mentioned begins with a version of the same argument which was
presented in Natur und Wesen. Avoiding repetition as much as possible, we may
draw from the present volume certain details in completion of the account of Justi’s
system.
Without the proviso just urged, we should be inclined to believe we had stumbled
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The nature, essence, and ultimate purpose [Endzweck] of states are
the only criteria by which to decide what is a good government.
Passing propositions which have already been quoted in other connections, we read
(§4):
Every human being has an energy [Kraft] of his own. If many human
beings combine in a society, there results a composite energy, which
is in proportion to the number of persons. Every person in society has
a share in this composite great energy. He is thus much stronger than
the isolated man. Participation in the great energy of society is thus
the ultimate purpose of societies.
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The will of each human being is to promote his own happiness. When
therefore many human beings combine their wills, and resign to this
combined will the use of their energy, i.e., when they set over
themselves a supreme power, and subordinate their particular will to
it, there can be no other intent than that each identifies his own
happiness with the happiness of the whole society. The common
happiness is accordingly the ultimate purpose of civic structures (§5;
vide pp. 51 ff.).
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Hence arises a state, a republic, a “common being” Wesen].
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three concepts are identical, if one takes the word republic in the most
general sense, as its chief significance demands. A state or republic,
however, is a society of human beings who have combined with one
another in order to promote their common happiness under a
sovereign power; or, in other words, a state consists of many families,
that have united their energies and their will with one another in order
to combine the happiness of each particular family with the common
good (§6).
Such a society of human beings is called a people [Volk], and it is a
ground of the state without which a stale cannot be thought, that such
a people occupies a certain portion of the earth’s surface, which is
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[Land] (§8).
When a people thus unites its energy and its will, and intrusts the use
of the combined energy to the master-will; that is, when it establishes
a supreme power, this power rests in the beginning unquestionably
with the people, since it originates through the unification of their
energies and wills. The people can accordingly either exercise this
power themselves and make ordinances about that exercise, or it can
transfer such exercise to others. All power in the state springs
therefore from the people [Volk] which is always the source of the
same. The power therefore, by virtue of which the people makes
ordinances about the exercise of the supreme power, or transfers such
responsibility to others, is called the fundamental power
[Grundgewalt] of the people, and is distinguished from the active
supreme power, which originates only through the ordination of the
former. This fundamental power of the people is a part of the essence
of the state, and is always present, even with the most unlimited
supreme power. It can be overthrown only by destruction of the state,
either through total subjugation by an alien enemy, or through internal
tyranny (§9).
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When a people, by virtue of its fundamental power, determines how
the active supreme power shall be exercised, it ordains fundamental
laws. These institutions for the exercise of the supreme power are
called the government, and the external ways and means in which the
supreme power is exercised are called the form of government.
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form of government of a state can therefore be established only
through the fundamental laws (§10).
In the establishment of the fundamental laws and of the form of
government, the fundamental power of the people acts as law-giver.
But when this fundamental power, according to the standards of the
established fundamental laws and form of government, makes over
the supreme power to others, it acts not as law-giver, but as party to
a contract, i.e., it makes a contract [Vertrag] with the assumers of the
supreme power, to the effect that they will take upon themselves and
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fundamental law. The fundamental power of the people can thus not
be a judge over the active supreme power, but all affairs and
controversies between them must be adjudicated according to the
nature of the contract (§11).
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The supreme power of the state consists in the use of the united
energy by a united will (§5). The supreme power then amounts to the
performance of two great activities, viz., law-giving and the execution
of law. Hence the supreme power may be divided into two branches,
each of which may be subdivided (§13). The various combinations of
these subdivisions give the mixed forms of government (§14).
The body thus formed has at most only the means [Vermögen] of
activity. To be really active, it must have a peculiar ground of
movement or activity. This can be none other than love of the
fatherland or of the form of government. The ground of all moral
actions of men is self-love, and the state, as a moral body, can have
no other ground of activity than love for itself, or for its essence and
form. This love, which is so natural in itself, must fill rulers and
ruled, and thereby all parts of the civic body will be vitalized (§15).
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Although self-love is the ground of all moral action of human beings,
yet this self-love requires very judicious guidance if human beings are
really to attain happiness. Man must be virtuous, and live according
to the natural laws if he wishes to be happy. Just so the civic body
would fail to attain its happiness if love for the Fatherland were not
judiciously guided toward this end. The moving spring of virtue is
necessary, and this virtue consists in fulfilment of duties toward the
state and fellow-citizens (§16).
The form of government is the special nature of each civic body. Each
body can move only in accordance with its special nature. Each form
of government requires its special spring of action, e.g., monarchy,
honor; aristocracy, moderation; democracy, love for equality (vide
Staatswirthschaft, above, p. 320) (§17).
All forms of government are equally good, so long as they preserve
their ground of activity and their springs of action in full strength
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If the springs of action are corrupted, well-organized mixed forms of
government are preferable (§19).
Good organization of the mixed governmental forms depends on a
just balance between the different branches of the sovereign power
(§20).
Despotism is not a special form of government, but merely an abuse
(§21).
Every state consists of rulers and ruled. This division alone is
essential, and is peculiar to all states. All other divisions are merely
accidental. In monarchical states these two classes are ruler and
subjects. In republics all are subjects of the supreme power, but not
of the persons at the head of the government (§23).
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The people, which in the democracy is everything, shrinks in
importance in the mixed forms of government, until in the aristocracy
and the monarchy it is only a very trifling something. Finally, through
abuse of monarchy in tyranny the people and its fundamental powers
are reduced to nothing. The people consists of thinking beings. A
thinking being, however, can never wholly and blindly give over the
care for its happiness to another. The people therefore should in all
states be something (§27).
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The sovereign power and the people are parts of a whole because the
one necessarily demands the presence of the other, and because
neither can exist without the other. So soon therefore as the one part
undertakes anything which is harmful to the other it harms itself
(§29).
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The substance of all duties of the ruler is accordingly to make his
people happy, or to unite the happiness of each several citizen with
the general good. All duties of people and subjects may be reduced to
the formula, to promote all the ways and means adopted by the ruler
for their happiness by their obedience, fidelity, and diligence (§30).
The happiness of individuals and of the state consists of freedom,
internal strength, good conditions, and security (§31).
Freedom may be separated into two concepts, political and civic; or
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free when it is independent, i.e., when it is neither wholly nor
partially subject to another state. The citizen is free when he can
without hindrance realize his will. But the citizen has merged his will
into another, and this combined will can express itself only through
the laws. Consequently the citizen is free when he suffers no other
limitation of his will than through the laws. The citizen is therefore
really free because he is restrained by nothing except rules for his
happiness, rules to which every free and thoughtful being must
subject himself (§32).
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A ruler must not impair the reasonable freedom of his subjects, nor
allow it to be impaired by his favorites and servants. No one in his
whole state must be directly or indirectly compelled to do or to
forbear from doing anything which the laws, made for the welfare of
the state, do not prescribe (§39).
The property of the subjects must be the most sacred and inviolable
object in the eyes of the ruler and his servants. Hence the ruler may
regard it as his greatest glory if in his private transactions the subjects
refuse to make over their property to him. That is always the most
royal mark of the goodness of a government (§40).
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The ruler and his ministers should neither directly nor indirectly
interfere with the due process of law (§41).
Never, except in the most extraordinary need, should the
contributions of the subjects be increased (§42).
No war should be fought unless the preservation of the state makes it
unavoidable (§43).
The text is then divided into five books, viz.:
I. On the ultimate purpose of a good government, and consequently the general idea
of a good government.
II. On the fundamental arrangements by means of which governments are made
good by nature.
III. On the goodness of the government which springs from its own moderation.
IV. On the wisdom of a good government.
V. The errors and faults of bad governments.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 349
It is unnecessary to go into further details of the argument. From these
generalizations it would be easy to anticipate the substance of the elaboration of each
topic. The state which Justi outlines is an organization of people whose conceded
legal and moral rights do not include a voice in making the laws which they must
obey, and they do not include legal or moral right to call ruler or ministers to account
if the laws which they decree are unjust, or if their administration of them is
oppressive. The few further passages to be cited will serve chiefly to illustrate this
proposition. In general the fact is that Justi’s ideal of the achievements of a good state
was in the main intelligent, if no account is made of the stultification involved in this
conception of the means by which the ideal was to be attained. But in such a case we
cannot separate the end thus abruptly from the means. Freedom to do our own
experimenting with freedom is one of the proximate ends which thinking beings
propose to themselves if their thinking is not suppressed; and this freedom to find our
own way to something that may be thought of as an ultimate freedom is a more
importunate aim than the conceivable ultimate freedom, if it could be conferred by
a superior power.
Justi lays down the major premise: “No one can rule over reasonable and free
beings except with the intention of promoting their welfare and making them happy”
(p. 33).
Of the possible meanings of this sententious proposition, the substance of Justi’s
system forces us to select this version, viz., It is impossible to suppose that a ruler
would desire anything but the best good of his subjects. That is, it was a purely ad
captandum appeal for acquiescence in the prevailing type of absolutism. With so
much granted, all the rest of the reasoning is unanswerable.
380 Once given an absolute
ruler with his existence justified, and no logic can depose him. The only refutation
possible is through destruction of the major premise; and of course this was the actual
first step in abolishing absolutism everywhere. Rulers being human are both
intellectually so narrow and morally so fallible that they are incapable in the long run
of performing the function which absolutism assumes. Then another functionary and
another technique and another philosophy must be substituted.
Justi begins his detailed discussion with a proposition which reflects the
fundamental political conception of which cameralism was an incident; viz., “To
govern is to guide the actions of other people in accordance with certain purposes.”
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The affair, in which Justi was engaged, both as advocate and as bureau official, wasAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 350
the operation of a legislative and executive organization conceived as something over
and above and superior to the people, although perforce in certain relations of and for
the people. So far as the relation had been thought out and realized, it was not by the
people, and it was for them only so far as the persons who wielded the power of the
organization were sufficient centers of light and leading to use it for the real benefit
of the nation in a democratic sense. The first and typical idea and aim was to magnify
the governing power itself, and the rest of the nation was accordingly rated as
tributary to that paramount purpose. Justi proceeds to build on his foundations of
political philosophy after this fashions.
Those who govern other men in the unobserved way, if they are
rightly constituted and honorable, will always have as their object the
best good of those whom they rule. .... If the ruled discover that they
are controlled in another spirit, no matter how simple they are, they
will sooner or later break the fetters. Invisible or unconscious
government must consequently have the best good pf the people at
heart; or, what amounts to the same thing, it must succeed in keeping
the people under the spell of assumption that its best good is the
foremost purpose. We have then to inquire what must be the ultimate
aims of those who openly govern other men (pp. 35, 36).
Thereupon Justi constructs an argument along these speculative lines; not an
induction of the actual character of states as they are, not a frank idealization of kinds
of government as he thought they ought to be, not even a modest inference as to the
requirements to which governments must eventually conform. Instead of either of
these, he actually expatiates upon considerations partly of the second, partly of the
third, types, and then, as though such considerations were pertinent evidence, he
derives the basic inference that governments as they are conform to those
specifications of morals and long-term expediency, which entitle them to the implicit
acquiescence of subjects. In short, his major premise is that actual governments are
essentially what they would be if the men in power were divinely good and wise.
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Justi constantly appealed to religious sanctions for beliefs and actions. No evidence
appears that this was a phenomenon with deeper roots than mere acceptance of the
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of argumentum ad hominem which would meet with least express opposition. It is
accordingly a matter of course that he relies upon the claim that goodness will in the
long run be successful, and badness unsuccessful. Upon this ground he urges that no
ruler would be so unwise as to rule simply in his own selfish interest. Even
Machiavelli, he thinks, did not teach that (p. 36 et passim)
383 and the worst tyrants
were probably not primarily enemies of their people, but they found that without
intending to rouse their hostility they had done so, and thereafter supposed
themselves to be unsafe unless they ruled with a high hand. This is all a priori
reasoning, monarchy being taken for granted, and the attempt being made to show
that the aim of monarchy must be the common good. There is no trace, even in the
last book of the volume, which at hasty glance might seem to furnish the exception,
of a genuine attempt to measure the strength of this probability by induction. In a
word, as Justi expresses it, the outcome of this a-priori reasoning is, that because it
is stupid and wrong for a ruler to govern with selfish aims, therefore, “His final
purpose can be no other than to guide the ruled to their best good, to promote their
welfare by wise measures—in a word, to make them happy.”
The chapter ends with a homiletical exhortation apparently intended both as a play
upon the suggestibility of the people on the one hand, and as the most direct appeal
permitted by good form to the better impulses of princes:
When a ruler in this manner makes his subjects and at the same time
himself happy, something grand is before him in their eyes. That is
the honor, which accompanies all his ways and the glory which
attends the footsteps of all his actions. How beautiful, how lordly,
how glorious, how commendable is it to govern men, when one
makes them happy! That is the greatest, the most exalted of all human
activities, to which a reasoning being can attain, and other kinds of
human honor and glory are not to be compared with it (p. 50).
The method of proving that men united in societies for the sake of promoting their
happiness is equally speculative, but the more pertinent fact is that the conclusion did
not go so far as to justify the continuance of an effectively ideological attitude of
subjects toward their governments after they were once formed. For practical
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to promote their happiness, but more than that, they must in the last resort trust the
good intentions of the government even when it is not apparently working in their
interest. That is, Justi posited absolutism mitigated by laws which the government
itself had made, by considerations of prudence, of religion, of benevolence, of
reputation, each and all to be valued in case of collision, not by the people, but by the
ruler.
This is the typical confusion of ideas in the philosophy of absolutism, and especially
in the conflict in Justi’s mind between tradition and a valid estimate of social values.
His judgment of political ends reads almost like fundamental democracy. The
limitation of his reasoning is found in his inability to accept the conclusion of social
logic that the historically developed means of attaining human ends must, in the long
run, command the approval of the groups in which they function, or be repudiated.
He could not advance beyond the dogma that the government, as constituted, must
be accepted by the people as an automatically self-correcting agency, not to be
interfered with by the subjects. That is, in creating it men acted as practical
utilitarians. In their attitude toward it since it has been created, they must be
essentially acquiescent. Throughout Justi’s writings standards of governmental action
are expressed which are prophetic of inevitable change of attitude toward
governments. The crucial matter for his views as a political philosophy, however, is
that these ideals are scheduled merely as standards which it is proper for the people
to desire, and right and wise for rulers to adopt, but not as rights which citizens are
free to enforce.
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Then Justi reiterates his generality that the common happiness of the state depends
on “the three ideas, freedom, inner strength, and security.” Then these ideas are
expanded in a way which makes them quite compatible with the virtual absolutism
previously assumed (pp. 65 ff.).
The discussion which follows (pp. 67–109) of the means of securing these three
elements of happiness, is in substance nearly identical with the treatment of the same
subject in Staatswirthschaft and we pass over all but a few incidental variations.
For example, the “law of parsimony,” of which so much has been made in later
economic theory, is recognized in the fundamental theorems about political means,
viz., first, the means must correspond with the nature of the thing to be attained;
second, of the possible means they must be the best; third, they must be the easiest,
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a greater force, which might be adequately brought about by a lesser” (p. 67); fourth,
they must also be just, “for reason, justice, and virtue command us not to apply bad
means for good ends.” “These are to be regarded as so many fundamental principles
of a good government, by disregard of which one will always fall into notable errors”
(p. 68). Justi nowhere contemplates any more effective sanctions of these virtuous
generalizations than the conscience of the monarch. If he is not so minded, there is
no appeal except to the inscrutable workings of divine Providence.
Another betrayal of the abortiveness of the conception of freedom posited in Justi’s
philosophy occurs in his elaboration of the concept in §85. He says: “Freedom
consists in the unhindered exercise of his (the citizen’s) will. But the citizens who
constitute a state have merged their separate wills in a single will. This single will
can show itself in no other manner than through the laws.” Thus freedom is defined
only in the same breath to be denied. In the state which Justi contemplated, freedom
had only an imaginary existence: It was a fiction of the philosophy of consolation
applied as a balm to the feelings of subjects whenever they were wounded. The
reality which occupied the place Of freedom was just as much tether for the
individual will as the will of the monarch, expressed through laws which he made,
saw fit to allow.
The light in which the factor of population was contemplated in Justi’s philosophy
appears in the same context. It was primarily a military consideration, and only
secondarily industrial. That is, in facing the prime problem of the strength and
security of the state against foreign aggression, the necessary factors are found to be,
first, well situated and fortified territory, and enough of it; second, a sufficient
population living in such close community that they can act effectively together. For,
says Justi (84):
Few people, scattered over a wide territory, cannot repulse enemies
invading from all directions. Thus they have much less activity than
the same number of people who live closer together in a smaller
country. It is easy to show mathematically how much weaker a
million people are who live scattered over a thousand square miles
than another million occupying two hundred and fifty square miles,
other circumstances being equal. It is consequently essential to the
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measure of its greatness. Accordingly, the internal strength of a state
depends upon the situation of its territory, upon the number of its
inhabitants, upon the goods at its disposal, and upon the talents and
moral qualities of the people.
Enlarging, two pages later (p. 86), upon the second of these conditions, Justi adds:
Two million people have of course more aggregate energy and
strength than one million, other things being equal.
The doctrine of population, taken in this obvious relation, would seem to have had
much less of the character of a distinctive dogma than the commentators upon the
history of economic theory have represented.
The same may be said of the factor of wealth in this philosophy of the state. It was
less a dictum asserting some occult potency of wealth than a matter-of-course
reckoning upon the obvious. Thus Justi says (p. 87):
The internal strength of the state depends further upon riches of all
sorts which are required for the needs and conveniences of human
life. .... Just as it is beyond doubt that those states have a much more
permanent ground for their welfare whose soil is by nature adapted to
the production of the necessities of life, so may we also assert that,
other things being equal, that state is always the strongest and
happiest which has to satisfy the fewest needs from other states. Such
a state is in no way dependent upon other peoples, and it will have
within itself all the means which are demanded for strength. A good
government must therefore give its weightiest attention to the
production of such riches and abundance of goods within the country.
Justi continues (p. 88):
I have here with great deliberation based the internal strength of the
state not upon riches in gold and silver, and upon the ways that lead
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wealth in goods. This wealth in goods is also alone the true wealth of
the state which is requisite for internal strength. The Spaniards, who
imagined that they would be the lords of the whole world, if they had
all the treasures of America in their possession, and for that reason
entirely neglected wealth in goods, were in gross error. With all their
treasures they have since been the poorest nation in Europe, and they
could not be anything else, since they lacked the real wealth of
peoples. .... If, however, a state possesses the real wealth in goods,
and is sufficiently populous, it can have all the internal strength of
which it is capable, with neither gold nor silver nor commerce nor
other intercourse with foreign nations, in so far as this isolation is
compatible with its natural situation, its circumstances, and its form
of government. .... Riches in gold and silver is only a relative wealth
of the state, which relates entirely to commerce and the
interconnection with other peoples, and is necessary merely on that
account. It belongs to the external strength of the state, and to
aggressive power [Angriff], but not to internal strength and defensive
power, to which alone I now refer, because aggression is not to be
included in the happiness of a state. If a state finds it in accordance
with its circumstances and happiness to have such connections and
intercourse with other nations, then its internal strength will require
that it shall seek to export as much as possible of its surplus in order
to increase its relative riches in gold and silver. Under these
circumstances that is the strongest state which has to look to other
states for the fewest satisfactions of its wants, and which exports the
most of its surplus.
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In confirmation of the general thesis as to the qualified absolutism which was the
ultimate term of Justi’s political philosophy, we may quote from a following section.
Having elaborated the proposition that the internal strength of a state depends, first,
on the fundamental virtue of obedience in the subjects, Justi continues (p. 93):
The moral quality of rulers, which is demanded for the internal
strength of the state, may be expressed in one word. It is wisdom. ButAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 356
this concept contains very much. If rulers are wise, they are
everything necessary to make their state strong and their people
happy. This quality, moreover, is so essential to the strength of the
state that all previous meanis to internal strength in the largest
measure lose their force, so soon as wisdom is lacking in rulers. ....
The perfection and wisdom of the government is accordingly the
chief means arm the foremost quality Whereupon the true power and
internal strength of the state rest. It is the soul of all previously
mentioned means, and it gives to them  their fulleffect. .... The
wisdom and perfection of a government, however, consists in the
positing of a wisely chosen plan and programme of government and
the genuine fundamental rules in government by the monarch himself,
through his own insight, not merely through his ministers, and the
concentration of all affairs in his strong hand; in his wise choice of
ministers and servants, and assignment of each to a post of duty in
accordance with his qualities and capabilities; in holding all business
and affairs in the most precise order and coherence and the fighting
forces in like order and discipline; and finally in putting the state in
the utmost possible condition of preparation against all the
misfortunes and accidents which must be anticipated. If a state is
governed in this way, and if it possesses at che same time the
before-mentioned means and qualities for internal strength, it is
certainly the most perfect machine for exerting an unspeakable
energy. .... Meanwhile, although a perfectly wise and complete
government will never exist in the world, it is always an indubitable
truth that, el two states which are otherwise completely equal, that
one will always overcome the other, the government of which is most
wisely and perfectly conducted.
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In the introduction to the second book, on “The Fundamental Constitution of States,
by Means of Which Governments Are by Nature Good,” Justi promises to sketch “a
sort of Platonic republic, which to be sure never will be realized. Meanwhile it is
never useless to know how far human provision can go in a probable way in the
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fulfilling the promise Justi estimates in some detail the merits and defects of different
types of government (pp. 132–82). If this passage were read without checking it up
by the rest of his political philosophy, the conclusion would be necessary that he was
in favor of a form of government more like that of England in the Victorian period
than that of the Stuarts (p. 175). It would falsify the record to explain away the
implications of this chapter. They are plainly and rather unreservedly democratic in
the modern sense with the monarchical element retained as an offset to democratic
faults and inefficiencies. If the whole system were contained in a compendium a
thousand years old, the higher critics might without remorse assign this chapter to
some interpolator of strange doctrines. The actual explanation is in harmony with
traits which are quite evident in Justi here and there, particularly in the
Staatswirthschaft.  He allowed himself short flights of fancy which he did not take
much care to guard from confusion with his working technology. Inasmuch as he
opened the discussion with the notification that he would end it with a castle in the
air, it is easy to infer that his feet left the ground much earlier than he proposed. He
simply permitted himself to rhapsodize. The chapter is half-conscious Wahrheit und
Dichtung throughout. It is of a piece with the ideal ethics which the author had
previously held up to rulers as a righteous standard, with, no thought of winning for
it available political sanctions. He meant it, in the unofficial, irresponsible
compartments of his mind which were open to the play of imagination. He was
sincere about these unassimilated conceits, with a sort of other-worldly longing that
took refuge in them from literal affairs; but as he gave partial notification in the
confession above quoted, he did not expect to be held accountable for supposing that
such visions could ever be actualized. Even in the course of this excursus, when he
is speaking of the checks which must be put upon the different branches of
government, he touches his familiar earth with the reservation —
The executive power, however, or the king, must, to be sure, always
be so sacred and so inviolate that he himself can never be required to
render such an account of his acts (p. 167).
In his summary Justi says:
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constitution of a mixed governmental form are so ordered, as above
pictured, we may declare that the government is good in its nature.
The king has all power which is requisite for execution, and on
reasonable grounds he can demand no more. In all external affairs of
state he has completely free hands, and nothing hinders him from
taking the resolves and measures which he regards as necessary for
the true welfare of his state. Since in matters of execution he is not
bound to obtain the consent of anyone, he can give to all his
undertakings the utmost swiftness, vigor, and efficiency, and it is his
own affair if his intentions and measures do not remain secret. In
short he has all power to do good, but no power at all to do evil (p.
173).
Coming to the avowedly Utopian part of his discussion, he begins as follows (p.
183):
Is then a governmental form possible, in which no errors and
imperfections would inhere, but which by virtue of the excellence of
its fundamental constitution would represent a type of government
which by its very nature would be always and completely good? If the
question were to be taken in all its severity we should be obliged to
answer without reserve in the negative. People themselves are subject
to a thousand limitations and weaknesses. All their actions are led by
their passions, and all too often do these passions raise a storm which
drives the wisest and best men hither and thither like so much chaff.
How is it to be expected, then, that people can erect a mode of
government which in the strict sense would be completely perfect ?
It is people who erect governments, and who are governed. They are
the stuff for the whole work. How can a highly perfect work be
composed of such meager and feeble material ? If, however, we
understand by the question, whether a form of government is possible
which is freed from all the major mistakes and failures which we so
often find in civic institutions, a form which can assure to citizens all
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nature they can ever attain, and which at the same time possesses all
the strength and permanence against contingencies within and without
of which a state is capable, then we must answer, Yes. We said above
that we would construct a sort of Platonic republic, which it would be
ridiculous to expect to realize in the present condition of realms and
states. Nevertheless, we hope to give our proposal such a form that
fewer faults can be found with it than with such idealistic structures
in the past.
Reducing Justi’s fantasy to the lowest terms, it is as follows (pp. 184–207):
1. We must take men as they are, with all their desires and passions.
Accordingly, when a reasonable and moral people, living by the side
of similar peoples, wishes to choose a constitution, it must base its
plan on the existence of these desires and passions. They must be
reckoned upon in the plan as the means of making the structure of the
state strong and durable. If we except love, which is rather a natural
impulse than a passion, the strongest among all human passions is the
desire for prestige [Vorzug], or the passion for honor and glory.
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Nothing is so natural to man as this passion. The impulse which the
wise Originator of nature implanted in every man, to hold his own
being most precious, in order that he might take pleasure in
maintaining himself and in fulfilling the designs of the Creator, is that
which brings forth the longing for prestige. Consequently this is the
passion of which chief use will be made in a wise design for a civic
constitution (p. 184).
2. Yet we must seek to establish and maintain virtue. All passions
may be evil as well as good, in the degree in which they are guided
and governed; and when they are left to themselves they always tend
rather to bad than to good. The desire for prestige needs therefore
another moving spring, whereby it is guided and, as it were, geared,
in order that it may be held back from excesses. This second moving
spring is virtue (p. 185).
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partly of democracy, would serve best in employing these two motive
springs in all their strength. I see no probability that virtue would be
preserved in a form composed of king and democracy. I would
therefore forego the efficiency of a monarchy for the virtue of a
republic. To be sure, Sparta had kings, and virtue was perfectly
maintained there. But our times are so different from those of the
Spartan republic, that we could not think of such a thing as subjecting
the king to the judicial judgment of the people, and his morals and
management to the guardians of the state. Our times are so
accustomed to combining with the royal dignity great outward
splendor and display, that a king without this frivolous, to be sure,
yet, on account of prejudice, necessary glitter, would be the
laughingstock of all his neighbors. It will, however, never be possible
to banish vice from a state if it contains that degree of luxury which
so closely borders on vice, if the king and his court are not subject to
the institutions of the state for the maintenance of virtue (p. 187).
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4. It is non-essential what marks of distinction a government adopts
to stimulate the desire for prestige, so long as sufficient skill is used
to create a prejudice in their favor. To this end three means must be
adopted: (1) the symbols of honor must be publicly bestowed; (2)
they must be gjven for actual merit only; (3) they must not be made
too common. Under these conditions a laurel wreath is as effective as
a golden crown bestudded with gems. The reason why our times show
so few heroic deeds is that our marks of distinction are not bestowed
according to these specifications (p. 188).
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5. Nobility should not be hereditary, and being obtained for life only
it will be a powerful spur to virtue (p. 190).
6. Virtue must be maintained by laws and morals which are identical,
and there must be a moral censorship [Sittenrichter]. This college
must consist of the most eminent, virtuous, and honor-able men in the
state, and the members must have a right of veto upon an election by
the people to a vacancy in the college in case they know anything to
the discredit of the person proposed. These censors must not have the
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protectors of the fundamental constitution of the state, the defenders
of the laws, the maintainers of virtue and good morals, the promoters
of skill, of the arts, and of science. In all these particulars they must
have a quite unlimited power subject to the fundamental laws, a
power which should extend indeed over all the administrative
colleges of the state, and even over the representative of the people.
They must have power to suspend or depose and imprison any
member of the government who is guilty of treasonable or corrupting
practices. There must be in front of the place of assemblage of this
college a receptacle in which citizens could deposit testimony about
anything of which the censors should be informed (p. 191).
7. In the form of government which I here propose no one has a
peculiar interest in the welfare of the whole people. It is therefore not
necessary that the people should possess law-giving power. The
power of the people is never free from deficiencies and faults. The
people [Volk], however, which has (sic) little capacity for governing,
is excellently endowed for selecting those who may be charged with
governing. I consequently propose that the whole work of
government, both law-giving and execution, should be reserved for
the personal nobility, and that the people should have no part in
governing beyond election of the officials (p. 194).
8. The common rabble should not be allowed to take part in elections.
Electoral right should be based upon the rates paid to the public
treasury. The man who pays 20 Thaler yearly should have one vote;
he who pays 100 Thaler yearly should have two votes, and for each
additional 100 Thaler there should be one vote. This would not only
be just in itself, but it would bring about a more willing payment of
the rates. The personal nobility, as the only class eligible for election,
would not be permitted to vote, because of their self-interest. In large
states a representative system of election must be adopted (p. 196).
9. The number of the nobility should be one hundred and fifty in
small states, three hundred in medium states, and six hundred in large
states. Each of these should receive from the state an annual
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10. The officials should be divided in the first place into three chief
colleges: (a) for law-giving, (h) for execution, (c) for judicial
functions. Members should be divided into three classes, one class
retiring from office each year (p. 200).
11. There should be in addition as many other colleges as are ait
present customary in European states, but they should be subor-dinate
to the three principal colleges (p. 201).
12. In case of disagreement between the three chief colleges, which
cannot be arranged by conferences within thirty days, it shall be the
duty of the chairman of the colleges, on pain of banishment, to lay the
matter before the college of censors. The latter must then summon the
whole body of the nobility to investigate the difficulty and to decide
it by majority vote. The contending colleges must adopt the decision
at once, for the total nobility is the body in which the unlimited power
should reside, although it does not exercise it except in an extremity.
Even then it must sometimes proceed by choosing from its own
number a dictator, who for a short period should unite in his own
person all might and power, in order to save the republic from
threatened destruction (p. 202).
13. Universal liability to military service for a term of six years would
be necessary (p. 204).
It is not worth while to analyze the implications of this conceit, as Justi himself a
third time (p. 206) reminds his readers that it is aside from the serious purpose of his
book. Even the specifications of this Utopia, however, serve to emphasize the literal
preconceptions of Justi’s working philosophy. It was in the first place a presumption
of static order in the state; second, a reliance upon some institutional absolute; third,
an overestimate of the relative importance of civic structure in the whole economy
of life.
Passing to Book III, “On the Goodness of the Government Due to Its Own
Moderation,” Justi begins with the proposition that if we cannot have such
“governments good by nature,” the only hope of good government is in the self-
enforced moderation of such governments as actually exist, “for every unlimited and
great power is by its very nature terrible, and it has harmful effects on the subjects (p.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 363
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In dealing with a body of thought which from our modern point of view is so
crowded with half-developed and arbitrarily correlated ideas, there is always danger
of making the anomalies more extreme than they were. No other interpretation can
be put on this section, however, than the following: first, we must in practice take for
granted the absolutism of government; second, “a government which lias unlimited
power in its hands, and can use that power as it pleases, can never be good unless it
moderates this power by its own initiative” (p. 211). In other words, this is the literal
formulation of the fundamental political conception which is known by the
proverbial phrase “benevolent despotism.” This formula expresses the cameralistic
conception, as the legend, l’état c’est moi,. symbolizes the ancien régime in France.
Justi assumes that the world being what it is, an absolutism embodied in a king is a
necessity. Yet many things go to make up that other conception, “happiness,” which
royal absolutism might easily frustrate. This philosophy does not thereupon
reconsider its conclusion that political absolutism is necessary. It leaves “happiness”
at the mercy of absolutism, with the hope that the absolute monarch actually will be
merciful. The present section then is virtually a series of memoranda from the side
of “happiness,” calling the attention of absolute monarchs to points which they will
observe if they want their rule to result in the largest output of advantage for the state,
in distinction from their own absolutism.
In other words, this political philosophy started with the lame and impotent
assumption that it is desirable for absolutism to be good, rather than the assumption
that absolutism is not a good. Then it proceeded along the cautious path of specifying
how an absolutism would conduct itself if it were good. If we were immediately
engaged in tracing the course of political evolution, we should have here an
important clue to the process. Even these dutiful reminders had a cumulative force.
Specifications of happiness presently came to have another logical value. The
inference drawn was no longer that it is desirable for the absolute government to
promote these things, but that an absolute government is intolerable because it can
jeopardize these things. This is the gist of the whole matter involved in this part of
Justi’s argument, and we shall notice only one or two details.
The first chapter of Book III is dedicated to proof of the proposition that “unlimited
and great power is in its nature terrible and dangerous.” It takes as its point of
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moralizings and mental philosophizings which form the medium of the discussion
need not be called to account. For our purposes it is enough to set down the
specifications of danger which Justi discovered. In the first place, he concluded that
even virtuous men who are able to extend their power fall into the way of thinking
that such extension of power is good in itself, regardless of consequences to others.
As Montesquieu says, “Even virtue needs limitations” (p. 213). Great power tends
to become arbitrary power (p. 214). Hence such power is always to be feared (p.
215). The outcome of arbitrary exercise of power is despotism in which the mere will
of the ruler is the highest law (p. 215). The whole power of the state in the hands of
one person is in itself to be feared, apart from its resting upon the will of the ruler
alone (p. 216). Platitudes are Justi’s specialty, but he seldom puts it on exhibit more
plainly than at this point.
The same level of bathos is maintained in the following chapter “On the
Moderation and Fixing of the Will Whereby an Unlimited Government Becomes
Good.” It consists of such “copy-book commonplaces” as these:
The misuse of unlimited power which is so harmful to the state
consists in the exercise of the will of the ruler according to his
pleasure and caprice (p. 222); hence a good unlimited government
must have two chief qualities: (a) its will must be moderated, (b) its
will must be constant (p. 223); the proper moderation of the will of
an unlimited government is through the guidance of reason, which
has no other aim than the best good of the state (p 223); a good ruler
must clearly distinguish his personal will from his will as a ruler (p.
224); even if convinced that his personal will is a good will, a wise
ruler will not try to make it his governmental will; e.g., he will not try
to impose his religion upon his subjects (p. 226); constancy of will in
the government is necessary to prevent uncertainty among the
governed (pp. 227–32).
In the same general tone Justi proceeds, in chap, iii, to schedule “the fundamental
principles and rules of a good government.” These turn out to be:
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that of benevolence and moderation [Gelindigkeit] (p. 233); (2) Since
it is the aim and duty of a good government to make the people
happy, one of its chief principles must be to make the people rich (p.
237);
390 (3) General diffusion of wealth, rather than its concentration
in a few hands, is to be promoted (p. 239); (4) Fraud and treachery as
devices of statecraft are to be rejected on grounds both of morals and
of utility (p. 241);
391 (5) Cunning not involving treachery may be used
(p. 242); (6) “A good government will observe five fundamental
rules: (a) To assure the subjects a reasonable freedom, (b) To regard
their property as inviolable, (c) To withhold its hands from
interference with justice, (d) Not to increase the imposts, (e) Except
in actual necessity not to declare war (p. 243).
The fourth chapter of the book, on the restraint which a good government should
exercise in the matter of expense, is merely a variation of commonplaces which
governments of the type that he had in mind observed or not, according to the temper
of their rulers.
Book IV, “On the Wisdom of a Good Government,” is a very slight variation upon
corresponding passages in Staatswirthschaft. It contains nothing which in principle
modifies our previously expressed estimate of Justi’s political philosophy. As we
intimated above,
392 Justi’s confessed knowledge of abuses in actual operation did not
lead him to the conclusion which has since become self-evident, viz., that the
quasi-absolutism of the eighteenth century was an intolerable anachronism, In the last
book, Justi catalogues enough faults of that type of government to condemn it
without remorse, but his expressed inferences amount only to the impotent reflection
that rulers who permit such abuses ought to be ashamed of themselves, and God
probably has in reserve for them such averted glances as are thinkable in the case of
his anointed. It would be profitless to rehearse specifications of delinquencies which
had no further meaning for human programmes.	"&)*
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We now come to the most peculiar division of cameralistic theory, the portion
which, next to the fundamental absolutistic political philosophy, contains most that
is antithetic with English and American theory and practice. In order to represent it
most vividly we shall digest Justi’s treatment, translating as nearly as possible his
own words. This will involve not a little repetition. We cannot fairly represent Justi,
however, without reporting some of his self-iteration. We deal first with Grundsätze
der Policeywissenschaft.
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The Preface to the first edition of this book is dated, Göttingen, May 11, 1756. A
second edition appeared in 1759. Beckmann says the book had been used by various
eminent teachers as the basis of their lectures on the subject. Meanwhile, several such
introductions had appeared. The editor refers to Justi’s disregard of other writers, and
promises to do his best in the notes to supply the gaps. In his own Preface to the first
edition (reprinted in the third) Justi discusses the literature of the subject, and in order
to show the state of his information and opinions about other theorists his remarks
must be cited. In substance he says:
This book is the first instalment of the promise to write textbooks on
each of the cameralistic sciences. It is the outline of a course to
occupy one semester. It is the first complete treatment of
Policeywissenschaft.  The common error has been to boil this subject
in one broth with Staatskunst. We have a countless number [eine
unbeschreibliche Menge] of books which contain the elements of
Staatskunst, but they do not assort their material, Staatskunst has
nothing for its purpose but the internal and external security of the
state, and its chief attention must be given to the conduct of states
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other states, and especially to wise conduct toward other states. In like
manner Staatskunst is concerned, on the other hand, with adjusting
the conduct of subjects toward one another and toward other states.
Policeywissenschaft, on the contrary, is concerned with nothing but
the preservation and increase of the total “means” [Vermogen] of the
state through good internal institutions [Verfassungen] and with
creating all sorts of internal power and strength for the republic: e.g.,
through (1) cultivating the land; (2) improving the laboring class; (3)
maintaining good discipline and order in the community. In the last
task it is the tool of Staatskunst in maintaining inner security.
Other books have treated Policey in connection with principles of
Cameral- oder Finanz-Wissenschaft, to the disadvantage of each
science, though they are nearly related. Policey is the ground (sic) of
genuine cameral science, and the police expert must sow if the
cameralist is to reap; yet each science has its fixed and indisputable
boundaries. The one seeks to increase the total “means.” The other
seeks to get from this the “readiest means,” without harm to the
former.
In other books, Policey is treated along with Oekonomie; e.g., Zink,
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both in his Grundriss and in his Anfangs-Gründe, starts with certain
general principles of Oeconomie, and then of Policey, and then treats
of more special economic questions first from the economic, second
from the police standpoint. This leads to constant repetitions.
Moreover,  Policey  cannot be completely treated in this way, because
it has a much wider scope than economic subjects. In his
Anfangs-Gründe,  which is very diffuse,
395 Zink either wholly forgets
many important police subjects, or gives them only a few lines.
The late Herr Canzler von Wolff wrote a large number of books,
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and as, according to his profession, he wanted to be a system-writer
of all sciences, it was to be expected that he would write a Policey.
But the social life of human beings was the mistaken chief subject of
his work, which did not fit into the proper boundaries of the sciences.
His book therefore contains many valuable teachings about Policey,
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many principles of moral philosophy [Sittenlehre], of the law of
nature, and of prudence [Lebensweisheit], in general, that the work is
of no use as a system of Policey. Sciences must be separated from
each other to be complete, because many useful doctrines will be
overlooked if they are treated together.
Of the few books that remain on Policey proper, we name none until
the present (eighteenth) century. There has been, until late years, no
adequate idea of Policey, as is proved by such examples as Boter,
Gründlicher Bericht von Anordnung guter Policey, Strassburg, 1696;
Schrammer,  Politia historica, Leipzig, 1605; Reinking, Bibliche
Policey;  etc.
Others in this century have a correct idea of Policeywissenschaft but
are not at all complete: e.g., Law, Entwurf einer wohleingerich-teten
Policey.  The author was not equal to his undertaking. With the
exception of certain observations about the Policey of various states,
the book contains little that can be used. Again a pseudonymous “C.
B. von L.” published (1739) Ohnverfängliche Vorschläge zu
Einrichtung guter Policey. It is not a system, and contains much that
is chimerical and not pertinent to the science. Lucas Friedrich
Langemack published Abbildung einer vollkommenen Policey, Berlin,
1747. In this brief work the fundamental principles are very well and
philosophically presented, but on the whole it is not specific enough
for a system. The Mecklenburg Hofrath Velter published several
monographs on Policey: e.g., Unvorgreifliclien Gedanken von
Einrichtung und Verbesserung der Policey, 1736; more important
was Unterrichi van der zur Stoats und Regierungswissenschaft
gehörenden Policey, 1753. The author flatters himself, in the
prospectus of the latter book, that he is the first to treat this science
systematically, but no one with an orderly mind will admit this. The
book is not only confused, but leaves out much that should be
included, and has much affectation of wisdom from the ancients,
while betraying defective judgment.
The English and French have produced nothing better. De la Marc’s
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no well-grounded and connected system.
It has been said that Zink’s book is more available as a text, because
it describes the police systems of other lands, and applies the general
principles of Policey to this or that particular state. On the contrary,
this ought not to be expected of such a textbook. We should rather
require of a textbook on the oconomischen Wissen- schaften only the
general principles, without this or that concrete application.
“In this book I have followed my usual rule of not citing other
authors. A dogmatic writer
397 must present the subject conclusively,
and if he does this he does not need the authority of earlier writers.
Such citations smack of pedantry, unless they contain historical facts,
or unless some special circumstances call for them.”
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Passing to the body of the book, our task is to abstract the more general
conceptions, within which the technology had its setting, from the applications,
which of course make up the bulk of the contents. The material so abstracted is
cumulative evidence for our interpretation of cameralism. Reducing Justi’s
propositions to the most compact form, we have the following general outline:
§1. The name Policey comes from the Greek word {
}, a city,
and should mean the good ordering of cities and of their civic
institutions.
§§2, 3. Two uses of the term Policey are common today: first, and
most generally, “All measures in the internal affairs of the country
through which the general means [Vermögen] of the state may be
more permanently founded and increased, the energies [Kräfte] of the
state better used, and in general the happiness of the community
[gemeines Wesen] promoted. In this sense we must include in Policey
die Commercienwissenschaften, die Stadt- und Landöconomie, das
Forstwesen, and similar subjects, in so far as the government extends
its care over them for the purpose of securing general correlation of
the welfare of the state. Some are accustomed to call this die
wirthschaltliche Policey-Wissenschaft. This name is a matter of
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science.
§3. In the narrower sense we understand by Policey everything which
is requisite for the good ordering of civic life, and especially the
maintenance of good discipline and order [Zucht und Ordnung]
among the subjects, and promotion of all measures for the comfort of
life and the growth of the sustaining system [Nahrungsstand]. We
shall treat here the general principles and rules of Policey according
to the comprehensive idea. In the special elaboration we shall not stop
to consider those things which are the subject-matter of other
economic sciences, and meanwhile we shall discuss chiefly the
objects of Policey in the narrower sense.
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§4. The purpose and consequently the essence of all republics rests
upon promotion of the Common happiness. The general “means” of
each republic is the resource which it must use for promoting its
happiness. Hence the general “means” must be assured, increased,
and reasonably used, i.e., applied for the promotion of the common
happiness. This is the content [Inbegriff] of all the economic and
cameral sciences. The maintenance and increase of the general
“means” in relations with other free states is the affair of Staatskunst.
Policeywissenschaft,  on the other hand, has for its object the
maintenance and increase of the same general “means” of the state in
connection with its inner institutions, while cameral and finance
science has for its task to raise from the general “means” of the state,
by a reasonable use of the same, the special, or “readiest means,” and
to put into the hands of Staatskunst and Policey the means of
accomplishing their purposes.
§5. The purpose of Policey is therefore to preserve and increase the
general “means” of the state; and since these “means” include not
merely the goods, but also the talents and skill of all persons
belonging to the republic, the Policey must have constant care to have
in mind the general interdependence of all these different sorts of
goods, and to make each of them contribute to the common
happiness.
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under existing circumstances of the community, wise measures may
be taken to maintain and increase the general “means” of the state in
its internal relations [Verfassung], and to make the same, both in its
correlation and in its parts, more efficient and useful for promotion
of the common happiness [gemeinschaftliche Glückseligkeit]. More
briefly, Poeiceywissenschaft consists in the theorems for preserving
and increasing the general “means” of the state, and for so using them
that they will better promote the common happiness.
§3. The general principle of Policeywissenschaft is accordingly: The
internal institutions of the community must be so arranged that
thereby the general “means” of the state will be preserved and
increased and the common happiness constantly promoted.
§§9–16. Hence follow three fundamental rules, viz.:
1. Before all things the lands of the republic must be cultivated and
improved.
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The development of the territories may take place in two ways: (a)
through external cultivation; (b) through increase of the population,
which may be called the internal culture of the lands. The second sort
of culture must be of three chief kinds: (1) Through attraction of
foreigners as settlers; (2) through means which promote increase of
the native inhabitants; (3) through prevention of sickness and
premature death.
2. Increase of the products of the country and the prosperity oj the
sustaining system [Nahrungsstand]  must be promoted in every
possible way.
3 Care must be given to securing among the subjects such capacities
and qualities, and such discipline and order, as are demanded by the
ultimate purpose, viz., the common happiness.
Book I is devoted to the subject of “the external cultivation of the land,” i.e., to all
measures conducive to (1) removal of impediments to occupation of the soil; (2)
utilization of the material advantages of the land in all its parts; (3) providing the
citizens with means of obtaining shelter and support. Chap, i treats of the
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heads, means discussed are, in general: clearing superfluous forests, draining ponds
and swamps, protecting against flooding from seas or rivers, bringing barren land
under cultivation, construction of harbors, making streams navigable and digging
canals, exploiting mineral and rock deposits, utilization of land formed by recent
action of the sea, or of islands, distribution of land, provision for both large and small
estates, establishment of villages and attached arable areas [Fluhre], etc.
Chap, ii deals with the improvement [Anbau] and growth of cities, and does not
vary in substance from the corresponding passage in Staatswirthschaft. The purpose
of cities is said to be to work up raw material and to carry on foreign commerce. All
other institutions of cities must end in these two purposes. Sites should be chosen
which are favorable, the general plans should conform to the needs, the dwellings
should not be left entirely to the caprice of the citizens, protection in the shape of
walls, gates, harbors, canals, water supply, and drainage must be furnished, decisions
must be reached about extensions of the city, those who furnish material and labor
must be looked after, means must be taken to secure circulation of sufficient money,
wealthy and talented foreigners and artisans must be attracted, the immediately
neighboring land must be made productive, diligence must be stimulated, means of
stimulating foreign trade must be devised, laws and statutes must be passed, in
accordance with the primary and secondary purposes of the towns, and with the other
characteristics of the locality, city councils must be so organized that proper
correlation of all police activities will be promoted, there must be special courts for
manufactures and for trade, Zünfte and Innungen must be discouraged in new
factories so far as possible, and in old hand-trades kept in close bounds.
Chap. iii deals with the convenience and ornamentation of country and city, and
discusses such subjects as roads, streets, postal systems, bridges, fountains,
reservoirs, water-mains, paving and cleaning and lighting of streets and alleys,
marking of time by bells, and by night watchmen, inns and other places of
refreshment, market-places, public conveyances, aesthetic regulations, parks and
pleasure gardens, amusements, etc.
Chap. iv begins the subject of “inner cultivation of the land, or the, increase of
population.” At the beginning of this chapter another of the passages, occurs to which
von Mohl referred. It is as follows:
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same were not satisfactorily settled and populated. This populating is
the internal cultivation which must give to external cultivation its soul
and life. Hence increase of population is the second main aim in the
cultivation of countries, and just as the sustaining system will always
be more flourishing, the more people there are in the country, so we
must regard it as a fundamental theorem in this division of the subject
that a land can never have too many inhabitants. It is easy to protect
this theorem against all objections.
However we may disagree with Justi’s presuppositions and with
subsequent conclusions, we do not do him justice if we charge him,
as von Mohl and many others have done, with teaching the opposite
of Malthusian conclusions. The fact is that he never considered the
Malthusian problem at all. He confronted a condition of
under-population. The states for which he spoke needed more
population for their purposes, and it was those purposes for which
Justi was the spokesman. He would have put the case precisely as he
meant it if he had said:
For the purposes of a practical cameralist today, the probability of
over- population may be canceled from the reckoning.
Although it had never occurred to him to pry far into the relations that determined
the limits of population, there is nothing in his books to show that he supposed
population could be increased indefinitely.
§§86–96 develop devices for attracting immigrants.
401 §§97–108
develop a programme, first, for increasing population, second, for
checking emigration.
402 §§109–21 are on public hygiene.
Chap, vii, Von der Landwirthschaft, approaches the subject rather from the
approximate standpoint of the agronomist, than of the economist. It begins (p. 109):
The promotion of the sustaining system in the country demands in the
first place that a sufficient number of rural products shall be gained.
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those sources through which rural products are derived. Here then the
rural Oeconomica come first to attention, as the chief means through
which the raw materials for the products of the country are brought
into existence. These
403 are: agriculture, the exploiting of natural and
cultivated forests, the mines, and the thereto appertaining smelting
and refining works. In this subdivision we deal first with agriculture.
Perhaps no part of Justi’s cameralism exhibits better than this division the contrast
between the régime which he represented and the other extreme illustrated by
American policy. We must again call attention to the main question, viz., What
should government do about these matters? The American answer from the
beginning has been, “Nothing! Every man knows best what he wants, and
government has no right to interfere, so long as each lets his neighbors alone.” We
have therefore taken absolute individualism as our presupposition, and have tried in
every way to cover with soothing phrases and fictions each departure from actual
individualism which changing conditions have required. The most important factor
in bringing about in reality, through our voluntaristic system, some approach to
scientific use of our agricultural resources, has been our legislation establishing
agricultural experiment stations, and systematic instruction in rural economy. The
thing that we have thus tardily and cautiously attempted on the ostensible theory that
it is primarily the affair of the individual, has from time immemorial been frankly
regarded in the German lands as primarily the affair of government. It is no part of
the present study to inquire about the relative efficiency of the two policies. Two
general remarks only are in point: first, Englishmen and Americans would have
treated German social science in the nineteenth century more intelligently and would
have gained more from it, if they had been more willing to judge it on its own
grounds, and had been less prone to damn “paternalism” and all its works; second,
whether on a paternalistic or an individualistic theory, much that cameralistic
administration worked out, especially in its latest forms in modern Germany, is
evidently enlightened wisdom for a commonwealth. Bureaucracy, or no bureaucracy,
the things themselves need to be done, or at least a constructive and coherent policy
with reference to them needs to be adopted. Study of the bureaucratic way of doing
them may tend to confirm most Americans in dislike of that way, but it ought at least
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and that our system is not vindicated until its technical results compare more
favorably with those of the more paternalistic German system.
We have then in cameralism a body of officials presiding over agricultural
programmes just as a general staff conducts the administration of a modern army.
The Landes-Policey deals with such subjects as the organization of larger and smaller
rural estates (§124), the regulation of acreage devoted to different crops on these
estates (§125), the adjustment of taxation so as best to stimulate agriculture (§126),
the protection of cultivators against the interests of hunting or forestry (§127),
regulation of other occupations which might draw the peasants from cultivation of
the soil (§128), stimulation of agricultural talent in the peasants (§129), inducing
production of raw materials which would not be raised without special stimulus
(§130), improvement of the quality of products (§131), employment of “economic
inspectors” to supervise all these things (§132), adoption of uniform systems of
measuring land (§133), adoption of rules of rotation of crops and other regulations,
like the wages of laborers, etc. (§134), adoption of special standards for particular
products, kinds of seed to be used, etc. (§135), enactment of ordinances to protect
growing crops from thieves, etc. (§136), particular attention to cattle-raising (137),
also to vineyards (§138), and to horticulture (§139).
In chap, viii cameralistic duties regarding forestry, mining, and minor industries are
analyzed (§§140-49). “Manufacturing and factories” are treated in the same relation
in chap. ix (§§150–80), and on these two presumptions (§152):
A wise government must consequently have two theorems constantly
before its eyes, viz.: (1) Everything required by the need and comfort
of the inhabitants of the country is to be produced as far as possible
within the country itself; (2) the government shall see that, in the
interest of the sustaining system, and of foreign commerce, everything
that the land produces shall, so far as possible, be worked over to its
complete form, and shall not be allowed to leave the country in a raw
and unfinished stale. To this end the government must have precise
extracts from the tariff, excise, and license sheets, on such points as
(a) all imported goods, in order to judge which of them might be
produced within the country; (b) all exported goods, in order to
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partially manufactured, are exported.
Thereupon the technique of keeping check upon raw. material produced or
producible in the country, of materials which must be supplied by other countries,
and of tools, etc., needed for working up the materials is discussed (§§153–55), and
then the programme for developing manufactures (§§156–80). The whole is merely
a somewhat expanded reproduction of the corresponding part of Staatswirthschaft.
Chap, x treats very briefly the hand industries (§§181–90), and chap, xi claims to
offer only fundamental principles of commercial administration, with the intention
of devoting a separate volume to the subject. Justi divides commerce [Commercien]
into domestic and foreign, applying to the former the name trades [Gewerben], and
repeating that a land might conceivably be happy if the trades flourished, even if
there were no commerce. Then the fundamental condition of a favorable balance is
mobilized as the basic principle of commercial administration. The details are not
greatly in excess of those indicated in Staatswirthschaft.
Chap, xii, on the circulation of money, contains little, for our purposes, which does
not occur elsewhere in Justi’s books. The fundamentally correct conception of gold
and silver money as a “ware,” the weight and fineness of which are accurately given,
is repeated (§221–23). The last of these paragraphs is worth quoting as cumulative
evidence:
If money and goods are to retain a constant ratio to each other, no
change should occur in either; and if such change could be totally
avoided, it would be a matter of entire indifference whether there
were much or little money in a country. A state which had no
relations whatever with other peoples, and whose inhabitants
consumed all that they produced, would have a constantly unbroken
circulation of money. It would have all the power and strength of
which it was capable, and it would be as fortunate as another state of
like population with ten times as much gold and silver. But since no
state in our part of the world is in such circumstances, changes in the
value of money and of goods with respect to each other often occur.
We must explain the effect of these changes upon circulation.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 377
In general Justi continues (§§224 ff.):
If the amount of money in circulation diminishes, the price of wares
will increase, beginning with the most needless, the influence
extending gradually to all. If the quantity of money in circulation
increases, the most necessary wares will grow dearer. This stimulates
the activity of laborers and has its influence upon all wares. Money
becomes less desirable, interest falls, more wares are produced.
Gradually wares will again become cheaper, and thereby exportation
is promoted, whereby the quantity of money in circulation is more
and more increased and the diligence of laborers more stimulated.
Accordingly it must be a first care of the government to prevent
diminution of the amount of money in circulation (§226). Lack of
confidence and external dangers are prime causes of diminished
circulation (§228). Unfavorable trade balance is the most effective
cause (§230).
Chap, xiii, on credit, is interesting for the historian of economics proper, but is not
immediately significant for our purpose. The same is true of chaps, xiv and xv on
means of encouraging the laboring classes.
Book III, on the moral condition of the subjects, and maintenance of good discipline
and order, has value for our present inquiry simply as cumulative evidence that the
problem which Justi formulated was essentially patriarchal. The point of attachment
between this division of labor and the whole purpose of the cameralistic state,
appears at the outset, as follows (§270):
If the means of the state in its internal constitution are to be used for
the promotion of the common happiness, the subjects, apart from the
cultivation of the land and the promotion of the sustaining system,
must also themselves possess such qualities, capacities, and talents
that they can contribute their part to the realization of the common
welfare. In this view religion deserves first to be considered. The
members of a community are made by religion incomparably more
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attain all the happiness of which it is capable if public institutions of
religion [äusserlicher Gottesdienst] are not introduced. The more this
cultus harmonizes with the nature and essence of men, and with the
paramount purpose of republics, the more excellent will it be, and the
more capable will it make the citizens of the state to work for the
common welfare.
The same point of view is adopted in considering the morals of the people (§§285
ff.), and also in treating science and education (§§295 ff.).
Whether religion, morals, and education are to be regarded as primarily affairs of
the individual, and thus not to be interfered with by government, is a question to
which Germany has always assumed one answer, while the United States has tried
to apply the opposite answer. Our business in the present connection is not to open
the question of principle, but merely to show the attitude of cameralism toward the
question. The state and its power to maintain itself against all assault from within or
without being the central aim, of course it was a strictly logical inference that
everything which could have an effect on the strength of the state was properly within
the sphere of state supervision.
It is beginning to be possible for a few people to discern that the old dilemma
between the individual and the state was purely fictitious in the abstract, and that
neither horn of the dilemma could be taken as the symbol of a concrete programme
without surprising results. Religion, morals, science, and education have both
individual and social relations, if we choose to retain that distinction. We are at once
in the region of absurdity if we attempt to run a legal boundary line between their
individual and their social phases. The real question for governmental theory is not
whether they are the one or the other, but to what extent and in what ways either
phase must be taken account of by the law. The arbitrary character of the traditional
criterion might be inferred from the historical contrasts between theory and practice.
The German presumption at once runs counter to individual aspects of each, which
dictate a thus-far-and-no-farther to government, while the American presumption not
only gives itself curious things to account for in our actual practice toward religious
institutions, moral conditions, and scientific needs, but it almost wholly disappears
in our systems of state education.
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checking the lesser nuisances and crimes (§§360–80), are notable only as indexes of
the place which cameralism assigned to these subjects in the civic structure.
The last book is a brief discussion of the technique to be operated by the branches
of government concerned with applying the foregoing principles of police science.
Justi says that in a certain sense the subject-matter of this book forms the practical
part of police science (p. 327). The following paragraph confirms our account of the
cameralistic state (§382):
The law-giving power in police affairs, since the internal arrangement
of the state chiefly rests upon it, can unquestionably be exercised by
no one but the sovereign power, the destiny of which is to administer
the affairs of the state for promotion of the common happiness. In
whosesoever hands the sovereign power is lodged, he has also to
enact the police laws which are to bind the state as a whole. If now
the sovereign power rests not alone in the hands of the ruler, but at
the same time also with the estates of the realm, or with
representatives of the people, obligatory police laws must be agreed
upon and promulgated by these conjointly. On the same principle, the
police laws which should affect the whole German Empire should be
enacted by the Kaiser and the estates assembled in the Reichstag.
Again, §384:
Since the territorial sovereignty which the estates of the German
Empire possess is nothing else than the sovereign power in each
particular state, which finds its limitations merely in the proviso that
its exercise shall not extend so far as to prejudice the general
coherence and common welfare of the Empire; the estates of the
German Empire accordingly possess the law-giving power in Policey
affairs; and the above limitation does not prevent them from adopting
such Policey institutions and ordinances as will serve the advantage
and prosperity of their respective lands; even if this advantage and
prosperity might not harmonize with the interest of other German
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neighboring German states for consumption within their own
territories. On the other hand, they could not forbid the mere
transportation of the wares of their neighbors; because thereby the
total coherence of the German states united in a common civic body
would be utterly destroyed.
The following sections (§§385 ff.) explain how this power is actually exercised in
the name of the sovereign.
To complete our account of Justi’s Policeywissenschaft we turn to the work in
which the author has expanded the outline just reviewed. With the possible exception
of the Finanz-wissenschaft, the Grundfeste
404 is the most elaborately wrought-out of
Justi’s works. We must nevertheless allow our résumé of the Grundsdtze to stand as
the best index which our space permits of the general contents of the more complete
treatise. The system of control outlined in the Grundfeste reflects a regime which the
people of the United States have thus far, by almost unanimous consent, refused to
reflect upon judicially. They have dismissed it without a hearing, as “unamerican.”
Nevertheless, it is safe to predict that the time will come when thoughtful Americans
will be able to deliberate about the system exhibited in an immature form in these
books, to weigh the purposes which the system was designed to serve, and to
conclude that although the methods of control which the purposes presuppose are
impossible in America, yet the purposes themselves must in principle be organized
somehow into the most highly civilized life.
This conclusion must be allowed to rest on the exhibit thus far made of the different
police systems. We may add merely a few notes from the Grundfeste.
In the Preface to the first volume Justi says:
I have often noticed that there are very few people who have a correct
idea of Policey. That which in the narrowest sense is called Policey,
namely the Policey in the cities, is regarded by the majority as the
whole scope of this science. If this very limited signification were the
whole, I should have insufficient ground for calling the Policey the
main defense of states. Both the Grundsätze and the present work
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Justi complains that most writers on Policey have not sharply separated the subject
from Slaatskunst.
It will be found [he says] that as a rule those who have treated
Staatskunst  have at the same time discussed Policey with
Commercien- und Finanz-Wissenschaft. This is the case, for example,
with the latest writer on Staatskunst.
405 If our conception of
Staatskunst or Politik made it include not only all knowledge
necessary for the government of a state, but also all the details of
institutions necessary in civic society, those would be right who
include in one system of Politik, Policey, the Finanz-Wissenschajten,
and all the other economic sciences.
406 But, in that case Staatskunst
would be no special science at all. It would be nothing but a general
name for almost all other sciences. Die Rechtsgelehrsamkeil, die
Bergwerks-Wissenschaften, die Mathematik, die Mechanik, and
almost all other sciences would belong to Staatskunst. For all these
furnish knowledge which is applicable in the government of a state,
and necessary for the institutions and practices of civic society. In a
word, they all contain knowledge of means whereby the state may be
made powerful, and the citizens happy. That is the explanation which
Baron von Bielfeld gives of Politik.
Justi declines to accept this description of Staatskunst. He contends that it has been
at all times not a general name for many and almost all sciences, but a special and
self-sufficient science, sharply distinguished from Policey, Finanz- und
Commercien-Wissenschaft.  Then he restates his definition of Policey thus:
“It is that science which has for its object permanently to maintain the welfare of
the separate families in an accurate correspondence and proportion with the best
common good.” This definition is supported by the comment: “The best common
good [das gemeinschaftliche Beste] is the ultimate aim of all civic institutions. But,
we can imagine no best common good without the welfare of the separate families.
To make these correspond with each other is accordingly in fact the main defense of
the state, out of which its power and happiness must chiefly arise.”
407
Justi elaborates in this connection his theory of the division of labor betweenAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 382
Staatskunst  and the other “sciences.” We have already quoted from the
Staatswirthschaft  his principal propositions on this classification.
A curious measure of Justi’s sense of proportion may be found in the fact that he
occupies five out of the fourteen pages of his Preface with a discussion of the relative
merits of different printing establishments. His laudation of the publisher chosen for
this work, after relation of sad experiences with others, one of them named, rouses
the suspicion that a motive less disinterested than zeal for improvement of the art of
printing was beneath this discourse. Incidentally he betrays a characteristic trait of the
whole Policey régime, as well as of his personal theory, in this suggestion:
Perhaps we find here a lack in our Policey. It is without doubt the duty of the
Policey to look out for the quality of wares and work, and to set the standard below
which work shall be regarded as entirely unfit, and to be made good to the person
who suffers injury from it. I doubt, however, if there is a country in which a standard
of passable quality in printing is enforced. The more our publishing system becomes
a staple ware (sic) the more will such laws be necessary.
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Having discussed the evils of putting the emphasis in the state either on the interests
of the government, or on those of the separate families, to the prejudice of the other,
Justi offers the following “general fundamental principle” of Policey-wissenschaft,
viz.:
In all the affairs of the country, the attempt must be made to put the
welfare of the separate families in the most accurate combination and
interdependence with the best common good, or the happiness of the
whole state.
409
In the most emphatic terms he declares that this is the single great object of police
institutions, and that all the major and minor rules of Politey must be derived from
this central purpose.
Less fundamental, but more significant for the matter upon which tradition has most
stupidly misrepresented the cameralists in general, is the main theorem which the
first part of the work supports, viz.; “The strength and the permanent happiness of
a state rest principally upon the goodness of the climate and soil of the country.”
Justi is not among the writers whose attention is given chiefly to agricultural
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extractive industries, mining was the only pursuit about which he professed to write
as an expert. Yet the place which he assigned to agriculture in his theory leaves no
valid excuse for applying to him the label “mercantilist,” if it carries the traditional
meaning “believer in trade as the sole source of wealth.” Instead of accepting this
doctrine, Justi urges (§27) that “economic trade,” as the phrase went, that is, the trade
of a nation of middlemen, like Holland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
is a precarious source of national prosperity and wealth. He says:
Economic trade is always based on the stupidity and laziness of other
peoples. So soon as a people perceives that it does better when it gets
its wares from the first hand, it is all over with this economic trade.
Upon quite as uncertain ground rest the manufactures of such a
country. A wise and industrious people will always seek to
manufacture its own raw materials. Hence this source of riches rests
on the stupidity and laziness of other peoples, and so soon as these
peoples get their eyes open, they will no longer furnish to the trading
nation a source of riches. .... A nation which, by virtue of its good and
well-cultivated soil, exports a great quantity of domestic products is
also in a situation, according to the nature and course of commerce,
to draw to itself much easier and to retain even the economic trade,
than another nation which has few domestic products.
From all this it is clear in my judgment, that the success and
permanent happiness of a people rest in a very important degree upon
the good character of its soil and climate, and that a people which
itself produces all its needs (sic) and many domestic goods is
incomparably more powerful and happy than a nation which must
obtain its necessities and wares for consumption from other peoples,
and thus is in a certain sense dependent upon them.
These considerations lead us to two theorems which will be of great
importance in the whole treatment of Policey: First, a prudent nation
must always take care to put itself in such condition that it is not
under the necessity of obtaining its most important wants
[Bedürfnisse] and materials from other peoples; second, a nation
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occupies and to improve its climate.
This proposition is not only repeated in slightly varied form in the following
paragraph, but the body of the book expands it, and Justi’s whole philosophy
presupposes it.
Along with this fundamental principle, Justi next reiterates his second main
theorem (§30), viz.:
Since there can never be complete cultivation of the soil without
dense population, our second working theorem is, that a state must in
every way promote population.
These theorems are insufficient without a third, viz.: If a state has
only inhabitants devoted to cultivation oj the surface of the earth, its
population can never be dense. .... Consequently we have the third
fundamental principle: that government must constantly pay the
strictest attention to the building and growth of cities and villages
A fourth theorem must be added, viz.: The Policey must devote itself
to works and institutions for the comfort of the inhabitants and the
ornamentation of the land (§32).
Each of the four books of the first part of the Grundfeste develops one of these four
theorems.
In the Preface of the second volume Justi professes an entire reversal of literary
policy. He says: “The attentive reader will be able to judge how great pains I have
taken to seek out the most excellent thoughts of the greatest minds, in order thereby
to strengthen my discussion.” The fact is that Justi was from the start the most expert
recoiner of other people’s thoughts that German political literature up to his time had
developed. He had not before approached so near to a confession that he was more
a codifier than a first- hand investigator. The Preface is chiefly devoted to a defense
against the criticism of Baron von Bielfeld that Justi had included altogether too
much in Policeywissenschaft. The passage is so characteristic of the time and of the
author that no independent student of the subject should neglect to read it.
Probably there is no more accurate and detailed contemporary picture of the policy
behind Frederick the Great’s type of benevolent despotism, at least no picture of theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 385
policy as it was idealized in the minds of theorists, than the views presented in these
two volumes of the Grundfeste, together with the later work, System des
Staatswesens  (1766). As the evidence already presented is more than sufficient to
support our main contention, we must pass these volumes with the remark that their
contents are cumulative proof of the correctness of the view we have taken of
cameralism in general.	"&)	.
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To complete the exhibit which the compass of this book permits us to make of
Justi’s views, we must draw from his collected miscellanies. Without attempting to
organize these extracts into systematic form, we shall present them in the accidental
order in which they occur in the three volumes.
410 This chapter is therefore in effect
an appendix, consisting principally of notes which serve to emphasize certain
features already referred to in the author’s theory.
The Preface to Vol. I of this collection is dated Berlin, Sept. 3, 1760. It refers to
“the present war” (i.e., the Seven Years’ War, 1756–63) as hindering the
correspondence with Austrian publishers, who wanted to get out a new edition of
some of these papers previously published in Teutschen Memoires.
The Preface to Vol. I repeats the theme of cameralism in this form:
Money is today so largely the ground (sic) of all the activity of the
state, that the greatest courage and the greatest bravery of a people in
our time can have little success if it is not provided with sufficient
money, that great motive spring and nervous fluid of all undertakings
which are to attain fortunate results. We must go farther; we must
indeed affirm that the most wholesome and excellent arrangements
and institutions of a state will have little success along with a bad
condition of the financial system of the state.
Again, in the same preface (the pages are not numbered):
I believe that we still lack a species of history which would be
peculiarly useful. The historical books of all peoples are concerned
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wars and slaughters which peoples have waged against one another,
with narration of extraordinary rascalities and villanies, and the
succession of rulers. In my opinion this is of least value and least
instructive in history. We should have a history from the earliest
times in which the chief attention would be given to the origin of
realms and states, to the efforts to found them and to bring them into
a flourishing condition, to the principles of government in political,
financial, and police affairs, to the attempts to cultivate and people
the lands, to the causes of the growth and decay of realms and states,
and especially to the governmental mistakes which rulers and
ministers have committed. On the other hand, the wars and other
matters which heretofore have filled the histories should be
mentioned only in passing, in so far as they have had a greater or less
influence upon the welfare or decline of civic societies. If a history
were so constructed, we could say that history is a mirror of human
transactions. As histories are now written I believe they have very
little claim to such a title. I have made up my mind to write such a
history. I will give it the title: The History of Mankind as Citizens
[Die Geschichte des Menschen, als Bürger].
411 In my opinion such a
history, if it satisfied its purpose, would go far toward extending a
knowledge of true governmental and financial principles upon which
the happiness of peoples largely rests, and such a book could
incidentally not fail to be useful to civic society. 
Again, in the same preface the author says:
If my efforts in the economic and cameralistic sciences have thus far
received the indulgent favor of the world, I do not credit this to my
own skill. I believe I owe it entirely to my efforts to establish all the
theorems and rules upon the essential purpose of all states, namely the
happiness of the peoples. These are also the principles on which I
base the financial treatises in this collection. In fact, one can never
have other principles in finance. A cameralist who bases his measures
upon other principles cheats his master, the state, and himself.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 388
Examining these papers in turn, and selecting items which are most significant for
our purpose, we have the following details of varying importance;
A usage that was common in this period, not in Germany alone but
throughout Europe, is illustrated in I, i, in the employment of the
word “philosophy” as equivalent to “science.”
The main point of I, 2, is in the paragraph on p. 17:
That which is the decisive factor in human affairs is “the allwise
Providence of the Highest which always has a hand in human
activities and which orders the outcome of all things according to its
great wisdom.”
A side-light on the application of Justi’s theories to actual conditions is in I, 6:
Should sumptuary laws be enacted in the interest of the happiness of
the state, especially when it is desirable to encourage commerce and
trade? Of course superfluous display and waste or luxury
[Ueppigkeit] are contrary to the principles of sound morals. What
degree of outlay should be regarded as extravagant is a question. It is
not at all certain that the outlays which would harm a single family
are for that reason harmful to the whole state. For strength against
possible enemies the state needs available means. If money were
hoarded by the subject, to that extent the sources of available means
would dry up. The good of the state demands that money should
circulate. If the outlays for display and luxury do not leave the
country, they are not harmful to the state (p. 80). Neither the power
of the sovereign nor the total means of the state lose anything by it.
Hence such outlays should not be forbidden. In the case of luxurious
consumption of foreign goods, the best regulation is by prohibiting
import of the same (p. 89). Yet certain luxuries should perhaps be
forbidden: e.g., those that consume gold and silver in perishable
ornaments, or in gilding wood or the baser metals. Probably,
however, even the trades that furnish these should be allowed
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state is trifling compared with the amounts which craftsmen are able
to earn in these trades.
The silver plate owned by the upper classes is so much dead treasure.
It is certain that this is not contributing to the welfare of the
community [gemeines Wesen], and it is to be wished that this sort of
display could be restricted (p. 91). Yet I cannot conclude that
possession of such things should be prohibited. A special tax on
luxuries would be a wiser means of restraining extravagance.
I, 8, compares the government of a state to a machine, and makes the analogy a text
for an argument for strict ordering of the civil service. I, ii, enters the field of social
psychology in this vein:
Peoples are governed by the help of prejudices [Vorurtheile]. The
passions are the first sources and motive springs of all human actions.
If we were controlled by reason only, we should need neither
republics nor forms of government. The strength and weakness of a
state depends accordingly upon the character of the prejudices with
which its citizens are filled, and the wisdom of the government
consists chiefly in producing prejudices by means of which the state
may attain to all the possible power of which it is capable.
If ever there was a people that needed to change its prejudices, we
poor Germans are the ones. Since the Saxon emperors (919–1024),
our strength has been steadily on the wane, and for two hundred years
we appear to have been the prey of all neighboring peoples. Our
prejudices cannot be of the sort that put us in possession of our full
strength. It is not the least of our lacks that we are wanting in the
impulse and genius that are necessary for commerce. We must change
our prejudices so that commerce and manufacture will rank higher,
and will not be beneath the dignity of the nobility. Is a nobility in
general consistent with the nature of republics (p. 151)? A hereditary
nobility stops up a source which could furnish a great number of
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Justi seems to discuss the question seriously (I, 170, et passim) whether it were not
better to give up the idea of developing commerce and to resume the idea on which
the old German nobility was based — power and happiness by conquest. The chief
idea would then be —not to have a sufficient army to repel attacks, but an aggressive
policy of conquest. This would be to turn the nation into a robber among nations.
After referring to somewhat more admissible causes of war, Justi continues (p. 175):
Moreover, in our day war is extremely costly. It is more a sacrifice of
unmeasured sums of money than of blood. If therefore a poor nation
should today determine to make conquests its chief purpose, it would
come to a very ridiculous resolve. A people that today wants to be
militant must accordingly also seek to be rich.
There is no other way whereby a people can become rich than through
commerce. If a people had in its power the richest gold mines,
without carrying on flourishing commerce, it would not thereby be
rich. Those foreign peoples who get control of its commerce will also
indirectly have its gold mines in their power. Spain furnishes a very
conclusive example.
Accordingly no people can today reasonably make conquests its chief
purpose without proposing commerce as an equally important affair.
.... But let us suppose that a militant folk has brought all Europe under
its yoke. Would it therefore be happy? By no means. It would without
doubt acquire vast plunder, but these very riches, instead of
promoting its happiness, would cause its ruin.
All riches which do not come into the state by way of commerce,
which do not make the industry of the citizens active in their
vocations, and which do not incidentally pour themselves into all
parts of the civic body, are the source of all disorders, which will
presently draw after them the corruption and total destruction of the
state. Not the German peoples were the real destroyers of Rome, but
the treasures of Attalus (sic) and other riches which came to Rome
through the plundering of so many peoples. .... This destruction
would have been even more rapid if the Romans, after their
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not restore the humors once totally corrupted. They were only a
strengthening by which the wholly emasculated body was able to
endure for a period. ....
All this amply proves, it seems to me, that a people can never make
conquest its chief aim, and thereby promote its happiness. It proves
that no people can be powerful without wealth, and consequently not
without commerce, that a people without sufficient power would be
very foolish if it dreamed of conquests, that the other European
powers would soon enough make it repent of its silly idea; yet, it
proves that if a poor people, contrary to all probability, gained the
conquests it had desired, still without commerce it would neither be
happy, nor would it be able to retain the advantages it had gained.
If, accordingly, all this is established, it naturally follows that the
militant origin of the nobility cannot be sufficient ground for its
devoting itself exclusively to the purpose out of which it originated.
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In I, 13 (p. 198), Justi again explains his doctrine of the importance of the factor of
density of population as a component of the strength of a nation. In brief his assertion
is that, other things being equal, a country with a million inhabitants scattered over
a thousand square miles of territory is much weaker than a country of two hundred
and fifty square miles, with the same population. He continues (p. 199):
The more populous a state, the more prosperous will be its food
industries and trades, and the more active will be the circulation of
money, because all men have need of reciprocal aid and of a thousand
kinds of necessi ties from each other. If a state has foreign commerce,
it will constantly acquire more riches, with the greater number of
hands that labor on the domestic products and wares. This increased
wealth will always set the industrious hands of the population into
more active motion, and the wealth of the state will the more
increase. This wealth will at the same time attract much folk from the
neighboring states, that barely support life: and thus this wealth will
increase the power of the state. The superiority of a people depends
today as much and more upon its wealth than upon its numbers. AAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 392
land which is wisely ruled, and has a flourishing sustaining system,
can accordingly never have too many inhabitants.
A moral state must look to wedlock for the increase of its population.
How important to the state therefore are its marriage laws (p. 200).
The monograph I, 19, is almost the modern “pace-making” generalization which
Professor W. I. Thomas has done so much to develop. The paper glorifies the type
that we now call “promoters,” while it denounces the merely adventurous varieties
of the type. I, 24, expands previous suggestions about getting the most out of people
by a system of honors.
Of the papers in the second division of Vol. I on financial questions, we need note
merely that (1) expands the view previously expressed, that it is better to farm the
Landesherr-lichen Cammergüter und Aemter than to administer them directly; (4)
adds details on wise forms of taxation; (5) discusses excise, and a proposed substitute
in the form of an occupation tax; (6) gives further details of the duties of a
cameral-ist in connection with forests and forestry; (7) elaborates a detail under the
same head; (8) expands the discussion of the proposition that subjects are not
necessarily happy by reason of low taxes; (9) enlarges on “Mauthen und Zolle,” as
means of promoting commerce; (12) treats of taxation as a means of developing and
managing the sustaining system.
Passing to Vol. II, the first paper deals with division and balance of power between
the main branches of the government in the fundamental constitution of the state.
Justi makes two primary divisions: first, the law-giving, second, the executive power.
The former has for its object both the main purpose of the complete happiness of the
state, and also the subsidiary purposes. Justi slides over, however, into the
conventional legislative, executive, judicial classification, and a main proposition is
that neither all nor two of these branches of power should be in the same hands. The
most tolerable combination is that of legislative and executive powers (p. 10).
If the executive power is entirely independent of the legislative
power, if the former has at its disposal all necessary resources, the
executive power will certainly attain such preponderance that the
legislative will presently be suppressed (p. 12). Either it will not be
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the most insignificant matters. “In all German nations legislation




414 put permanently in the hands of the executive
power, or of their kings and princes, the means of execution, namely
the revenues of the state, in such a way that the executive power had
no more need of their co-operation, the result was that in Spain and
France nothing remains of the legislative power of the Volk, and in
most of the German states only a bare shadow. If on the other hand
the legislative power is entirely unlimited, and not at all dependent
upon the executive power, the former will presently abuse its strength
to suppress the executive.
The indubitable conclusion is it seems to me that a well-ordered
fundamental constitution of the state will be so arranged that the two
highest powers will always be in a certain sort of interdependence or
equilibrium. This equilibrium depends entirely on their having the
right to hinder each other when the one or the other goes too far and
loses sight of the welfare of the state, or tends to repudiate the
fundamental constitution.
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The true freedom of the citizen in monarchies would be represented
principally by two circumstances, viz., first, if the laws were so clear
and distinct that the decisions would be rather the decisions of the
laws than of the judge; second, if the accused, especially in penal
cases, were allowed to choose his own judges, or at least to reject so
many of them that the remainder would seem to be of his own
choosing.
416
Another passage occurs (Vol. II, p. 26) in which a leaning toward the English form
of constitution is expressed. More important than symptoms of this kind is the touch
of color which we find in II, I, 9, Justi’s inaugural address at the beginning of his
professorial work at Vienna. It contains among other things, an anticipation of the
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more minutely worked out by Adam Smith.
The address further glorifies “republics,” as against the fantasy of “the state of
nature,” and is in effect a plea for acquiescence in the type of rule which the House
of Habsburg represented.
In the course of the address, after an outline of the tasks that a state must perform
in order to insure its happiness, a passage occurs which is so full of the
time-temperament that we are unwilling to weaken it by translation. It reads (p. 135):
Ohne Zweifel, hochgebiethende geheimde Conjerenzminister, und
wirkliche geheimde Räthe, gnädige Herren, wie auch höchst und
hochgeehrteste Anwesende! hat Ihnen allen dieser geringe Abriss nur
Gelegenheit gegeben, sich unterdessen an der geheiligten Person
unserer allerdurchlauchtesten Monarchin, eine weit würdigere und
erhabene Vorstellung von der Sache zu machen. Ich bin versichert,
dass sie unterdessen in ihren Gedanken diejenigen weisen und uner-
müdeten Bemühungen welche diese wahrhaftig grosse Regentin vor
die Wohlfahrt ihrer anvertrauten Völker anwendet, an die Stelle
meiner unzulänglichen Beschreibung gesetzt haben: und was vor eine
weit lebhaftigere und vollkommenere Abschilderung ist ihnen nicht
dadurch gerathen? Die österreichischen Staaten haben zwar allemal
das Glück genossen, das ihre Monarchen den anvertrauten Zepter mit
weiser Vorsicht, mit unermüdeter Sorgfalt, mit einer Gütigkeit ohne
Beyspiele, und mit der zärtlichsten Liebe gegen ihre Unterthanen
geführet haben. Allein die Hand des unendlichen Weltbeherrschers,
wenn er es seiner allgemeinen Haushaltung gemäss befindet, dass die
Gestalt der Zeiten verändert, der Wuth der Verwüster des Erdbodens,
die sich die Schwäche ihrer Nachbarn zu Nutze machen, Einhalt
gethan, und die Ruhe des menschlichen Geschlechts dargestellet
werden soll, bildet manchmal in dem Schoosse seiner Vorsehung
ausserordentlich grosse Seelen, welche geschickt sind, ein Reich auf
einen viel höhern Grad der Macht und der Glückseligkeit zu setzen.
Wenn also die glück-lichen österreichischen Länder ihren Zepter
jemals in weisen Händen gesehen haben; wenn jemals die besten und
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worden sind; wenn sie sich jemals dem wahren Punkte ihrer Grösse,
Macht und Glückseligkeit genähert haben: so ist es itzo, und die
gegenwärtigen Zeiten werden das Glüek geniessen, dass unsere
späten Enkel den Zeitlauf von Oesterreichs vergrössertem Zustande
bey ihnen anfangen werden.
Of course this impossible fulsomeness was largely a matter of prescribed and
perfunctory form. It would be absurd to draw the conclusions from it which literal
interpretation of the language would suggest to modern democrats. At the same time
the fact remains that Justi was a pliant servant of a régime which called for that sort
of conventionality. Discount whatever is necessary for the demands of ceremony;
discount too the reservations in Justi’s mind, and betrayed frequently in his books;
he remains the spokesman of the type of state of which Mafia Theresia is a symbol.
In the remainder of the address from Which the passage is taken he employs rhetoric
of almost equal extravagance to express his pride in the vocation of preparing youth
for service in the administration of the Habsburg state (p. 137). When a little later he
found himself no longer persona grata in Vienna, he went from state to state of the
same essential type, and left behind no credible evidence of ever in his responsible
moments having entertained the thought that in Germany an essentially different type
of state was feasible. The relation of Justi to the modern type of political theory may
be indicated in a perfectly fair illustration. Suppose that in a hundred years Great
Britain shall have moved as far from her present type in the direction of socialism as
continental states, in becoming constitutional, have moved from the absolutistic type
in the direction of democracy. Suppose that a historian at that date should take John
Stuart Mill’s record in connection with the Land Tenure Reform Association as proof
that he was not a nineteenth-century conservative, but a twenty-first century radical.
The guess would be no wider of the mark than an interpretation of Justi as other than
a technologist of the Maria Thcresia type of governmental theory.
In this same address (p. 142), in speaking of the conditions which enable a state to
accomplish its purposes for its citizens, Justi puts “adequate riches” first, and
“complete security” second, and he continues:
We must not, however, form the same notion of the riches of a state
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a land may contain can be regarded as wealth [ein Reichthum] of the
land. Not chests filled with money in the treasury of the monarch, not
the heaped-up piles of gold in the houses of private persons,
accumulated by greed and oppression, constitute the riches of the
state. Gold and silver, these lustrous metals, which seem so beautiful
to the eager eyes of men, lose all price and all worth previously
credited to them, and they turn again to trifling parts of the globe, if
they lose their ultimate purpose: namely, to be a universal means of
determining the worth of all other sorts of goods, and to serve for the
establishment and promotion of the business of men. Only that wealth
is therefore the real wealth of the state which is grasped by the busy
hands of the inhabitants, and is daily moved from one employment
into another.
Apparently Justi had to defend his claims for the cameral sciences against suspicion
of being on a level with alchemy, fortune-telling, etc. With changes of detail, his lot
was not unlike the situation in which even now sociology finds itself when it presents
its case to representatives of the older social sciences. Apparently in part to outflank
this phase of opposition to his subject Justi explained (op. cit., pp. 155–60) the three
methods of obtaining national wealth which he assumed to be worth considering,
viz., (1) mining; (2) commerce; (3) inducing rich foreigners to become citizens.
The essay, “Proof that a Universal Monarchy Would Make for the Welfare of
Europe and the Human Race” (II, I, 17), was first published anonymously in 1748.
Justi acknowledges that it is punctured by the consideration that there would be no
assurance of a succession of fit monarchs. It amounts then merely to a fancy picture.
He meant it, however, as a means of expressing indirectly certain opinions which
could not be published unveiled. In general, he wanted to ring changes on the idea
that princes had no right to govern arbitrarily, but that right reason must control them.
He took the round-about way of arguing that it was not necessarily a misfortune to
subjects to have their prince subordinate to an overlord, because he might enforce the
reasonable principles which might not otherwise prevail.
Justi argues that the present status quo of some hundred and twenty ruling princes
was regarded by the princes themselves as synonymous with the happiness of
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are of relatively little moment (II, 246).
This essay tends to raise the suspicion that Justi was much more of a skeptic in his
early manhood about the prevailing type of government than he found it expedient
to remain. He very explicitly declares that the curse of Germany is its multitude of
independent princes (II, 257).
The last 167 pages of Vol. II (i.e., 406–572) are devoted to a technically very
important monograph on causes of the debasement of the currency, and means of
removing the evil. The view of gold and silver money which Justi expresses (II, 427
ff.) is essentially sound. The heading of §16 is: “The supreme power cannot
arbitrarily fix the price of gold and silver.” Again (§22), he says: “The conditions of
European states make gold and silver necessary as the material of money.” There
were, just before Justi’s time, “silver campaigns” in Germany. It was claimed that the
currency evils were due to the fact of the unfair ratio of gold to silver, while the ratio
established by other nations did not correspond. An act of the Empire in 1737 fixed
the ratio at 15 1/10 to 1. The ratio in England and most other countries at the same
time was 14½ to 1 (II, 468; vide II, 544 ff.).
Justi makes the coinage right a consequence of sovereignty over mines (II, 472–86).
From Vol. III we gather the following: First, a passage in the second paper (p. 23):
To be rich is to possess in abundance all that is demanded for the
needs and comforts of human life, just as he who can procure for
hmself in sufficiency the comforts of life is a well-to-do man.
[Wohlhabender]. According to the foregoing concept, a rich state is
the one which has within itself superabundant provision for all the
needs and comforts of life for a dense population. A well-to-do or
opulent state is one which produces an adequate quantity of the goods
which a dense population requires for its needs and comforts (III, 26).
In the following pages Justi explains at length that money is not merely the symbol
of goods, but that it is itself a “ware.” “Gold and silver are in a certain sense
necessary as money only in trade with foreign peoples” (III, 31).
If a land possesses only one sort of wares, viz., gold and silver, in
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comforts are to be supplied by exchange for it to such an extent that
the gold and silver country will be properly called rich. Of course in
such case the price of gold and silver in the country would be very
low. .... The foreign nations which supplied other goods in exchange
for these metals would make large profits, the metals would go into
the foreign lands, while no surplus of goods would remain in their
place to make the land rich. This is the case with Spanish America
(III, 34).
Another consequence of the supposed conditions is that such a land
is very thinly populated (III, 35).
All this sufficiently proves, in my opinion, that a state which
produces a surplus of only gold and silver, but not of other goods
demanded for the needs and comforts of life, can never be called rich.
On the other hand a state is always to be regarded as rich which itself
produces these goods in abundance. It possesses the true riches of
nature, which are much superior to those fanciful riches which arise
from the silent conventions of men. It possesses the essential and the
thing itself, and needs not to trouble itself about the symbols of the
same. It is quite independent of other nations, and need fear no
unfortunate consequences if its commerce with them is cut off.
Indeed, if it pleases such a state, it can terminate all trade with other
peoples, and enjoy by itself all happiness which a wise government
can procure.
We may even assert that such a state would be truly rich, if not a
pound of gold and silver were to be found in it; and such a state
would be able to continue all its connection and trade with
neighboring nations. This appears to be a paradox, because gold and
silver are necessary, particularly on account of foreign trade, and the
relative wealth as compared with other states has always been
regarded of great importance. Yet, since I have considered the matter
more carefully, I find that what I here affirm is strictly correct.
If it is presupposed that such a state produces in superabundance all
the goods pertaining to the needs and comforts of life, there will
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have in such abundance, which they must constantly seek in the state
in question. It is natural that such a state, which itself satisfies all the
needs and comforts of its people, requires few wares from other
peoples, and hence must have the balance of trade in its favor, so that
it has to pay little to other nations. Now let us assume that such a state
has no money in circulation, but only paper. Sure enough! This paper,
as the sole representative symbol for which the wares of this state can
be exchanged, will be eagerly sought by the neighboring nations. It is
so untrue that this paper will pass at a lower value than real money,
that in proportion to profit anticipated a premium will be paid for the
paper above the value of the gold that it represents. This is a natural
and familiar experience with all paper money and bills of exchange
of a land to which neighboring nations must pay more than they
collect. Both the government and the merchants and subjects of this
state will accordingly do the same and more with their paper than if
they used gold and silver coins in their transactions with other nations
fill, 36 ff.).
The third paper in Vol. III contains a translation of the letter alleged to have been
written by Colbert to Louis XIV in 1672, and first published in the Guardian. It has
a scheme of reasons why the French monarch could not subdue the Netherlands. On
the general question of the true power of states, the essay premises: The state is not
powerful because of extensive territories (pp. 57 ff.); nor because of population
alone (pp. 60 ff.); nor because of territories, plus population, plus riches (pp. 62 ff.);
nor even because of invincible armies (pp. 65 ff.), with frequent and strong
fortifications (pp. 73 ff.).
Then the positive doctrine follows:
The true strength and power of a state rests entirely upon the wisdom
and completeness [Vollkommenheit] of the government (p. 74). This
theorem involves very much. It means not only that the whole
correlation and fundamental constitution of the state is good; but the
wisdom of the government must display itself in all parts of the civic
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powerful in the degree in which its government is completely
organized [eingerichtet] and wisely exercised; and of two states,
equal to each other in population and riches, that one will always
ovcrrome the other the government of which is the wiser and more
complete (p. 74).
The development or justification of the theorem, which Justi says will be new to
many, is virtually a glorification of cameralism as the technique of a wise and
complete government; although Justi admits that all lands are not to be governed in
the same way.
In the sixth essay of the same volume, Justi schedules the services of religion to the
state. In brief these are: (1) It may stimulate the citizens to cultivate the soil, and to
increase the population. In this respect Catholicism is pronounced least efficient (p.
147); (2) it may promote diligence and skill (p. 151); (3) it may promote civic virtues
and stimulate people to practice them (161).
Justi proceeds to consider the relation of Christianity in particular to these services
(pp. 169 ff.), and he does not think that this religion is well fitted to be the dominant
force in the state because:
It is entirely heavenly, entirely spiritual, entirely devoted to God,
entirely withdrawn from this temporal life, and dedicated alone to the
future life. It is all too passive, patient, humble, with respect to the
earthly life, and so strongly and openly despises everything which
constitutes the welfare of citizens, that a civic constitution could not
be maintained among other powers by true Christians only (p. 170).
The first paper in the second division of the volume, a prospectus of the economic
courses to be offered at Göttingen, is dated June 20, 1755. It has the following
variation of scientific classification:
The sciences either contribute something directly to the discharge of
our duties and the improvement of our external condition or they
serve those purposes indirectly, and put us in a condition betcer to
fulfil our duties; or they are merely capable of amusing our immortalAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 401
soul (p. 222).
The economic and cameralistic sciences are those which teach
management on a large scale with the means of the state, or which put
us in possession of the measures by which the general means of the
republic may be preserved, increased, and reasonably applied to its
ultimate purpose of happiness (p. 223).
One of the impressions which the paper makes, from our point of view, is that Justi
was beginning to increase his attention to the economic emphasis, and second, that
the presumption of the prime and necessary first claim of the state was still decisive.
Justi urges that the cameralistic sciences belong in the first of the three groups just
distinguished. He calls attention to the lively movement at the time in favor of getting
these subjects taught in the universities (p. 226); and he repeats his frequent
reflection that, until recently, the learned were simply engaged in exchanging esoteric
views with one another, chiefly in a language not understood by the people, instead
of doing something that would be of service to the general good.
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In the sixth paper of the second division there is discussion of problems of state
revenues with respect to different circumstances of states and forms of government.
In the seventh paper an open secret of the cameralistic régime is confessed in this
wise:
The distribution and direction of the means of private persons belong,
to be sure, among the subjects which demand the special care of the
government. If the government could bring it about that no citizen or
resident should become entirely inpoverished, it would thereby
perform a service of the highest importance to the welfare of the state.
Ancient governments looked out for this. Modern governments have
neglected it almost completely. It has been taken for granted that it
was entirely a matter of indifference for the state whose hands held
the means and the wealth, if they were only present and remained in
the country. The contrary is true wisdom.
Special and peculiar measures are demanded of the government in the
case of movable and immovable wealth respectively. Movable goods
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add its encouragement in every way to stimulate diligence and skill.
Immovable goods, on the other hand, belong to the total means of the
state, and the means of a state is the chief ground of its energies, its
strength, and its power [Kräfte, Stärke und Macht]. It cannot thus be
a matter of indifference to the slate whether this portion of its total
means, which is in the hands of private persons, is in good or bad
condition, or whether it is well or ill employed. .... The use and the
good condition of private estates, however, rests to a great extent
upon the direction of a wise government over the same, and upon the
proper proportion and distribution of private estates in the country. ....
If the movable goods belong, so to speak, to the whole world, and
circulate from one country into another, the immovable goods are the
real fixed and assured property [Eigenthum] of the state. They are the
terra firma [Grund und Boden] of the Volk, because they belong to
the country which peculiarly pertains to the total Volk (p. 358).
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As a primary principle, government must see that lands shall be in the
possession of those who will live on them and cultivate them (p. 359).
It is also desirable that the peasants shall have a proprietary tenure (p.
362). This will tend to increase the rural population (p. 366).
In the eighth paper in the second division Justi tries to make his views about
population as emphatic as possible. He says (p. 379):
If one should ask me whether the chief consideration of a genuine and
wise cameralist—to which, according to the general principle of the
happiness of the state, his chief care must be directed, and back to
which he must refer in all his measures and operations— could be
expressed with a single word and concept, I would without a
moment’s hesitation cry out the word POPULATION.  Yes! Truly!
POPULATION  must be the apple of his eye, as compared with all other
measures.
419
Many cameralists who glance at this monograph will certainly not
have expected this word. If they had been asked for such a leading
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MONEY! REVENUES! “PLUS!” or something of that sort. Most of them
are so entirely convinced that the whole reason for their existence is
to bring together MONEY, or revenues, that all the philosophers in the
world could not convince them otherwise. I am not now writing for
these people. I will at this point attempt to convince only those
cameralists who, along with a good head, have also a good heart, that
money and revenues should at least be only their second great aim, if
they are not to fail of both population and revenues (p. 379).
Someone will perhaps reply that my theorem might lead too far. It
might be possible for a land to be very well populated, and to have a
surplus of all goods required for the need and comfort of human life,
while still lacking money; or gold and silver, and consequently to be
poor in comparison with other states, as a result of which it would be
exposed to various harmful consequences. We must therefore
conclude that riches in gold and silver, if not more necessary than
population, are still equally necessary, and thus deserve equal
attention.
I reply. If a country possesses a surplus of all sorts of goods, and
therewith the true riches, there is scarcely a possibility that it can
suffer a lack of the representative signs of goods, namely gold and
silver. The signs automatically follow the thing which they represent.
The surplus of goods in this country will stimulate other nations to
exchange the same among us for the representative signs, because the
goods will be cheap among us, and the quantity of gold in the country
will presently be in proportion to the quantity of money.
420
We have no instance of a country with a great surplus of goods,
which was still poor in money, provided that such a country carried
on commerce with other peoples. On the other hand, we have
examples of countries which possessed the richest silver and gold
deposits, and still were very poor in the goods of life, and thus in the
true riches. The representative signs at once followed the thing, they
entered the country which had the surplus of the goods of life, and
such a (gold- producing) country remained poor in spite of its gold
mines.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 404
Justi’s opponents in the above argument are men of straw so far as evidence appears
in the cameralistic books. He must have had in mind cameralists of the bureau, men
of affairs rather than of theory, who wanted policies to be shaped according to the
contrary hypothesis. In the next paragraph (p. 385) Justi continues:
But suppose that a well-populated land, supplied with a surplus of
goods, has not an adequate proportion of the “representative signs”
in gold and silver. This would be a very slight disadvantage. In the
country itself it would have not the- slightest harmful effect. In
respect to domestic circulation [Umlauf] the proportion of money in
the country is wholly indifferent. If the land is only well populated
and has a surplus of goods, exchange will be as lively with little
money as with much. Indeed, it may be dispensed with entirely. Such
a country could, without money, have all the happiness and strength
of which it is capable.
421
Then Justi goes on to say (p. 386) that of course the quantity of money becomes
important so soon as we consider relations with other states. That is, it is important
chiefly when a state is in an aggressive attitude toward others, and its policy is to
harm them.
The true relative defensive strength of a country depends always upon the larger
population, other things being equal; although the relative aggressive power depends
more upon wealth in gold and silver; or at least the relative wealth has in this
connection the most effect.
In the following pages (pp. 387 ff.) Justi resumes his main line of argument on
population, and elaborates rules for encouraging a high birth rate. These are: (1)
Means of earning a living must be made abundant; (2) the government must not be
oppressive; (3) the laws must encourage marriage; (4) the chief means of promotion
is that the rights of the pater familias and of the husband, namely the lordship over
his house and his wife, which so undoubtedly belongs to him according to the law of
nature and of civic society, should be restored (p. 393; vide Natur und Wesen der
Staaten, 8. Hauptstück, §§240, 241);
422 (5) the state must exercise great care over the
education of poor children, and the training of children in general (p. 395).
The remaining papers in the collection are so strictly technical that they add nothingAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 405







The reasons for treating Sonnenfels as the last in the camera-listic series must be
reserved for a later volume. More conventional usage extends the present group to
the time of Rau.
423 This summary measure of convenience is possible only by
ignoring the essential distinctions of purpose which distinguish theorists of
successive periods.
Roscher divides the history of German economic theory into three great periods:
First, the theologico-humanistic, from the early humanists to the end of the Thirty
Years’ War; second, the “polizeilich-cameralistische” to which no date of expiration
is assigned; third, the scientific, for which no distinct birthday is designated, but the
implication is that it begins with the favorable reception of physiocratic doctrines in
Germany, that is, during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As divisions of
this sort are mere uncritical superficialities at best, we need waste no time upon them,
after pointing out that they are worthless for purposes of precision. They magnify
accidentals, instead of penetrating first to the purposes which are the ultimate marks
of distinction between theorists, and second, to the methodologies which are the
variants of their procedure.
If we compare Roscher’s main analysis with the titles of his subdivisions, we find
that he falls back upon a collection of uncorrelated characterizations after all. For
example, he treats Dithmar, Gasser, Zincke, and Justi, with others of lesser note or
of equal importance if studied primarily in relation to their proper groups, under the
subtitle, “the older eclectics of the eighteenth century.”
424 He makes a subdivision
under the “scientific period,” for Sonnenfels, with two or three others of trifling
consequence thrown in to keep up appearances, with the label, “the later absolutistic
eclectics.”
425 This all amounts to the veriest parody of analysis. Roscher gravely
declares that in the period from the predominance of Wolff to the influence of KantAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 407
all German philosophy was eclecticism, and at the same time national economy, from
the end of the Seven Years’ War to the outbreak of the French Revolution, was
predominantly eclectic. We should say rather that “national economy” was still what
it had been for two hundred years, an increasingly circumstantial and subdivided
technology of management of the state, considered as the patriarchate of the prince,
and that it was no more eclectic in principle than it had been from the beginning. It
is always uncertain whether Roscher’s term “Nationalokonomik” amounts to
anything more than a synonym for Justi’s “Staatswirthschaft.” If Roscher meant to
imply that there was in Gennany, at the period designated, an economic science of
any sort differentiated from the general system of civic management, in which the
power of the government was the decisive aim, no evidence appears that the wish
was not father to the thought. In this period, and notably in Sonnenfels, a new spirit
is evident. The more obvious and extreme corollaries of quasi-absolutism are
challenged, indirectly at any rate, by sentimental rather than formulated variants
consisting of higher valuations of the claims of citizens as such, in contrast with the
older presumption that whatever the supposed good of the government demanded
must as a matter of course prescribe the terms of individuals’ rights.
Yet Roscher is correct in a way when he continues: 
In such a time criticism is far from serious examination of
fundamental ideas. It is rather busy rubbing down the sharp points,
reconciling petty contradictions; that is, it is essentially eclectic.
Before the discussion of the Smithian system, all the German teachers
of public management [Volkswirthschaft], the apostles of physiocracy
and the historical-conservative opponents of the new spirit excepted,
may be classed in two groups—absolutistic and liberal eclectics, the
former attached to the two major German powers, especially Austria,
the latter to the medium and petty states of North Germany,
particularly the Hanse cities.
For more than two generations Austrian national economy was
dominated by Joseph von Sonnenfels (1733–1817). He undertook his
professorship of Finanz- und Policeiwissenschaft at Vienna in 1763.
His significant literary influence began still earlier, and a little later
his political importance. The latter constantly grew under Joseph II.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 408
In the troubled times of the French Revolution it encountered
opposition, but on the whole it maintained itself so long that until the
publication of his own handbook in 1845 Kudler followed the
tradition of making Sonnenfels’ works the basis of his lectures. This,
to be sure, does not speak well for the intellectual productivity of
Austria, and the fact is that the country had to rely largely on thinkers
from the other German states.
Sonnenfels was the grandson of a Berlin rabbi. His father moved to
Austria, submitted to baptism, and assumed the name Sonnenfels. He
was a pioneer of German culture in Austria, and some of his
experiences remind one of the reception which Adam Smith found in
Scotland for the Oxford English which he had acquired during his
university residence.
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Of Sonnenfels the younger, Roscher further says:
His general political view is a theoretical and insecurely founded
absolutism, mitigated by the sort of philanthropic ideas which were
prevalent in the second half of the eighteenth century. In a monograph
dedicated to Maria Theresia (1771) and entitled “On Love of the
Fatherland,” he has much to say about monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy, but with express adherence to the words of Pope,
For forms of government let fools contest,
The best administered is the best.
He explains the origin of the state in the sense of Rousseau, and the
mottoes of all three volumes of his chief work were taken from
Rousseau.
427 At the same time he declares that the natural condition
of men is the social condition, and following Rousseau’s own words,
to be sure, he compared the state with the organism of the human
body. Meanwhile, because “irresistibility is the most essential trait of
the sovereign power, the governments nominated by the aggregate
will are as unlimited as the will was whose place they have taken.”Albion Small, The Cameralists, 409
Religion itself is by no means a positive limitation of the will of the
ruler. It is conceived rather quite in the sense of Joseph II, as a
guiding thread in the hand of the ruler, which the latter should never
neglect, and which was especially necessary in dealing with ordinary
people. Freethinking is also politically a crime, and there is no ground
for the fear that attachment to the laws of society could ever harm
religion and morality. Sonnenfels calls the censorship of books one
of the most necessary police regulations. He urges the shortening of
processes before the courts, and the payment of advocates by the
state: thus impressing the most natural and expert organ of the
opposition into the service of the government. A favorite idea of
Sonnenfels was that in criminal cases the penalty of ascertained guilt
should be determined by the vote of the majority off the judges; the
question of guilt or innocence however, as well as of the mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, should be settled only by a unanimous
vote. In practice this proposition would in most cases simply lead to
the release of the accused.
On the other hand, Sonnenfels gained a reputation in Austria for his
efforts to abolish torture.
428 This reform was decided in 1775 by the
publication of a tract which was at the same time in defiance of a
decree of 1769 against “all too great freedom in writing,” the same
being occasioned by his publications on the death penalty and torture.
Sonnenfels also opposed treatment of the pensions of civic servants
as charity. Again his curt demand that every obsolete law should be
repealed, ran counter to a well-known maximum of despotism
according to which the ruler is never to admit that he has erred, and
reserves the choice between various fundamental principles in dealing
with a specific case. That in the case of every law the purposes of the
law-giver should be discussed so as to protect right principles, is
much more emphatically urged by Sonnenfels than by Justi.
At the same time, it is characteristic of Sonnenfels’ absolutism to be
more liberal at the expense of private rights than at the expense of
governmental power. Thus in the case of the obligations attached to
peasant holdings of the soil, he speaks, for example, of the ancientAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 410
imprescriptible human rights, in contrast with the traditional rights of
possession.
429
The foregoing passage from Roscher has been cited not for its value as an
interpretation of Sonnenfels, but as a commentary on Roscher’s use of the term
eclectic. The details recited furnish a content for the word as he employed it. This
usage is to be distinguished from another which to some minds at least is more
appropriate. That is, we understand by eclecticism an attempt to construct a system
of thought by combination of two or more systems which are held by their extreme
adherents to be mutually exclusive, as for instance the Kantian psychology and the
Benthamite ethics.
430 According to Roscher’s specifications, he meant by eclecticism
a certain degree of independence in deciding whether traditional conclusions about
details necessarily follow from principles still regarded as fundamental. It is in the
latter sense alone that Sonnenfels can be called an eclectic. It is not true that he was
a mediator between the traditional philosophy of quasi-absolutism and a rival
political philosophy. It is true that his attempts to mitigate the consequences of
quasi-absolutism must be read at this distance as clear signs that a new thought-era
was in the making. The times were ripening for a system of political philosophy
which would openly challenge tradition. Specific valuations were forming in men’s
minds which would presently amount to repudiation of the old general theory. The
reconstruction, however, in the case of men like Sonnenfels, had gone only so far as
to produe a half-conscious conflict between the cognitive and the emotional sides of
political judgments. To put it in paradox, Sonnenfels thought as an absolutist, but he
felt as a democrat. Like every other paradox, this is a very loose statement. It more
correctly characterizes the breaking-up process of which Sonnenfels was an index
than any label which purports to assign him a precise position in a schematic
classification of theorists. The justice of this dissent from Roscher will appear as we
deal directly with Sonnenfels.
The work which is most important for our purpose, as reflecting, so to speak, a fin
de siècle phase of cameralism, is in three volumes, entitled, Grundsdtze der Policey,
Handlung und Finanz.
431 The volumes are closely related, but each is a distinct unit,
devoted respectively Vol. I to Policey, Vol. II to Handlung, Vol. III to Finanz.
According to the author’s explanation in the Preface to Vol. I, the books were what
we should now call syllabi of the courses which he gave in the uni-sity at Vienna onAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 411
the corresponding subjects. This description must be commented upon further in
connection with the several volumes.
A single observation should precede analysis of these books, viz.: One feels in
passing from Justi to Sonnenfels that a watershed has been crossed, and that one is
within the borders of another territory. Speaking literally, the mere fact that
Sonnenfels makes the conscious attempt at modernism involved in adopting a
corrected orthography makes the reader aware of a transition. Typographically these
volumes are not an improvement upon the mechanical style of Justi’s publications.
In their contents one detects a somewhat freer spirit. Judging wholly from the internal
evidence, one would by no means rank Sonnenfels as Justi’s equal in intellectual
strength. The later writer appears to have been of a more receptive than creative type,
but although they were in part contemporaries the impressions which molded him
contained elements which were less active in Justi’s world. If one were called upon
to defend this estimate, it might be said that while Justi seems to have been
intellectually more virile, he seems also to have been less open to persuasion by the
comparison of moral values. Justi’s personality betrays some of the signs of
quasi-absolutism at its worst. Sonnenfels shows affinities for something superior to
quasi-absolutism at its best. In spite of this contrast, we should go astray if we
followed the example of Roscher in affixing a distinctive label to Sonnenfels. We
cannot make such men fit into any schematic classification. They show that a new
type was in the process of evolution. They do not quite correspond with any general
description or definition. They are not entirely consistent with themselves. They are
partly of one tendency and partly of another. They show survivals of traits which are
logically incompatible with the presence of other traits, yet the incongruities exist.
Historical veracity consists in reporting them just as they were, without attempting
to conventionalize them in the image of any conceptual type whatsoever.
Turning to Vol. I, Policey, we find at once in the Preface literary symptoms rather
favorably contrasted with those observed in Justi. Sonnenfels begins by explaining
why he finds himself obliged to add a textbook to those already in existence. Some
of them he thinks are too comprehensive, others too narrow in their scope. At the
same time he names none of these works at this point, and we are obliged to search
the body of the book for desirable information about his connection with other
writers.
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importance of rewards as means of securing good civil service had, been overlooked
in the earlier editions. Sonnenfels replies that he did not forget the subject, but that
he intentionally omitted rewards from his schedule of means of obtaining good
government. He urges, however, that the best way to stimulate a high quality of
service is to make distinction the prize of excellence. Rewards of any other sort are
really premiums to the unworthy who do not become worthy in return for such
payments. He contends that civil servants should be punished for neglect of duty, but
should not receive premiums as means of making them perform the duties that
belong to their positions, and he supports his view by citing Humc without locating
the quotation.
This first volume contains 552 pages, of about 125 words each, and is divided into
432 sections. As a rule, one of these sections is a succinct statement of the substance
of the author’s view upon the matter to which it refers, and elaboration rather than
addition was attempted in the lectures. The point of view is partially indicated in the
opening sections of the “general introduction,”
432 viz.:
The isolated human being is not the human being in the state of
nature; his condition would be a condition of constant helplessness.
But he feels his lack. He feels that he is capable of remedying the
lack, of improving his condition. Reason, which distinguishes him
from the beasts, enables him to perceive the means by which he may
reach an improved condition. This means is socialization with his
kind [Vergesellschaftung mit seines Gleichen], The natural condition
of man is thus the condition of society: the domestic, the conjugal, the
paternal society, are so many steps whereby he comes nearer to the
great society, which includes all others, and which, since the minor
groupings direct their gaze toward the weal of the separate members,
has adopted as its aim the best good of all societies.
433
Sec. 2 continues:
The great society is the state. The transition into the same has given
the members a new name, has put them into new relationships. The
human beings have become citizens, beings who, through the natureAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 413
of their self-chosen (sic!) status, have now, as parts, their relationship
to a whole, are united as members in a moral body. The effect of this
unification is unity of ultimate purpose, unity of will, unity of force.
The three following sections expand the three principal concepts in the last
sentence. Thus (§3):
Unity of ultimate purpose, or of welfare, of the best, which now is
called the best good of the community das gemeinschaftliche Beste]
whereby the best of the single member, that is, private advantage,
remains constantly subordinated to the former, and cannot be
otherwise brought into the account than in so far as it constitutes a
part of the common best of the whole body. In case their private
advantage could not be reconciled with “the common best,” the
former must necessarily be subordinated to the latter. Fortunately,
however, in the precise sense, there can be no thought of a
contradiction between the true permanent private welfare and the
general welfare. For upon closer examination it will always appear,
either that what is regarded as private advantage ceases to be such so
soon as it works in opposition to the general advantage; or frequently
that a supposed limitation of the common weal is not actually such.
.... The welfare of the parts is based upon the welfare of the whole;
but at the same time the welfare of the whole springs only from the
welfare of the parts.
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Sonnenfels continues (§4):
Unity of the will, which, in case something is involved whose effects
extend to community interests, suspends all contradiction, upon the
principle that no one can at the same time will and not will, and
makes the separate will of the individual subordinate to the
community decision.
435
In §5 the explanation continues:Albion Small, The Cameralists, 414
Unity of force. In so far as the individual energies are necessary for
the attainment of the ultimate end of the community, they should be
exerted in no way except that toward which the community energy is
devoted. Whoever withdraws his share of this energy, in case the
common ends require a given quantity of force, leaves the general
activity too weak; but if he turns his energy against the general
purpose the disadvantage is doubled, because the energy of another
person is thereby nullified.
In the sixth section Sonnenfels distinctly asserts the right of each member of society
to take part in deciding what measures should be taken to attain the common ends,
and the consent of all the members is necessary if this decision is to appear in a law.
In the seventh section, however, doubt is cast upon the connotations which the
generalization had for the author’s mind. It seems to be more a historical hypothesis
in the sense of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, than a moral principle by which to test
the technique of existing societies. By means of this generalization Sonnenfels
accounts for the transition “from the multitude to society, from anarchy to the
simplest democracy.” He goes on to say, however, that confusion must soon have
appeared in council, universal agreement must have been impossible. Decisions of
some sort were necessary. Out of this practical necessity grew the different forms of
government. Then follows (§8) enumeration of democracy, aristocracy, and
monarchy, with the comment (§9) that:
in these three forms of government nothing essential to society is
modified, but merely the form in which the common will expresses
itself, i.e., either through the majority or through the élite, or through
the autocrat. .... Thus, just as the decisions of all were binding upon
each individual, the same must be the case with the decisions of those
who take the place of all. This obligation on the one side implies on
the other side the right of compulsion, and irresistibility, and thus the
relations between rulers and ruled, between subjects and the supreme
power, were more specifically determined. Originally (§10) the use
of the combined forces was determined by the will of all the citizens.
Since now the supreme power combines in itself the community will,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 415
its prerogative is likewise to determine how the community energies
shall best be used for the common welfare.
Gratitude is due to Sonnenfels for reducing this reasoning to such a bare skeleton
that its most serious dislocation is evident. We can see at a glance, and it is hard to
understand why thinkers of Sonnenfels’ ability did not perceive, that this was merely
an illusive collocation of a generalization about political rights, a hypothesis about
historical sequence, and an utterly arbitrary begging of the essential question of fact
about the institution of monarchy. This special pleading was a perfunctory excuse for
taking quasi-absolutism for granted, and proceeding to inquire how to make the best
of it. If each member of society has a right to his share in making up the will of the
society, nothing but sheer assertion appears in Sonnenfels’ reasoning to justify the
conclusion that the monarch must be accepted as vicariously exercising that right for
all the citizens, and must be obeyed because his will is virtually the will of all. Thus,
in spite of sentiments which make for reconstruction of ideas, Sonnenfels’ major
premise was the same old impotent makeshift of absolutism, the presumption that
royal power summarizes all the fundamental rights of citizens, and that it is a
political datum back of which our theories of social technique must not pry.
In §11 Sonnenfels further elaborates his concept “welfare,” and it is in this direction
that we find evidences of a force that was generating as a variant both of the theory
and the practice of quasi-absolutism. While criticism of the social logic summed up
in benevolent despotism was not admitted into this type of social science, the concept
“welfare” was becoming more intensive and was thus looming up as a factor in the
modification of theory and indirectly of action. The syllabus continues:
The ultimate purpose for the sake of which men enter society is that
best which they possess neither enough moral nor physical power to
attain alone; which in itself considered is, to be sure, the separate best
of each member. Since, however, this separate best is sought by each
at the same time, and each by promoting the best of the other thereby
also confirms his own, it is called the community best. The ultimate
purpose of men entering into combination might be expressed
therefore as the individual best; the ultimate purpose of combined
men as the general best. In civic societies this best, this ultimateAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 416
purpose, has been security and convenience of life, which combined
constitute the public welfare.
Security is defined (§12) as:
a condition in which we have nothing to fear. The condition in which
the state has nothing to fear is called public security, that in which no
citizen has anything to fear is called private security. When the state
is safe against attacks from without, the condition is called public
external security, and if no danger threatens from its own citizens,
there exists public internal security. If neither the state, from within
nor without, nor the citizens have anything to fear, this fortunate
condition is called the general security.
The convenience of life [continues the author in §13] is the facility of
providing one’s support by diligence. Diligence will find its support
the easier the more diversified the gainful occupations. The general
convenience of life depends therefore upon diversification of the
gainful occupations.
The general welfare [as explained in §14] cannot be maintained
without cost. .... The ruler must be provided with revenues, which
must be in proportion to his dignity. This outlay is made for the best
good of all the citizens. It is therefore proper that the expense should
be borne by all the citizens, but that it should be drawn from them in
a way that will promote the ultimate purpose.
Thereupon follows the definition (§15):
From manifold observations and experiences it is possible to refer the
various rules through which the general welfare may be maintained,
to reliable fundamental principles, and to give them the form of a
science, which is Staatswssenschaft in the most comprehensive sense;
that is, the science of maintaining the welfare of a state, the science
of governing. .... We are convinced that the problematical and the
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circumstances and occurrences to which the principles are to be
applied. The mere empiricist in politics is therefore as lictle to be
regarded as a statesman as the empiricist in the healing art is to be
regarded as a physician.
When Sonnenfels takes care to warn against confounding the practical administrator
with the empiricist (§16), and when he describes the former as the man who is trained
and experienced in applying the rules of Staatswissenschaft to actual conditions, he
completes his demonstration that he is dealing with a technology pure and simple.
Sonnenfels took for granted a certain general standard of life. He did not go to the
trouble of justifying the standard, but he counted on it as a conceded major premise.
Then his problem was to set forth the governmental processes by which that standard
might be reached. Just as there was no question about the authority of the standard,
so there was no inquiry into the assumption that responsibility for maintaining it
belonged to the government. In principle, therefore, as we have said above,
Sonnenfels was simply one of the series of spokesmen for the dominant régime of
quasi-absolutism. His humanitarian sympathies called for qualification of the system
in detail, but they did not produce the slightest variation in essentials from the typical
position of the earlier cameralists.
Sonnenfels replies (§17) to the possible objection that politics is too inclusive to be
the subject-matter of a science:
The ultimate purpose of states may be divided into four cardinal
subdivisions, which are connected with one another, to be sure, and
must join hands with one another, each of which stops, however, with
a subordinate end. Staatswissenschaft has accordingly been divided
into four sciences, viz.: external security; internal security;
diversification of gainful occupations; and raising the revenues
necessary for the expenses of the state.
The first of these sciences he calls (§18) Staatswissenschaft in the special sense;
otherwise known as Staatsklugheit or Politik. The second is his Polizeywissenschaft
(§19). The third he calls Handlungswissenschaft (§20). The fourth is
Finanz-wissenschaft  (§21).
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There is a surprisingly modern appearance on the surface of §22, the last of the
Introduction. It reads:
Natural science [Naturlehre] in all its parts, the mathematical
sciences, physical geography [Erdbeschreibung], the history, laws,
languages, are to be regarded partly as an indispensable preparation,
partly as reinforcing auxiliaries of the theory of Polizey, Handlung,
and Finans. But the man of affairs, in actual administration, must
know the customs, habits, and statutes of peoples, the reciprocal
advantages and disadvantages of lands, the political conditions of
states, and if he is to participate with advantage in law-giving, he
must know men.
We should compare this dictum, however, with Justi’s prospectus of a school for
cameralists, and we should not jump to the conclusion that Sonnenfels had really
advanced beyond him in discovery of the proportions and relations of governmental
technology.
The second chapter of Vol. I, Polizey, is entitled, Fundamental Principle of Civic
Science, and its Branches.
437 The chapter begins with a brief homily quite in the spirit
of its time, upon the importance of a principle to serve as an a priori, and the
qualifications which such a fundamental principle must possess. In §24 Sonnenfels
adds: “The only one who has referred Staatswissenschaft with all its branches to a
universal principle is, so far as I know, Justi.” If Roscher discovered the bearings of
this remark and of the context, he certainly failed to make them plain to his
readers.
438 The passage is really one of the most compact illustrations to be found, in
any literature, of the crossings of judgments in a period of scientific reconstruction.
If the passage had been made to order it could hardly have reflected more typically
the confusion introduced into theory by attention to new valuations;
On the one hand, Sonnenfels truly interprets Justi as building his whole theory upon
the principle of “general happiness” [allgemeine Glückseligkeit]. On the other hand,
the point of the paragraph is its attempt to show that it is a fallacy on Justi’s part to
depend on such a principle. In spite of more evident sympathetic leanings than
previous cameralists had shown in the direction toward which Justi’s principle
points, Sonnenfels rejects it as a major premise for civic science.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 419
As we have seen, of the two men, Sonnenfels was far and away more inclined than
Justi to decide, in the concrete, in favor of the alternative which promised most in the
way of general happiness in the modern or democratic, as distinguished from the
absolutistic, sense. Yet in this connection, instead of praising Justi, Sonnenfels really
blames him. His contention is that “general happiness” cannot be made a test of civic
measures, but that a more ultimate test must be found. Thus Sonnenfels deliberately
commits himself to a form of reasoning which subordinates in theory the element
which in the historical perspective makes him most conspicuous: and he reproves
Justi for an element in his formal reasoning which had much less effect on his
concrete technology than it had on that of Sonnenfels himself. As a literary landmark
the passage must be cited in full. We must remember that it occurs as a part of the
argument on the necessity of an adequate logical principle as the basis of a science.
It reads:
The only one who has referred Staatswissenschaft with all its
branches to a universal principle is, so far as I know, Justi. He
assumed as such a principle the promotion of general happiness. That
is a true, hut not a conclusive principle. The promotion of general
happiness is the object of all states, to be sure, in the period of their
origin, and it is their perpetual aim; for that very reason, however, it
cannot be taken as a principle of verification, or as the general
fundamental,  because by means o) this fundamental the goodness of
the measures, which consists in their harmony with the ultimate
purpose, must be tested.
To bring out Sonnenfels’ thought as distinctly as possible, we must translate the
note to this section, viz.:
In his [Justi’s] Staatswirthschaft when a law is to be given, or any
other device is to be derided on, about which it is doubtful whether
it would be advantageous for the state, the question is, “does the
proposed law promote the general happiness?” Hereupon it must be
tested by that principle, as the moral touchbtone, and when the
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is given through that principle (i.e., “general happiness”). In case,
therefore, the promotion of general happiness is assumed as the chief
fundamental principle, the decision will amount to this: “It promotes
the general happiness because it promotes the general happiness.”
This passage, by the way, may serve also as a sample of the evidences which might
be cited in support of the estimate above expressed of the relative intellectual
strength of Justi and Sonnenfels. The former had few qualms about adopting a
frankly opportunistic principle and getting the benefit of all the conclusions it would
yield. The latter tried to be more profound, but succeeded only in being confused. We
shall see in a moment that Justi’s a priori was no more and no less reducible to an
identical proposition than Sonnenfels’ substitute. The chief meaning of the section
then is its profession of faith in a deductive a priori rather than a functional test of
social values. The next section shows how far Sonnenfels was capable of going
toward a test which was absolute in form without being functional in essence. Sec.
25 is as follows:
Observation of how civic societies have arisen, and through what
means they have reached their end, will more surely guide to the real
fundamental principle. The isolated man was at the mercy of every
attack by a superior power. His security was not greater than the
forces with which he could defend himself against the attack. Two
men whose physical strength exceeded his own were already
dangerous to his security. He therefore sought to increase his strength
by combination with others. The isolated man felt wants for the
support of his life, sufficiency to satisfy which was within the
compass neither of his strength of body nor of soul nor yet of his
time. He sought to satisfy these wants by putting his diligence at the
service of the wants of other men, from whom he received as
compensation the supply of necessaries which he lacked. The isolated
mart was deprived of a thousand comforts, the lack of which he felt,
the possession of which would make his external condition more
complete. He sought the comforts through socialization
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was merged, the greater was the quantity of the resistance which he
could exert in every case, and thereby assure his security. The more
numerous the society, the more frequent its wants, the easier he found
ways, by supplying what was lacking to somebody, to get from the
same person what he wanted. The more numerous the society, the
more various were its products, and the easier was it for him to supply
each of his wants and comforts. Through the enlarging of the society
therefore, and according to its bulk, was the aim of civic societies
reached, viz., the security and comfort oj life. In later times this aim
remains ever the same. The same means will also remain effective.
Continuing the argument in §26, Sonnenfels adds:
The enlargement oj the society thus contains in itself all subordinate
special means which in the aggregate promote the general welfare. So
soon then as it is proved of an institution [Anstalt], or of a law that it
makes for the enlargement of the society, or at least does not hinder
the same; this proof at the same time carries the higher conclusion,
viz., that the measure promotes, or at least does not hinder, the
general welfare either on the side of security or of comfort.
439 I take,
therefore, the enlargement of civic society, through promotion of the
increase of population, as the common fundamental principle of
Staatswissenschaft, with its included parts: and the validating
principle [Prüfsatz] of every measure which is adopted for promotion
of the general happiness is this: Does it lend to increase or diminish
population?
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Further comment upon this explicit statement is unnecessary. It confirms our
proposition about the uncertain character of Sonnenfels’ underlying philosophy. It is
not our affair to probe the logical fatuities of the cameralists beyond discovery of
their actual ways of thinking. It is not even necessary to note that by turning
Sonnenfels’ method against himself his supposed ultimatum is at once reduced to the
identical proposition “Promoting population is the main principle because it
promotes population.” We go far enough for our purpose when we find thatAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 422
Sonnenfels was content with the generalization that increase of population promotes
the general happiness, and thereupon he persuaded himself that increase of
population is the ultima ratio of civic science. His system turns out to be a
technology in the interest now of “the general happiness,” now of “the promotion of
population;” with more inclination in practice than previous cameralists had shown
to treat the ill-defined concept “general happiness” as the ultimate end, with
corresponding tendency, inadvertent but real, to revise valuations of all means
whatsoever by judgment of their adaptation to that end.
In the same connection, however, we find a methodological indication of a more
gratifying kind. It adds to the evidence scheduled above to the effect that, so far as
the cameralists are concerned, it is very easy to overestimate the distance between
previous theories of population and that of Malthus. Thus, in §27, Sonnenfels speaks
as follows:
I must seek to avoid indefiniteness. The population contains all the
means which the common welfare [gemeinschaftliche Wohlfahrt]
demands. All institutions of the ruler should accordingly be directed
toward maintaining and increasing the numbers of the population.
This number, nevertheless, has its limits, or a so-called maximum:
and these limits are drawn by the nature of states, by the political and
physical situation, and by the circumstances. Genoa will never reach
the populousness of France. The bare rocks of Malta will never
maintain as many inhabitants as fertile Sicily, the sandy Mark
Brandenburg never so many as Bohemia. This, however, should not,
on the other hand, prevent the Senate of Genoa, the Order of St. John,
the king of Prussia, from using all means to assure for their territories
the largest population which they are capable of supporting. If man
with all his efforts can never be quite perfect, yet it always remains
nevertheless a principle of morals that man must strive for the highest
perfection! In politics, as in morals, if small states, less favored than
others by nature, never can become as populous as those which
combine larger area with rich soil, this does not invalidate the
principle,  the government should always concern itself with
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which the means at its disposal make possible. This explanation will
remove most of the objections which can be made against the
fundamental principle of population. I come then to the application
of this principle to the separate branches of Staatswissenschaft.
Thereupon. Sonnenfels indicates, in a merely formal way, the application of this
fundamental principle of population in the different divisions of the science. Thus
(§§28–31):
“The greater the number of the people, the greater is the quantity of
the resistance upon which the external security rests.” A note adds:
“The smaller states are consequently of their own strength capable of
no high degree of external security. They combine with others, so that
with the same, in respect to the ultimate purpose of defense, they may
constitute a numerous society. Even the promptness of diplomatic
action is affected by the amount of power at the command of the
conferring parties.” Then follow the conclusions:
(1) “Hence the fundamental principle of Politik.”
(2) “The greater the number of the people, upon whose ready
assistance one may count, the less has one to fear from within—
hence the fundamental principle of Polizey.”
(3) “The greater the number of people, the more the needs, hence the more
various the gainful occupations within the society. The more hands, the more
abundant the products of agriculture and industry, the stuff for external
exchange. Hence the fundamental principle of Handlungswissenschaft.”
(4) “The greater the number of citizens, the more are there to help
bear the public expenses. The smaller therefore is the share of each
taxpayer, without decreasing the total amount of the public revenues.
Consequently the fundamental principle of Finanzwissenschaft.”
“The knowledge of population is therefore, in all parts of public
administration, indispensable. The means of surveying it, as a whole
and in its parts, belong therefore to no branch of Staatswissenschaft
exclusively. They belong as introductory knowledge to all.”Albion Small, The Cameralists, 424
If we were relying on the proof-text method of supporting a foregone conclusion,
it would be somewhat difficult to explain away the formal principle either of Justi or
of Sonnenfels, so as to justify their inclusion in the cameralistic series, as above
defined (p. 6 et passim). We have not in any case relied on detached propositions, but
we have attempted to interpret each writer’s single propositions by the whole content
of his writings. We have made his promises and his performance confront each other,
and have tried to find the resultant. In fact both these writers were centered about the
fiscal needs of governments, and their principles of “welfare” and “population “
respectively were in effect rather less distinctive of a particular type of cameralism
than regimental colors are of distinctive military tactics.
Chap. iii bears the title “Means of Computing the Population.” It does not profess
to contain a contribution by the author to the statistical method, and is significant
merely an as index of the extent to which statistical theory had impressed men of
Sonnenfels’ type. Beginning with the observation that, from the earliest times,
whether the doctrine of population was taken as fundamental principle or not, states
have been interested for practical purposes in ascertaining the ‘size of the population,
the author distinguishes two methods of computation, viz., “political calculation,”
and “actual enumeration.” Under the former head he briefly discusses the uses and
uncertainties of estimates based on (a) the number of deaths, (b) the number of births,
(c) the consumption of grain. We need notice merely that the authors to whom
Sonnenfels refers as the sources of his information about statistics are the following:
Bielefeld (sic), Institutions Politiques, 1760;1 Zanoni, “VI. Band seiner Briefe dell’
agricoltura dell










The special introduction to the first volume bears the title: “The Simplest Concepts
of Polizey and Consequently an Outline in Accordance with Which They Will Be
Treated.”
Assuming that political institutions \voro, to a much greater degree than appears
probable today, premeditated anticipations of evils, Sonnenfels makes this formula:
When these measures and devices are assembled, and re/erred to
certain principles derived from the nature of the social purpose, there
results the science of founding and maintaining the internal security
of the state; that is, die Polizeywissenschaft.
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The author’s own comment will best indicate the relation of this formula to
previous conceptions of classification within the boundaries of Staatswissenschaft.
He says:
“By this formula I take issue with all authors who have previously
treated the subject. To a certain extent I give Polizey an entirely
different meaning. Perhaps I should say, my reason is because the
formulas hitherto offered seem to me too vague, too ill-defined, some
of them too limited, not including all which belongs within the scope
of  Polizey;  others too general, embracing much which does not
belong in Polizey. My intention is not, however, to repudiate other
formulas, but by means of my own to draw the proper boundaries of
Polizey according to my own views, and to exhaust the concept. I
think I have a right to demand that after the work itself has been read
the judgment should be passed whether I have acted in accordanceAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 426
with my intention.” In a note the author adds: “This intention is to
treat the internal constitution of a state in its interdependence, and in
all parts of the public administration, and at the same time to
investigate the sources of law- giving. Consequently I shall frequently
use the words Polizey and Gesetzgebung as synonymous.”
Sonnenfels’ further analysis of his method of treatment will afford the most direct
means of comparing his outlook with that of Justi.
The author proceeds to indicate his line of approach by pointing out, first (§44):
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that in a certain sense Polizey is principally defense against either
intentional or fortuitous occurrences of a harmful nature; second,
every occurrence which hinders the accomplishment of the ultimate
purpose of society must be regarded as harmful; third, from this point
of view Polizey regards every transaction which does not promote this
ultimate purpose as harmful.
In order to perform a harmful act, the will and the ability must
coincide. The law-abiding man has constant opportunities to perform
harmful acts, but he does not want to. The imprisoned criminal has
the will to perform harmful acts, but he is deprived of ability. Hence
Polizey falls into two parts, first, directive, the intention of which is
that no one shall wish to perform harmful acts; second, preventive,
which seeks to make it impossible for anyone to commit harmful acts
even if he has the desire.
The will of the actor is determined by impulses [Beweggründe], and
the more certainly and effectively the oftener the impulses toward or
against an action occur, or the greater the weight of the single impulse
which operates upon the actor. This is the invariable principle of will,
in which alone the great secret of law-giving resides. If the law-giver
only knows how to offer his people preponderating impulses toward
the good, he may be assured that he may lead them as he will.
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The impulses to action are of two sorts—first, attractive [einladend];
second,  preventive.  Again, the nature of the advantages or
disadvantages to be anticipated from actions divides impulses intoAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 427
general and special. The general impulses include all actors and
actions. For that reason they deserve the first rank in law- giving.
There is another reason, viz., there are actions in connection with
which it is difficult or impossible to discover a special attractive or
preventive impulse. In such a case there remains for the lawgiver only
the motive power of the general impulses, which may be grouped in
two classes: morals, and the high idea oj the excellence oj the laws.
Morals, in the relation in which they are regarded by the law-giving
authorities, are devotion to the general order. As Toussaint well says,
“they very well supply the place of laws, but nothing is capable of
supplying the place of morals.” Devotion to the general order is the
effect of combined institutions, which enlighten the understanding of
the citizen to the end that he may pass correct judgments upon
everything which affects the general order, which guides the
inclinations, which controls the passions and directs them to worthy
actions. The whole system of devices to this end I refer to under the
phrase attention to the moral condition.
Next in importance is effort to propagate a high idea oj the excellence
oj the laws; that is, to raise it, among all the citizens, to the rank of an
accepted, incontestable principle, that whatever the laws command is
good; that is, with respect to the whole, necessary; and with respect
to each individual, profitable. Whenever the supreme power succeeds
in establishing this presupposition, it is the most reliable guarantee for
the observance of the laws, through the violation of which each will
then believe that he will harm himself.
But given the willingness to obey the laws, insight into the special
actions that would conform to the laws is not thereby assured. The
ruler must consequently supply this lack by laws which specify what
is to be done and left undone. This is what Hume had in mind when
he said that the laws are to be regarded as reinforcement of the insight
of the individual. The subject-matter of these laws is internal public
and internal private security.
As previously defined, internal public security is a condition in which
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governmental form, has nothing to fear from the citizens. Voluntary
obedience to the law, and thus public security, is brought about
through the devotion above discussed. Compulsory obedience springs
from the consciousness of weakness against the superior powers of
the sovereign, or from impossibility of resistance. What Montesquieu
in another connection makes the fundamental principle of a civic
structure [Staatsverfassung] may be applied here with great accuracy,
viz., “it is essential,” he says, “that through the order of nature one
force holds another in check;”
449 that is, the quantity of possible
powers of resistance on the side of the citizens must always be
smaller than the quantity of the powers of coercion on the side of the
state. Hence the chief attention of the Polizey and law-givers is
demanded to prevent any stratum or single citizen from attaining to
such power that the public authorities may be successfully opposed.
In §52 Soanenfels repeats the definition given above of internal private security, and
he proceeds:
All good, which can accrue to the citizen, all bad, whereby his
happiness may be endangered, may be traced back to his business, his
person, his honor, and his goods.
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It is difficult to understand why the elementary observations which followed upon
the workings of legal mandates and sanctions were necessary or even tolerable in a
university lecture-room. As we have said above in the case of Justi, the most
plausible explanation is that they were of a piece with the homiletical style of the
period, the method of magnifying the obvious.
The foregoing discussion furnishes the reasons for the subdivisions of the book.
Except in details of classification and of judgment about minor means, the remainder
of the volume affords little material for our purpose. Roscher has digested the
technical contents of the three volumes in which Sonnenfels varies somewhat from
the other cameralists.
451 The most noticeable contrast with Justi, in respect to
technique, is the creation of the division Handlung co-ordinate with Polizey, instead
of treating subjects falling under the former as subdivisions of the latter. In respectAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 429
to the spirit of the treatment I am able to adopt Roscher’s judgments with but slight
modification.
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“For the development of German national economy, Sonnenfels may be
characterized most accurately in this way: his standpoint reminds us essentially of
Justi’s ideas,” but he gave to the ideas an apparently firmer setting in the sort of
reasoning which was conventional in his day; and he was rather more systematic in
developing the consequences of the ideas. “At the same time the demands of the
ought-to-be play with him a much more significant role than explanation of the
existing. Suggestion of practical propositions is in bulk, as well as in the interest of
the author, much more notable than the scientific analysis of the subjects in
question.”
Although we shall be led into somewhat extended discussion of numerous details,
we have thus covered in principle all that our main purpose calls for in the case of
Sonnenfels, and what follows amounts merely to illustrative specifications under
previous propositions.
The first section in the chapter on “Attention to the Moral Condition” is worth
quoting as a summary of Sonnenfels’ ethical preconceptions. He says (§61):
Morals are a common subject-matter of religion, of ethics, and of
law-giving; but each treats them in the light of its own purpose; the
first two as an end, the last only as a means, satisfied if
correspondence of conduct with the laws can be procured not by the
most lofty motives, but also merely by hope of an advantage or by
fear of punishment. Hence arises the idea of political virtue, which
differs from the concept of virtue demanded by ethics and religion.
Political or social virtue is the facility of ordering one’s conduct in
correspondence with the laws of the society. The motor machinery,
whereby this correspondence is procured, does not fall within the
scope of the present explanation, since virtue of a higher order is not
to be dispensed with. Meanwhile there is no ground for the anxiety
that  political virtue may be dangerous for religion and ethics
[Sittenlehre]; that would be the case if political virtue and religious
virtue were in antithesis with each other: but this is by no means the
case. For the purpose of the law-giver, to be sure, the first is enough;Albion Small, The Cameralists, 430
yet the second is not thereby excluded,” but to a certain extent it is
presupposed by the first. A wise law-giver will always seek to base
social virtue [Gesellschaftungstugend] upon moral virtue, yet from
inadequacy of the means at his command he cannot always discover
whether each member of society in practice bases his social virtue
upon moral virtue. He must therefore be content to take knowledge
simply of the body of the transactions, and he leaves it to the spiritual
teacher to introduce the vitalizing spirit of religion.
Of course Sonnenfels is at this point merely a symptom of the ethical and
theological dichotomy which still succeeds in keeping most of the population of the
world under the impression that virtue is an affair of separate circuits, which may be
operated independently or be brought into communication with one another. It was
no peculiar demerit of his that he could treat social virtue as different in kind from
ethical or religious virtue. It would simply plunge us into conflict with speculative
moral philosophy in general if we should enter upon discussion of this part of the
analysis. We may simply allow him to show further, in his own idiom, what working
relation he presupposed between social virtue on the one hand and religious virtue
on the other. In §63 he says:
The chief and most effective means for the building-up of morals are
religion, education, and the sciences. Among these religion deserves
the first place. Religion is the gentlest bond of society. Religion
instructs through her venerable teachings in goodness. Religion
stimulates to the application of the same through promises. Religion
deters from evil actions by threats. Religion brings about thorough
repentance, which she produces in the sinner, and forgiveness, which
she offers to the penitent, the improvement of the vicious. Religion
increases therefore the determining as well as the deterring motives.
Law-giving would in countless cases find itself inadequate, if religion
did not beneficently come to its aid. Whenever the eye of the
law-giver, and consequently also the penalty of the judge, fails to
accomplish the end, the exalted principle of the omnipresent God, as
witness and judge of all, even the most secret evildoers, is the soleAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 431
means of arresting evil undertakings. The whole world is
consequently in agreement with Warburton, that the doctrine of a
future life of rewards and punishments is utterly indispensable for
every civic society. The ruler may not disregard this leash
[Leitrie-men] given into his hand, and he must take care that every
citizen in the state has religion. From this point of view (§64)
freethinking appears as a political crime, because to a certain extent
it robs the state of the means of guiding its citizens most completely.
The chancellor Bacon, and President Montesquieu have never been
under suspicion as persecutors, yet the former writes: “No one denies
God, except those who have an interest in there being no God;”
453 the
latter: “From the opinion that there is no God comes our
independence or our revolt.”
454 Accordingly to them the atheist
becomes either a criminal or a disorderly citizen. Consequently the
concord and happiness of the state depend on intolerance of the
declared  freethinkers;  and circumstances might often make it
necessary for the public authorities to demand of everyone a visible
sign of the religion “to which he adheres.”
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The argument continues (§65):
From the necessity of religion, even for the temporal happiness of the
citizens, and the common security, are derived the right and the
obligation of the Polizey to extend its attention to the education of the
people in religious duties, to prevent abuses, and to watch over the
external order of religious functions and worship. The instruction in
the duties of religion, in the rural regions particularly, is worthy of so
much attention, because with the rural population religion must
largely take the place of education, and at the same time it is the only
means of making an impression upon their ways of thinking. The first
object to which the care of the Polizey should be given in this respect
should be sufficient and skilful curates.
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On the ground of necessity for public morals, education is then discussed as aAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 432
section of the duties of Polizey. The author says (§70):
After religion, education has the greatest influence upon morals. It is,
to be sure, a peculiar duty of parents; but not only a son, a citizen is
also to be educated. Education can therefore, on account of its
connection with the common welfare, not be a matter of indifference
to the law-giver, and cannot be left by the state to private whim.
Parents must be compelled to give their children the necessary
education (§71). In order that dependent children may be educated,
academies, foundling and orphan asylums are necessary (§72). It is
desirable that public schools should be attended by children of the
upper as well as of the lower classes, for the sake of making these
classes acquainted with each other (§73). Sees. 74–79 go into some
detail about alternatives in the administration of foundling and orphan
asylums, with respect to influence upon public morals, and §§80–82
attempt to answer the question whether it is worth while to-enlighten
the people through “the sciences.” Son-nenfels urges instruction in
the lower schools about ordinary civic duties, and he argues for
favors, like separate jurisdiction, for the higher schools, in order that
their prestige may be increased. Then follow hints, rather than
programmes, about the availability of various minor means for
promoting good morals (§§83–98); distinctions for exemplary
citizens, the stage, with necessity of censorship, and as another
negative means, the censorship of books. In connection with this last
subject Hume is quoted,
457 to the effect that the freedom of the press
is absolutely assential to England’s form of government, in order that
mind and talent may without any hindrance act in defense of liberty.
“But,” answers Sonnenfels, “this author himself admits that this same
means allows the spirit of resistance, of revolt, and other harmful
influences to be spread abroad. He consequently holds the censorship
as necessary for other forms of government, especially for the
ecclesiastical state. Perhaps we are justified in replying to the
Englishman, that the goodness of a constitution which is capable of
preservation only by such dangerous means, must be very equivocal.”Albion Small, The Cameralists, 433
But Sonnenfels presently reaches conclusions which have a firmer psychological
basis, whatever be the estimate of them in current economic or political theory. In
§100 he begins with the premise that law-giving wisdom must provide the general
and special means of preventing vagrancy and idleness in general. The previous §99
lays down, as a major premise for this dictum, the proposition that idleness produces
immorality. Whether we should agree or not with the inference that the government
must prevent idleness, there is little doubt among social theorists today that an
occcupation is one of the primary conditions conducive to morality in Sonnenfels’
sense of the term. The special arrangements which he recommends for repressing
idleness fall under the heads: prevention of begging; careful inspection to see that
everyone in the state is earning a living; checking of all useless occupations akin to
vagrancy; diminution of the number of students (because in Austria they were said
to be in excess of the positions requiring highly educated men); good discipline of
the servant class (§§107–14), and as a means of making all these efforts efficient
well-ordered workhouses and penal institutions (§§119–21). Everything, of the nature
of free soup, and indiscriminate alms-giving, including gifts to begging students, is
protested against almost in the spirit of modern scientific charity (§§101– 6). The
degree to which Sonnenfels relies on constraint, as compared with his belief in
attractive measures, is noticeable at every step. The second phase of laws relating to
the servant class, viz., their protection against unjust employers, is treated in §§115,
116; and the third phase, provision for reducing the number of the unemployed
servant class, in §§117, 118. While he emphasizes the danger to good morals from
all tolerance of pandering to sexual vice, Sonnenfels has only the following as a
programme (§122):
All that can be demanded of a reasonable Polizey is, not that its
attention shall be carried to the extreme of increasing its numbers for
the purpose of spying and house-visitation, nor that by excessive
severity toward weaknesses it shall give occasion for greater and
more dangerous crimes, but that the Polizey shall restrict itself to
preventing public indecency, and outbreaking offenses, and that it
shall co-operate with parents, relatives, married people, who make
complaints about seduction of their relatives, or disturbance of
domestic order. Beyond that, religion, education, and reduction of theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 434
number of the unmarried must do the most toward the restriction of
an evil which it will be possible for no foresight entirely to uproot.
Finally the chapter concludes with this omnibus paragraph (§123):
The Polizey must, however, exert itself to remove all occasions
through which, directly or indirectly, moral disorders of another sort
may be increased. Here belong, for lessening drunkenness, and the
evils that flow from it, the restriction of the number of dram shops;
the ordinance that after a certain hour (at night) nothing more shall be
sold in such shops, and at no time to intoxicated persons; exemplary
punishments for confirmed drunkards; prohibition of lodging
strangers except in recognized inns; and further, measures approved
by monarchs of insight, and readily granted by a head of the church
worthy of immortality, viz., for decrease of the number of feast days.
For it is certain that all time devoted to labor will be rescued from
vice and excess.
The spirit of chap, ii, “On the Means of Awakening a High Idea of the Laws,” may
be indicated very briefly. The fundamental proposition is that:
“on the average in a nation high respect for the law will be less a
result of persuasion than of antecedently formed opinion, that is, of
a favorable prejudice” (§124). This prejudice must be aroused and
strengthened. It may be weakened or destroyed. The means in either
case are in the hands of those who give the laws. In republics, where
laws are examined by representations of the people before they are
enacted, the presumption of the goodness of the laws springs from the
nature of the constitution. That is, it is supposed that the law would
have been rejected if its advantages had not been beyond all doubt. In
monarchies, that which occurs in republics before the acceptance of
a law should occur at the promulgation of the same. This may take
place in two ways—first, by giving assurance that consultation with
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that every law should have a preamble, setting forth the reasons why
it was necessary for the public weal and beneficial for the individual.
“A government which imposes upon itself the rule of accompanying
its laws, so far as possible, with reasons, shows confidence in its
measures, honors the intelligence and integrity of the citizens, appears
less to command than to persuade. The people itself imagines that it
obeys less the law than its own insight.” Again (§128) it is added:
“Even if the law bears only some such legend as ‘moved by the public
good,’ the people will be inclined to believe it.” Furthermore, the
conviction which assumes that the laws are good is produced by laws
of great age, and the invariability of laws is the condition of their
attaining great age (§129). Conflicting interpretations of the law by
experts weaken the presumption in its favor (§131). Nothing weakens
the prestige of the laws more than a distinction between obligation
before the judge, and’ absence of obligation in conscience (§132).
Chap, iii, “On Provision for Holding Private Powers in a Subordinate Equilibrium
with the Powers of the State,” may also be epitomized very briefly. The main
proposition is that:
the powers of resistance on the side of the citizens must always be
kept inferior to the powers of compulsion on the side of the state (sic)
(§136). This persistent antithesis between the citizens and the state is
one of the most essential traits of the pre-democratic political
philosophy. “The forces or means, which might hinder the state in the
exercise of its powers, consist of wealth, of the strength of a stratum
of society, and of privileges.” “While security of property is one of
the principal advantages to be gained by civic society, wisdom seeks
to prevent the accumulation of excessive private wealth” (§138).
458 It
is not wise to prescribe the limits of wealth which individuals or
families may possess (§139); but the state may set precise bounds to
the wealth of deathless societies. “This necessity has been recognized
in all states,
459 especially since Edward I set the example with his
‘amortization laws’ “ (§140). “In case the laws have neglected to
provide against too great accumulation of wealth in families, indirectAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 436
measures may be adopted with advantage to correct the evil; as when
Henry VII of England allowed the division of the estates of the
nobility among several sons. If he had ordered the division, it would
have been resisted. The permission was regarded as beneficent.
Similar indirect measures may be taken to limit the growth of
deathless societies (§141); and parallel action is wise in the case of
societies, parties, and organizations of many sorts which tend to
acquire excessive power (§142 ff.). Sees. 149 ff. deal with cases in
which sedition of more or less violent sort breaks out, from actual
violation of laws against accumulation of riches or power, to
reflections on the government by public speakers, preachers, teachers,
actors, writers, etc.; and different kinds and degrees of censorship by
the police are rather vaguely recommended. The duties of the police
in case of disorderly assemblies are rather hinted at than specified
(§§155 ff.).
Chap, iv, “On Security of Action,” is notable, first, because it gives evidence that
some of the concepts of an innovating popular philosophy were beginning to call for
attention in one of the more conservative universities of the German countries.
Sonnenfels begins by saying that “security of action” and “freedom of action”
are.identical ideas. “They refer to the condition in which we have nothing to fear with
respect to our actions.” Thereupon he undertakes an analysis of the distinctions to be
made between “freedom,” “licentiousness” [Zügellosigkeit], and “independence”
[Unabhängigkeit]. The presuppositions of his argument are, first, “the laws of
nature;” second, “the social compact.” These make “freedom” a limited, not an
absolute condition, and per contra they estop licentiousness and independence.
Regardless of the method of the argument, the author urges the sane view, which he
phrases after Pope, that “he who obeys reason is free.” He finds that reasonable
freedom or security of action may be endangered, first, by the ruler, considered as
law-giver and judge; e.g., when he transgresses the limits of the law-giving power,
or when he falsely accuses, or unfairly conducts a process in court; second, by
fellow-citizens in various relations. The succeeding discussion of the limits of the
law-giving and judicial power is literary rather than technical, but it marks a rising
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citizens feel to be reasonable. In this connection (§§165–69), Sonnenfels presents his
famous objections to torture as a judicial measure. The infringements upon security
of action by fellow-citizens are scheduled under the heads, “servitude,” “chattel
slavery,” “constraint by parents, guardians, etc.” (§§171–75).
Chap, v, “On the Security of the Person” (§§176–293), covers a wider range of
detail with a greater number of specific topics, than any other main division of the
book. Although in many cases it indicates rather definite policies about particular
problems, yet on the whole it has rather the force of a catalogue of subjects than of
a codification of rules. Its importance is technological, and a proper estimate of its
value could be made only by technologists in the different subjects of which it treats.
It does not furnish material which falls directly within the scope of our inquiry. It
should be said, however, that it is another remarkable reflection of the degree of
attention which German administrative theory had already given to details affecting
public welfare. It discusses a surprising number of relations by which physical
well-being is affected. These range from crimes of violence, to methods of relieving
poverty, caring for the sick, promoting public hygiene, and securing pure food or pure
air. It should be noticed too that the chapter includes a strong and explicit argument
against toleration of duelling, and also against all methods of procuring abortions. In
the latter connection Sonnenfels shows farsighted views about the policy which the
government should pursue toward mothers of illegitimate children.
Chap, vi, “Security of Honor” (§§294–304), proposes to treat of honor “considered
as respect for the integrity [Reclit-schaffenheit] of a citizen.” The viewpoint is
indicated by the propositions: “Whatever deprives the citizen of honor, therefore,
robs him of actual advantages, harms him seriously: and the legal authority is bound
to defend every citizen against such injuries.” The chapter accordingly specifies the
following subjects which should be taken into account in applying the principle:
supposed hereditary dishonor (§§295–97); supposed dishonor on account of certain
occupations, court servants, spies, executioners, etc. (§298); loss of honor through
insult and slander (§§300–303); loss of honor through seduction (§304). It should be
observed that, whatever be the value of the means recommended in these
connections, the content of private and public welfare in particulars of which this
chapter contains samples was much more justly estimated in the German civic
theories of the cameralistic period than in the practice of modern democracies. We
have by no means improved in all particulars upon the civic theories of the eighteenthAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 438
century.
Chap, vii, “On Security of Goods” (§§305–51), contains nothing that calls for
special remark, except that it groups with the crimes against property as ordinarily
understood, various injuries to possessions through oversight [Versehen] (§§337 ff.).
Under the latter head, Sonnenfels discusses protection against damage by fire,
including building-ordinances, fire-departments, fire-insurance, protection against
lightning, use of firearms and fireworks, ordinances against vagrants, and various
minor devices.
Chap, viii, “On Penalties” (§§352–88), although not strictly pertinent to our
purpose, deserves brief notice because it contains symptoms of the independence of
thought about details which led Roscher to apply the term “eclectic.”
Sonnenfels begins by questioning the sufficiency of Grotius’ explanation of legal
penalties, viz.: “Punishment is an evil of sensation because of malice of action.” The
author comments:
This aphorism, handed down from writer to writer, has given a
one-sided direction to reflection upon the subject. The viewpoint
from which the judge who enforces the penalty regards it, and that of
the law-giver who ordains it are quite different. The first punishes
because the law was disobeyed. The second threatens a penalty in
order that the law may not be disobeyed. With the former the penalty
is a consequence of the conduct. With the latter the conduct is a
consequence of the penalty. With the first the affixing of penalty is
inculpation, with the second it is stimulus. Penalty therefore,
considered as an auxiliary, to protect the law, namely, by exerting an
influence upon the resolutions of actors, and by supplying the place
of other determining motives, is an evil which is attached to the law
as a means of influencing against infraction oj the same. In
determining penalties, attention is to be paid, first, to the quantity;
second, to the kind of the same.
The attempt to find a principle on which to decide the former question proceeds by
considering four possible criteria, viz., the conduct itself, its relation to the state, its
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means of measuring punishment is, therefore, to be sought only in the motives of the
crime.” The following specifications are deduced:
“(1) The penalty must be as great as necessary to procure the lawful
action or restraint; (2) The penalty must not be greater than necessary
to procure the lawful action; (3) The strongest deterring motive, that
is, the most effective penalty, will always be that which threatens an
evil in direct antithesis with the motive which solicits to the crime.”
In explaining the application to be made of these principles,
Sonnenfels recurs to his classification of evils to be avoided, or of
“securities” to be gained. As the evils have reference in turn to civic
freedom, honor, .goods, and corporal integrity, the penalties should
correspond. Thus, they should be variations of—“loss of all civic
rights; loss of social standing [Standesrechte]; loss of rights of the
family; loss of legal rights; or, in special cases, banishment from the
country; expulsion from the locality; infamy; degradation
[Standesenlsetzung]; confiscation of goods; fines; corporal
punishment, from minor inflictions to the death-penalty.”
Respecting the extreme penalty, Sonnenfels energetically opposes the prevailing
opinions and practices. He repeats the theorem which he had published in 1764:
Death penalties are contrary to the purpose of penalties. Hard,
incessant public labor promises much more for that purpose, and at
the same time makes the punishment of the criminal profitable for the
state.
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One paragraph in particular, in discussion of this question, is notable more for its
wider implications than for its immediate bearings. Whether its author was aware or
not that he was betraying tendencies which were ominous for the old régime, it is
evident enough from our present viewpoint that we have here one of the signs that
absolutistic preconceptions were losing some of their hold. On justification of the
right of capital punishment the author says (§377):Albion Small, The Cameralists, 440
The first question which must be investigated is without doubt in
respect to the right. Has the law a right to punish with death? If
questions have been raised over this point, it was because writers
have fawned upon princes, and have sought the source of this right in
no one knows what form of a majesty derived immediately from
heaven, and assigned to them an unlimited right over life and death.
The source of this awful right is to be sought nowhere except in the
individual man, whose combination constitutes the state. Man,
thought of in the natural condition, has the right to protect his security
in every way, and if the violence of attack cannot otherwise be
warded off, it is his right to carry his defense even to the death of the
assailant. In civil society each separate member has made over this
right of defense to the whole, that is, to the sovereign power that
represents the whole; that is, not a right over his own life, which no
one possesses, but the right of each over the life of every other who
might become an assailant. In that way the sovereign power acquired
the right over all.
Our concern is not with the validity of this reasoning, but with the fact that
Sonnenfels exhibited a tendency to think for himself about certain parts of the
traditional philosophy of the state.
The purpose of chap, ix, “On Institutions for Maintaining Internal Security,” is
particularized in the opening paragraph (§389), viz,:
Under the name institutions we include all persons and devices which
aim at prevention and discovery of every action harmful to civic
security, including the higher as well as the lower stations and
functionaries that have to do in any way with guarding the peace, with
detecting seditious intentions, or dangerous persons, and finally
everything which has to do with punishment of the same.
As a survey of the civic structure which all the cameralists have contemplated with
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As the prerogatives of Polizey have been treated in this work, the
law-giving as well as the executive power lies within the scope of its
functions. The supreme administration of the same can consequently
be accredited only to the highest station in the state, whatever be the
name under which it exists. This is the directing guidance of the state,
where the principal laws and ordinances are enacted. Execution,
however, is, according to the variety of the objects, committed to
subordinate divisions. Moreover, the public administration usually
subdivides affairs, and retains for itself law-giving, at least in general
affairs of the country, or respecting other more important matters; it
turns over the civil and criminal judiciary functions to special bodies,
or so-called Stellen, and restricts the operations of Polizey in the
narrower sense to maintenance of the public peace, good order, and
discipline, to superintendence over measures, weights, markets,
cleanliness of cities, institutions necessitated by the various dangers
and accidents, and especially over everything which demands
emergency action. Since mention has already been made of the
different judicial offices, it remains for this chapter to treat only of
this last significance of Polizey.
The chief difference between Justi and Sonnenfels in this division of the subject is
not that they disagree in principle, but that Sonnenfels has scheduled a larger number
of concrete details to which the principles apply, and that these specifications have
the effect of considerably extending the apparent consequences of the principles. A
striking instance of this is the argument for abolition of places of refuge (§§410–15).
Chap, x, “Use of the Institutions in Case of Great Accidents” furnishes a sort of title
for activities which in the nature of the case cannot be thoroughly analyzed nor
formulated, and no very explicit prescriptions about them are possible. The reference
is to occurrences which may be anticipated in kind, but cannot be foreseen in time
and place, and cannot be averted by human power. The sort of foresight to be
exercised is suggested by the questions, What sort of accidents are probable in a
given locality? How does the situation affect the probability of such accidents? What
variations of the probability are there at different times? Among such accidents,
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may be in part thought out in advance by dividing the calamity into stages, and by
determining the sort of conduct appropriate in each, viz., (1) before the actual case;
(2) during the same; (3) after the same. As an illustration, Sonnenfels takes the case
of a freshet in the Danube at Vienna, and specifies a programme for minimizing the
calamity, before, during, and after. It is evident that this sketch is not a mere
academic exercise, but it has the same importance for civic conditions which the
plans of a commissary department have for an army.
With reference to the volume as a whole the curious fact is to be noted that no one
who had not been advised of the author’s alleged fundamental principle would
discover a sign of it in any paragraph of the book after the passage in which it is
discussed in the abstract. From that point it disappears, and no use is made of it
whatsoever. A student of Justi who omitted the first forty-two sections of the present
volume, and carefully studied the remaining three hundred and ninety, would
probably find no occasion for doubting that Sonnenfels was completely in accord
with his predecessor in making “the general happiness” the criterion of civic
procedure. The argument does not close here, to be sure, and the author will find a
use for his alleged criterion later. We shall return to the subject, and shall find it







The title-page of Sonnenfel’s second volume, Handlung, is identical with that of
Vol. I, Polizey, except that the vignette represents “Fortbonnais.”
461 If Sonnenfels did
not translate Forbonnais’ term commerce by the word Handlung, the scope of his
book would call for the version “industry,” in the more general sense connoted by
ordinary American usage, not in the more technical sense of the German “Industrie.”
Although the activities discussed include gainful occupations in general, Sonnenfels
prefers to consider them as “commerce,” and that term will be used as a translation
of his word Handlung. If all the passages in which it occurs were collated, they
would show a curious lack of precision in his analysis. To what extent this
classification of economic activities of different kinds under a name proper to some
of them and not to others is cause or effect of important economic misconceptions
is a query which we merely register, without attempting to offer an answer.
This second part is very largely a discussion of technical phases of different kinds
of business, more than investigation of economic principles at the basis of all
business. The introductory portions of the book, however, show traits that are highly
useful in marking theoretical tendencies.
The Preface declares that this “outline of political commercial science
462 was not
written for men in business, whose theories have been established by long
experience, and have become complete. If I wish to leave the book in their hands, it
is only in order that I may be corrected by them if any errors have escaped my
knowledge.”
The Preface continues:
My ambition limits itself to the young friends to whom my calling
commissions me as a guide. If I have in some measure smoothed their
way to their duty, if I have made their preparation for their callingAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 444
easier, I have accomplished my purpose.
As an index of the intellectual conditions within which Sonnenfels wrote, the next
paragraph is instructive, viz.:
There is no lack, to be sure, of thorough writings on the subject of
commerce. The English and the French have always recognized the
importance of a subject which may be regarded as the foundation of
public welfare
463 [ der öffenttichen Wohlfahrt], since through
multiplication of means of subsistence it is the basis of population.
The greatest men in all sciences, publicists [Staatskündige],
historians, philosophers, have made contributions to the explanation
of commerce. Mathematicians have believed that they were no less
useful to the world and to their fatherland when they spoke of the
advantages of a cloth factory than when they analyzed the profound
theory of the infinite. Their writings meanwhile are rather for the
already educated readers than for beginners. It appears that men of
such ability have been unable to put themselves on the level of the
untrained. Hence the obscurity of their writings. They presuppose
knowledge of which the uninitiated have no comprehension. The
latter cannot grasp conclusions from principles which they do not
understand. 
The profound author of the Elements of Commerce declares at the
outset that he did not write for those who read only to save
themselves the trouble of thinking. If Forbonnais would admit only
thinking readers, did he reflect that his excellent book would remain
almost unread? I take the liberty of confessing that my intention is
precisely the opposite of his. I write for those who are not yet capable
of thinking for themselves on this subject. This book is to introduce
them to it. My purpose is to prepare readers for Forbonnais.
Sonnenfels presently schedules the Austrian literature of the subject as follows:
The catalogue of writings to which we can make claim as a national possession may
be read at a glance. It comprises in all Oesterreich über alles — mostly credited toAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 445
Horneck, but partly to Becher; Schrötters Fürstliche Schatz- und Rentkammer;
Meixner’s Anmerkungen über die Beschaffenheit der k. k. Erblande:
464 a book which
only arouses the wish that such a work might be undertaken by a more competent and
better informed man; and an anomymous book entitled, Wahre und vortrefliche
Mittel, wodurch die k. k. Erbkönigreiche und Länder in einen glücklicheren und
florissanteren Zustand geselzt werden könnten, under which much-promising
inscription everyone would be likely to expect more than five pieces
465 which are
shoved together without connection as without choice, and of which, for the author’s
sake, I will attribute the much- professing title to one of the usual publishers’ tricks
to make eight paltry sheets salable.
Four books, or eight, if we reckon Becher’s Bedenken van
Manufacture in Deutschland,
466 von Vogemont’s (or Bogemont’s)
Deutschlands vermehrten Wohlstand, Boden’s Fürstliche
Machtkunst,  and Jörger’s Vota Cameralia, from all of which no one
would be able to gather particularly important information. These are
all of this species, however, which Austria up to this time has to
show. The rest of Germany is not rich in writings of distinction, while
other nations are taught about all parts of commerce and finance by
the most excellent works.
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Not less instructive is Sonnenfels’ hypothesis in explanation of Austria’s
backwardness in this respect (Preface, p. 8):
This lack may have its cause chiefly in the difficulty of access to
those sources which occasion the speculations of writers, which guide
them, which must necessarily be made fundamental by them, in so far
as their works are not to remain merely indecisive and mostly
inapplicable thoughts. The strength and population, the condition of
commerce, of manufactures, the various changes, the occasions of the
same, the hindrances, the encouragements, the increase of diligence,
the condition of the public revenues, of the national credit, all this is
in other states known in detail, either from public registers and tables,
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about these matters. Competent men then look upon it as their duty
not to withhold from the state their observations about the same, and
their advice. In this way, as it were, a whole nation unifies its insight.
The number of its councilors is in certain respects not smaller than
the number of its thinking patriots.
With us such facts are still regarded as state secrets. There may be
many important grounds for this reticence, which are unknown to me.
Meanwhile I can cite this secrecy in general as the cause of that dearth
of political writings, the number of which I wish to increase by
publishing these elements. My merit may perhaps be very slight, if a
one-sided estimate is put upon the worth of my labor. If, however,
judgment is so generous as to consider the intention, the endeavor, to
be useful at my post, I have thereby earned at least a certain measure
of thanks.
In the evolution of the methodology of the social sciences in Germany, no writer
seems to me more symptomatic than Sonnenfels of the tendency toward transition
from a technology of civic management, with the interests of quasi-absolutistic
governments as the determining aim and norm, to a technology in which a co-
ordinate position among the aims and norms would be assigned to the interests of
economic production, and of popular welfare in a more modern sense than that which
was the content of the concept “welfare” in the philosophy of the quasi- absolutists.
For this reason, the entire introduction to this volume—Handlung—must be adopted
into this survey. The alternative title given to the volume at this point is: Elements
of the Science of Commerce, and the particular subject of the introduction is “The
Simplest Concepts of Commerce, and its Branches.”
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From one point of view, the work in a pure science upon which all the subsequent
details and applications are based, is discovery of the categories in which the facts
of the science have to be thought. The methodology of a positive science is a
rhythmic reaction between observation of isolated facts and generalization of those
facts into categories. From any stage of discovery the way to an advanced stage is
through processes of further analysis of facts and assembling new facts, to learn
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in the categories in use. A history of economic science might with advantage be
written as an expansion of this proposition. Logically antecedent to all quantitative
formulation of economic laws must be static formulation of the structural phases of
economic processes. Whatever other merits or demerits may be attributed to the
Smithian type of economic theory, it was the most potent factor in nineteenth-century
thinking in stimulating analysis of the elementary economic relationships, and of
bringing into use relatively precise terms as symbols of those relationships.
In other words, a first step in passing from every less critical to a more critical stage
of a positive science consists in displacing less adequately analyzed categories for
more adequately analyzed categories, as the qualitative conceptions of the science.
From our present point of view, the value of Sonnenfels’ introduction to this second
volume consists in its exhibit of such economic categories in a relatively early stage
of their evolution. Their crudity is cumulative evidence in support of our theorem that
the cameralists are radically misunderstood if we interpret them as economists in the
classical sense of the term. They were political scientists in whose minds distinct
economic categories were not differentiated until the Smithian influence became a
variant of German thinking. Sonnenfels’ own language is the most effective
commentary on this thesis which could be cited. We translate his introduction in full:
The beneficent influence of commerce upon general happiness
[allgemeine Glückseligkeit] was long overlooked by political
philosophy [Staatsklugheit]. No attention, no care, no promotion was
supposed to be due to this subject. Not as though Alexander, even in
the irresistible course of his victories, had not cast a glance upon
commerce, and after the destruction of Tyre had not built Alexandria
as the emporium of eastern and northern wares: but ministers and
monarchs recognized in the son of Philip only the conqueror, and
only in that character did he seem worthy of imitation. Charles V,
Sully, Elizabeth, Colbert first enlightened, cabinets about the true
advantages of commerce. World-wisdom lent statecraft its insight.
Men who had received from Providence the calling of being teachers
of the nations instructed the world on this subject in deathless
writings. Finally, as the principle gained prevalence—the happiness
of the state consists in the number of its citizens — people began toAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 448
recognize the worth of a business [Geschaft] which, through
multiplication of the means of support, contributes such a large
portion to this happiness. Thereupon commerce became an affair of
the cabinets. Attention was given to the principles by whose
application tlie largest number of people may be supplied with
occupation.  The collection of these principles constitutes the political
science oj commerce.
469 Mercantile [die kaufmannische] science is
distinguished from this subject, because the private merchant has for
his purpose the increase of his own private means, without thought
whether thereby anything accrues to the general advantage of the
state, or whether the general advantage is endangered. Yet the
political commerce by no means works against private advantage.
The former seeks to use the latter as a tool to subordinate it as a
means to the general end: that is, to combine the advantage of the
state with that of the individual citizen.
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The occupation [Besckäftigung] of human beings has for its purpose
the placing in their hands the means whereby they may provide their
support. They derive this support through receiving something as
compensation for that which they produce by their occupation.
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Thus barter comes into existence, and this is the business of
commerce in the most proper sense (§2).
What one should accept as a compensation for that which one has
given must be of such character that one wants it. Want [Bedürfen] is
here not to be understood in the restricted sense which misanthropic
worldly-wise have given to the word. Desire [Verlangen] for greater
comfort, the means to gratify this desire, the ability to find pleasure
in possession and enjoyment of the same, are not without a purpose
in the plan of nature. They are, to the same extent, not without a
purpose in the plan of Staatsklugheit (vide  §10 below). Want
[Bedürjniss] means accordingly everything the use of which can give
us advantage of any sort whatever, the possession of which is
meanwhile desired; and these wants, whether they are real wants,
without which human beings could not exist, or imaginary wants,
which the customary mode of life, the standard of comfort orAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 449
enjoyment, the pride of men, have made desirable, are equally an
object of exchange through which wants are traded for wants (§3).
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If that which one can give for that which is offered were of such a sort
that it were everywhere found in abundance, it would have no
compensating worth, and by means of it, therefore, no exchange could
occur. The object offered in exchange must accordingly be something
which he, with whom the exchange is to occur, wants and does not
possess, or at any rate does not possess in the quantity which he
desires. That is, it must be relatively rare. Commerce is thus a
business which owes its origin to a reciprocal want. What one may
offer to another for the satisfaction of a want, is called a ware
[Waare] (§4).
In the exchange of wares many sorts of hindrances presently appear.
It is possible that he who desires to acquire a ware cannot offer for it
precisely the ware which the other party wants at the moment, or in
the quantity in which it is offered, and the offered ware is either
entirely incapable of division, or the division diminishes its worth. In
such a case one must seek to secure what one wants through a series
of exchanges. Then again, that which one possesses may be of such
a nature that it cannot, without difficulty or deterioration, be
transferred from one place to another; the want may be so imperative
that one cannot wait for the circuit of exchanges. These difficulties
presently led men to look around for a means by which the difficulties
might be avoided, and exchange be made easy. Something was sought
which might, as it were, take the place of all wares, and be regarded
as a universal equivalent [Entgelt] for the same. Not any stuff
whatever could be adopted arbitrarily as such equivalent. Each of the
qualities which was sought in the same should be a recourse against
one of the indicated difficulties of exchange, and these difficulties
pointed to that stuff in which the qualities were found united (§5).
In order to relieve wants in as small portions as was necessary
according to circumstances, that which was adopted as the general
equivalent must necessarily be capable of very great divisibility
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commerce, the objects of exchange often had to be carried long
distances, durability and imperishability were demanded, both in
order that in the exchange itself, or in going from hand to hand, it
might not be used up, and also in order that, without danger of
deterioration, it might be saved up. In order that the carriage should
not be difficult it must be rare. In this way a small piece became an
equivalent for a considerable bulk of wares. At the same time a great
sum could be sent in a small space. But it is probable that only after
many unsuccessful attempts would the peoples discover the
combination of these qualities in the precious metals, which had
elsewhere been sought in vain. And therein lies the cause of the
almost universal agreement of the nations about gold and silver,
which now are regarded as the representatives of wares, and are called
money (§6).
After the introduction of money, to be sure, the turn-over [Umsatz]
was no longer called barter,
473 but purchase. But this change in the
words (sic!) did not essentially change the “commerce.” The money
did not thereby come otherwise into consideration than in so far as it
represented those wants, or wares, which at another time could be
procured for it. The thing accomplished by the “commerce” is still
always the exchange of one ware for another, or for the representative
of a ware (§7).
Wares with which exchange is effected are either immediately usable
in their original form, or they must be transformed for use by artificial
labor. The occupation which devotes itself to obtaining [Erzielung]
the former is rural management [Land-wirthschaft]. It embraces the
natural produce of the earth, of grazing, and of the waters. The
occupation which makes the natural products usable through
imparting an artificial form, or which multiplies their use, is called
Manufaktur.
474 The manufactures are dependent upon land
management. The first attention of the state must therefore be given
to this latter. What land management furnishes to the manufactures
is called raw materials or stuffs (§8).
The original commerce consists therefore in the produce of the earthAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 451
and of artificial labor,
475 so far, that is, as both come to the assistance
of wants; and in those who devote themselves with their produce,
who furnish the means, of providing in turn their own wants. This
enables us to determine the extent of general commerce. It is equal to
the sum of the wants of all consumers [Versehrenden].
476 In order to
extend commerce, either the wants or the consumers must be
increased (§9).
The wants of human beings, as already observed, are very limited, if
we attach to the word the strictest concept of real wants. But in that
case the occupations of the citizens will be kept within the same
narrow bounds. The multiplication of wants occurs through
introduction of comforts and of superfluity, both of which make
luxury. All declamations against luxury, therefore, are either not well
considered, or the objections which are urged against it are not really
directed so much against luxury, as against the one-sided
wastefulness on the part of a few, while the other portion of the
nation ekes out a miserable existence. Luxury, in so far, on the one
hand, as it increases the wants of citizens, and thereby perhaps makes
it harder for some to support themselves, increases on the other hand
the occupations; thus it incidentally makes gainful occupations easier
and more numerous; that is, the superfluity of one satisfies the wants
of others. And if here and there a citizen does not know how to limit
his outlays by the rules of private prudence, and ruins himself, his
wasted resources are, in the first place, no loss for the state, because
they merely pass out of one hand into the other, or are transferred to
many persons; second, the ruin of the one may perhaps have provided
the support of ten families of the laboring class of the nation. With
this explanation all, even the most plausible, objections to luxury may
be answered (§10).
At the same time, however, the boundaries between useful and
harmful luxury may be determined. For without doubt there is a sort
of luxury which is harmful. All luxury, for example, is harmful,
which contradicts the purpose for the sake of which the state should
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occupations, but diminishes it. This occurs in the case of unnecessary
foreign articles of luxury and also in the case of those which are not
made in the country itself, because these foreign wares always take
the place of a national ware, and crowd the latter out of the sum of
national occupations. One case only deserves to be regarded as an
exception, viz., when the foreign article of luxury has come in, not by
purchase but in exchange for a ware produced at home. In this
instance justice is done in advance both to national consumption and
to all demands of the foreigners who wanted to acquire it by purchase
or in exchange for wants. In this case, however, it is only the
extension of a branch of the occupation. The foreign article of luxury
takes the place of the national product (§11).
The outlay that is restricted to domestic products cannot be increased
without end. The resources of those who use these products, and their
number, constitute their necessary limits. Commerce would thus not
be greater than the possible national consumption. There remains,
however, the extension of the same on another side, through increase
of consumption. Takers of the wares will be sought outside the
country. The effort is made to supply other nations with what they
need, and through their consumption to increase the sum of national
occupation. Commerce thus divides itself into domestic and foreign.
Domestic commerce is that which is carried on between the members
of a state (§12).
Foreign commerce is carried on with foreigners. It must necessarily
be based on domestic commerce, and it must give up something to
foreigners only when it has first satisfied the national wants. Thus
foreign commerce is carried on only with the surplus; that is, with
that which the national consumption can spare. On the other hand a
nation will take either only such wares as it really needs, or those to
the taking of which it is drawn by powerful stimuli. These two
grounds determine takers in general, but a state will be moved to take
from precisely this nation, inasmuch as the same wares may actually
be had from several sides, only through the most advantageous, or the
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These conditions affect the price of wares, or their qualities (§13).
Scarcely any state or nation, at least under present circumstances, and
with the once introduced mode of life, will be sufficient unto itself.
What it does not possess, it must try to get from abroad under the
least oppressive conditions. To this end external commerce furnishes
its aid, and in accordance with the division of its occupation it is
divided into two branches, viz., export and import. It carries out, from
the surplus; it brings in for a double purpose, either to use the
imported articles itself, or to export them again, with advantage, to
other nations (§14).
This last makes a third branch of commerce, re-export
[Wiederausfuhr], called economic commerce [ökonomische
Handlung]. If its advantage consisted only in the occupation of
persons engaged in trade, and in the increase of navigation or of
wainage, re-export would even then be highly important for a state.
It would be giving occupation to a part of the citizens at the cost of
other nations. But this is not the whole of the advantage, and the
re-exporting state increases thereby the national stock
[Nationalhauptstamm] to the extent of the excess of the selling price
over the price of purchase, which is always a nation’s gain if it may
not always be the gain of the merchant (§15).
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The less a nation has to receive from others for its own wants, and the
more sales it can make to other nations, the more advantageous is its
commerce. But the situation in different regions does not always
afford to countries either the requisite quantity or the variety of wares
necessary for their own consumption and for export. The commercial
states, particularly the maritime provinces, turned their gaze in
consequence toward the islands, sought to subjugate the same, and to
secure possession through settlers transplanted thither, whence they
have the name colonies, or settlements [Pflanz-drter]. Thence they
may now draw a part of their wants, independent of other states and
under self-imposed conditions, and they may increase without limit
the stuff to be exported thither (§16).
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sent abroad, must be transported to the place of sale. This
transportation, which is denoted by the word “carriage” [Fracht], may
occur in various ways. The nation receives its own wants through
foreign carriage; and foreigners bring that which they are to receive
by their own carriage; or the nation brings in by its own carriage what
it receives from others, and returns by its own carriage what other
nations buy. In the former case the nation loses the whole advantage
of the occupation, which reciprocal carriage was capable of creating;
and its commerce is thus in a certain sense passive. In the second case
the nation appropriates this advantage and its commerce becomes
more active. Every nation must therefore seek to receive its wants
through its own carriage and to deliver exports to other nations with
its own carriage (§17).
Carriage is by land or by water. Land carriage depends on good
commercial roads and a well-conducted carrying system (§18).
Water carriage is on rivers or on the sea. River navigation is
promoted by making and keeping rivers navigable, and by uniting
rivers by means of canals and locks. These arrangements cannot be
extended beyond the boundaries of a state. Sea carriage, on the
contrary, is of incomparably greater extent. It depends upon a
well-organized and supported merchant-marine (§19).
The danger of carrying, especially at sea, would of itself frighten from
undertakings, because only few have enough courage to risk their
whole resources, or a considerable portion of them, for a gain which
is in no proportion to the possible and often very probable loss.
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costs of carriage would also mount very high on account of this
consideration, because the carrier would take into account the risk
which he undertook. The danger of carriage may be approximately
estimated, and according to this estimate the goods and ships may be
made secure for a proportional compensation. From this making
secure the business has the name insurance or assurance, whereby the
courage for commercial undertakings is produced and increased
(§20).
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extend commerce, or to maintain already extensive commerce,
without a corresponding sum of money. The presence of money is
necessary from two points of view: the state must in general not lack
money as a promoter of national exertion; in particular commerce
must not lack an adequate fund for its undertakings (§21).
The physical presence of money in a state does not give to enterprise
the energy which comports with the purpose of commerce. It is
necessary that the money shall do its work, and shall circulate among
the members of society. It is therefore a special duty of the state to
promote the circulation, and to remove all hindrances which might
obstruct the same (§22).
In case, however, for whatever cause, the circulating sum of money
is either insufficient, or diminished, means must be sought to replace
the deficiency. The work [Verrichtung] of money is as follows: to be
to its possessors the reliable representation oj a certain quantity of
wares, to the effect that whenever it pleases them they may exchange
the representation for that which is represented. If it is possible for
a state to succeed in procuring, for verbal consent, or for certain other
signs, the same confidence, that, as money represented the wares,
these signs represent the money, these arbitrary signs will then
accomplish the work of money, and will temporarily make up
completely for its absence. No care will therefore be too great which
the ruler may devote to the maintenance of public confidence (§23).
If commercial enterprises are to be carried on energetically, they will
require great sums. Only a few individual citizens in a state have the
means or the credit, and those who have both have not always
resolution enough to risk so much in undertakings from which to be
sure great gain may be expected, which however are always exposed
to an uncertain outcome. Where the means of individuals are not
sufficient, an association is formed, each member of which risks only
a small sum the more resolutely because in any event the loss would
not impair his fortune; and yet the total of these separate contributions
procures for commerce the adequate fund. The commercial
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commerce (§24).
Through export to foreigners and import from foreigners the
commercial nations become reciprocal debtors. The discharge of
these debts with ready money would be expensive, through the
carriage of the money to the place of payment, and also dangerous;
the money in carriage would be a considerable time unused, and the
business of commerce would be plunged into tedious straggling
[Weit-Iäufigkeit]. It is possible to avoid these difficulties in whole or
in part, if a state exchanges its claims with another, whereby it
discharges its debts in so far as the condition of their commerce with
each other permits. This exchange of reciprocal claims gave rise to
the business of dealing in exchange, which to be sure is only a private
affair, but it is always worthy of public attention, because it either
facilitates or retards general commerce, and in addition furnishes
useful information for the guidance of the same (§25).
In the present situation of science and knowledge, all cabinets are in
such wise enlightened about the great influence of commerce that
each nation must expect to be crossed [durchkreuzt] in all
undertakings by the states with which commerce is carried on, or
through whose territory the commerce will take its course, whenever
it runs counter to their purposes. It is necessary to anticipate these
hindrances, and at favorable opportunities, by means of negotiation,
to assure advantageous conditions both for oneself and against other
rivals. Commercial treaties consequently constitute an important part
of Handlimgspolitik (§16).
In order to know the status of commerce in itself and relatively and
therefrom to conclude whether the course of affairs conduces to the
utmost expansion of population, states compare the amount which
they have supplied to others with that which they have received. This
comparison of import and export is called the balance: the plumb line
in the hands of the state to show where and in what parts commerce
requires special aid (§27).
From the foregoing merely general concepts we see how numerous
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plans which must be made the basis of advantageous commerce; and
the necessity of controlling this important business through the
combined insight of capable men, and incidentally of establishing for
the conduct of commerce a special Kollegium, or a special Stellc, is
thus very obvious. The name in itself is a matter of indifference, but
this Kollegium must embrace in the circuit of its activity everything
which can promote the advantage of commerce (§28).











In two or three particulars more direct light is focused on factors of firstrate
importance for our argument by chaps, i and ii of Sonnenfels’ second volume, than
by an equal portion of any of the works thus far reviewed.
In the first place a relatively minor matter of methodology deserves passing remark.
Chap, i, on rural management, occupies 116 pages, and chap, ii, on manufactures,
157 pages: a total of 273 out of the 564 pages in the body of the book. Attention is
called to this division as a commentary on the lack of precision in the title Handlung
which for reasons stated above we are obliged to render “commerce.” It must be said,
on the other hand, that a considerable portion of chap. ii is concerned with relations
of manufacture to trade, primarily domestic, so that commerce in the strict sense
creeps into the discussion earlier than the titles of chapters would indicate. Nor is the
mere proportion of pages given to various topics a safe guide to the logical value
assigned to different portions of subject-matter. It remains true, however, that
Sonnenfels’ classification of material under the term Handlung was extremely
uncritical.
In the second place, it must be admitted that we are not entitled to infer from a book
of this type anything very specific about the actual administrations for which the
book offers a technology. To what extent the government of the German states as a
whole, or of any of them, approached the ideal set forth in Sonnenfels’ theory must
be determined by other sorts of evidence. Neither the original sources nor even the
secondary authorities on this line of evidence can be brought within the compass of
our present argument; the former, because they are inaccessible to investigators on
this side the ocean, the latter, because a digest of the material would require a
separate volume. We must repeat then that we have to do merely with the theory of
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With these qualifications, we may state positively, third, that one must be
disqualified by invincible prejudice if candid study of this book did not arouse a
certain degree of admiration for the comprehensiveness, and prudent attention to
details, involved in the ideals of cameralism. By comparison with administrations
which attempted anything approaching the systematic and thorough management here
outlined, democracy as practiced in America has been slovenly, improvident, and
reckless.
In the fourth place, this second volume reflects at its best the fundamental
cameralistic conception of the state. Without referring to the more abstract legal
theories of the relation of the concepts “state,” “government,” “people,” etc., the
working resultant of all these was an assumption of a community pictured as a great
landed estate, ‘which was such a unity that every part and member had to be
considered as having an importance for the whole, and the task of the administration
of the whole was to see that nothing was neglected which might serve to insure that
efficiency of every resource within the whole which might contribute to the
well-being of the aggregate. Whatever our philosophical preconceptions, they are
tending toward a common expression in terms of values ascertained and agreed upon
in the course of experience. Certain things are found to be worth while. If other
things interfere with those which we judge to be worth while, they must drop out of
competition and give place to the more highly valued things. Suppose a modern
democrat has no tolerance whatsoever for the basic political philosophy of
cameralism. He could hardly be intolerant enough to deny that in this book
Sonnenfels has done something worthy of praise. He has drawn a wonderfully
farsighted and inclusive sketch of things that people must learn to provide for, in
some way or other, before they can make the most of life. It is difficult to show this
without reproducing his discussion in detail, but the following pages contain an
attempt to digest the argument in a way that will confirm this estimate.
At the same time our purpose calls for attention to the embryonic state of the
concepts employed in the argument. We must keep in mind that Sonnenfels’
problems were not our problems. His social science did not correspond precisely with
any division or definition of social science today, much more than the “rhetoric” of
the schoolmen tallied with any field of knowledge recognized in modern
classifications. Especially must we discriminate between the administrative problems
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former, but as we have repeatedly pointed out, we misinterpret and misvalue the
theories of this period if we construe them as theorems applied by their authors to the
more general problems of the abstract economists.
The last proposition is in order at once, when we begin to examine the concept
Landwirthschaft (chap. i). Neither in England nor in America does anything exist
today which quite corresponds with the activities which Sonnenfels included under
the term. Let us render it as we have in previous cases, “rural management.” The term
applies, however, to a conception of the situation which it is difficult for Americans
to keep in mind. The whole national territory is presumed to be virtually a farm, to
be operated for the advantage of the state; and it is the right and duty of the
government to see that every foot of the farm is thriftily cultivated. The occupants of
the soil are regarded as indentured to the state, and it is the right and duty of the
government to dispose of their labor-ability so as to make the land most fruitful, just
as it is the business of the managers of a modern factory to organize the help so that
their combined labor will be most profitable for the company. That is, “rural
management” connoted to the cameralist, and to the governments of the
quasi-absolutistic states, a plane of administrative function which correlated
individual extractive occupations in a way virtually unknown in America. Our
Department of Agriculture, our Geological Survey, our irrigation and forestry
enterprises, our agricultural colleges and experiment stations are recent and partial
approximations to certain features involved in the German system; but they rest upon
a quite different theory of the relation of the state to individuals, and for that reason
are essentially unlike much that cameralistic “rural management” included. On the
other hand, this phrase did not include the special technique of extractive industries.
Both sides of this formal description of the concept will be illustrated by details in
the following résumé.
Sec. 30 begins with betrayal of the complexity of the classification which the author
adopted. He says:
Rural management is regarded in Polizey as the occupation which
provides means of life; in its commercial functions
[Handlnngnleis-tung] as also providing the material [Staff].
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from all three realms of nature, “the vegetable kingdom, the animal kingdom, and the
mineral kingdom.” Sonnenfels proposes, however, to deal principally with
agricultural management, including stock-raising, in so far as the latter is combined
with the former; and “only in the political aspect, not in practical technique, which
it is the business of the so-called Oekonomie to treat.” The standpoint from which tne
discussion starts is further indicated (§30 by the specifications:
“Considered from the side of the state, the perfection of rural
management consists in the best possible utilization of the earth
479 in
accordance with the demands of subsistence [Unterhalts] and of
commerce.” A note adds: “From the side of the proprietor, it is the
best combination of the largest yield with the least expenditure”
[Vorauslage].
This result will have to be sought:
I, by utilizing all the earth; II, by utilizing it in the best way as
respects systems of cultivation; and III, by utilizing it as required by
relations to the other connected or dependent occupations. The use of
all the earth, and the best use of the same, coincide in many ways in
obstacles and in furtherance.
Sec. 32 seems to start upon the trail of a cardinal sociological distinction, but it is
immediately dropped, and nothing is done to follow out the fundamental implications
of the distinction. The first sentence reads:
The earth is either private property, or the means of the state.
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The dictum follows that:
In order to make full use of private property, the proprietor must have
first the necessary power, and second the necessary motives. Lack of
means for rural management may be regarded from two sides (§33);
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cultivator. The former condition comes from such unavoidable
circumstances as first, wars, loss of cattle, failure of crops, the
poverty of the present possessor, or only from his temporary
embarrassment.
Each of these types of misfortune is treated as deserving of public
attention. Means of extinguishing fires are to be provided by the local
administration; the dwellings are to be in village groups, not scattered
over the land, and the garden plots are to be located between the
houses instead of behind them, the barns to be separated from the
houses, etc., in order that there may be the minimum danger from fire
with the maximum facility of controlling it. Districts should also
maintain systems of mutual fire insurance; proprietors should be
made to see that their interests demand such precautions. In case such
protection is lacking, the cultivator who is embarrassed must be
assisted either by the proprietor or by the state. Mere negative help,
which is customary, i.e., remission of the dues, does not meet the
case. Active help must be given, e.g., lumber, building materials,
farming implements; seed must be furnished gratuitously, or at least
on the easiest terms. If the individual proprietors are not in a position
to do this, it must be done by the state. The alternative is sterilization
of the soil, declining value of the revenues of the state, and
diminishing population. To remedy these conditions is more
expensive than to prevent them. The direct and indirect consequences
of cattle diseases are among the important objects of public attention.
To prevent them veterinary schools should be introduced (§36), and
the causes of the diseases should be investigated.
481 The price of salt,
and provision that farmers shall have easy access to it are important
in this connection, and should be carefully looked to by the state. In
case of failure of crops, as in case of fire or war, the cultivator must
be helped either by the proprietor or the state to raise his crops the
following year. The state must take measures to prevent exorbitant or
oppressive terms in case of loans by individuals (§37). In case an
individual proprietor is too poor properly to cultivate his tract, the
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therefore no reason why the state should not have the right to require
that the proprietor should permit others to cultivate the land on
shares, or to purchase it. The very circumstances which have caused
the embarrassment of the proprietor may make such purchaser or
farmer hard to find. The flocking of persons of means to the cities
leaves the cultivation of the soil to an inferior class of people. In case
forced sale is necessary, the state should provisionally take over the
property at a fair price, in order that the possessor may not be
compelled to make too great sacrifice (§38). Land is often
uncultivated, not by reason of the permanent but the temporary
poverty of the possessor (§39). It is an unpardonable mistake of the
law-making power to aggravate this helplessness by exaction of the
usual dues. The proprietor who has allowed the tenant to fall into
arrears should be declared to have forfeited the amount.
Laws should seek to prevent excessive debt by setting a limit to the
amount which may be borrowed (§40). An exception should be made
in case the loan is necessary for actual cultivation of the land, and the
conditions of loans for that purpose should be made especially
favorable, and should be under the oversight of the proper officials.
Unthrift on the part of proprietors will be checked by the introduction
of supervisors of rural management [Landwirthschaftsaufsicht] (§41),
consisting of the officials of the circuit [Kreis] to whom a subordinate
might be added, and the private managers subordinated to these.
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A second means of preventing neglect of proper cultivation is
afforded by the dues to the state (§42). That is, every piece of arable
land should be taxed on a moderate estimate of what it would yield
if properly cultivated. Thus the occupant will be compelled to
cultivate the land or to pay dues for land which yields him no crop,
while the industrious cultivator receives as it were a reward for his
industry, in being assessed only on a medium rate of yield.
If these means are not sufficient to secure good cultivation, a third
remains. It seems severe, but it is not if the others have failed (§43),
viz.: In case a piece of land has remained uncultivated two or three
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excuse, it shall be declared forfeited, and transferred to someone who
will cultivate it. Such a provision is based on the claim which the
state has upon the private property of the citizens, for proportional
contribution for maintenance of the whole. The forfeiture here
proposed can no more be regarded as an invasion of property rights
than the law of limitations. The security of property is only
conditionally assured by the state, viz., in case the private proprietor
does not impair the property of the state.
The lack of courage on the part of the cultivator has its ground in the
opinion that his labor is lost, and that he will not reap its fruits (§44).
The insecurity of property, the rate of taxation, and the excessively
favored love of hunting, on the part both of the sovereign prince and
of the private owners, may be regarded as the chief causes of this lack
of courage, and the multitude of idle days may be added.
In case the insecurity of property has its origin in the defective
fundamental order [Grundverfassung] of a country, it will always be
difficult for the laws to limit the evil (§45).
483 If the private
posses-sors considered, however, that such fundamental order made
against their own advantage, they would not oppose abrogation of the
same. The right which is based on ancient possession is made very
questionable through the older and imprescriptible rights of
mankind.
484 Where the tenants in a certain sense are regarded only as
farmers [Pachtinhaber] the lords of the soil think they do wisely
when they transfer a thrifty farmer to the holdings of a negligent one.
Instead of increasing the industry of each, they ruin both. The
negligent one shirks work because he is negligent, because this
negligence is rewarded, and he keeps hoping for the same reason to
be transferred to a better cultivated location. The thrifty one is
discouraged and refuses to make improvements which would give
occasion for another transfer. Since this right has such great influence
upon the condition of rural management in general, we cannot but
approve a system which would assure to the peasants a tenure for life
at least, and the abolition of this freedom of transfer.
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empowered to make must also be reckoned as unfavorable to the
security of property (§§45, 46). They must consequently never be a
one-sided procedure. Even the economic supervisors must have their
hands bound in this respect; how much more the private owners.
The tiller of the soil will work only hard enough to maintain life, if all
the rest of his produce is taken from him by landlord and government
(§47). Experience proves how little statesmanship there is in the
proposition, “The peasant is most industrious when he is miserable.”
Secs. 48 and 49 recite some of the hardships which hunting rights
inflict on cultivators of the soil, and point out the depressing effect of
these hardships upon cultivation in general. The author observes that
the restrictions which the laws ostensibly put on these rights arc
always ineffective in practice. The indemnities allowed to the farmers
are awarded by the parties who inflict the losses, and consequently do
not compensate the loser, while it is impossible to repair the damage
done to the national productiveness in general. The time and loss of
rest expended on protecting crops against game are a great drain on
the resources of the country. An ordinance of Joseph II, dated
January, 1786, is called a long- overdue attempt to protect the general
welfare of many against a very equivocal pleasure of the few.
The depressing influence of fast days and other holidays upon
agriculture is referred to again in §49, and complaint is made that “the
obstinacy or the caprice of the pastor” determines whether the
peasants shall be permitted to take advantage of good weather on
such a day, after protracted rain, to make sure of the crop for which
they have toiled earlier in the season. While Sonnenfels here betrays
independence of ecclesiastical tradition, yet one detects in his tone no
such bitterness toward the clergy as is frequently exhibited by Justi.
In §50 the author verges upon economic generalization in the
Smithian sense. Thus he says: “The more incentives to labor are
presented to the fanner, the greater will be his diligence. The first
motive for him is the support of self and family; the second, the
tribute [Entrichtung] to which he is bound; the third, the desire to lay
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or for his family. The products of the soil must not fall below a value
which affords the hope that all three motives may be satisfied. In
determining this price the interests of agriculture seem to be to a
certain extent opposed to those of other kinds of business
[Handlungsgeschäfte}. If the price of agricultural products is high,
the price of every manufactured product must rise, whereby one of the
principal qualities of a ware, cheapness, is lost. If the price of
agricultural products is low, it is not sufficiently encouraging for the
farmer, and he finds it to his advantage to produce less, because from
half the crop he can then receive a like sum, and save himself trouble,
time, seed, etc. Only the medium price remains therefore where the
interests of both branches can be combined. This medium price may
be considered in its essence or merely numerically.”
The subject is continued in §51: “In its essence the medium price is
always and everywhere the same: the price, namely, which stands in
such relation to the condition of commerce in general
486 that thereby
land management may get its proportional share of the gain which
comes from commerce. This sharing in the general advantage is not
only just, it is also necessary. The state is under obligations to observe
and maintain equality between the members of society according to
the degree of their reciprocal contribution to the general welfare.
Where this equality is not observed the neglected part lacks those
encouragements which must be the spur to and the real soul of
diligence. It is also unavoidably demanded in order that the worth of
the agricultural products may procure for the seller adequate means
of satisfying his other wants, that—in the degree in which the wants
either rise in price, or otherwise, as through the prosperity of
commerce, the prosperity of the working class, and with the same the
number of their wants increases—the farmer shall find enough in the
price of his products to procure either the higher-priced or the more
numerous wants. If his way to this result is closed by an arbitrary
fixing of the price, it would follow in the one case that his wants
would not be satisfied, whereby he would be forced to interrupt his
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more unfortunate than that of the other working classes. The peasant
class would consequently be abandoned, because it would be eager to
improve its lot by going over to the other classes. Those that would
remain in the class would be without means, or would avenge
themselves by indolence for the unrighteousness of society.”
The conclusion is drawn in §52: “It is consequently necessary from
so many grounds to assure to land management through the medium
price its share of the gains of commerce. But the regulation of the
medium price cannot occur through the taxes, but through the
reciprocal agreements of purchasers and sellers in the market place,
if no hindrances are otherwise placed in the way of the freedom of
these compacts.
487 If the varying market price of several ordinary
years is compared, and the average reckoned, this will be taken as the
numerical mean, which is variable according to circumstances.”
Still further, in §53, Sonnenfels has an elementary statement of the
demand side of price, with the corollary that “the state must see that
the number of sellers is not too great, and also that a proportional
number of customers for agricultural products may be assured.” In
§54 natural variations of demand and supply are further discussed in
contrast with forced variations, e.g., through constraint upon the
peasants to pay their taxes at a certain time. The closer this date is to
the harvest the greater the disadvantage to the farmer. The cheapness
of farm products at such a time is one of the principal causes of the
ruin of agriculture. “The state has therefore not merely to moderate
the fiscal burdens upon agriculture, but to prevent cheapening of the
produce by spreading the payment over various periods.”
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The sections just epitomized (§§50–54) are notable for several reasons. In the first
place, they present the familiar conception of the state as a something which is set
over against the component elements of the nation. In the second place, they
consistently presume that the state can and must regulate prices. In the third place,
they show that some of the elementary facts of market valuation, which eventually
show the impotence of statute law against economic law, were beginning to make an
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conclusions, but the difference between him and Justi in this connection is not so
much in variations of view about particulars, as in the extent to which Sonnenfels
betrays a sort of premonition that something deeper than laws of the state is the key
to the situation.
Sec. 55 analyzes demand into that of national and that of foreign
consumers. As to the former, it is not enough that there should be a
favorable proportion between agricultural products and consumers,
i.e., a large population; it is at the same time necessary that this
population shall be distributed so that local demand and supply shall
be balanced. Otherwise the purchasers will control prices at one point,
and sellers at another. The former situation tends to ruin agriculture.
Hence disproportionate flocking of people to chief cities is the main
cause of the decline of agriculture (§56). Those states therefore are
most prosperous in this respect which have numerous provincial cities
in which the landed gentry reside. Here manufactures will also spring
up, and become middle points of consumption, through which money
will circulate uniformly in all localities. If these intermediate cities
did not exist, this division of consumers might be otherwise secured,
e.g., by forbidding the nobility not in the service of the government
permanently to leave their estates, and by distributing over the
country those consumers that are not necessarily located in the
capital, e.g., factories, alms-houses, universities, a great number of
cloisters, etc. From the same point of view §57 discusses the
operation of intermediate tariffs between provinces of the same state;
the inference is that both agriculture and the state suffer if artificial
barriers limit the extent of the market.
But the demand of national consumers cannot, at the present rate of
population, assure to agriculture the price necessary for its
encouragement (§58).
489 Hope of foreign markets alone can stimulate
the farmer to cultivate all his land, and give him courage for better
cultivation. This hope will be animated by freedom of export.
“Opinions about the advantage of free trade in grain, and about the
limits of the freedom, have varied among times, states, and writersAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 469
(§59). Early times did not consider agriculture in connection with
commerce, and fear of scarcity long restricted export of grain. On the
contrary, writers of eminence have urged unlimited freedom in this
respect at all times and places. The purpose and the effect of free
export of grain must be to assure a sufficiently remunerative price for
agricultural products without embarrassing national consumption.
This combination is secured in a freedom of export which is not
directly limited in quantity but by rise of price above an accepted
mean. In application this principle will have the expression: Everyone
has freedom to export grain so long as the price at such and such
markets does not exceed such and such figures.”
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“If administrative policy adopts this view, it rests on the principle that
the mean price is a sign of adequate supply [Feilschafl] (§60). If this
is not the case the state is infallibly and immediately informed of it by
the advancing price. At the same time the counter-influence begins to
work. Export ceases, and the national market contains what had been
exported. Thereupon the price falls. The mean price and therewith
freedom of export are restored.
“England began in 1689 to furnish the other nations an illustration
that freedom of foreign trade in grain not only supports the cultivator
in this industry, but is also capable of bringing agriculture to
perfection (§61). Since that time other nations have tried still harder
to promote agriculture, and through this effort foreign trade in grain
has been greatly hindered. All the more must the law-giver remove
the internal hindrances and must assist the merchants by external
means, e.g., premiums on export, etc., so that they can compete with
the merchants of other nations.”
These sections have been reviewed at such length because they contain a neglected
link in the chain of evidence which accounts for the tendencies in political theory,
both abstract and technological, for the following half-century. The remainder of the
chapter is of minor importance for our chief purpose. If affords cumulative evidence,
however, of the minuteness with which cameralism analyzed elements of national
prudence.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 470
The immediately following sections (§§62, 63) refer to the problems of utilizing
lands that for various reasons are wholly or partially uncultivated. Secs. 64–79
develop the same problem in connection with such details as means of assuring a
proper proportion between cultivators of the soil and other classes; discouragement
of luxury; restriction of the numbers of the servant class; the loss of labor through
military service; colonization of laborers; means of making new settlements
prosperous; reclamation of waste lands through clearing of forests, the draining of
swamps, the construction of dykes and protection of the same. Sees. 80–107
elaborate the following proposition: “In order that the earth may be used to the best
purpose in respect to cultivation, it is necessary: I, that the rural folk shall possess
the necessary knowledge oj cultivation and of agricultural improvements; II, that no
hindrances shall stand in the way of applying their knowledge; III, land which is
devoted to other purposes than cultivation must be managed with skill.”
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The center of attention under the first clause is the introduction and development
of various sorts of agricultural schools, and means of scattering the information
gathered by such schools among the peasantry.
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The second clause deals chiefly with hardships that come from the methods of
concentrating or dividing the land, from the taxing system, or from survivals of
feudal liabilities. On the first subject it is asserted that “the French economists are in
general in favor of cultivation on a large scale, and assume as certain that it is not
possible to cultivate small holdings profitably” (p. 128). In the same connection
Arbuthnot is cited as representing English opinion to the same effect. The third
clause is devoted to three classes of uses of the land by which agriculture is the loser:
meadows, common pastures, and tracts reserved for beauty.
Chap. ii, on manufactures, begins with the definition: “Manufactures, in the most
extended and literal sense, are all occupations which give a new form to any stuff
whatsoever.” Millers, bakers, and all similar workers are expressly included in the
class of manufaturers. More specifically, manufacturers are those species of artisans
who make a stock, or so-called merchants’ goods.
493 In the more proper sense,
Manufacture is the correlation of all the kinds of labor which are
demanded in order to make a ware complete, that is, to make it
marketable. The manufacturer is accordingly the citizen who guides
this correlation.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 471
The purpose of manufactures, from the standpoint of the individual
manufacturer, is to provide support and gain; from the standpoint of
the whole state, to increase the occupations; in other words, through
manufactures to give work and employment to a part of the people
which land management does not employ.
The paragraph continues:
From this point of view, from which manufactures must be
contemplated by the public administration, the designation by which
the economists
494 mean to depreciate the value of artisanship and of
the whole class of manufacturers, is a senseless play on words. The
amount advanced to manufactures is called by them “an unproductive
outlay” [unfruchtbare Auslage]; the class of manufacturers, “the
unproductive class,” because, in the physical sense of the word, they
do not create [heruorbringen] anything. The essential thing is,
however, not whether manufactures create, but, whether they enlarge
occupation, that is, whether they increase the means of support for the
people, and herewith the population, the welfare of the state from
within, the security and prestige of the same from without. This is the
effect of manufactures. They themselves really originate [erzielen]
nothing; they are however the immediate occasion for the origination
of the stuff, which without the transformation of artisanship would
have no worth and consequently would not be originated.
A note illustrates the author’s meaning by the specification:
“Without the prospect of linen, flax would have little or no use.
Worked into Brabantian lace the price rises to such an extent that the
worth of the stuff entirely disappears.” The text continues:
Manufacturers “are the immediate occasion for the enlargement of
agriculture, for they increase the consumption of the necessities of
life, which would otherwise be reduced to the demands of the
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even occasion a real growth of national wealth. For, although,
according to the calculation of the physiocrats, in the case of an
artificial product all parts of the investment [Vorauslage] can be
resolved into products of the soil [Erdreich], yet in the case of wares
disposed of abroad the gain of the merchant cannot be classified
under that head, but is a real addition either in equivalents of wealth
[Numerarien] or in wares taken in exchange.
495 More than that, when
the Genevan clock-maker constructs of brass and steel worth perhaps
two gulden a clock which he sells abroad for thirty gulden, and then
in exchange for the thirty gulden imports fifteen measures of grain,
is not his skilled labor quite as fruit-bringing for Geneva as that of a
farmer who has got fifteen measures from his field? On the other
hand, when a state raises a surplus of agricultural products, but is
surrounded by states that are devoted to agriculture, its surplus will
find no sale, and because there is no prospect of disposing of it no
surplus will be raised. But a silk factory is established. The laborers
engaged in it consume the produce of the field. The silks are
exported. The state receives in exchange their worth. Is it not
indifferent to the state whether it exports grain in its original form, or
grain transformed into silk? Only, that the skilled labor obtained a
sale which agriculture could not have obtained; only, that the skilled
labor furnishes a growth in occupation and so a growth in
population.”
Sec. 110 draws the conclusion, which serves as the presumption of the rest of the
book:
Manufactures are thus, in the economy of the state, not unfruitful, but
a useful and an indispensable enlargement of occupation. In the
arranging [Anordnung] of manufactures the grades of promotion are
to be measured according to their contribution to the purpose of the
state, that is, according as the general mass of occupation is enlarged
and made more permanent. The general mass of occupation, however,
gains only when artisan labor is a means of multiplying the productsAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 473
of agriculture.
496 Those manufactures accordingly deserve the first
attention for which national stuff is either actually in hand, or might
be had with little trouble. Without observing this consideration,
agriculture not only loses a possible sale, and consequently a portion
of the occupation which it could appropriate; but the manufacturing
labor will be dependent upon those nations which furnish the raw
stuff. Therefore the occupation of the people, from this side also, will
exist only by favor [bittweise], that is, only so long as the nation from
which the raw stuff is received either does not work it up itself, or it
is not taken under more favorable conditions by another nation, or for
some reason or other the supplying nation makes the export of the
stuff more difficult, or finally for political reasons the supplying
nation stops production of this stuff altogether.
Continuing the argument, §111 proceeds:
It is worth while to draw out the consequences of such a situation still
farther, in order to reach conviction of another truth, viz.: that it is
less harmful never to have extended occupations above a medium
number, than ultimately to lose something from a greater number. In
the former case, to be sure, the state will enjoy only a moderate
degree of prosperity, but it will maintain itself on that level. In the
other case the reversal of its prosperity will be almost without limits.
In such circumstances many people lose their occupation. That is,
they no longer receive the sum of money which they previously used
for their support. Since it is not easy at once to absorb an unemployed
number into the ranks of the general gainful agencies, the laborers
who have lost their employment will be reduced to the most
miserable circumstances, and perhaps find themselves compelled to
emigrate in order to find ways of earning a living. I will not follow
out the consequences of diminution of the number of marriages and
other harmful accompanying effects, but restrict myself to the most
immediate.Albion Small, The Cameralists, 474
The section closes with a brief but clear indication of the different effects of a
contraction of the market through withdrawal of the purchasing power of the
unemployed.
It would he difficult to epitomize the remainder of the chapter, and a very general
description must suffice. It must be said with emphasis that this chapter would repay
study today. The men who are engaged in callings which apply this sort of knowledge
usually prefer to get their information by doing the thing itself, rather than by
consulting books. The men who are responsible for the parliamentary process of
enacting public demands into law do not as a rule in this country attain eminence as
students of comparative legislation. The programmes of more than a century ago do
not appear to impress them as likely to throw light on the problems of modern life.
The fact is that democracy has yet to learn how to co-operate as effectively on the
basis of its fundamental conceptions, as quasi-absolutism did on the basis which
democrats repudiate. The German benevolent despotisms of the eighteenth century
took a more comprehensive survey of the different factors which must lay the
foundation of general prosperity than American democracy has learned to take. These
benevolent despotisms accordingly planned more intelligent co-operation of their
interests and agencies than Americans have yet devised. The German system wasted
at the governmental end, on the expenditures of the court, and on the military system,
much that this prudent thrift at the popular end enabled states to save. On the other
hand, we lose in actual convenience, comfort, and security of life much that the
German paternalistic system secured. Without surrendering any principle of
democratic political philosophy whatsoever, Americans may well study the details
of German quasi-absolutistic administration, in order to learn from it elements of
public and private prudence which our pride of individualism has caused us to
neglect, and greatly to our own hurt.
The remainder of the chapter elaborates an analysis along these lines:
A manufacture occupies more people in proportion to the amount of
preparation necessary before the stuff which it handles becomes
complete wares, and in proportion to the generality of its use (§112).
The more common use of a ware depends upon it’s sale to the greater
part of the people; that is, it must be of a quality and price which the
small means of the great numbers can purchase (§113). It would beAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 475
at bottom to the advantage of manufacturers to give to their wares the
four features: cheap price, good quality, external beauty, and variety.
Shortsighted manufacturers should be compelled to recognize this
principle, so that they would not in the end make foreign purchases
more desirable, and thus diminish the amount of home occupation
(§114). In order to be able to sell wares of a poor quality at a high
price, the manufacturer must be in a position to control the supply,
and it must be something that the public needs. If competitors enter
into rivalry, the conditions are reversed. The conjunction of the above
conditions alone can insure to manufactured articles those qualities
which will multiply their sale (§115). So soon as an occupation yields
profits, it is attractive enough for itself; hence, to promote the active
combination of factors above named, not only affirmative means are
necessary, but also negative, i.e., removal of all hindrances to industry
and zeal, e.g., monopolies, exclusive societies, special privileges,
manufactures supported by the prince, exclusive guilds, and
disproportionate levies upon a manufacture. Examination of these
hindrances in order will call attention to principles which may never
be neglected in conducting manufactures (§§116–32).
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Throughout this discussion the word Zusammenfluss defies translation. Collating
all the passages in which it occurs one would decide that the concept which the
author generally associated with it was “concurrence of all the conditions necessary
to insure the four qualities of manufactured goods enumerated above.” In certain
cases it is plainly used in the sense of “concourse,” either of buyers, or sellers, or
laborers, or capitalists, as the case may be. In other passages it means “agreement
between competitors;” in others it apparently puts the emphasis on the competition
itself; while again the chief reference seems to be to the idea of a confluence of
manufacturing enterprise into channels that would provide a sufficient supply of
goods. Sonnenfels apparently regards the word as a sort of technical term, but it is not
confined to a precise idea.
Passing to another phase of the subject the analysis continues:
If the hindrances mentioned are out of the way, the zeal of industryAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 476
will be unrestrained, and its fortunate consequence will be the
perfection of manufactures. Each of the qualities which we have
specified as necessary to this perfection springs from a multitude of
separate parts, knowledge of which is necessary, and it will not be
practicable in considering them not to cast side glances at foreign
commerce (§133).
Thereupon still more intensive analysis is undertaken of the qualities of wares
posited as essential, and of the conditions requisite to insure them. Secs. 134–68
might be set apart under the title, “The Elements Which Enter into the Price of
Manufactured Goods.” Secs. 169–82 might be entitled, “The Elements Which Enter
into the Quality of Manufactured Goods.” Under the corresponding title, “The
Elements Which Enter into the Beauty of Manufactured Goods,” we should mark off
a briefer passage, §§183, 184. In a general way an appropriate designation for the
remainder of the chapter (§§185–202) would be, “Factors Involved in Assuring
Variety of Goods.” The details are largely technical primarily on the side, of
manufacture, or trade, or administrative policy, as the case may be; and so do not fall
immediately within the scope of our inquiry; but the underlying criterion gives the
discussion its principal significance. The persistent question is always by implication
ultimate: “What line of conduct will conduce to the largest consuming ability of the
largest number of people, and so to the strength of the state?”
The passage cannot be dismissed without certain minor observations. Thus, the
discussion of the terms “cheap” [wohlfeil], “price,” and “value” reflects a critical
spirit quite in accord with that of Adam Smith.
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The proposition with which Sonnenfels covers the whole subject of the price of
manufactured goods is:
The price at which the manufacturer can part with his wares
comprises the sum of all the separate outlays which were made up to
the time of sale, with addition of the profit (§136).
This decidedly empirical formula is then translated into detail. The elements of
price upon what the author puts emphasis are:Albion Small, The Cameralists, 477
buildings, lumber, and all other common necessities, purchase of
material, wages, carriages, insurance premiums, import and export
duties, interest on the capital, exchange, in case of wares requiring
foreign purchases, and profit.
The discussion does not deal with abstractions, but generalizes business prudence.
The spirit of the whole may be illustrated by such a passage as the following:
Not even for the advantage of a manufacture established in the
province is it advisable to put restrictions on removal of raw material
to another province. For this outgo will not occur so long as buyers
are to be found in the locality of its origin who offer acceptable terms
of purchase. If it were desired however to give the manufacturer a
one-sided advantage, this would amount to promotion of industry
[Aemsigkeit] at the cost of land management. Then only can the state
hope for permanent advantage when it supports both at the same
time.... ; so long as the producer can get a proper price for raw
material, constraint is unnecessary; so soon however as the
manufacturers take advantage of the constraint of export duties and
try to oppress the producer, the latter abandons the unremunerative
production, and the manufacturer suffers from lack of material
(§141).
The effect upon cost of raw material of duties on imports and exports is discussed
at considerable length. Again, the effect of numerous holidays upon the price of
manufactured goods is analyzed, and on the ground of the advantage of the state, the
term in this case meaning the necessary material prosperity of all classes, the
advisability of reducing the number is urged, in spite of the church.
499 Further (§153),
different situations in which scarcity of laborers is the decisive factor are intelligently
treated. A paragraph follows (§154) on the advantages of the division of labor. It
refers to the classical passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,
500 and it borrows
from that passage the illustration of pin manufacture. Smith is referred to merely as
“one of the more recent English writers,” and no indication appears that Sonnenfels
had discovered in him any radical importance. The inventiveness of manufacturers,Albion Small, The Cameralists, 478
turned to construction of machinery which saves labor and diminishes that item of
cost, is next in order (§155). In this connection a qualification is entered which
plainly illustrates the difference between the purpose which Sonnenfels had in mind
and the sheer capitalistic standard:
For the state, cheapness of manufactured goods is merely a secondary
purpose, which must not be opposed to the paramount purpose, viz.,
the multiplication of occupations. Everywhere, therefore, where the
ways to occupation are in such precise equilibrium with the
population that the portion of people whose place would be taken by
machines could not be utilized for other labor, the introduction of
machines would be harmful. This would be approximately the
situation of a state which had no foreign commerce of any
consequence. The same consideration is to be kept in view in the case
of agriculture. The introduction of agricultural machinery would
diminish the class of rural folk, and for the state nothing is so
desirable as to see this class as numerous as possible.
In connection with the subject of export and import duties, as a factor of the price
of manufactured goods, another indication to the same effect appears (§157).
Referring to “the almost universal assumption that customs dues are to be regarded
as a profitable branch of the public revenues,” Sonnenfels says:
Since increase of price in the first instance contradicts the paramount
purpose of commerce it is necessary to criticize this theorem. As
certain as it is that the revenues of the state must cover the
expenditures, so certain is it also that inappropriate means may be
selected for raising these revenues. Those objects then will be
inappropriate in which the first purpose of the state, viz., to have a
large population, is hindered, because the impost has an influence on
occupation; in which case what may be gained on the one side may
be more than lost on the other, and in which by virtue of their very
nature, no fixed basis of assessment can be assumed; in which,
finally, the collection of the money revenues is not in accord with theAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 479
main purpose, for the reason that although large sums are collected
the main purpose is not promoted; or if this purpose is reached, the
revenues would have to be raised to an impossible amount. All of this
may be proved in the case of customs [Mäuthe].
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The argument is continued in §§158–65. The claim is urged that import duties are
taxes on consumption and tend to diminish the output of wealth. They are only
admissible, under ordinary circumstances, when they do not have this effect. An
export tax discourages foreign use of the ware, and so limits domestic occupation.
Consequently the finances purchase their momentary advantage at a
much too high price, through the loss of land management whose
stuff is in less demand, and through the harm to industry whose
earnings are in the same degree lessened.
On the distinction between two kinds of commerce noted above, a passage (p. 242)
is a commentary. Speaking of the part played by general frugality if it does not
descend to a stinginess which limits the national output more than foreign trade
extends it, Sonnenfels says:
A state which in the last analysis possesses only an economic trade,
cannot carry exclusiveness [Häuslichkeit] in its mode of life too far
without provoking other states, whose trade is based upon their own
products, to imitate this policy with equal vigor.
A sample of a different sort will show how minutely Sonnenfels’ technology
calculated cause and effect from the standpoint of the state. It occurs in the sections
on the relations of the qualities of goods to price. The custom of requiring of young
artisans a certain number of Wunderjahre before they were allowed to work at their
trade in their own locality had been referred to as on the whole tending to vagrancy.
The author, however, adds (§174):
Considered from one point of view, however, these migrations should
not be abolished, but better regulated. Only the most talented shouldAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 480
be sent abroad, and that with the previous knowledge of the state, and
with certain assistance. According to their branch of trade the places
to which they should go should be designated, and they should be
recommended to the embassies at those places. In this way the
emigrations would be profitable in gaining for domestic wares the
envied perfection of foreign goods.
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A little later (§179) Sonnenfels epitomizes the objections to Meisterrecht, and
particularly to Manufacturreglement, die Inspektionen und Beschauanstalten, in a
volume translated from the English, with the title rendered from a French version,
Versuch über die Meisterschaften. The author’s name is not given. The hook urges
the abolition of the institutions named. The reasons are evidently those of very
narrow selfishness. Sonnenfels takes the position that every one of them may be
answered in favor of continuing existing or similar regulations and supervision, by
consideration of the general welfare. A little later, speaking of the policy of
encouraging settlement of skilled laborers from abroad, Hume, Geschichte des
Hauses Tudor, T. III, is cited as authority for the statement that Henry VII, instigated
by an outcry of women, drove 15,000 artisans, mostly French, from London.
Sonnenfels charges England with still maintaining essentially the same attitude.
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We pass to chap. iii, “On Foreign Commerce.” In the previous chapter Sonnenfels
had shown a decidedly opportunistic attitude toward regulation of foreign trade. On
the whole, he is inclined to assume that artificial restrictions of the spontaneous
course of trade are likely to work more harm than good. At the same time he holds
firmly that it is entirely within the competence of the state to enforce all sorts of
restrictions, provided they actually tend to promote the main end, viz., the
multiplication of “occupations,” and thus the increase of population. Besides details
under this principal proposition, and technical specifications with which we are not
concerned, the chapter contains little that is germane to our purpose. A leading
theorem is that, “The ground of speculation is knowledge of foreign countries” (p.
205). The author’s expansion of the idea shows sagacity of a high order, and again
it must be said that Sonnenfels might be read at this point with profit by everyone
who is directly or indirectly connected with foreign trade or the diplomatic
intercourse which is based upon commercial interests. The rudiments of the duties
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Germany, and so tardily practiced in America, are distinctly set forth. Sonnenfels
writes rather as a learner from other nations on this subject than as a eulogist of
German policy. For example, he remarks (§207):
England especially has selected as ambassadors men of fundamental
insight into the commercial system; such were “die Keene, Castres,
Fallquener, Porter, Walpole,” in Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and
France.
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The drift of the chapter may be gathered from a part of the closing section (§223).
The opening sentences read:
In order therefore not to diminish the useful class of merchants, the
state should make common cause with them. Instead of granting
letters of nobility to rich merchants upon retirement from business it
should rather ennoble the merchant only upon condition that he shall
continue to carry on commerce, and shall bring up his children to the
same occupation. The state should offer nobility to him who, with
certain resources, passes from another stratum into the ranks of the
merchants. On occasions where distinctions are to be drawn between
classes of the people, for instance, at court festivities, the state should
include the merchant class among the distinguished. The protection
of the state must be extended to the large, as well as to the small
trades, etc.
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The standpoint of chap. iv, “On Colonies” may be indicated in brief in accordance
with the analysis in §224, viz.:
Colonies have the significance and the purpose, first, of promoting external
security;  second, of promoting commerce; third, of promoting navigation.
A fundamental presumption is frankly expressed in §225, viz.:
The mother state will have the preference over every other country in
drawing from the colonies those wants which it will either use itself
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between foreigners and the colonists, the state will seek to secure the
advantage for the latter. Whenever, on the other hand, a question
arises between the state and the colonies, the state appropriates the
advantage to itself, and deals with the colonies in complete
accordance with the principles of foreign commerce. That is,
everything which the colonies supply will be accepted only in the
simplest form. On the contrary, whatever is supplied to the colonies
they must consent to take in the most complete form. Thence the
mother state derives the increased advantage: it gets its wants in the
easiest and supplies the wants of the colonies in the most profitable
way, since it increases occupation at home through the consumption
of the colonists. These advantages are all the greater since the home
government prescribes laws for the colonies, and can exclude all
rivals from trade with them. Consequently the merchants of the
mother state are to be regarded as to a certain extent monopolists as
respects the colonies.
After a few more specifications to the same effect, Sonnenfels shows that he is by
no means in sympathy with the policy which he faithfully analyzes. He says (§228):
Such are the chief principles in accordance with which mother states
treat their colonies: principles of armed power, against defenseless
weakness, to the injustice of which the lust of expansion and the
mercantile spirit blind all nations. .... When the English, who regard
private property in their own island as so inviolable, but treat with
contempt the property of inoffensive peoples in other parts of the
world, when they, even yet in our century, take possession of every
island on which they land, in the name of his British Majesty, are they
nevertheless in the eyes of mankind the honorable [achtungsurürdig]
nation in which the concepts of freedom and right seem almost
exclusively to have been preserved? .... But however many the
advantages which are drawn from the colonies, their possession will
continue only so long as the colonists are kept in the ignorance, out
of which time, the efforts of rival nations, and the confluence ofAlbion Small, The Cameralists, 483
favoring conditions, will sooner or later, but certainly, some time
remove them, and will put an end to their dependence.
A note comments:
This was written in the year 1763; the outcome of the war with
America converts it into a prophecy.
Chap. v, on “Land Carriage,”calls for two observations only. In the first place, we
may note its bibliographical citations.
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In the second place, we must recognize the continued attentive elaboration of
administrative detail. The chapter contains hardly more than titles of subjects which
have to be dealt with in securing all possible advantage to the state from means of
internal communication by land, but merely as a programme or as a catalogue of
items to be kept in view by the state, it is a notable reflection of the cameralistic
spirit. The details to be dealt with by government under this head are all considered
as “means of increasing the national occupation.” They vary from construction and
repair of roads, the encouragement and control of carriers, the provision and
regulation of inns, stables, and storehouses for the men, animals, and goods engaged
in transportation, to maintenance of the various trades, wheelrights, saddlers, smiths,
etc., necessary for conducting the repairs incidental to land traffic.
Substantially the same is all that need be said of each remaining chapter in the
book. In the first place, the printed sources to which the author acknowledged himself
indebted must be noted.
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In the second place, these chapters are cumulative evidence that the center of
gravity in Sonnenfels’ system was shifting its position. It does not appear that he was
conscious of it. He does not directly substitute another aim for the strengthening of
the state which had been ultimate with the other cameralists. He returns frequently
to some variation of the constant theme that the state must look out that the proper
thing is done in all these relations, but the reader cannot fail to detect an infusion of
more of the spirit of gain for the sake of gain, which distinguishes the specifically
commercial from the typically political standpoint, and which was, consciously or
unconsciously, the animus of the Smithian political economy. Although Sonnenfels
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Smithian manner, his dealing with the technique of the subjects treated in the last half
of this volume was distinctly an approximation to the Smithian method.
For various reasons, Vol. III, Finanzwissenschaft, must be much more summarily
treated than the other two. A few of its general characteristics, however, should be
pointed out, and this may be done in the form of disconnected notes.
The title-page is a duplicate of that of the first two volumes with the exception that
the vignette represents Maximilien de Berthume, due de Sully.
In the Preface of the first edition the author indicates his purpose to occupy an
intermediate position between two classes among the numerous writers on the
subject, viz., first, those who have exaggerated their systems into Utopias; second,
those who have tried to reduce policies of oppressive exploitation to an art. These
latter talk only of enriching the treasury. They ask how much may be taken from the
citizen without bringing him to the threshold of extreme poverty.
These contemptible hirelings of tyranny resemble the hunting-dog
that scares up the game for the hunter in order to feed on its entrails.
A third type which, to be sure, is very small, aims at a quite different
purpose, viz., the honor of standing for the interest of the people [des
Volkes]. These have to reckon with the ruler, and to challenge every
expenditure which exceeds reasonable needs.
In this passage Sonnenfels applies the word Kammeral-schriftsteller to a class of
writers on finance who correspond to the term Oekonomieaufseher, as used above.
That is, he asserts that they knew nothing of the broad principles of finance but fill
their books with the most minute details of private thrift. These petty people should
have confined their pride entirely to writing for zealous administrative employees,
who might have read their books with advantage. According to this passage, then,
Sonnenfels repudiated the name “cameralist;” but that was a matter of words, and it
does not separate him in fact from the series of writers whom we are considering.
As between the types thus characterized Sonnenfels hints, rather than directly says,
that he intends to write with a view to the general prosperity, rather than chiefly in
the interest of the national treasury. He declares that he proposes to write principles
of finance, not a finance encyclopaedia; and he advertises the freedom and
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the impression of protesting too much. His language serves chiefly to remind the
reader of the difficulty of making any presumption except the governmental one
tolerable to rulers. Although Sonnenfels praises the magnanimity of the empress,
which had protected his freedom of teaching, we read between the lines that he was
consciously approaching delicate subjects, and he wanted to conciliate the civic
powers as much as possible. The Preface to the present edition contains a paragraph
which expresses the author’s attitude toward bibliography, viz.:
In respect to the books to which I have referred in this as well as in
the first and second parts, I have this to say: that my intention in such
references was not to furnish a literary encyclopaedia. The reader or
student does not want a mere list of writings, brought together from
catalogues and unreliable journals, without selection and very often
without knowledge. He wishes to get acquainted with good writings,
from which he may extend the principles which he has gained, and in
which he may find further information about this or that subject. With
this purpose alone in view I have listed books, and none others than
those which I have myself read and of which I can give assurance that
they will repay the trouble of consulting or reading them.
It is perhaps a virtue rather than a fault of the first two volumes, that they appear to
have been drawn more from observation than from previous writers. Whether it is a
virtue or not, the internal evidence does not strongly sustain a literal version of the
above claim to personal acquaintance with all the books cited in the parts already
discussed. In this third part the citations are more frequent, but this fact merely
reflects the state of the available literature.
It should be noticed too that the volume now before us is full of vivid side-lights
upon the issues which were then seething in all the political pots of Europe. Nowhere
did the fundamental issue, government for the sake of the citizen or the citizen for the
sake of government, come to more distinct definition than in policies of taxation. The
day after the Preface to this fifth edition of the third volume was written, the
Assembly of Notables at Versailles was dissolved. Reduced to the concrete, the
Revolution was an assertion that taxes should thereafter leave Frenchmen a living.
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book one feels the tug of the vested interests upon the earnings of the masses, but
what is better, one feels the force of a moral judgment that the masses must not be
sacrificed to institutions. There is no assertion of a new social principle here. There
is, however, assertion that old social principles must be applied with changed
emphasis. So understood the book is a vivid document of political reconstruction.
On p. 2 Sonnenfels gives his definition of the science of finance, viz.:
The more necessary is it, therefore, for those interested in this
important part of administration to be guided by well-considered
principles according to which the revenues of the state may be most
advantageously raised. These collected principles are the science of
finance [Finanzwissenschaft].
The author’s formulation of the standpoint from which these principles are to be
considered may be summarized as follows: In the first place, we may reduce the
general process of financial administration, according to his analysis, to four stages,
viz.: first, estimate of the needs of the state, and drawing up a corresponding budget
[Staatsaufwandsüberschlag]; second, determination of the resources of the state;
third, by comparing the former with the latter, discovery of the proportion of the
resources which it will be necessary to use in order to cover the needs; fourth, the
technique of assessing and collecting the revenues. Without attempting to reproduce
the author’s doctrines of the limits within which the idea of the ordinary and
extraordinary needs of the state must be defined, we note, first, that the sources of
revenue are divided into two classes, viz.: the mediate and the immediate
contributions of the citizens (§15). The former class includes revenues from all those
sources which are the common property of the citizens: crown estates, regalian rights,
etc. The second class includes all revenues which are derived from payments by
individuals. As an ideal principle, the former class should cover the ordinary
expenses of the state, while the latter should be the means of discharging the
extraordinary expenses (§§18, 19).
Then follows a most characteristic and illuminating proposition, viz.:
The contribution to the extraordinary expenses must be arranged
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itself, always however without allowing attention to wander from the
well-being of the citizens, which remains under all circumstances the
ultimate purpose of every expenditure (§20).
More than a mere verbal variation is involved in this dictum. Instead of the
conventional Wohl des Staates, or the noncommittal phrase which occurs in the
Preface of the first edition, “die Sache des Volkes” we now have “das Wohl der
Burger.” Of course it would be absurd to rest an important conclusion upon a single
phrase. It is hardly probable that Sonnenfels was distinctly aware of meaning
anything different by this phrase from the ideas conventionally associated with the
terms in more frequent use. A difference between two stages of civilization might be
expressed in the contrasts between the conventional concepts connoted by the
technical phrases der Staat, or das Volk, and the democratic phrase, die Burger. The
two former presuppose an entity in antithesis with the individual citizens, or a mystic
collectivity in which the role of the individual citizen is an after consideration. The
latter phrase connotes a conception that there is no whole except that composed of
the individuals whose co-operation gives reality to the state. Even conceding that
Sonnenfels consciously meant less by substitution of the new phrase than it means
to us, the fact that he made the substitution may legitimately be taken as a straw
showing the direction of his own thought and of current opinion. A change of
emphasis was taking place. The state as a self-existent entity was becoming less real.
The individual was becoming relatively both more real and more important.
As a means of locating Sonnenfels with reference to another important principle,
the opening of §32 is significant, viz.:
The sources of national income arc agriculture and industry
[Aemsigkeit], under which latter everything is included which
increases the so-called numerical riches [numerären Reichthum] of a
state.
Sonnenfels has been called the “systematizer of mercantilism.” Such a phrase
would have to be defined very precisely, and so as to remove most of its proper
meaning, before it could be accepted as covering the facts.
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discussion (§§85 ff.) of exemptions from taxation. Sonnenfels tersely disposes of the
claims to freedom from taxation on the part of nobility, clergy, and scholars
respectively. In a word, his argument is: first, these classes either arc citizens or they
are not; second, if they are, this general designation, and the consequent advantages
from the protection of the community, carry with them the general obligation of
sharing in the costs of government; if they are not citizens, then it would be well for
them to consider whether they would gain by release of the state from the obligation
of protection which it owes to all citizens. As to the claim that these classes perform
a special service to the state, which entitles them to exemption, Sonnenfels declares
with rather unusual warmth:
I at least lay my hand on my conscience, in order to concede that the
community could do without my writings better than it could dispense
with the labor of the rustic who produces our bread by the sweat of
his brow. But I am treating the matter more seriously than it deserves.
Every social stratum contributes after a certain proportion its share to
the common well-being. These contributions therefore cancel one
another, and the duty to contribute remains the completely equal
responsibility of all.
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In the course of the discussion of clerical claims to exemption from taxation the
author incidentally utters another opinion, which may not properly be construed as
intentionally asserting all that would now be found in it. As a symptom, however, of
the fluid condition into which political philosophy was lapsing it is decidedly
instructive. Sonnenfels had shown his reasons for concluding that no claim to
exemption could be maintained by the clergy on the ground of special divine right or
through the claims of an external power, such as the Roman court, and he continues:
The concessions of princes are the only remaining ground for the
claim. Now, in so far as this exemption is a concession of the ruler,
it carries with it, like every concession of this sort, the tacit
qualification,  provided the public welfare is not too nearly affected
thereby; in which case it is not alone revocable, but it must be
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community for the sake of an individual or a class (§91).
Quite as democratic in form, but perhaps even more vague in application, were
Sonnenfels’ principles fur distributing the burdens of taxation. Thus he says:
The payments of the individual citizen must be reckoned according
to a double relation: to his own means, and to the means of the other
tax-payers. .... With reference to the former, this principle must
govern: the dues must not be so great as to impair the earning-power
of the citizen, or to affect his courage to continue earning. That is,
whatever is necessary to the continuance of his earning must be free
from tax; e.g., first, the necessary support; second, the advance
[Vorschuss] or the necessary and useful outlays without which the
income cannot be gained at all, or at least in full; third, a portion of
income large enough to stimulate the citizen to continued labor.
In pursuing the argument, the author adds:
Men whose hearts are of steel and whose temper is hostile to the
citizens have tried to make it a principle that a people will be the
more industrious, the more it is loaded with taxes. .... The difference
between stimulating and discouraging taxes consists in this: the
former increase the motives for industry, .... the latter diminish the
motives to labor. .... Even if the state had a right, therefore, to extend
the taxes to the limit of support and advance, the self-interest of the
state would forbid use of this right. The greater sum of one year
would be purchased too dear at cost of the deficit of the following
years through loss of energy and decrease of national zeal for labor
[Arbeitsamkeit] (§99).
In the same connection Sonnenfels betrays uncertainty bout the precision of the two
tests of taxation which he has proposed. Thus he says:
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income which may be taken for taxes. Men of insight cannot fail to
have seen the impossibility of finding such a general numerical ratio.
....
In the following section another angle of the subject is encountered:
In order to determine the ratio of the payments for taxes to the means
of other tax-payers, this seems to be taken for granted as an infallible
principle, viz., The portions to be paid should be to each other as the
incomes of those who are liable to taxation (§100).
That is, as the context explains, if one citizen has an income of 100, and another of
1, the tax of the former should be 100 times that of the latter. But Sonnenfels at once
points out that this principle cannot be accepted without modification, for, “suppose
we consider not the sum which this principle would take from the two citizens
respectively, but the sum which would be left to each after the payment.” The one
might still be left in affluence after the payment, the other might be crowded below
the means of subsistence, and. the exact principle is still left in question by the
conclusion:
One sees that no point can be assigned for even an approximate
comparison of the abundance of the one with the misery of the other.
In the next paragraph the attempt is made to help out this vagueness by another
specification, viz.:
Nevertheless one must be fair enough to admit that this striking
inequality is not the consequence of the disproportion in the tax, but
of the incomparability [Unebenmasses] of means, i.e., of the
difference in the strata of civic society, and that the demand to reduce
to equality, by means of a finance system, this difference which, at
least in larger states, is not accidental, would be senseless. The thing
to be considered, in the case of definition of the reciprocal relation
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disproportionate burden of taxation. This end will be approached as
near as possible by applying the following principle: “The sums to be
paid shall be to each other as the net incomes of the taxable citizens;
that is, as the sums which remain to each after subtraction of support
and advance.”
In the closing section of the chapter (§104) the general marks of a good financial
system are summarized as follows:
The same will have to raise the sum reckoned with reference to the
general national income and adequate for the needs of the state, in so
far as the domains [Regalien] and accidental revenues do not yield”
the same according to a provincial apportionment corresponding to
the balance of money, from the citizens assessed without exception,
in proportion to their net incomes, covering short specified periods,
at the time which is least inconvenient, through its own system of
collection, which must be as simple as possible.
Sonnenfels regards the Regalien as either essentially taxes, and to be treated as
such, or as auxiliaries of Polizey and Handlung. He declines to elaborate the subject
therefore on the ground that Justi was strongest at this point, and may be regarded as
the best authority.
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This epitome of Sonnenfels’ views about finance in general contains all that is
necessary for our purpose about his ideas of taxation. He enters at some length into
argument with the physiocrats, but his position may be inferred from what has
preceded. We may note his use of the phrase, “die einzige Abgabe” for the
physiocratic  l’impôt unique which has passed into the modern “single tax.” We may
also note that while the critique by which Sonnenfels defended his position was quite
different from the major premises of the modern single-tax argument, his discussion
contains the rudiments of all that has been said for and against the “single tax” as an
expedient.
On the whole, Sonnenfels regards the consumption tax [Verzekrungssteuer] as the
least oppressive to the tax-payer, and for these reasons:
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time when the citizen has the means of payment; third, because it is collected in rates
which the payer feels less than any other form of tax (§180).
A single quotation from chap, x, on “Financial Schemes,” may complete our study
of Sonnenfels. He says:
Financial schemes are in great part the offspring of the spirit of
selfishness, which clothes itself, however, in the garb of zeal for the
public good. This must arouse the distrust of the financial
administration, and as the anonymous author of the Versuchs Ube.r
die Staatseinkünfte says, always rouse the more suspicion against
them the more they promise. Every proposition looking to the
improvement of the income of the state is a financial scheme.
However they may be dressed up, these schemes fall into three
classes: I, those which propose to facilitate collection, and
incidentally to diminish cost of collection; II, those that propose to
increase the amounts raised on actually assessed objects; III, those
that propose to assess new objects. Before dealing with these in
detail, the following two observations may be advanced: I. Every
proposition which promises no other advantage than increase of
public revenues in general, or as the hirelings are accustomed to
express themselves, den Nutzen des allerhöchsten Aerariums,
deserves no attention. For the incorrectness of the principle, the
public revenues must constantly be raised, has been exposed. A
proposition which aims at the one-sided advantage of the treasury is
a scheme for exaction. II, Every proposition which promises larger
sums for the state treasury, in spite of the fact that the payers are to
pay less, unless it discovers fraud or incompetence in the collection,
is at first glance to be rejected. It promises a numerical increase by
means of a subtraction. That is, it promises a monstrosity.	""-
1. It would be superfluous to argue with students of the social sciences that German
experience is instructive. Whatever our opinion of the purposes which German polity
has proposed, or of the methods by which the purposes have been pursued, the
efficiency of the German civic system is beyond dispute. As an adaptation of means
to ends, it operates with a remarkably low rate of waste.
2. In order to give this factor of efficiency its full valuation, we must look back of
German polity to German political philosophy. Here too, for purposes of
interpretation, we are under no necessity of approving or disapproving the German
conception of the state. We are merely bound to understand it. Americans cannot
interpret German polity correctly so long as we assume that its basic thoughts are
identical with our thoughts. Whether they ought to be or not is beside the mark. The
Germans have done what they have done while aiming at a somewhat different goal
from ours, while assuming a somewhat different social reality from that which we
presuppose, and while consequently applying a somewhat different scale of values
to details of available ways and means.
3. In spite of the necessary inaccuracy of a brief theorem, especially when it is
antithetic in form, the contrast between German and American conceptions of civic
experience may be stated approximately as follows: From the beginning the Germans
have regarded the state as primarily a unit, and only secondarily an aggregate. From
the beginning Americans have regarded the state as primarily an aggregate, and
only secondarily a unit. This contrast is the necessary starting- point for American
interpretation of German polity. The theorem is commonplace enough to American
students of comparative politics. It is indeed merely a variation of the familiar
proposition that German political theory is primarily collectivistic, while American
political theory is primarily individualistic. Americans have not given all the
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German political experience.
If rigid and consistent logic ruled human conduct, the foregoing formulas would not
be as true as they are, nor on the other hand would the degree of truth in them have
permitted the degree of similarity which actually exists between individualistic and
collectivistic states. In all social affairs we are dealing with relativities, not with
absolutes. We have to do with proportions, and emphases, and emotional attitudes,
not with fixed quantities. We find accordingly that there are certain collectivistic
types of civic conduct, but they are by no means confined to states properly classed
as primarily collectivistic. In certain types of situations the most individualistic states,
as though with one accord, have recourse to the most extreme types of collectivistic
conduct. In like manner, the most collectivistic states tend, in certain situations,
toward individualistic types of conduct. No state, therefore, can be truly described as
a product of either collectivism or individualism. Each state is a resultant of
individualistic and collectivistic factors in the mental operations of its citizens and
of other peoples. To use a different figure, we may say that in Germany collectivism
has been the constant predicate, while individualism has furnished the varying
modifiers. In America individualism has been the predicate, while collectivism
supplied the modifiers.
4. Nor must we allow ourselves to be distracted by the fact that the German
conception of the unity of the state has often lent itself to perversions which no
theory could excuse. The state has not only been regarded as exterior to the citizens,
as above and beyond them, as identical with the government, but the government has
sometimes been regarded as merely an emanation from the prince, and the prince has
been accepted as a ruler by divine right, even when he respected no law that might
have restrained his arbitrary will.
We must remember, on the other hand, that individualism as we know it in America
has, in its turn, too often degenerated into license of some to invade the rights of
others. The argument from perversion cuts about as deep on the one side as on the
other. This argument is insufficient either to cast down collectivism or to set up
individualism. The legitimate conclusion from the facts is that neither policy is a
self-sufficient principle for control of civic action. Neither policy has been finally
correlated, in theory or in practice, with its necessary correctives. The purpose of this
book has not been to argue for the one policy nor for the other, but simply to
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the collectivistic idea was interpreted by the Germans during the cameralistic period.
This retrospect is a necessary preliminary to intelligent interpretation of subsequent
developments in German civic theory and practice down to the present.
5. According to the cameralistic conception then, the state was a magnified family
with a big farm as its property. The unity of this family with its estate was
symbolized by the prince. Its interests were represented by the prince in such a way
that no one could very clearly discriminate between the personality of the prince and
the interests of the state. The unity of this farm-patriarchate- principality was so
impressive that at first very little occasion seems to have been found for
distinguishing between the concepts “welfare of the prince,” “welfare of the state,”
“welfare of the people” (considered collectively), and “welfare of the people”
(considered individually). It is approximately true that the cameralists did not
distinctly entertain the last of these conceptions. They implied it from the beginning.
They insisted upon valuations which became motives of the German democratic
movement after the Napoleonic period. They furnished schedules which might be
adopted as the programme of a rather thorough individualism; yet on the whole their
theory, as far as it was published, treated all civic problems as questions of situations
within a literal or mystical unity of prince and people. In the last analysis, the
knowing and feeling and willing for this unity was to be done by the prince. On the
other hand, the good citizen lived and moved and had his being as a sort of organ of
a body whose center of consciousness was the prince.
Of course the relationship did not present itself in precisely this form to the
cameralists. We are expressing it in our terms, not in theirs; yet it is not sure that a
single one among them would have rejected our form of statement.
In general it may be said that political evolution in Germany, as everywhere else,
has been a variation of adjustments between the extreme conceptions, on the one
hand that the citizens may, can, and should exist only as functions of the state, and
on the other hand that the state may, can, and should exist only as functions of the
citizens. The latter conception was latent rather than patent among the cameralists.
It is not within the scope of this book to inquire whether there is a possible synthesis
of the foregoing thesis and antithesis. We are dealing with men who would have said,
and after a fashion did say, that the two views are mutually exclusive.
6. Considering the state then as an organism of which the prince was the head and
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cameralists easily reduced the questions of civic polity to this double problem: How
may it be well with this state-organism in its internal operations and in its external
relations?
By a process which does not fully appear in its elements in the cameralistic books,
the cameralists arrived at the major premise that all the problems of “internal and
external security” resolved themselves into the question of the princely revenues. We
must remember that the social preconceptions of the cameralistic period were
thoroughly static. Publicists were apparently no more certain than every other social
class that the human lot was a permanent arrangement of social strata. It was assumed
that a certain standard of life was appropriate to each stratum, and that, maintenance
of this standard of life being assured, it would be impertinent and presumptuous for
members of any stratum to long for satisfactions in excess of the norm for their social
level. If then the conduct of the different strata of society could be so ordered by the
state that the total activities of the people could be made to result in an increasing
margin of material return, above the aggregate demands of the different class
standards, the state might appropriate that surplus without injustice or hardship to
the individual. This, in a word, was the programme which the cameralists undertook
to formulate. It might be expressed in this way: Given the resources of a territory, the
labor capacity of the population, and the customary wants of the different strata, how
may the state so exploit territory and people that the customary wants may be
supplied, with an increasing surplus which may be claimed as public revenue?
7. Cameralism was accordingly in no sense an abstract philosophy, except as every
human action connotes to the philosophical onlooker some implied preconceptions.
Cameralism was an administrative technology.
1 It was not an inquiry into the abstract
principles of wealth, in the Smithian sense.
510 It was much more closely analogous
with grub-staking a prospector or financing a street railroad. It was a theory of
managing natural resources and human capacities so that they would be most
lucrative for the prince in whose interest the management was conducted. To be sure,
just as any other human activity tends to suggest generalizations, this cameralistic
technology visibly expanded its conceptions from rule-of-thumb thrift to somewhat
comprehensive industrial, commercial, and political principles. It even cast its
conclusions occasionally at last in forms which seemed almost to anticipate
abstractions of the classical economists. On the whole, however, cameralism
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which one might learn in the course of practical business. It was not like the
philosophic reasoning in the economic treatises. Not until the Smithian influence
began to be felt in Germany did questions of material ways and means cease to be
treated on the one hand merely as matters of domestic thrift, on the other hand,
merely as matters of political expediency. It is accordingly a fundamental error to
treat the cameralistic technology as a system of economic generalizations in the
nineteenth-century sense. The theoretical setting of the economic ideas was the
paramount political opportunism of the period. The provincialisms of the came-ralists
were more essentially political than economic.
8. In expansion of the last proposition we may specify that tradition has very
seriously misconstrued cameralism, in consequence of treating it as a system of
doctrines about nineteenth-century economic problems. The truth is that the
cameralists had not come within sight of those problems. They were trying to answer
the questions of expediency proposed to them by the political opportunism which
animated the statecraft of their period. The controlling principle of that type of
politics was, let each state look out for its own interests. This meant a policy of
readiness for aggression or for resistance to aggression. The foremost consideration
was ways and means to protect the state in the constant struggle with other states. In
this situation there was no more use for doctrines of abstract economics than there
was in the latest special session of Congress, when the main concern was not
scientific tariff legislation but the most skilful trading of votes in the interest of
particular constituencies. The wonder is not that the cameralists held narrow
economic views, but that their ideas of economic relations contained such a small
proportion of error.
The supposed economic fallacies of the cameralists might be expressed as details
of the policy known as mercantilism. It would be irrelevant to open the question of
the merits or defects of the mercantilist policy in its historical time and place. It
would be futile to deny that the cameralists were mercantilists. The significant fact,
however, for the development of the social sciences, is that mercantilism was not an
economic generalization at all, as we now understand that phrase. It was a fiscal
expedient. It is as fallacious to infer fundamental economic doctrines from the
mercantilistic programmes as it would be to impute strange notions of essentials of
economics to the American legislators who prefer a tariff to an income tax. There is
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understood as clearly as the physiocrats, or as modern economists, that the extractive
industries arc the ultimate sources of wealth. The mercantilists did not differ from the
physiocrats about the ultimate sources of wealth, but if they had expressed
themselves in the modern way they would have said that was “a purely academic
question.” The real difference between mercantilists and physiocrats was on fiscal
policy. The former held that it was wiser fiscal policy for governments to put their
strength into promotion of commerce than into encouragement of the extractive
industries. The latter insisted on inverting the proposition. This disagreement about
practical policy no more proved a difference of opinion about basic economic
relations, than opposite views about the expediency of a corporation tax in America
today would prove that the opponents believed in antagonistic systems of abstract
economics.
In particular, it has been supposed that the mercantilists, and especially the
cameralists, held fantastic views of the nature of wealth. This tradition is not
supported by the cameralistic books. Their essentially sane assumption about wealth
does not appear more clearly anywhere than in Justi’s propositions.
1 If a reader had
heard none of the misrepresentations of mercantilism, however, study of the
cameralistic books would impress him from the start with the authors’ sense of the
urgency of fiscal needs; but he would find nothing which could legitimately be
interpreted as an essentially different view of what constitutes wealth from that which
the most enlightened modern economist would exhibit if he owned an elevator full
of corn, but needed to raise ready money.
Less prominent in the list of alleged errors of the mercantilists, and particularly of
the cameralists, is their supposed misconceptions on the subject of population. It is
frequently implied, rather than positively slated, in allusions to these writers, that
they supposed increase of population might go on without limit. In fact, so far as they
are to he judged by their books, they knew as well as Malthus did that population
must always be in proportion to the food supply. They believed that the German
lands were undercultivated and therefore underpopulated. They believed that there
was no immediate prospect of exhausting the resources of German soil, and therefore
it was good govermental policy to promote increase of population by every possible
means. They were no more guilty of economic misconception because of this
judgment than Kansas farmers are when they advertise for laborers from outside the
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But the gravest of all the errors of cameralism is supposed to be its connivance with
paternalism. On this count we may as well confess judgment at once, but our plea is
that the facts do not constitute a fault in the historic sense. The Germans three or four
hundred years ago confronted a task which was hardly less appalling than that which
Russia is facing at present. The statesmen of the time saw certain elements of the
problem much more clearly than we can see them today. In a word, the great masses
of the Germans were infants—infants in knowledge, infants in experience, infants in
feeling, infants in judgment about the conduct of life. They lived in straightened
circumstances. No affluence of natural resources stimulated their ambition and
allured them to effort. They loved the pitiful measure of comfort which they could
command, and they were timid, even if they were wistful, about enterprises that
might improve their condition. How might the dormant powers of these unaroused
folk be awakened and enlisted in the task of making the most of themselves and of
their material conditions?
The method by which the German leaders undertook this task was something like
the method by which a levy of raw recruits is made over into a regiment of
disciplined soldiers. The Germans were divided up into some hundreds of squads,
each controlled by a territorial prince who was within limits absolute in his own land.
This was of course not a scheme invented out of hand. It was a stage in the historical
evolutionary process. The arrangement corresponded to the conditions and fitted the
conditions. Populations largely of peasants, and the remainder mostly artisans who
had been incubated in the quasi-communistic guild organizations, and had never
learned to walk alone, populations politically and economically in their swaddling
clothes, and needing, first, nursery care, then tutors and governors to bring them to
maturity—this was the situation in which that paternalism culminated which
Americans have been taught to despise. The regime would have been impossible in
America, because of the difference in conditions. It has been more than justified by
its results in Germany.
9. As was intimated in the Preface, the chief motive for this study was a desire to
find out whether history had treated the cameralists fairly, and if not to learn the
lesson of this unfairness for methodology in the social sciences. So far as the facts
are concerned, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon the statements in the Preface. The
cameralists have been misunderstood and misrepresented simply because their own
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deal with the problems which interested their critics. The consequence has been that
a series of writers, unsurpassed by authors of any other period as exhibitors of the
social forces which were conducting the evolution of their time, have either been
neglected altogether, or they have been represented as freaks, with unimportant
relations to the social process in which they occurred.
The cameralists not only gave voice to the constructive civic ideas of an era, but the
system which they formulated contains all the essentials of German polity today.
From the close of the cameralistic period, and the turning of German political
thinking from its natural course by the Revolution on the one hand and Smithism on
the other, down to the formation of the Verein für Socialpolitik in 1871, so many
factors enter into the reorganization of German social science that it is easy to
overlook the permanent cameralistic elements. To understand modern Germany
which is directly and indirectly exerting such manifold influence upon the whole
world, it is necessary to take account not only of present activities in Germany, but
of those formative purposes and tentative institutions which the cameralists represent.
The wider methodological generalization is that every process of thought has its
telic coefficient, which must be accurately computed if the thought is to be
objectively estimated. In other words, we must know what the thinker is consciously
or unconsciously trying to do with his thought, in order to value it correctly in the
scheme of intelligence.
If the cameralists had been trying to determine the laws of wealth, or value, or
distribution, their thinking would have had one force. Since they were attempting no
such thing, but were trying to work out a civic technology which would incidentally
provide for the necessities of citizens, and thereby furnish the prince with money
enough to pay his bills, their thinking has a quite different force. Historical
interpretation of the cameralists not only turns the strongest light upon the later
evolution of civic theory and practice in Germany, but it furnishes a typical case for
illustration of the theorem that every system of thought must be interpreted in
connection with its peculiar purposes.1. Translated under the supervision of Jevons, with the title, Guide to the Study of Political Economy;
original first edition, 1876, second, 1878, translation, 1880.
2. Julius Kautz, Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der National-Oekonomik und ihrer Literatur, Wien,
1860.
3. Wilhelm Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland, München, 1874. In the
following pages, if nothing appears to the contrary, this work is referred to whenever the author’s name
is used.
4. Loc. cit., p. 25.
5. Under title (5) above.
6. Title (4) above.
7. Loc. cit., p. xiv.
8. Geschichte der Staatswissenschajt, 2 vols., 1832–33.
9. Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften, 3 vols., 1855–58.
10. Exhaustive study of the literature of cameralism should take, as its base of operations, Baumstark,
Cameralistische Encyklopädie, 1835. The state of tradition about the meaning of the cameralists is
ocular proof, however, that it is a far cry from bibliography to interpretation.
11. Versuch einer Geschichte der Oekonomie und Cameralwissenschaft, 2 vols., 1781.
12. Studien über die Entwickelung der Verwaltungslehre in Deutschland von der sweiten Häljte des
17. bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts. Von Dr. Gustav Marchet, o. ö. Professor an der k.-k.
Hochschule für Boden-cultur in Wien. München, 1885 (pp. viii + 437).
13. Originally published 1808–9. I refer to the fifth edition (1830), Vol. IX of the Historische Werke,
p. 16. The English translation appeared in 1864 under the title, A Manual of the History of the
Political System of Europe and Its Colonies. The passage is on p. 11.
14. The italics are mine, and the author’s word is Staatswirthschaft. The next clause in parenthesis
reads: man kannte nur die Kunst, Geld aufzubringen.
15. Teutsche Fürstenstaat, 1655.
16. Grundsätze der Policey, Handlung und Finanz, 1765.
17. Vide Schmoller, The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance (Macmillan, 1902).
Translated from the Studien über die wirthschaftliche Politik Friedrichs des Grossen (1883),
published in the first issue of Schmoller’s Jahrbuch (1884).
18. Loc. cit., pp. 43 ff.
519. For Schmoller’s later views on this main theme, and especially for bibliography of the various
phases of the subject, vide Grundriss, Index, title “Mercantilismus,” etc.
20. Wealth of Nations, Book IV, chap. i.
21. Bax ed., Vol. I, p. 450.
22. Von Mohl, Ceschichte und Literatur der Staatfwissenschaften, III. Bd. (1858), p. 296.
23. Italics mine.
24. Von Mohl fails to discover, and consequently helps to add vogue to, the fallacy of the whole
generalization. He does not perceive that the generalizers put into the system what they thought it
should be made responsible for, instead of finding out what its followers actually thought.
25. Vide below, p. 242; cf. p. 256. The blurred view of the cameralists given by Cohn is still more
notable, because Cohn’s book has probably influenced the thinking of many times more students than
von Mohl’s. Vide Grundriss der Nationalökonomie, 1885, pp. 99, 100.
26. Gietchichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland.
27. While Rosther partially corrects an error, yet he rehabilitates it at the same time in another form:
Zur Geschichte der englischen Volks-wirthschaftslehre, p. 122.
28. Liddell and Scott: “anything with a vaulted roof or arched covering;” Heyse, Fremdwörterbuch:
‘’camera or Kammer in the more restricted sense is the apartment where the counselors charged with
administration of the revenues of a principality assembled: then the persons themselves, Kammerräthe
and  Kammer-Assessoren.”  Cameralia,  or  Cameral-Wissenschaften,  were the theories on which
administration of the revenues proceeded; in a wider sense the term was applied to the sciences of the
state in general. A cameralist was one who understood these sciences either theoretically or in practice.
29. Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland, p. 237. I shall urge later (p. 49; cf. pp. 195,
196) that it is necessary to supply English-speaking students with a commentary on this term, if they
are to be protected against misconceptions of historical facts. The term “National-okonomik”
corresponds with what existed in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, only if it has
the force of the phrase “national management.” This management included morals, education, religion,
politics, diplomacy, war, and finance, much more directly and intensively than it concerned itself with
economic questions as understood in England and America. It is an anachronism therefore to credit
Germany, before Adam Smith’s critique of economic relations was imported and domesticated, with
an economic science in the British sense. The men in Germany who theorized about civic interests
before the close of the eighteenth century were political scientists after their kind. They were political
economists only in a secondary and incidental sense. This distinction is crucial for the interpretation
of all the social sciences in Germany from this point.
30. Loc. cit., p. 238.
31. Readers who want the author’s conclusions, but who are unwilling to examine his evidence, may
pass from this point to the last chapter.
32. Diestel in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, title “Osse.”
33. Testament, ed. Thom., 1717, “Vorrede,” p. 10.
34. D. Melchiors von Osse “Testament.” Gegen Hertzog Augusta Churfürsten zu Sachsen. Sr.
Churfürst. Gnaden Räthen und Land-schafften, 1556. Anitzo zum ersten mahl völlig gedruckt. Auch
hin und wieder durch nutzliche Anmerckungen Erläutert. Nebst einer Vorrede und Anhang von einen
Versuch kleiner “Annalium” den damahligen Zustand so wohl bey Hofe als auf Universitäten desto
deutlicher sich cin-zubilden. Zum Gebrauch des Thomasischen “Auditorii.” Halle im Magdeburgisch.
A. MDCCXVII. A portion of the author’s special title-page to the body of the document reads:
“Welchergestalt eine Christliche Obrigkeit ingemein, in ihrem Regiment mit Gottes Hülffe eine
gottselige, weissliche vernünfftige und rechtmässige Justicien erhalten kan. Darum auch Erwehnung
geschieht von dem Regiment. Gericht-barkeit und Policey der löblichen Chur- und FürstenthumSachsen, Thüringen, und Meissen, Hochermeldtem Churfursten zuständig.”
35. Zuschrifft, pp. 8 ff.
36. The reasons for allowing this term to stand in its German form will appear later.
37. The uneasiness of Thomasius over the traditional doctrines about “beschriebene Gesetze” (vide
Roscher, in re Thomasius) begins to show itself in the note in this passage, viz., “the written laws are
by no means to be preferred to the customs” (Gewohnheiten). The naive reasoning which Osse
represents was an effective means of control so long as people accepted it at face value. Revolution
was certain wherever it was repudiated without substitution of a constructive theory.
38. Entirely aside from the familiar dogmatic basis of this argument, Osse’s use of the terms
“beschriebene” and “geschriebene Rechte”— apparently without variation of concept—plainly shows
that the argument got some of its plausibility from a peculiar form of the ambiguous middle hidden
in the logic, i.e., the ecclesiastico-theological associations of the terms “heilige Schrift,”
“geschrieben,” etc., were carried over to all written laws.
39. Thomasius at once challenges this dictum, on the ground that debates over “the best form of
government” are mere pedantries.
40. The two first in 1543, the last 1550 (Thomasius).
41. Leipzig, 1400. Wittenberg, 1502.
42. These courts were supposed to secure justice in minor cases by a fair combination of official and
lay persons. Thomasius has an important note (p. 210) on the quarrels in the law faculties over
Schöppenstuhle.
43. Thereupon Thomasius tartly comments, “I will not undertake to judge what sort of a thing a fine
or a nasty Policey may be.” We shall not go into Osse’s discussion of Policey in detail, because it suits
our purpose to deal with the maturer form of the system particularly as reflected in Justi.
44. Americans receive no more elementary impression in Germany than that the concept gute Ordnung
fills the place in German life-philosophy which the notion “freedom” occupies in ours.
45. Bin hleiner Versuch von Annalibus von Anno 1409 bis 1629. Eine etwas genauere Einsicht in die
Historie von Ursprung und Fortgang der Universitäten in Deutschland, sonderlich der Universität
Leipzig und Wittenberg, und denen in denenselben entstandenen Zänchereyen unter-schicdener
Facultäten ingleichen des eingeführten langweiligen Processes, und was vermittelst dieser
Zänckereyen vor Unruhe an den Chur- und Fürstlichen Sächsischen Höfen verursacht worden, zu
erlangen, zu desto bessern Verstand des van D. Melchior von Osse auf Churfürst Augusti
Allergnädigslen Befehl A. 1555 verfertigten und 1556 übergebenen Recht-lichen Bedenckens. Zum
Gebrauch des Thomasischen Auditorii.
46. The first half at least is a rather notable apostrophe to Justice, and the remainder shows that lofty
ideals of practical application were not without witnesses.
47. “Ein Regent und Ober-Herr; guter weiser Rath; unparlheyische gute Gerichtbarkeil, und ein
fromm gehorsam Volck.”
48. He first calls to mind the note referred to above, and then cites: “aus dem ersten Theil die relation
und  judicium  von  Clapmarii arcanis rerumpublicarum, von Faust’s consilils pro aerario, von
Obrechts Politischen Bedencken, von Klokii de Aerario, von der Fürstlichen Macht-kunst oder
unerschöpflichen Goldgrube, von des Freyherrn von Schrötern Fürst. Schatz und Rent-Cammer,
Ingleichen von der Einfältigkeit der Haushaltungs-Regeln.
49. One of the anachronisms in English interpretation of German thought has come in through
premature translation of this word Verfassung by our modern term “constitution.” Unless direct
evidence to the contrary appears in, rare cases, the word should never be understood to mean
“constitution” in the modern sense, until the beginning of the struggle for constitutions. I believe I
fairly represent what the word meant to the author cited and even to Thomasius by the vague word“condition.” The remainder of the quotation supports this view.
50. The reasons for not translating this term will appear later. Vide Index, title “Economy and Related
Terms.”
51. A part of the reason for introducing Osse at all in this book is the value of these editorial notes
upon his monograph in throwing light on contemporary estimates of the cameral system. Thomasius
here puts his finger upon the central trait of cameralism, and it is astonishing that later writers have
so far lost account of this clue to the whole theory.
52. As evidence that this part of the administration was well guarded, he cites the Policey- und
Landes-Ordnung,  published by Elector August in 1555, “in Carpore Juris Saxonici, tom. I, pp. 31 biss
59 zu lesen.”
53. Thomasius insists (p. 532) that Osse’s omission to mention in this connection the Religious Peace
of Augsburg (September 25, 1555) strengthens the suspicion that he was not a good Lutheran, but at
heart a papist. As the Testament was dated December, 1555, and as the Additio was written later,
failure to mention it, the editor thinks, points to the author’s lack of sympathy with any arrangement
in the nature of a modus vivendi between the contending forces. Osse’s own professions do not tend
to confirm this hypothesis.
54. All. d. Bib., in loc.
55. Viz., (1) Della Cavelleria. S. de arte equitando, exercitiis equestribus et torneamentis, gründlicher
Bericht von allem was zu der loblichen Reiterei gehurig, und einem Cavalier zu wissen von Nothen,
auch Chur und War-lung der Pferde und wie man dieselben auf allerhand Manier abrichten und
zäumen soll, 1609, 2d ed., 1624; (2) Bericht vom Bergwerk, wie man dieselben bauen und in guten
Wohlstand bringen soll, 1617; (3) Aulicopolitica oder Hof-Staats- und Regierungskunst, 1622–24,
republished 1679. Apparently the last was identical with the book often referred to under the title
Teutscher Regentenstaat (vide Roscher, p. 116). There are good reasons for the suspicion that
Löhneyss has been mentioned by many writers who neglected to state that their knowledge of him was
at second hand.
56. All. d. Bib., in loc.
57. Fünff underschiedliche Secreta Politica, von Anstellung, Erhaltung und Vermehrung guter
Policey, und von billicher, rechtmässiger und nothivendiger, Erhöhung eines jeden Regenten
Jährlichen Gefallen und Einkommen. Allen Hohen und Nidern Obrigkeiten, besonders dess Hettigen
Römischen Reichs Ständen, in diesen letzten und hochbetrangten Zeiten zum besten. Hiebevor
gestellet durch Georgium Obrechtum, J. C. Sacri Palatij Comitem, Reipub. Argentinens. Advocatum,
& Academiae Antecessorem. Hernacher im Jahr l617 zum Truch befördert, und biss anhero ingeheim
gehalten: Nunmehr aber zu männigliches Nutzen publi-cirt, und mit nothwendigen Registern
verbessert.  “Lectio lecta placet, decies repetita placebit” (351 pp. with indexes).
58. “Auf meinen Costen, in geheim und sub secreto,” Vorrede, p. i.
59. Its special title reads: Georgii Obrechti, etc. Discursus Bellico-politicus. Invictissimo et
Augustissimo Principi ac Domino, Dn. Rudolpho Laudatissimae Memoriae. II Romanorum
Imperalori, Anno M. DC. IV. ab Authore humilima animi devotione oblatus, in quo quomodo advur-
sus Turcicum Tyrannum bellum commode geri possit, quam felicissime ostenditur.
60. Beginning with the initials of the ascription, “Auspice Deo Triuno Optimo Maximo,” the title-page
reads: “Politisch Bedencken und Dis-curs: Von Verbesserung Land unnd Leut, Anrichtung guter
Policey. Und jurnemblich von nutzlicher Erledigung grosser Aussgaben, und billicher Vermehrung
eines jeden Regenlen und Oberherren Jahrlichen Cefällen und Einkommen.” This monograph
occupies 135 pages, without index. Its main propositions are in German, and they are fortified by
copious quotations in Latin from the Politicorum scripta, the same ranging from legendary sayings
of Servius Tullius, to dicta of contemporary authorities in canonical and civil law.61. There is a discrepancy of no material importance for our purpose, between the younger Obrecht
and Thomasius with reference to this monograph. The latter states (Osse, p. 87) that the Politisches
Bedencken was printed at Strassburg in the year 1606; that is, three years earlier than it was completed,
if the former is correct. Thomasius adds that a copy of this first edition was in his possession. This
appears to make him a competent witness so far, especially as he quotes enough of the remainder of
the title to make the identity of the monograph rather certain. From the context, however, it is plain
that Thomasius had never seen the edition of 1617, in which the document in question was virtually
the second chapter. Of that edition he says, upon the authority of Deckher, “descriptis Adespotis, p.m.
335. .... The other, presumably somewhat enlarged, appeared in the year 1617.” He further states that
copies of the latter edition, at some date which he does not mention, sold for one hundred Gulden. To
account for this he quotes that writer as follows: “Testata est Republ. Argentinensis, adferendo omnis
exemplaria suae Cancellariae nolle se consilia civis fui, quae illi in proxi pessime cessere, omnibus
palam fieri.” Thomasius concludes that this “confiscation” was the reason for the scarcity price. The
inference is plausible enough, but the only reason that can be surmised for calling in the book is
similar to parents’ motives for keeping some books which they find profitable for themselves out of
reach of their children.
A little later in the Preface, the editor says of the third document in the volume, the Aerarium Sanctum,
“so biss dato niemanden communi-ciret worden.” The date referred to must mean that on which the
collection was published, 1617.
62.  The title and general outline indicate its scope, viz., Constitutio von nothwendiger und nützlicher
Anstellung eines Aerarij Sancti. Durch welches fürnemblich die Bejorderung und Erhaltung gemeiner
Wohlfahrt gesucht und erlangt wird; Beschrieben und angeslellt von Georgio Obreclito, etc.
I. Ein sondere Constitutio und Ordnung, de ludiciario Vectigali.
II. Von sechs Ordnungen, in welchen die bona Fisci, dem Aerario Sancto zugeeignet werden: 1.
Ordinatio, von oeden und unerbawten Güteren; 2. Ordinatio, de Bonis Vacantibus: 3. Ordinatio de
Bonis perditis, & proderelicto habitis, item de bonis peregrinorum, & Thesauris; 4. Ordinatio, de
Bonis Ereptitiis; 5. Ordinatio, de Bonis Damnatorum et Proscriptorum; 6. Ordinatio, de Bonis
incestas Nuptias contrahentium;
III. Von vier Ordnungen, durch welche ratione bonorum subditorum das Aerarium Sanctum mit vielen
starcken Jährlichen Gefällen, und Einkommen versehen wird: 7. Ordinalio, de Bonis subdilorum in
ultima aliqua voluntate Aerario Sancto relictis; 8. Ordinatio, de Bonis Subdilorum, qui in ultima
aliqua voluntate, extraneis personis aliquid reliquerunt: 9. Ordinatio, de Bonis subditorum, qui sine
herede lineae ascendentis & descendentis decedunt, & in Linea collaterali tantum ultra septimum
gradum heredes post se relinquunt: 10. Ordinatio, von einer nothwen-digen, und hochnutzlichen
Fewr-Ordnung.
IV. De Fine huius Constitutions, und wahin oberkliirte reditus können, und sollen verwendet werden.
63. The so-called “Constitution,” in which this scheme of Policey is outlined, contains only 31 pages.
Its title-page is as follows:
Ein sondere Policey-Ordnung, und Constitution, durch welche ein jeder Magistratus, vermittels
besonderen angestellten Deputaten, jederzeit in seiner Regierung, eine gewisse Nachrichlung haben
mag, I. Wie es gleichsam mit seiner ganzen Policey, als eines Politischen Leibs, und allen desselberen
Gliederen, den Underlhanen beschaffen. II. Wie gemelter Policey, derselben Gliederen, und
Administration, auff: und zunemmen zubeffürderen, ab: und undergang zuverhüten. So dann zum III.
Wie auch die gemeine Wolfar/h, so auss vorgedachten dreyen Stücken herkompt, zuvermehren, und
zu erhalten seyen, Allen Oberheiten, in diesen letzten, verhehrten, und gefährlichen Zeiten,
hochnotwendig, und in viel Weg nutzlich samt einer kurtzen Information, und Erhlärung, auch einem
Appendice.
The “Information” and “Erkldrung,” together with the Appendix, occupy 32 pages. The inscriptionof the former reads: “Kurtze Infor-mation und Erklarung. In welchen die Precia Inscriptionum
bestimbt,  und die Nutzbarkeiten welche auss den inscriptionibus, inscriptionum Documentis & Albis,
wie auch aus Anordnung der Deputaten, sowol privalim, als publice zuerlangcn seind, kürtzlich
deducirt werden, Zu besserem Verstand, unnd Nachrichtung, voriger Policey Ordnung, und
Constitution  angestellt.” The special title of the Appendix is: “Von underschiedenen Inscriptionum
Documentis.”
The passage in which the editor accounts for the writing of the Constitution contains so many side-
lights upon the impulses of the document, which would disappear in a translation, that it would have
been quoted in full in an appendix if space had permitted.
64. The monograph contains 56 pages, including an Appendix of 10 pages, and in addition an Index
of 8 pages. The title-page reads: Constilutio und Ordnung. Von einem Hochnutzlichen Aerario Libero-
rum, in welches, von den Elteren, allerhand Summen Gelts, fürnemblich ihren Newgebornen
Kinderen, und in evenlum ihnen selbs, auch der Obrig-keit, und Gemeiner Wohlfahrt zum besten
angelegt werden: Sampt aller-hand Erklärungen, und zweyen Kinder Rechnungen. Beschrieben unnd
angestellt von Georgio Obrechto etc.
65. I. De necessariarum rerum comparatione: &c. praecipuè de modis, quibus cum onere subditorum
pecunia comparari possit. II. De modis quibus sine onere subditorum pecunia compariri possit: et
praecipuè de bona Oeconomia et de venditione vel oppigneratione bonorum.
66. We may merely name the four classes of resources which the author mentions under the first head,
viz., (1) imposition of taxes; (2) extraordinary taxes; (3) “si annui reditus atque census, sique portoria
et vecti-galia augentur” (and without entering into the question of the precise connotation of these
terms at the date of the book, the author’s illustrations permit us to render them in general, income,
property, and poll taxes, customs and excise); (4) certain ordinances (constitutiones) which may yield
something to the treasury. In a sense the second monograph, and in a much more literal sense the third,
fourth, and fifth papers are elaborations of the author’s meaning under this head.
67. This will be evident from headings of the remaining subdivisions: viz., “De novorum Acccptorum
et redituum constitutione: et praecipue de modis quibus mediantè justitiae administratione arcepta
augeri possunt.”
“De modis quibus sine lustitiae administratione accepta atque reditus absque onere subditorum augeri
possunt.”
“De Commeatu Pabuli et Frumenti, item de armis, et de ijs rebus, quae ad arma pertinent
comparandis.”
“De Praecedentibus ad constitulionem belli accommodandis.”
68. Thus, “Sintemal wie in einem Natürlichen Leib, die nervi prima animalis sensus et motus
instrumenta, auch causa actionum seind: also in corpore civili, oder in einer Republica, als in einem
Fürstenthumb, Graffschafft, Herrschafft, und in fürnemmen Stätten, seind Gelt und Gut gleichsam die
nervi, und instrumenta, ohn welche kein Respublica, angericht, gebessert, und so wol zu Friedens Zeit,
als in Kriegs Empe-rungen, unnd anderen hochbetrangten Zustanden, erhalten werden kan, etc.” A
little later the figure continues: “Dann welcher gestalt Gelt und Gut nit weniger Reipublicae von
nohlen seind, als im Menschlichen Leib seind die nervi sentientes, welche von dem Hirn entspringen
sollen; ebner massen Gelt und Gut gebührlicher weiss zuerlangen, gehört einer jeden Oberkeit zu, die
gleichsam in Republica, als in corpore civili, anstatt Hirns ist, und hat soldi corpus vollkömmlich zu
regieren, etc.”
69. These were to have appeared in an appendix.
70. The introduction is such a vivid reflection of the situation within which Obrecht wrote that it would
have been reproduced in full if space had permitted.71. For the reason parenthetically assigned: Because “Matrimonia” are “von den Politicis recht und
wol principia Urbium, seminaria Rerum-publicarum, et fundamenta Rei familiaris genandt werden.”
In this connection the plan contemplates the appointment of officials who should censor the wedding
customs, particularly with reference to extravagant outlays. One of the ends in view was to prevent
squandering of the savings with which housekeeping must be set up. The word here used for that idea
is worth our notice. The phrase is: “auss welchem sie ihre Oeconomi anstellen sollen.”
72. Instead of reducing the various forms of these titles to a single style, the usage of the passages from
which they have been cited has been followed.
73. Commeniarius historians et apologeticus de Luther anismo seu de reformatione, 1688–92.
74. Th. Kolde, in All. d. Bib , title “Seckendorff,” and Roscher, in loc. This account should be
compared with Seckendorff’s own recollections in the dedication of Der Christenstat.
75. For confirmation of this judgment vide below, pp. 73 ff.; cf. doctrine of Schröder, pp. 137 ff.
76. For the conditions of the Peace of Westphalia which furnished the general setting within which the
problems of the several states of Germany are to be explained, vide Tillinghast’s Ploetz, p. 316,
following K. F. Eichhorn, Deutsche Staats- u. Rechtsgeschichte, IV, 522 ff. The most useful outline
of the condition of Germany in the period in which Seckendorff wrote is in Bryce, Holy Roman
Empire, chap. xx. Vide Tillinghast, loc. cit., p. 371. “The Emperor was Leopold I, 1658–1705. After
1663 permanent diet at Regensburg, consisting of the representatives of the eight electors, the sixty-
nine ecclesiastical, the ninety-six secular princes, and the imperial cities. (A miracle of tedious
legislation, often degenerating into a squabble for precedence. ‘A bladeless knife without a handle’.)
Corpus Catholicorum and Corpus Evangeli-corum (the corporate organizations of the Catholic and
the evangelical estates, the latter being the most important. This organization of the Protestant estates
had existed, in fact, since the latter half of the sixteenth century, but it was legally recognized in the
Peace of Westphalia, when it was decreed that in the diet matters relating to religion and the church
should not be decided by a majority, but should be settled by conference and agreement between the
Catholic and Protestant estates, as organized corporations.).”
77. Loc. cit., p. 389; vide Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. 1, pp.
231–36.
78. Herrn Veit Ludwigs von Seckendorff, etc., Teutscher Fürsten Staat, nun zum fünftenmal
übersehen und auffgelegt, Auch mit einer gans neuen Zugabe. Sonderbahrer und wichtiger Materien
um ein grosses Theil vermehret. . ... Anno MDCLXXIIX. In my revision of this chapter I have been
able to refer only to this fifth edition.
79. The translation “constitution” is avoided because it carries associations which would be largely
anachronistic if referred to the quasi-absolute type of state.
80. It appears that amateur social psychologists had already brought rash generalizations about the
character of peoples into disrepute. Seckendorff demands that judgments of that nature shall be based
on adequate examination of the facts, instead of accidental and fragmentary evidence. He also points
out that many characteristics of people which are attributed to their “natural traits” are due rather to
their bringing up and their food supply (Aufferziehung und Nahrung); a decidedly farsighted paragraph
(p. 45).
81. The criterion in mind here is essentially that of civic and ecclesiastical structure, on the
administrative side.
82. Here the reference is to social differences which reflect group interests not primarily official, but
the analysis suggested is very crude. It names differences of religion, differences connected with
differentiation of a learned class, differences between the imperial and the local nobility, differences
between the status of burghers in free cities and those of other cities, etc.83. The specifications under this head concern chiefly the traditions which hedge about the succession.
They are of an entirely different order, according to modern methodology, from those with which the
chapter began: i.e., they are political, constitutional, legal, not physical.
84. I do not think it is necessary to enter into any of the constantly recurring questions about
theoretical relations of the princes to the Empire. In practice, from this time on, the titular head of the
Empire was virtually only one of the most powerful among the scores of rival quasi-sovereign princes
in Germany, the ruler of Prussia looming up more and more as his most formidable competitor. The
political plot, down indeed to the Franco-Prussian war, turned in the first instance upon the fluctuating
success of these principal actors in controlling the lesser princes. I take. the liberty of using the term
sovereignty in connection with these rulers and states, because in relation to their subjects it was so
nearly an unqualified fact that the modifications of the fact through relations to the Empire were
relatively trivial.
85. The word Vermögen is an extremely loose term in cameralistic usage. We shall have to call
attention to it frequently. It may mean “wealth,” oftener it means wealth plus everything else, from
bodily strength to the arts and sciences and a strong army, which is a civic resource. The colorless term
“means” is therefore chosen as a rendering.
86. It should be observed that while Seckendorff probably thought he was thus defining freedom, from
our angle of vision he was simply drawing the outlines of quasi-absolutism. The ruler was relatively
free to deride for himself whether and in what particulars he would respect these limitations, and what
specific actions respect for them demanded. The subjects were not free to hold him strictly responsible
to the law, or to take part in making new laws. They were thus at the mercy of the caprice of the prince
to such an extent that their ancient liberties might at any moment virtually be nullified.
87. A general description of a Landtag follows (pp. 77 ff.). The whole discussion is typical of a state
of things already referred to, and to be emphasized later, viz., that during the cameralistic period there
was growing definiteness of opinion about the things wanted of governments. Very little appears in
the writings of the cameralists to show that their eyes were opening to the need of some reinforcement
of these wants beyond the irresponsible will of the rulers. In other words, the cameralists formulated
governmental standards which involved more and more consideration of the wants of the people. They
do not come out into the open with any theories of effective sanctions for these popular demands.
88. The context elaborates the proposition by making it equivalent to a demand that the prince shall
know all that is in the programme of the cameralists—a naive way of reiterating the supreme
importance of cameralism! The astonishing thing, to the modern mind, in the elaboration of this
theorem is that its tone is that which we might expect in a tutor toward a prince in his early teens. One
wonders whether the author was really addressing rulers, or was actually attempting to make the
reading public believe that his picture of what a prince ought to be was a correct likeness of rulers as
they were. One wonders too whether the theorems about the selection of the servants of the prince (pp.
89–92) could have been intended as exhortations. They are so axiomatic that no one at all acquainted
with government could be expected to express any other views for public consumption. The fact that
they were usually disregarded at will by the quasi-absolute rulers was a large part of the social logic
which ultimately abolished absolutism.
89. The use of the word Balbierer tells its own story of the degree ot differentiation which the
professions had then attained.
90. The section suggests a curiously unassorted mixture of physical and moral devices, from
compulsion of each industrial class to stick to its traditional occupations, to moral discipline of
apprentices and artisans.
91. Vide the corresponding passage in Staatswissenschaft, i.e., pp. 122–32.92. The title-page reads: Herrn Veit Ludwig’s von Seckendorff Christen-Stat. In Drey Bütcher
abgetheilet. Im Ersten wird von dem Chris-tenthum an sich selbst, und dessen Behauptung, wider die
Atheisten und dergleichen Leute; Im Anderen von der Verbesserung des Weltlichen, und Im Dritten
des Geistlichen Standes, nach dem Zweck des Christen-thums gehandelt. Darbey unterschiedliche
merckliche Stellen, aus alten und neuen Autoribus, in besonderen Additionen zur Bekräftigung und
Nachdencken angehängt zu befinden. Leipzig, verlegts. Joh. Friedrich Gleditsch. M.DC.XCIII. This
second edition (first dated April 18, 1685) is the only one that I have seen. It is apparently a reprint
of the first, without change. Nothing appears in it to show whether it was given to the printer by the
author, or by an editor after his death. The body of the book, after a dedication, preface, etc..
occupying 38 pages, consists of 719 pages. The Additiones and Index occupy 570 pages.
93. The reasons are obvious from the title, viz., Das Erste Buck, Von dem Chrislenthum an sich selbst,
wie es wider die Atheisten, Deisten und Heuchler, durch äusserliche Gründe zu behaupten, und
worinnen es ingemein bestehe. Of course this whole theological background must have its full
reckoning in a calculus of the various social factors of the period. It must be kept in mind as the
ultimate sanction to which the principles of statecraft were referred by the cameralists in Lutheran
states, as a parallel sanction was appealed to in states which adopted other confessions. We simply
cannot consider it here in detail.
94. Among the curiosities of this chapter is an argument for the existence of God based on an ad
hominem appeal to the current belief in the existence of ghosts. “Whosoever admits the existence of
spirits, must also admit God as the supreme and highest spirit.” The plausibility of the argument was
also derived in part from the double meaning of the word Geist.
95. Das Andere Buch, Von der Verbesserung der Stände nach dem Grund des Christenthums und
dessen Haupt-Zwecks, nemlich der wahren und ewigen Glückseligkeit, insonderheit aber von
Verbesserung des Haus-Standes, wie auch des weltlichen Regiments.
96. “Den Geistlichen, Weltlichen und Haus-Stand.” The problem which the word “Stand” in this sense
always presents to the English translator is only partially solved by the rendering “stratum.”
97. I.e., from “des Heil Römischen Reichs Reuter-Bestallung, Anno 1570" (p. 331).
98. Seckendorff’s Vier und vierzig Teutsche Reden, and Politische und moralische Discurse über
dreyhundert auserlesene lehrreiche Sprtiche des Lucani, I have not been able to obtain.
99. Vide Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, pp. 9, 27, 32, 65, et passim.
100. Vide Oppenheim, in All. d. Bib., in loc.; vide Roscher, pp. 270 ff.
101.  Vide Discurs, p. 38, 11. 23, 24.
102. “Kluger Hausvater, verständige Hausmutter, vollkommener Land-Medicus, wie auch erfahrener
Ross- und Vieharzi.”
103. D. Johann Joachim Berbers von Speyer, Rom. Käyserl. Majestät Commercien-Raths Politische
Discurs von den eigentlichen Ursachen des Auff- und Abnehmens der Städt Länder und Republicken.
“In specie: Wie ein Land Volckreich und Nahrhafft zu machen, und in eine rechte Societatem civilem
zu bringen. Auch wird von dem Bauren- Handwercks-und Kauffmanns-Standt derer Handel und
Wandel, Item, von dem Monopolio, Polypolio und Propolio, von allgemeinen Land-Magazinen,
Niederlagen, Kauff-Häusern, Montibus Pietatis, Zucht- und Werck-Häusern, Wechselbäncken und
dergleichen ausführlich gehandelt. Dritte Edition, mit vier Theilen vermehret, worinnen viel nützliche,
wichtige und curiose Sachen begriffen. Franckfurt. .... M.DC.LX–XXVIII.” I have used only this third
edition. The first is dated 1668.
104. As a sample of judgments passed upon Becher in less critical scien-tific periods than ours, we
may cite estimates quoted by Roscher from Zincke’s Leipziger Sammlungen (1758). Becher is spoken
of as “the first reformer of German systems of artisanship, manufacture, trade, Polizei, and finance.”
Of the Diacurs, the same author says: “almost to the present time the only fundamental book whichcan be used in a certain degree as introduction to Stadtwirthschaft and its Policei system” (Roscher,
p. 435).
105. Reasons for this rendering will be assigned in connection with Justi’s employment of the same
phrase.
106. It would be unkind to ask Socratic questions of this wisdom. Why not let such simplicity alone
and not invent the historical fiction that it is to be understood as political economy!
107. The parallel should be noted, for further use in other connections, between the argument from
succession in the case of monarchy and the similar argument today in the case of property. The first
stand taken today against possible modification of our institutions of inheritance is on essentially the
same ground as that chosen by the defenders of monarchy of the “benevolent despot” type. Is the
ground more tenable in the one case than in the other?
108. For further expansion of this theme, Becher refers to his tract, Bilanx humanae felicitatis et
infelicitatis.
109. That is, neighboring governments.
110. Becher applies the term to the type in the industrial system of the time which combined the
processes of the modern manufacturer and jobber. They not only kept large stocks of goods, but they
furnished capital to those who produced the goods (p. 103).
111. Op. cit., p. 290.
112. Vide the chapter on Schröder, for more explicit development of essentially the same view.
113. Roscher adds the note: “If we compare these rules with the still very unsystematic mercantilism
of a Bornitz, a Besold, and a Klock, who were already acquainted with the great Italian mercantilists
Botero and Serra, we get an idea of the meaning of the practical impulse which Colbert also gave to
the theory.”
114. The title-page of the first edition of Schröder’s chief work does not contain the author’s name.
It reads: Fürstliche Schatz- und Rent-Cammer, ad Augustissimum & Invictissimum Imperatorem
Leopoldum I. Principem Triumphantem. Cum speciali Privilegio Sacr. Caes. Majest., .... 1686. Unless
otherwise specified, the references are to this edition. I have also used the edition of 1744.
115. All. d. Bib., in loc.
116. Vide pp. 552–69 of 1st ed., Fürst. Schatz- und Rent-Cammer.
117. Under this sub-title Schröder quotes I Sam. 7:11–19 as a divine code defining princely
prerogative in general. The Lutheran rendering is even more drastic than the King James version in
the text. For example, we cannot fail to trace an effect of the Zeitgeist upon Luther in the gloss which
he forces upon the passage, thus turning the episode from its historical meaning, by translating the first
sentence: “Das wird des Königs Recht sein, der über euch herrschen wird.” In the quotation above,
the King James version is adapted to the same liberties which Schroder takes with the Lutheran text.
118. It is characteristic of this exegetical method that it had no compunctions about falsifying the very
evidence on which it relied. Whatever the bearing of the episode referred to, on its face it lends more
countenance to the social compact conception than to Schröder’s interpretation. It pictures the people
as taking the initiative in demanding a king, and God as reluctantly acquiescing. Schroder not only
expurgates this part of the record, in his original statement, but in this clinching passage he omits the
clause “which ye shall have chosen you,” which would be a sufficient ad hominem argument to refute
his main contention.
119. I refer to the edition of 1744. The Vorrede does not appear in the first edition. It purports to have
been written by the author of the body of the book, and the fact that it did not appear in the original
edition is the only reason I have for suggesting that there is a possible question of authorship. The
internal evidence leaves little room for doubt that Schröder was the writer.120. I do not mean that no betrayals of views pointing to reconsideration of political philosophy are
to be found in the cameralistic books. Instances of contrary impulses, if not insights, may be found
between the lines of almost every one of them. So far as they were willing to state their basic
presumptions, however, the cameralists all adhered to substantially the view above indicated.
121. Again by changing the tense from future to past Schröder alters the text just enough to make it
suit his purpose better than the actual language (Ps. 2:8).
122. Although this is a literal rendering, the last sentence must be understood as referring to the
alternatives presented above, and it means “he cannot rely upon mobilizing the good will of his
subjects whenever occasion demands, but must have a regular system of revenue.”
123. E.g., Sonnenfels.
124. The discussion then passes to certain political considerations which should govern the policy of
states with respect to promotion of specific kinds of cultivation. The necessary methods of promoting
trade, and the value of the same as a source of “surplus” are discussed in chaps. lxxi–lxxix, and the
subject of manufactures as means of procuring a “surplus” is treated in chaps. lxxxviii–cv.
125. I confess that I am unable to offer a plausible explanation of this passage, beyond the observation
that it is too summary and too detached from the rest of the author’s argument to reveal his full
meaning. On the whole, I classify it as a vagrant conceit which the author did not regard as within the
scope of practical politics. From the absolutistic point of view, it was a counsel of perfection; a vision
of the absolutistic regime so realized that the prince would be a corporation sole, both politically and
industrially, while the subjects would have legal existence merely as his agents. The passage, however,
has the effect of a mere fugitive suggestion, without significance enough of any sort to affect our
estimate of the author’s general purpose.
126. I.e., not of money but of other useful articles.
127. Not necessarily in the invidious sense.
128. Including not merely gamblers but purveyors of amusement, etc.
129. These schedules are reduced to a conspectus which is numbered as chap. xii, and appears as an
insert in the edition of 1744. The insert has been removed from the copy of the original edition which
I have used. The table is a complete answer to the irresponsible charge that Schröder ignored the
extractive industries as a source of wealth. It should have estopped Seckendorff’s denunciation (vide
above, p. 135). If Seckendorff’s master, Ernst the Pious, was not an extortioner and a villain in using
this schedule for fiscal purposes, surely Schröder cannot be condemned for making it his point of
departure in attempting to outline a more; equitable system. Thomasius recorded a fairly judicial
estimate of Schröder, in the Testament, p. 152, n. 76.
130.  Fürstliche Macht-Kunst, Oder Unerschöpfliche Gold-Grube, Wordurch ein Fürst sich kan
mächtig und seine Unterthanen reich machen. Durch einen in vielen Wisscnschafften Erfahrnen
Vornehmen Cavallier entworffen, und mit dessen Gutbefinden heraus gegeben Von Heinrich Boden,
Königl. Preussis. Rath im Hcrtzogthum Magdeb. und Prof. Jur. in Halle, Editio III. The editor’s
preface is dated Halle, July 3, 1702.
131. The third edition, which I have used, is not dated. It appears to be identical with the original.
132. For example, vide Thomasius on Klenck, Testament, pp. 99 ff., n. 41.
133. Roscher seldom packs as much into a few words as in his estimate: “In der Hauptsache ist
Marperger als ein Verwässerer des von ihm bewunderten Becher zu charakterisiren. Ein entsetzlicher
Vielschreiber, der z. B. in seinem Ersten Hundert gelehrter Kaufleute (1717) 35 Bücher aufzahlt, die
er seit 1698 herausgegeben, und noch 71 andere, zum Druck bereite Schriften.” (Vide Roscher, p.
301.)
134. Von Verbesserung Land und Leuten, und wie ein Regent seine Macht und Ansehen erheben
könne (1708).135. Roscher refers to him (p. 379) as “Der kurländische Hofrath und Cabinelsdirector.” His- book
is entitled Aufrichiiger Vorschlag: von Glücklicher: vortheilhaftiger: beständiger Einrichlung der
Intraden: und Einkünftten; der Souverainen: und ihrer Unterthanen; In welchen: Von Policey- und
Cammer-Negocien und Steuer Sachen: gehandelt wird. Entworffen Von dem Hochfürstlich-
Curländischem Hoff-Rath, und Cabinets-Directeur, Theodor Ludwig Lau .... 1719.
136. Practische Vorschläge, Welcher gestalt Steuer und respective Contribution zum Nutzen Eines
Landes-Herren, und ohne Nachtheil der Unterthanen einzurichlen seye, Damit unter allen
steuerbaren und Con-tribuablen Dingen eine proportionate Gleichheit, Nach Anleitung der Reichs-
Abschiede, gehalten, und kein Unterthan vor dem andern graviret werde, Auch, wie alle
Unterschleiffe und viele Kosten vermieden, Und der Steuer- und respective Contributions-Stock in
beständiger Richtigkeit erhalten werden kan, Ausführlich projectirt und tum Druck befördert. Im Jahr
1721.
137. Kurtzer Begriff von einer unbeträglichen Fürstlichen Machtkunst (1711); vide Roscher, p. 377.
138. Einleitung zur wahren Staatsklugheit (posth., 1751); vide Roscher, loc. cit.
139. “Der Leipziger Professor der Oekonomie, Polizei und Cameral-wissenschaft.” Hauptwerk:
Abhandlung von Cammergütern und Einkünften, deren Verpachtung und Administration (1743); vide
Roscher, loc. cit.
140. Politische Anmerkungen über die wahre und falsche Staatskunst, worin aus den Geschichten
aller Zeit bemerket wird, was einem Lande zutrdälich oder schädlich sei (Latin, 1718; German, 1735);
vide Roscher, p. 380.
141. D. Ephraim Gerhards “Einleitung zur Staats-Lehre,” Nebst ange-hengten Discurs von des Herrn
von Seckendorf Politischen Schriflen. .... 1713.
142. Op. cit., p. 238.
143. In his preface to Stisser’s Eirdeitung, Zincke throws light on Gerhard’s influence by the remark
that Stisser “sich nebst denen berühmten Männern, Herrmarms, Stollens, Dithmars, Struvens,
Kressens, Wild-vogels und Schröders, sonderlich des Unterrichts-Hausses und Tisches des Herrn D.
Gerhards .... bediente, unter dessen Vorsiz er auch, 1711, eine Dissert, de crimine Lenocinii schrieb
und vertheidigte.”
144. This schedule suggests the conceptions which Adam Smith appropriated from the philosophy in
which he was trained. Vide Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith (Bohn
ed., p. xvii). Vide Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, p. 32 et passim.
145. “The Coming Slavery,” in Appleton’s edition of Social Statics; The Man versus the State (1892),
p. 312.
146. “Wohlseyn des Staates.” Comments on this and related phrases will be reserved until we reach
Justi.
147. Thereupon he quotes with approval “D. Leib, in seinen vier Proben.”
148. In All. d. Bib., in loc.
149. In comparison with this account, it is surprising that Roscher did not probe beyond the misleading
contents of the note (p. 178): “Er lebte unvermählt, mit viel Büchern, Correspondenz und Reisen, als
Domherr zu Merseberg.” For our interests, Rohr’s life ended before this appointment.
150. Zedler, Universallexicon, in loc. Chief among these were: (1) Compendieuse
Haushaltungsbihliothek  (1716; 2. Ausg., 1726; 3. Ausg., 1755); (2) Physikalische Bibliothek (1724;
2. Aufl., 1754); Rohr projected a Mathematische Bibliothek, “since these three sciences are united by
an inseparable bond;” (3) Einleitung zur Staatsklugheit (1718); (4) Einleitung zur Ceremonial-
Wissenschaft der Privatpersonen (1728); (5) Einleitung zur Ceremonial-Wissenschaft der grossen
Herrn (1729); (6) Obersächsisches Hauswirthschaftsbuch (1722); (7) Haushaltungsrecht (1732,
1734; 2 Bande; 2. Aufl., 1738).151. Julius Bernhards von Rohr, Merseb. Domherrn und Land-Cammerraths Haushaltungs Bibliothek
worinnen die vornehmsten Schriften, die zur Haushaltungskunst gehören, angezeiget werden. Dritte
und viel vermehrte Auflage, 1755. I have not seen a copy of the original edition of 1716.
152. This passage is one of the clearest reflections of the meanings attached at this time to variations
of the term Oeconomie. It meant plain vulgar thrift, and then the beginnings of systematic thinking
about thrift.
153. We shall return to this point in connection with later writers.
154. This last proposition is notable because, although it seems to be a platitude, it expresses the
common-sense which became one of the working premises of nearly all the later cameralists.
155. Julii Bernhards von Rohr Einleitung zur Staats-Klugheit, oder: Vorstellung Wie Christliche und
weise Regenten zur Beförderung ihrer eigenen und ihres Landes Glüekseeligkeit Ihre Unterthanen
zu beherrschen pflegen. Mit Königl. Pohln, und Clurfl. Sächss. allergn. Privilegio. Leipzig, 1718. In
his Vorrede, Rohr speaks of a previous book, Einleitung zur Klugheit zu leben, darinnen ich jungen
Leuten einige Regeln der Privat-Klugheit beybringen wollen. The author refers to the present volume
as a companion book, designed for the use of beginners in the study of Staats-Klugheit. He says that
the book is quite different from Seckendorff’s Teutschen Fürsten-Staate, which had been “up to that
time much read by the Germans, and to good advantage.” Rohr makes this difference consist first, in
describing not only what Christian princes have done in the way of wise and just administration, but
also what they might well cease to do; and second, Rohr says that Seckendorff composed his book
more as a moral than as a political treatise; that is, he showed what a ruler would do in pursuance of
civic law, if he acted in accordance with his conscience and his duty to God, and his obligations to
his country, but he did not show the means by which the tasks of government are to be carried out in
detail. Rohr claims also that his book treats of many subjects which Seckendorff neglected. At the
same time he concedes to Seckendorff’s works a rank above his own. He explains also that he has had
the Evangelical Lutheran states chiefly in mind, because in the Catholic states the doctrines of Staats-
Klugheit are concerned with somewhat different objects, and rest upon quite different principles.
Besides Seckendorff, Rohr says that he has used particularly Srhröder, Leib, Marperger, “the learned
and eminent authors of the Unschuldigen Nachrichten,” Herr D. Döhler, Hr. Höm.
156. The copy of the Einleitung which I have studied was borrowed from the Royal Library at Berlin.
While it is much discolored by age, it shows no signs of use. Indeed many of the leaves had evidently
never been separated since they left the bindery, and a considerable number, including one containing
a part of the Table of Contents, were uncut!
157. Klugheit zu lehen.
158. At this point the author appeals to the second chapter of Schröder’s Fürstliche Schatz- und Renth-
Cammer.
159. At this point appeal is made to Morhoff, “in dem 3. Buche des III. Tomi seines Polyhistoris;” and
to “der berühmte Professor zu Franckfurt, Johann Christoph Beckmann, in dem §10. des X. Capitels
seiner Polit. Parall.”
160. “Herrn Job. George Döhler in seiner Untersuchung des heut-zu-Tage überhand nehmenden Geld-
und Nahrungs-Mangels.”
161. The author refers for further considerations on the subject to the first chapter of his
Haushaltungs-Bibliothek.
162. Obrecht has already furnished us a case in point.
163. Rohr cites Schröder, “Fürstliche Schatz- und Rent-Cammer, as holding the opposite view, viz.,
“a prince who has no money in his chest, but relies on the good will of his subjects and territories, is
walking on stilts.” Our review of Schröder, in which we have quoted the same words, shows that the
contradiction was not so direct as Rohr supposes. He had chiefly in mind one stage in the process,while Schroder put the emphasis at another point, relying however on the same ultimate resource.
164. After Schröder’s chap, xxx, no equally clear expression of this opinion is to be found in the
cameralistic writers previous to Rohr. If the language is carefully considered it will be seen that even
this brash assertion of Rohr cannot properly be construed as a generalization of the same logical order
as Adam Smith’s propositions about wealth. Rohr was evidently not probing beyond immediate
practical utility. He was not seeking for a philosophy of wealth, but for a basis of prudence in dealing
with the means necessary for practical wisdom. It would be as preposterous to make such a statement,
by a writer of Rohr’s type, the clue to the economic basis of cameralism, as it would be to take the
enthusiastic declaration of some interested politician, in the days of Dingley and McKinley, that a
protective tariff is the only way to create wealth, as the measure of the economic insight of Americans
in the present generation. As we have seen, Rohr was not an authority upon any technical or
philosophical subject. He is not to be taken as representing the cameralists, except in a relatively
remote way. Yet it is from such sources that the extreme forms of statement came which were
afterward charged, under the label “mercantilism,” to the responsible publicists of Germany for most
of the rest of the century.
165. Particularly on p. 278 of the first edition of Fürstl. Schatz- und Rent-Cammer. In the edition of
1744, which I have compared, the passage is on p. 181.
166. In the same connection Rohr remarks, “Es wäre zu wtlndschen, dass die Bergwercks-Lehren, die
der Herr Abraham von Schönberg in seiner Berg-information, Tit. von Berg-Herren, s. 15, vortraget,
von allen Potentaten in würckliche Observanz gesetzt wttrden.” Except that Justi does not find
occasion to lay stress on the first of Schönberg’s six recommendations, viz., gratitude to God, if the
country has been blessed with gold and silver deposits, Justi developed his mining policy along the
lines of this predecessor.
167. The most complete survey up to date of the academic phase of cameralism is Stieda, Die
Nationalokonomie als Universitätswissenschaft, Leipzig, 1906. Within the period covered by the
present study, the cameralism even of the book-writers centered in the bureaus rather than in the
universities. The reverse became the case in the following period. Stieda (p. 9) credits Thomasius with
having been the first to read a course on national economy in a German university. Such judgments
do not impress me as at all reliable. In the first place, if we had syllabi of all the courses given at this
period, it would be difficult to gain a consensus about the way of drawing the line between those that
should be regarded as economic in the general sense of the time, and those that should not. In the
second place, judging from Thomasius’ notes on Osse, it seems to me altogether probable that
Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling (vide Stintzing, All. d. Bib., in loc.), although a pupil of Thomasius
in Naturrecht, may have been earlier and quite as distinguished as he in the economic field. Stieda
does not seem to have, run down the facts in this instance. Again, it is certain that Gerhard was
lecturing at Jena on economics, in the contemporary sense, as early as 1713. Gerhard’s name does not
appear in Stieda’s index. As a sign of the difficulty of obtaining the literature of cameralism, it is worth
noting that, in spite of his vantage ground at Leipzig, Stieda says he has been unable to see a copy of
Sincerus, Projekt der Oeconomie in Form einer Wissenschaft nebst einem unmassgeblichen Bedenken,
wie diese Wissenschaft, beydes in Theorie und Praxi, mil mehrerm Fleiss und Nutzen getrieben
werden könne, Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1660; he failed also to find a copy of Zincke, Progromm von
praclischen Collegiis juridico-politico-cameralibus, 1741–42; he appears to have found in one library
only (Leipziger Stadtbiblio-thek) the monograph of Justi (1734), Auf höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm.
Kaiserl. und zu Ungarn und Böhmen Königl. Majestät erstattetes aller-untertänigstes Gutachten von
dem vernünftigen Zusammenhange und praktischen Vortrage aller Oekonomischen u.
Kameralwisnenschaften;  he found no copy of John Christian Forster, Einleitung in die Cameral-
Policey- und Finanz-Wissenschaft, 1779 (?); etc. Although I have failed to get access to certain of the
cameralistic books, my examination of previous accounts of them leads me to the belief that on thewhole they have never been subjected to a more conscientious examination than in this study. At least,
I have expressed no judgment as my own upon books which I have not carefully analyzed. There are
good reasons for doubting whether even Roscher could have said as much. I venture to hope that this
necessarily incomplete survey will provoke German scholars to attempt a completely objective
restoration of the cameralistic writers.
168. All. d. Bib., in loc.
169. Simon Peter Gassers, JCti, Einleitung zu den Oeconomischen Politischen und Cameral
Wissenschaften, Worinnen für dieses mal die Oeconomico-Cameralia Von den Domainen- oder
Cammer- auch andern Gütern, deren Administration und Anschlägen, so wol des Ackerbaites als
anderer Pertinentien halber, samt den Regalien angezeiget und erläutert werden. Nebst einem
Vorbericht Von der Fundation der neuen oecono-mischen Profession, und der Allerdurchlauchligsten
Stifters eigentlichen allergnädigsten Absicht, Halle; In Verlegung des Wäysenhauses, MDCCXXIX
(pp. 347 ff.).
170. “Blosse Juristerey oder wol gar Advocaten-Streicken.”
171. He retained his legal professorship, and his economic teaching occupied only a portion of his
time.
172. Inasmuch as he presently acknowledges Seckendorff as a pioneer to whom he is greatly indebted,
it seems necessary to connect this remark particularly with the special sort of material to which
Gasser’s book is devoted. This conclusion carries with it a judgment as to the sense in which Gasser
used all variations of the term oeconomisch.
173. Cautele der Rechts-Gelahrtheit, cap. 17, §1.
174. In further explanation of the royal purpose in establishing the professorship at Halle to improve
the situation thus indicated, Gasser inserts abstracts from the official correspondence leading to his
appointment. The most significant expressions are these: “Es haben Seine Königliche Majest. in
Preussen .... resolviret auf beyden Universitäten, Halle und Franckfurth, Professores Oeconomiae
bestellen zu lassen, welche denen Studiosis die principia der Land-Wirthschaft, wie auch der Policey,
ingleichen die Einrichtung der Anschläge von Aemtern und Gütern, nicht weniger guter Verfass- und
Regulirung der Städte beybringen sollen.” Further, in the final rescript: “Friederich Wilhelm, Konig,
Demnach Wie aus hochst eigener Bewegung allergnädigst resolviret, dass auf der dortigen Universität
die  cameralia oeconomica und Policey-Sachen gleichergestalt, wie die übrige Studia und
Wissenschaften, dociret werden sollen, .... dam it die studirende Jugend in Zeiten, und ehe sie zu
Bedienungen employret werden, einen guten Grund in obge-dachten Wissenschaften erlangen mögen,
etc., etc. .... Berlin den 24. Julii 1727.” Gasser also refers to a monograph by the prorector of the
University of Halle, von Ludewig.
175. Fürst. Schatz- und Rent-Cammer.
176. Die, von Sr. Königlichen Majestät, unserm allergnädigsten Könige, auf Dero Universität Halle,
am 14 Juli 1727, Neu angerichtete Profession, in Oeconomie, Policey, und Cammer-Sachen wird,
nebst Vorstellung einiger Stücke verbesserter Kon. Preussl. Policey, bekannt gemachet von dem
zeitigent Prorectore, Joh. Peter von Ludewig, Ict. Universitäts-Cantzlern. .... 1727.
177. It is impossible to decide from the context whether Ludewig clearly chose between the subjective
and the objective force of his genitive: i.e., whether his thought was “on the part of the subjects” or
“over the subjects.” From the succeeding discussion it appears that the two aspects of the case were
hardly differentiated in his mind, although the emphasis falls heavily on management by the ruler.
178. In the two following sections (49, 50) Ludewig discusses the need of more exact terms, and
especially the possible substitution of the term Wirthschaft or Haushalterschaft for Oeconomie. The
remainder of the essay repays careful analysis as an index of the author’s knowledge about the
bibliography of the subject. He depends chiefly upon Seckendorff and Rohr, both for generalconceptions of the sciences with which the new professorship is to deal and for clues to other writers.
He is sufficiently explicit that the men who understand Wirthschaft, as distinguished from the
commentators upon Aristotle, have ignored controversies about mere words and names, and have
written some good books about all kinds of practical management.
179. This is merely Roscher’s surmise. I have ventured to locate the differences between them a little
farther back.
180. The former is implied, not quite precisely, in the title-page; the latter is in chap, ii, in the
subdivision of rural and town economy in building.
181. All. d. Bib., in loc.
182. Einleitung, i. Abth., §10.
183. Hn. Just. Christoph Dithmars, des Natur und Völkerrechts, wie auch der Geschichte und
öconomischen Wissenschaften vormahligen offent-lichen Lehrers und der königl. preussischen
Academie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin Mitgleides, Einleitung in die Sconomischen, Policey- und
cameral-Wissenschaften. Nebst Vertseichniss eines zu solchen Wissenschaften dienlichen
Büchervorrathes und ausführlichem Register. Mit neuen Anmerkungen um Gebrauch öconomischer
Vorlesungen vermehret und verbessert van D. Daniel Gottfried Schreber. Fünfte Ausgabe. .... 1755.
With bibliography and index, pp. 328. According to Inama (op. cit.) editions of this book were
published in 1731, 1740, 1745, 1748, 1755, and 1768. The author’s preface to the first edition was
dated “16. Nov. 1731.” I have used only this fifth edition, whose preface is dated Halle, September
24, 1755. Of Schreber, the editor, Roscher says: “. . . . the Leipzig Professor of Oeconomie, Polizei-
und Cameral-wissenschaft (1708–77), whose botanical knowledge was valued by Linnaeus, and who
showed historical sense in his chief work: Abhandlung von Cammergütern und Einkünften, deren
Verpachtung und Administration (1743, II. Aufl., 1754).”
184. Of G. A. Hoffman, Roscher says (p. 436): “His Klugheit Haus zu halten oder Prudentia
oeconomica vulgaris (IV, 1730–49) purports to treat systematically all Wirthschaftslehre. It pays
attention more, however, to the physico-chemical than to the police aspects.” I have not seen this work,
and it does not seem possible that Schreber could have seen the first edition of Justi’s
Staatswirthschaft.  which was published the same year this preface was written. Of Stisser I shall speak
below. I do not think it probable that Schreber referred to Johann Adolph Hoffman, whose book,
Politische Anmerkungen über die wahre und falsche Staatskunst, was published in Latin in 1718, and
a German version by the author in 1725. (Vide Roscher, p. 380.)
185. After explaining that he put before his students all the writers on the subjects in question, he adds:
“Sodann lege ich bey denen Theilen wo practische Ausarbeitungen zur Erläuterung nöthig sind, nach
vor-ausgeschickten Grundsätzen, meinen Zuhörern theils selbst entworfene Muster, theils Auszüge aus
ergangenen cameral-Acten, Amtsbücher, Manuale und Rechnungen, Anschläge, Steuercatastra,
Cammer-Etats, tabellarische Stadt- und Landbeschreibungen, Commercientabellen, Kaufmannsbücher
und dergleichen Schemata vor die Augen, wobey sie zugleich, wie Tabellen ordentlich zu verfertigen
sind, angeführet werden, wovon ich den Nutzen bey meinen ehemaligen Expeditionen einzusehen
Geiegenheit genug gehabt, etc.”
186. The reference may have been to Darjes, or Justi.
187. But the suffix Kunst was used with great freedom not only by Dithmar in the formula above
quoted but by a long line of successors.
188. In a note Dithmar gives the earliest explanation of the origin of the term which I have found in
the textbooks, viz., “The science has its names from the word Camera, by which, according to the
idiom of the Middle Ages, the place was designated in which the revenues of the reigning prince were
guarded.” He refers to “du Fresne, glos. v. camera.”189. On the use of Dithmar’s book as a text by Ickstatt, at Ingolstadt, 1746, vide Stieda, op. cit., p.
241; also by Thorn in Giessen, 1757, ibid., p. 153.
190. I say this in spite of the fact that there had been many confused lists of books.
191. A final estimate of Dithmar would have to consider his work as editor and largely as author of
the ten numbers of Oekonomische Fama, the first German cameralistic journal, 1729. As I have seen
none of these numbers, I must be content to refer to Roscher’s account of them (pp. 431, 432). In this
connection mention must be made of several men of whose relative merits as cameralistic writers I am
not prepared to judge. These are, first, Johann Hermann Fürstenau, 1688–1756, “intrusted with the
professorship  Oeconomiae  at the University of Rinteln (Gründliche Anleitung zu der
Haushaltungskunst und denen gehörigen fürnehmsten Schriften, Lemgo, 1736); second, Andreas
Berch, 1711–74, who was not in Germany, to be sure, but was professor of Oeconomie at Upsala (an
anonymous monograph, 1746, on Die Art durch die politische Arithmetik die Haushaltung der Länder
und Reiche zu erforschen, and, in 1747, Einleitung zur allgemeinen Haushaltung, Grundsätze der
Policey-Oekonomie- und Kameralwissenschaft, the latter translated into German, 1763, by the writer
about to be named); third, Daniel Gottfried Schreber, 1709–77, “the first to hold a professorship of
the economic sciences at Leipzig” (Abhandlung von Kammergütern und Einkünften, deren
Ver-pachtung und Administration, 1743, II. Aufl., 1754; Zwo Schriften von der Geschichte und
Nothwendigkeit der Kameralwissenschaften insofern sie als Universitätswissenschaft anzusehen sind:
Entwurf von einer zum Nutzen eines Slaats zu errichtenden Akademie der okonomischen
Wissen-schaften,  1763). I have been able to see none of the writings of these men. Stieda (vide Index)
adds important information, particularly about Schreber.
192. All. d. Bib., in loc.
193. Roscher has it “nearly six years” (p. 432).
194. Roscher, pp. 433 ff.
195. Grundriss einer Einleitung zu der Cameralwissenschaft, II Theile, 1748.
196. Anfangsgründe. The mere publishers’ description, “II, 17551" while technically correct, would
hardly have been allowed to stand as a sufficient index of the proportions of the work, if it had been
carefully examined. It is nominally in two parts, but each part consists of two considerable volumes.
The four volumes contain respectively pp. 806, 1218, 998, and 662 + Index 62.
197. Leipziger Sammlungen von wirthschaftlichen, Policey- Cammer-und Finanz- Sachen, of which
184 numbers appeared, 1742–67. As I have seen none of these numbers, I am obliged to depend upon
Roscher’s testimony with regard to them.
198. Op. cit., pp. 433–41.
199. Stieda, op. cit., pp. 25 ff. I cite this passage, first, because I have been unable to obtain the two
sources to which it refers; and, second, because it coincides with the judgment of Zincke which I had
formed from study of his more mature works.
200. Vide Stieda, op. cit., p. 13.
201. Vide Stieda, pp. 3, 4.
202. Friedrich Ulrich Stissers, Ehemahligen Fürstl. Braunschweig-Lünchurgl. Amtmanns und
nachherigen K. Pr. Krieges- und Domainen-Kalhs Einleitung zur Land-Wirthschaft und Policey der
Teutschen. Zum Unterricht in Oeconomie- Policey- und Cammer-Wesen eingerichtet. Nunmero aber
von neuen ubersehen, an vielen Orten verbessert, vermehret und brauchbarer auf Verlangen
gemachet, wie auch mit noch mehr His-torischen Nachrichten von denen Geschäften und Schriften,
auch mit einer neuen Vorrede versehen von D. Ceorg Heinrich Zincken, Hoch-fürstl.
Braunschweigischen würckl. Hof- und Cammer-Rath, Prof. Juris und Cameralium auf der Universität
Helmstadt und des Hochfürstl. Collegii Carolini in Braunschweig Curatore. .... 1746. (First edition,
1735.) Roscher (p. 376) erroneously dates this second edition 1748.203. “Krieges- und Domainen-Rath in der Pommerischen Cammer zu Stettin, mit einem Gehalt von
66 Rthl.” Zincke’s date for this transfer (1734) is obviously a misprint for 1737. Stisser died two years
later, at the age of fifty-one.
204. Zincke remarks in a note, “These have been presented best by Hr. Lic. Hofmann in his first book,
Klugheit Haus zu halten.” This is G. A. Hoffmann. The remainder of the title of the book is: oder
prudentia oeconomica vulgaris; 4 vols., 1730–49. Vide Roscher, p. 436.
205. The bibliography of this part of the subject, as cited by Zincke, is notable: viz., “(1) Das
Cheminizische Oeconomische Lexicon, new ed., Nürnberg, 1746; (2) Chommel Diction.
Oeconomique;  (3)  Das allge-meine Oeconomische Lexic., so vormahls schon bey Gleditschen in
Leipzig herausgekommen, an. 1744, aber von mir dem jezgen Editore dieser Einleitung, vermehret
und verbessert herausgegeben worden; (4) Savery, Lexic. de Commerce, ed. n.; (5) Das bey Heinsio
in Leipzig edirte Handels-Lexic. sub. Tit. Allgemeine Schatz-Cammer der Kaufmannschaff, in 4
Theilen und einem Supplem., ed. in fol., 1741; (6) Beiers, Allge-meines Handlungs- Kunst- Berg- und
Handwercks-Lexic., von D. Struben ed. in 4to, an. 1722; (7) Das in Berlin von einem Gliede der
Societal der Wissenschaften herausgekommene Real-Lexicon der Wissenschaften; (8) Das bey
Gleditschen herausgekommene Natur- Berg- Gewerck- und Handlungs-Lex.; (9) Minerophili
Berg-Wercks-Lexicon; (10) Mein D. Zinckens Manufactur- und Handwercks-Lexic., so jetzt unter der
Presse und von Fuchsen allhier ediret wird.”
206. In his Hausshaltungs-Bibliothek, ed. 1726, p. 129. Vide also Hrn. von Hohberg, Adlichen
Land-Wirthschafft (Zincke).
207. D. Georg Heinrich Zinckens, Herzogl. Braunsrhw. wirckl. Hof-und Cammer- Raths, etc.,
Cameralisten Bibliothek, Worinne nebst der Anleitung die Cameral-Wissenschaft zu lehren und zu
lernen, ein voll-ständiges Verzeichniss der Bücher und Schriften von der Land- und Stadt-Oeconomie,
dem Policey- Finanz und Cammer-Wesen zu finden, so theils kurz beurtheilet, theils umstandlich
vorgestellet worden. Der erste Theil, von der Oeconomie. .... 1751 (304 pages); “Zweyter Theil, von
der Policey-Wissenschaft, 1751.” (270 pages); “Dritter Theil, von der Cammer- und
Finanz-Wissenschaft. .... 1752" (354 pages); “Vierter und Letzter Theil. Nebst vollstandigem
gedoppelten Register über alle vier Theile. .... 1752" (210 pages). In addition, the authors’ index
occupies 58 pages, and the subject-index, 36 pages, besides four pages of errata.
208. For reasons already alluded to and which will appear more fully later, it is necessary to render
Mittel and Vermogen by the same term. We shall have little to do with the former term in the technical
sense which Zincke tries to impress upon it, while the latter figures very prominently in the theories
that follow. It is necessary to protect it against the unauthorized legal additions forced into it by the
rendering “property.”
209. It is impossible to choose a rendering of such terms which can be used consistently even in
translating single authors. They vary indefinitely in the usage of the writers in this group (§§10, 11).
210. One of the incidental questions which this study raises is as to the possible effect of this mere
phrase upon the suggestibility of actual rulers during the eighteenth century, The idea of the “readiest”
means undoubtedly carried with it the snap judgment of best means, and thus one of the impulses was
given to exaggeration in practice of the stimulus applied to trade as a producer of national revenue.
211. Zincke uses the French word fond, but in apposition with it the German words Quellen and
Grund. The sense is sometimes merely “source” in general; sometimes “fund” in a more special use,
and sometimes a close approach to the modern technical concept “capital.” Without representing the
unstable condition of Zincke’s ideas at this point, the term “source” will fairly translate the essential
thoughts in this connection.
212. In this particular passage the author approaches as close as the conceptions of his time would
permit to the plain formula, “Nature is the ultimate source of wealth.”213. But on p. 55 Zincke distinctly defines the word Oeconomie as meaning “die Wirthschaft selbst.”
Again, in the Anfangsgründe (I, p. 18), Zincke assigns to the first part of Cameral-Wissenschaft: “Die
Natur und Beschaffenheit aller Nahrungsgeschäfte insgemein, und besonders deutlich und gründlich
zu analysiren und einzusehen. Und diesen Theil nenne ich die gelehrte Oeconomic.”
214. Again attention must be called to the absurdity of the tradition voiced by von Mohl, in view of
this large body of literature on the extractive industries.
215. D. Georg Heinrich Zinckens Anfangsgründe der Cameralwissen-schaft, worinne dessen
Grundriss wetter ausgeführet und verbessert wird. Des Erst en Thetis, welcher so wohl die General
alt Special Land- und Stadtoconomic (sic) und Policeywissenschaft abhandelt. .... Des Zweyten Theils,
welche die eigentliche Finanz- und Cammerwissenschaft enthalt. .... Leipzig. .... 1755.
216. I, pp. 172 ff. Vide the nine rules on the relations of occupations to one another (I, 205); the four
fundamental rules for Policey (I, p. 266); etc. On the other hand, the schedule of 38 “police questions”
(I, p. 266) is in spirit and in detail quite typical of the best practical standards of the system.
217. Especially pp. xiii ff.
218. Kurtzer Abriss und wahres Ebenbild eines grossen Fursten und erhabenen Geistes. Worinnen
die allgemeinen Grundlekren der gesunden Staatskunst in natürlicher Ordnung abgehandelt, und mit
den neuesten Exempeln der Europäischen Geschichte erläulert seyn. Nebst einigen Anmerkungen
über die Lehrsätze Machiavels von der Regierungskunst eines Fursten, verfasset und entworfen von
Christian Friedrich Kottencamp, Audileur bey dem Königl. Preussis. hochlöbl. Wallravischen
Pionnier-Regimente. . . . 1747.
219. His subtitles are: “I. Von den verschiedenen Gattungen, und der Gemüths-Art der Fürsten;” “II.
Von der verschiedenen Fähigkeit und Arten des Verstandes regierender Fürsten;” “III. Von der
Gerechtig-keit, wie, auf welche weise, und wie weit souveraine Fursten solche gegen ihre Nachbaren
und Unterthanen beobachten müssen;” “IV. Wie ein Fürst seinen Staat erhalten und gross werden
könne;” “V. Von dem Staatsinteresse, und der Verbindlichkeit der Fürsten in Betracht des-selben;”
“VI. Von dem Glücke, und dem Einflusse desselben in die Handlungen, und Staatsgeschafte der
Fürsten;” “VII. Ursachen, wodurch die Reiche und Staaten verfallen, und die Fürstenlichen Häuser
zu Grunde gehen.”
220. E. g., p. 19. Still more distinctly, p. 44, “Das wahre Staats-interesse besteht in den Nutzen, ....
aber .... dieser Nutze .... könne von der Gerechtigkeit auf keine Weise getrennt werden.”
221. “Suche dich und deinen Staat zu erhalten, und deines Staats Beste xu beförden” (p. 19).
222. As I have been unable to secure copies of his books, this reference is wholly a quotation from
Roscher (p. 441).
223.  Die wahren Mittel zur Vergrosserung eines Staats, 1753. (166 pp.) This essay is dedicated to
Frederick II of Prussia. Der vergrösserte Staat, von Johann Albrecht Philippi, Königl. Preussischen
Auditeur Finckischen Regiments. .... 1759. (372 pp.) Dedicated to the Prince of Prussia.
224. Die wahren Mittel, chap. i.
225. Here and elsewhere Philippi cites von Loen as conclusive authority.
226. This part of the argument corroborates our generalization that the traditional accounts of this
mercantilist theory are largely fabulous. Vide p. 14. Philippi quotes with approval a remark attributed
to Pliny: “The more diversified crops a land has, the greater its happiness and wealth.”
227. 
1 I have used both a separately bound copy of the first, and a copy in the same covers with the
second. It should be added, however, that the binding, though not very recent, is apparently of a much
later date than the publication.
228. Of his numerous writings (scheduled in Meusel’s Lexicon), we may name, in addition to the book
to be discussed below: Elementa metaphysica, 1743; Institutiones jurisprudentiae universalis, 1745;
Philosophische Nebenstunden, 1749–52; Erste Gründe der philosophischen Sittenlehre, 1750; Viaad Veritatem, 1758; Discurs üher Natur- und Völkerrecht, 1762; Einleitung in des Freyherrn von
Bielefeld Lehrbegriff der Staatsklugheit, 1764 (on J. F. von Bielfeld [sic] vide Roscher, pp. 426 ff.)
229. Vide Stieda, pp. 52 and 78.
230. Erste Gründe der Cameral-Wissenschaften, darinnen die Haupt-Theile so wohl der Oeconomie
als auch der Policey und besondern Cameral-Wissenschaft in ihrer natürlichen Verknüpfung, zum
Gebrauch seiner academiscken Fürlesung entworfen von Joachim Georg Darjes, Hoch-fürstl.
Sachsen- Weimar- und Eisenachischen Hof-Rathe, der Philosophie und beyder Rechten Doctor, wie
auch der Sitten-Lehre und Staats-Klugheit ordentlichen Professor zu Jena, des Senats der Churfürstl.
Maynz. Aka-demie nützlicher Wissenschaften ordentlichem Beysitzer, der Jenaischen Akademie z. d.
Z. Pro-Rector und der Philosophischen Facultät Decano. .... 1756. (Pp. 664, exclusive of the Index,
which fills 54 pages.)
231. All references in this chapter are to the first edition. I have not seen the second.
232. Rohr’s digest seems to have had an influence out of proportion to its author’s merit.
233. In expanding the argument, Darjes cites, “for the benefit of those who allow themselves to be
influenced more by celebrated men than by reasons, .... die vortrefliche Streitschrift . . . . de excolendo
studio oeconomico.” (By Rohr. Vide Roscher, p. 378.)
234. The substitution within a few lines of the term, “Haushaltungskunst” for “öconomische
Wissenschaft” is strictly typical. The clearest thinkers in the group did not get their objects of attention
so definitely related that such terms as these received a precise and invariable content.
235. “Wer in der Haushaltungskunst keine Wissenschaft besitzet.” However sane the fundamental
thinking of men who expressed themselves in such fashion, they were outside the threshold of
scientific precision, and without special evidence for each particular case, none of their propositions
are to be interpreted as carrying the same content which their terms would connote in later, more
critical, stages of social theory. If Richter meant to accuse Darjes of lack of precision in this sense,
there is surely no reason for treating him as exceptional. It was the fashion of the time.
236. Is “pragmatism” then a recent discovery!
237. The word is Wirth. Shall we translate it “economist”? If we do, we introduce an ambiguous
middle term which falsifies our whole subsequent interpretation of evolution in German theory. One
of the constant motives of this book is to set forth enough selections from the mass of evidence to
show that English assumptions about the history of German thought have almost completely failed to
take account of the actual process. In fact, the conception of the manager of economic relations was
much later than this, and with great difficulty differentiated from the conception of the generalizer of
economic operations. Consequently the arts of economic management, and the science of economic
relations were (also much later than this, and never with quite the same abstractness in Germany as
in England) set distinctly over against each other. Between the cameralistic period and the economic
period in the nineteenth-century sense, an evolutionary process intervened in which the center of
attention was shifted a long distance away from particular operations and details of results toward
correspondences of many operations, and formulas of relations between operations and results.
German experience before this process was matured has a value of its own, but we have misconceived
most of the value, because we have assumed it without proper reckoning with this evolution of purpose
by which it must be interpreted.
238. Darjes gives no hint of the writers whom he had in mind in this connection. The probability is
that they were French, for I have found in the earlier cameralists no direct attempt to define the use
of the term.
239. This distinction seems to have been assumed by all the cameralists more or less consciously. The
most definite previous formulation of it is in chap, vi.240. The importance of this argument can hardly be estimated unless it is connected with chap, cviii,
in Schröder’s Schatz- und Rent-Cammer. We must allow for the persistence in practice, to a certain
extent confusing theory, of the less mature idea of which Schroder was the spokesman.
241. Throughout this discussion, and in the same connection in other rameralists, there is ambiguity
in the words which I have translated “raise the revenue,” etc. The meaning is sometimes “increase the
revenue,” but it is not always clear to the writers themselves which they mean.
242. Substantially the same explanation is given more at length, with quotation from Xenophon’s
Athenian Republic, in Justi’s Grundfeste, I, 5.
243. The author promises to name, as occasion requires, books on the various subjects; but he refers
in general to Rohr’s Haushaltungs-Bibliothek and “Zink,” Cameral-Bibliothek.
244.  If the sources had been accessible, I should have added an estimate of Johann Jacob Moser as
an index of the spirit of cameralism. I have as yet no means of testing the reliability of Roscher’s
account (pp. 441 ff.).
245. F. Frensdorff, “Ueber das Leben und die Schriften des Natio-nalökonomen J. H. G. von Justi,”
Nachrickten von der Königl. Gesell-schaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische
Klasse, aus dem Jahre 1903. Göttingen, 1904. (Pp. 354–503.) It would be an unfortunate misdirection
of energy to enter upon examination of Justi’s career under the guidance of the previous accounts of
his life: e.g., the article in All. d. Bib.; Roscher’s essay, in Archiv für die Säich-sische Geschkte, 6ter
Bd., pp. 77 ff.; the digest of that essay, Gesch., pp. 444 ff., etc. My first loss of confidence in the
reliability of Roscher in matters of detail came from discovery of numerous inaccuracies in his
biography of Justi. These related to itemson which the text of the author’s works is final. Frensdorff
has used sources of other kinds, not accessible in this country. He has not only discovered Roscher’s
mistakes in cases of the type just referred to, but he has proved that previous biographical sketches of
Justi were largely fabulous. An earlier monograph by the same author should be consulted: Festschrift
zur Feier des hundert-fünfzigjährigen Bestehens der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
Göttingen. “Beiträge zur Gelehrtengeschichte Gottingens” (Berlin 1901), pp. 495 ff.
246. Auf höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. und zu Ungarn und Bohmen Königl. Majeslät
erstaltetei alleruntertänigstes Gutachten von dem vernunftigen Zusammtnhange und praktischen
Vortrage aller Oekonomischen und Kanteralwissenschaften .... von Herrn Hofrat u. Professor J. H.
G. edlen Herrn v. Justi. Herausgegeben von Dr. K. W., Leipzig, 1754. According to Stieda’s
description (p. 32) this document contains virtually the same programme afterward proposed in the
Preface of Staatswirthschaft. In the latter form it will be discussed below.
247. Staatswirthschaft, I, 119. It does not seem to me that Frensdorff has given due weight to this
evidence.
248. Grundriss einer guten Regierung, p. 324.
249. This estimate must be considerably qualified, especially as to the contrast of purpose between
Justi and his predecessors. I note my partial dissent, however, without further comment.
250.  Neue Wahrheiten zum Vortheil der Naturkunde und des gesell-schaftlichen Lebens der
Menschen. Vide Frensdorff, p. 391.
251. Frensdorff, p. 393.
252.  Roscher says “from 1761" (p. 444); but the Vorrede of Vol. I of the Grundfeste is dated “Berlin
den 25. April 1760;” of Vol. II, “Berlin, den 6. April 1761;” while the Vorrede of Natur und Wesen
der Staaten is subscribed, “Geschrieben zur Leipziger Michaelis-Messe 1759.”
253. Vide Frensdorff, pp. 449 ff.
254. Staatswirthschaft, I, xxiv.
255. Natur und Wesen der Staaten, pp. 176 ff.256. E. g., in the last paragraph of the Vorrede of the first edition of Grundsätze der
Policeywissenschaft.
257.  Vorrede to the “swoten Ausgabe” of the book just cited, 1759.
258. Johann Heinrich Gottlobs von Justi Staatswirthschaft, oder sys-tematische Abkandlung aller
Oekonomischen and Cameral-Wissenschaften, die zur Regierung eines Landes erfodert werden. In
zweien Theilen ausgefertigt. Erster Theil, Welcker die Lehre von Erhaltung und Ver-tnekrung des
Vermdgens des Staats, und mithin die Staatskunst, die Policey- und Commercien-Wissenschaft nebst
der Hauskaltungskunst in sich begreifft. Zweyte stark vermehrte Auflage. .... 1758.
The title-page of the second part of the book, bound in the same volume, is varied as follows: Zweyter
Theil, Welcher die Lehre von dem vernünftigen Gebrauche des Vermögens des Staates, und mitkin
die eigent-liche Cameral- oder Finanz-Wissenschaft in sick begreifft. Nebst einem vottständigen
Register über beyde Theile.
I have seen Professor E. R. A. Seligman’s copy of the same edition. It is bound in two volumes, but
the binding is evidently much later than that of the copy which I chiefly used.
259. Vide Index, title “Republic.” Justi applies the designation to the beginnings of civic society,
apparently making the origins of the institution of property and of “republics” simultaneous, if not
identical. With Justi, as with his predecessors, the word “republic” was a purely generic term of the
most general application to all sorts of civic societies in which the relations of meum and tuum had
begun to receive social sanction.
260. While Justi is literally correct about the foundation of cameralistic professorships, he overstates
the neglect of these subjects. They were treated more or less formally, oftener, however, on some other
than the cameralistic basis, by many men in Germany: e.g., Gerhard, as early as 1713 at Jena. For
further details vide Stieda.
261. He mentions Gasser and Dithmar again (Preface, p. xliii), where he also refers to “a new
cameralist.” On p. viii of the Preface to the second edition it appears that some reviewers had
compared the first edition unfavorably with Zincke’s Grundriss. Unless the latter writer was the “new
cameralist” referred to (and such a phrase would have been both inaccurate and insolent), I have no
surmise about the man intended. Justi takes up the matter again in the Preface of the second edition
of Grundiätze der Policeywissenschaft.
262. I give under protest this rendering to the phrase, “dem gemeinen Wesen.” It has no exact
equivalent in our idiom, and must certainly not be understood to carry the associations which we attach
to the expression that must serve us as translation.
263. Vide Spencer’s argument in The Study of Sociology.
264. This is one of the ambiguous terms which a literal translation would not fairly render.
265. The rest of the paragraph (p. xxxii) reads like a memorandum for Spencer’s The Sins of
Legislators.
266. I.e., every matriculant at the university.
267. Without trying to make too much of it, we may notice that he uses the art rather than the science
concept.
268. The undifferentiated conception of which the word was a symbol at that time cannot be indicated
by any English word now in use. The rendering “statecraft” does not quite correspond with Justi’s
idea, yet it would be more unfair to use the modern term “political science.” In the rough, Staatskunst
as Justi knew it, was the methods of keeping the civic machinery running and of assuring the ways and
means on which the machinery depended; including, however, much more management of private
affairs than Americans or Englishmen would admit into political science.
269. Vide Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, pp. 56, 107, 125, 148, 160, etc.
270. This passage contains a part of the reply which I would make to Frensdorff’s generalization.271. While this proposition suggests the remark which Herbert Spencer somewhere makes, to the
effect that “the problems of the state are merely the problems of the household enlarged and
extended,” the inferences drawn by the two men from the same generalization were quite
contradictory.
272. The “consequently” is obviously a term of reasoning in a circle. But why call attention to a spot
on the outside of this cup and platter, while the whole contents were a ragout of begged questions?
273. As an item of evidence bearing on the growth of the seminar method in German universities, sec.
xlii is worth consulting.
274. Secs, vi–ix of this preface contain curious circumstantial evidence about the author’s attitude
toward other writers, and about the sort of liberty which a commentator on political subjects might at
that time assume.
275. The syllabus is entitled: Kurzer systematischer Grundriss aller Oeconomischen und
Cameralwissenschaften.  It is reprinted in Justi’s Gesam. Pol. u. Finanzschriften, Vol. I, Abth. 2, pp.
504–73; and in Vol. II, Abth. 2, pp. 303–77. A note to §2 says: “I used this outline as the basis of my
lectures at Vienna, and it had to be submitted to the previous censorship of the ministry. Graf von
Haugwitz was so much pleased with it that he caused it to be circulated among all the members of the
General-direclorii.” This seems to settle the case with Roscher as to Justi’s academic activities at
Vienna.
Both in the essay referred to above (p. 286) and in the Geschichte (p. 444) Roscher says that
Staatswirlhschaft  was dedicated to Maria Theresia. Frensdorff (p. 385) assumes that such was the fact.
I have been unable to find a copy of the first edition, but have used the second (1758). My copy seems
to be in the original binding, but it contains no dedication whatever. The same is true of other copies
of the same edition on which I have obtained reports from libraries in this country. As the Preface to
the first edition was dated “Leipzig 11 April, 1755,” i.e., in the second year after Justi left Vienna, it
does not accord with the circumstances of his departure, so far as they are understood, to suppose that
he would have been in a state of mind to waste any veneration on the empress. Roscher seems to have
been in error about the dedication. It is possible that the original of the Grundriss may have been
dedicated to Maria Theresia, and that Roscher confused the syllabus with the expanded work.
After the foregoing was written I received the following from the library of the British Museum: “The
first ed. of Justi’s Staatswirthschaft (1755) is in B. M. and is dedicated to Maria Teresia. His Kurzer
systematischer Grundriss (1752 ?) is not in B. M.” This puts Roscher right; but it also shows that he
missed the significance of the omission in the second edition.
276. Zincke’s Cameralwissenschaft appeared the same year with Justi’s first edition. I fear he was a
cad to publish such a reflection three years later.
277. In Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, pp. 189 and 210, I have called attention to the strange
turn of affairs which led von Mohl to declare that political science had nothing to do with political
economy. This antithesis must be looked into later.
278. The unsteadiness of the conception in Justi’s mind is evident.
279. As we have pointed out before, this is today one of the most confident presumptions of industrial
monarchy.
280. I translate the phrase “gebrauchet und damit gewirthschaftet” in this clumsy way, to avoid
premature use of the technical concepts “consumption” and “production.”
281. In Grundriss einer guten Regierung, p. 65, Justi makes the constituents of happiness, “freedom,
internal strength, and security.”
282. A note qualifies the proposition by asserting that this must never go so far as the making of
apologies by one state to another.283. Justi has a long note on this subject in which he takes decidedly advanced ground against war
except for the most important reasons. Vide §56, p. 88, last sentence.
284. A note applies this proposition particularly to the Jesuits.
285. Again a note states that this has special reference to the Jesuits, and intimates that the author’s
teaching in this spirit in Vienna was one of the causes of his becoming persona non grata.
286. The qualifications which Justi adds would seem to the modern mind sufficient to nullify the
proposition itself.
287. Justi cites the French Parliament as an example of a wise arrangement of influence upon the ruler
in an unlimited monarchy, from the judicial department. He apparently had no suspicion of the verdict
which the Revolution was about to pass upon that same Parliament.
288. Justi speaks on this point as though he considered his opinion utterly impractical.
289. Again Justi, whether facetiously or as a mere excursus in academic utopianism it is impossible
to decide, suggests that it would be well to imitate the Chinese custom of docking the pay of officials
if they failed to apprehend robbers or murderers within six months of the crime.
290. It is obvious at a glance that this description is an unanalyzed compound which presently had to
be decomposed into the concepts, “wealth” and “capital.”
291. The item chiefly in Justi’s thought at this point is the custom of deposit in foreign banks, and the
antidote which he proposes is such a firmly established domestic bank system that a premium will be
put on keeping the funds at home.
292. The expression is “seine Beschaffenheit und Regierungsverfassung.” This seems to be one of the
rare cases in the cameralistic books of use of the term Verfassung very nearly in the modern sense.
293. The pious reflection is subjoined: “Nevertheless we must bow to the wise providence of God,
which perhaps in this way will make the most remote regions of the earth moral, reasonable, and
enlightened in religion.”
294. Certain fines and penalties for celibate men are suggested, and it is further hinted that instead of
requiring a payment to the government for permission to marry, a reward should be given for
marrying.
295. This paragraph is translated as literally as possible; the obscurity is in the original.
296. To those who imagine that commercial dishonesty is of recent growth, Justi’s note on types of
rascality which have to be counted on would furnish valuable information.
297. In such propositions as this, mercantilism seems to be less false than crude and unanalyzed.
298. Transliteration of the vague term Grund is probably the best way of indicating the altogether
immature character of the thought in this connection.
299. It is rather remarkable that Justi does not state in the same connection that gold and silver are
themselves essentially “wares” like any other.
300. In such propositions it appears that Justi’s generalization was even narrower than its usual form
would indicate. The problem was not even that of the type of state then regarded as permanent, but of
the author’s particular state.
301. Justi’s note on this section is a plea for governmental encouragement of inventors.
302. A considerable list follows of German resources for such supply.
303. The picture of unthrift and indifference which follows is an important piece of culture-historical
evidence. There is also a plea for industrial education which has a truly modern ring, and also
suggestions about stimuli to individual effort.
304. The reasons assigned for this rule make against protective tariffs, and all the consequences which
Justi suggests have been illustrated on an enormous scale in recent years. Justi adds that this last
principle had come to be recognized in practice at his time. He also remarks that “such privileges canhave no validity in themselves,” for it is presumed that they are to be allowed only in so far as they
make for the welfare of the state, and the successor to the throne can in no way be bound to continue
them. He recommends the formation of a special company for exploiting the mineral resources of the
country (p. 210).
305. In a note Justi goes into considerable detail about the sort of specifications that should be
prescribed.
306. This paragraph gives more evidence of economic insight than any that have preceded.
307. Justi testifies to scruples, which must have passed as altogether Utopian, about the grounds in
justice for exploiting the territories of weaker people.
308. Justi fortifies this opinion by citing the opposition in England to the great trading companies, and
he expresses the judgment that they had become more harmful than useful to the British Empire. On
the other hand he thinks it is not time for Holland to abolish the Dutch East India Company (p. 225)
309. Vide above, Propositions 115–18.
310. Justi cites the wisdom of countries which put premiums on exportation.
311. Justi’s illustration of harm to the book trade through taxation of paper might be quoted as
prophetic.
312. The author’s discriminations between degrees and types of dispensability are sociologically
interesting.
313. For its bearing on the content of Justi’s mercantilism, the note at this point is worth translating
in full, viz.: “There can be no doubt that a low rate of exchange is very harmful for a country, and there
are two chief circumstances which put the exchange of a country on a bad footing: (1) when it must
annually pay a large sum to other nations to settle the trade balance; (2) when its coinage is
depreciated. A land which finds itself in these bad conditions is in a sorry plight. Bad will go toward
worse through the workings of exchange. All in all the coinage today is in an unspeakably bad
condition. Under it twenty million people suffer extreme disadvantage, and only in the neighborhood
of fifty dealers in coin [Münzlieferanten] and fifty money-changers enrich themselves as leeches by
sucking the blood of their neighbors. In such a situation it would be a thousand times better that we
had no coinage at all, but simply settled our balances in gold and silver by weight” (p. 239).
314. Vide Prop. 156.
315. A naïve discussion follows in a note, as to whether the spirit of the Christian religion permits a
state to buy immunity from piracy of non-Christian powers; and the comforting conclusion is reached
that the Christian religion surely cannot oppose any arrangements which make for the real welfare of
the state (p. 243).
316. This doctrine goes back to Schröder, loc. cit., chap. lxv.
317. The idea here proves to be, not that mines should be operated if the net outcome is to be a loss,
but that mines at first unprofitable should be assisted until they can be made to pay.
318. This apparently means two German miles square, and Justi recommends that such a reservation
should be divided into four or five hundred parts, whether for separate operation or merely in dividing
the proceeds is not clear.
319. This paragraph is translated in full because it is a characteristic expression of mercantilism, and
contains its own evidence that the theory was not so definite as tradition has made it.
320. These sections are almost exclusively composed of rule-of-thumb conclusions about practical
details. They presuppose the essentially patriarchal conception of the state which we have called the
major premise of cameralism. The state being the housewifely patron saint of the people, specifications
of the supervision to be exerted depend on their efficiency in promoting the chief end of such a state.321. The Italics are mine, and the proposition is quoted for its bearing upon our interpretation of
Justi’s fundamental political conceptions.
322. The immediately following sections are a diversified homily on the fundamental virtue of
obedience, with extreme claims for the arbitrary rights of rulers (pp. 331–73).
323. Again the treatment is rather hortatory than scientific.
324. The third type of duty (vide Prop. 239c) is discussed in variations of commonplaces adapted to
the particular conception of the state on which cameralism was based (pp. 402–28). The following
division, “On the Indirect Duties of the Subject,” exploits the homely virtues of the thrifty type (pp.
429–35).
325. Apparently used in this paragraph as a synonym for the former term. In the following paragraph
this is certainly the case, i.e., Prop. 243.
326. Of the whole following division, which has certain necessary resemblances to political economy
as Adam Smith used the term, yet differs from it as kitchen work from chemistry, we may say that it
contains nothing beyond commonplace material which genius and humor like Benjamin Franklin’s
might have coined into pithy Poor Richard’s proverbs. Sufficient samples are given to show the
quality. It should be observed that the presence of this department in Staatswirthschaft again
demonstrates the absurdity of the traditional accounts of mercantilism as a theory.
327. This paragraph sufficiently accounts for choice of the vague term “means” instead of a more
technical term as a rendering for Vermögen. We should misinterpret egregiously if we smuggled a later
precise and constant concept into the word. Vide pp. 76 and 250.
328. It is needless to comment on this typically cameralistic inversion of essence and accident.
329. This programme results only in slight variations upon the generalities indicated by Props. 253–64.
Passing to treatment of occupations which are not necessarily peculiar to towns, Justi lapses into
extended pseudo- technical discussion of brewing, distilling, vinting, truck-gardening, and milling (pp.
505-17).
330. Then follows an academic version of the wisdom that every farmer’s boy is supposed to acquire
(pp. 526-606). This then is as deep as Justi goes into the theory of economics on the side of production
proper.
331. Vide II, 63, and Prop. 219.
332. Vide I, 19, and this book, pp. 76, 250, 367.
333. This proposition is typical of the vagueness of undigerentiated cameralistic ideas. The original
reads: “Alle Anordnungen der obersten Gewalt kommen also darauf an, doss sie van dem Vermögen
und den Kräften des Staates zu der Bewirkung der gemeinschaftlichen Glückseligkeit einen weisen
Gebrauch machet.” I attribute the thoroughly noncommittal force in this connection of the phrase
“komnten darauf an,” to an unreconciled antithesis of ideas. As it stands, the proposition distinctly
means neither, “The objective goodness or badness of the acts of a government is to be decided by its
use, etc.,” nor, “The intention of the government is to use, etc.” The former meaning would lead to a
corollary which is abhorrent to Justi (vide I, 47, above, pp. 325 ff.). The latter meaning is always the
reserve presumption on which lo rest the claim of the government to unquestioning submission. Yet,
so long as the latter claim maintained its orthodoxy, it was by smuggling into its assets some of the
credit which the former proposition would establish, while that proposition was not admitted at full
force. In other words, the stage of thinking represented by Justi was a dodging between affirmative and
negative answers to the question, Are governments absolute, and so unimpeachable, or are they
fallible, and consequently to stand or fall on the merits of their acts as determined by some objective
standard? The quasi-absolutism which Justi represented resorted, when hard pushed, to the affirmative.
Cromwellism and the French Revolution, and the American Declaration of Independence vindicated
the negative. We shall miss the full meaning of this treatise and of cameralism in general, if we failto keep in mind that they were straddles on this fundamental problem, with the working balance toward
the arbitrary side (p. 513)
334. It should be remembered, that this discussion is in terms of Vermogen, not of Reichthum. One
of the most subtle questions in future historical criticism of the literature of economics will to a large
extent turn upon the fallacy of interchanging the two concepts. When Adam Smith founded systematic
study of problems of wealth, he carefully delimited the concept. The subsequent confusions in English
thinking were not quite indentical with those in German theory, and one of the reasons for the
differences was strictly verbal. I am not prepared to express a judgment about the relative importance
of this factor. I have not collected sufficient evidence to prove that much of the confusion in English
economic theories came from taking over arguments expressed in unwarranted translations of German
terms. I am convinced, however, that this is the case. It is enough at present to point out that it would
shunt us on to a side track if we should render Justi’s word Vermögen by the primarily legal term
“property;” still more if we should use the more restricted economic term “wealth.” The work of
reducing this and similar ambiguous terms to constant values has been a considerable part of the
difficulty of promoting the various social technologies assembled as “cameralism” to relative
distinctness and precision.
The idea of the divine fore-ordination of hereditary sovereignty reappears as the constant motif in the
cameralistic doctrines. We illustrated this in its most dogmatic form in the case of Schroder (above,
pp. 137 ff.). Thus Justi says: “The Eternal Being whose Providence has appointed him to the
government of the people put under him as subjects will hold a ruler to strict accounting, etc.” This
was not merely a pious phrasing of social order. It was literal interpretation, and it carried the corollary
that the Almighty alone, not the people of a state, had the right to call the ruler to account. Justi
employs formulas of the ruler’s responsibility which would mean to a twentieth-century man almost
all that we should assert about the responsibility of chief magistrates (e. g., II, 10); but we must always
construe these propositions in the light of the reserve clauses in the author’s mind. These latter
virtually nullify those phases of democracy in the formulas which a twentieth-century man would
regard as crucial.
335. Much of the development of the proposition in subsequent sections has already appeared in
substance in our citations from Justi’s Preface and Introduction, and need not be repeated. For
instance, a section (II, 13–15) is devoted to the proposition that a ruler ought not to use the “means”
of the state without having a correct estimate of them. It amounts only to a more pedantic way of
reading the New Testament moral: “What king going to make war against another king, sitteth not
down first and consulteth whether he be able, etc.”
336. Although the proposition is supported only by the most commonplace generalities, it indicates,
along with stalwart faith (for publication) in the virtues of paternalism, a rather comprehensive view
of the sorts of interests which the benevolent despot should try to harmonize. Incidentally, Justi again
has his fling at the relative unimportance of the learned class.
337. Justi has evidently used the term “means” now in a special sense, i.e., the reserve plus the current
revenues of the state. Whether this idea is more cause or effect of the general mercantilist position it
would be fruitless to inquire. It is a typical case of fallacious transition from a concept defined to
include both goods and persons, to a concept symbolized by the same term, Vermögen, but defined
to mean gold and silver coin.
338. As we have seen, these are categories which do not correspond with recognized classifications
in current social science. The essential reason is that they were impossible as scientific categories. At
a venture we may offer as equivalents the terms, civic policy, police and commercial science, and
economy.339. In spite of the arbitrary conception of the state in terms of which this formula must be interpreted,
it contains much saving grace of correct moral valuation, while the context shows that the principle
was not always evident in actual cameralistic practices.
340. In this connection (II, 33) Justi admits that he is repeating rules that have already been laid down,
but he solemnly adds, “But in those passages we were not yet treating cameral science proper. Since
it is now necessary particularly to define the fundamental principles of this science, we must not be
content with mere citation of the fundamental principles reviewed above. Indeed these are not the
same, since in the former case we were talking of the use of the general “means” of the state, while
now we are speaking of the administration of the revenues of the state. Nevertheless, everything that
could be called a “principle” is the same, even in Justi’s version, and he was close to the perception
that cameralistics was not a science at all, but merely a technology without a peculiar scientific
content.
341. From this point the treatment becomes more narrowly technical. To what extent it was practical
rather than academic, according to contemporary standards, it does not fall within my province to
decide. The technical programme proposed has diminishing pertinence to the purposes of this book.
I shall accordingly ignore the larger part of its contents, and, as in the account of Adam Smith’s purely
economic chapters (vide Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology), merely call attention to
incidental symptoms.
342. While our aim does not permit attention to details of fiscal technology, it should be noted that for
investigators of the subject of taxation, the rule-of-thumb conclusions scheduled by Justi are by no
means unworthy of consideration. For example, Justi’s rules are quite close approaches to the
doctrines of free trade afterward promulgated by Adam Smith (e.g., II, 48, 49).
343. A highly idealistic excursus follows on the possibility of painless taxation. Justi declares that
democracies might easily realize such an ideal (II, 57).
344. Justi’s examples would fall in the class of sumptuary laws.
345. Vide Prop. 208.
346. The sections devoted in turn to these subjects contain almost nothing pertinent to our purpose.
They are strictly technological (II, 97–305).
347. Vide Adam Smith’s “four maxims,” Wealth of Nations, Book V, cap. ii, part ii, Bax ed., p. 351.
Vide Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, pp. 229 ff. Smith’s first maxim is approximately
Justi’s third rule; the second maxim is nearly Justi’s fourth rule; the third maxim is almost identical
with Justi’s sixth rule; the fourth maxim may be compared with Justi’s second rule, but is much more
fundamental and precise. Justi’s Rule 1 is nebulous; Rule 5 refers to one class of consideration only
which, with many others, enforces the much wider generalization of Smith’s Maxim 4.
348. The details which follow deal with the technique of assessing and collecting land taxes.
349.  It is not clear whether Justi regards this precept as a further elaboration of 342, or as something
distinct. There is no meaning in the classification proposed in 342, unless it is a part of the process
intended by 343.
350. Justi makes the Schutzgeld appear as a species of the genus now known as “police graft.”
351. Justi broadly hints that “the benefit of clergy” had German forms which amounted to serious
abuses, e.g., in freeing from personal taxation as “Gelehrte,” men who had made no good use of their
time in the university.
352. Justi elaborates a scheme of occupation taxes in considerable detail, and seems to regard it as
wholly practicable and wise.
353. These items as treated by Justi are so largely reflections of temporary conditions, that the details
yield nothing for our purpose that has not appeared elsewhere.
354. Additional minor taxes are discussed (II, 445–49).355. Justi accuses the cameralistic writers of having failed to give this subject proportional attention,
and assigns as one of the reasons that they have had little faith that rulers would pay attention to
cameralistic precepts on the subject. Justi disclaims the purpose of instructing courts as to their duties,
but thinks it the duty of cameralists to systematize wise rules of administration, whether rulers adopt
them or not.
356. Justi adds: “I have no hesitation in giving the preference to outlays for the display of the court:
for since the chief purpose of these outlays is to impress foreign nations with the prosperity and power
of the state, no better place of using the money can be found than at the court of the monarch, where
it most directly appeals to the eye of foreigners. Still, that which is appropriate for the comfort and
elegance of the country in other places must not be forgotten. It is not consistent if the residence
charms the eye of foreigners, while the rest of the country has a poverty-stricken appearance.
357. The following section, viz., Division Two, “Of the Proper Ordering of Expenditure, or the
General Budget,” contains simply considerations still more strictly technical and does not call for
analysis. We may note one important precept, viz., If a European state wants to have influence, it must
devote at least two-thirds of its revenues to the military Budget (II, 523).
358.  The remainder of this subdivision (II, 614–60) is entirely devoted to the routine of cameralistic
functions. Justi makes the topic of correlating the different kinds of cameral administration co-ordinate
with (a) the raising of funds; (b) the reasonable use of the “means” of the state. The technique of this
organization as outlined in the remainder of the Staatswirtkschaft contains nothing directly material
to our purpose. Nevertheless, as a bit of shading for the picture of the state which we have, already
found in the book, an abstract from Justi’s introduction to the section, is added.
359. The remainder of the book contains (1) a general sketch of the administrative organization of the
chief European states (II, 666–84); (2) a brief discussion of propositions looking to improvement of
the cameral organization (II, 684–88); (3) Justi’s own programme of reorganization (II, 688–702); (4)
the fundamental ordinances and technical processes of cameral administration (II, 702–44). In this
portion of the book a conspicuous trait of Justi’s method is particularly prominent, viz., an appearance
of studied effort to avoid giving credit to previous writers. This peculiarity cannot be overlooked as
a symptom of the literary practice of his time, as the usage of previous cameralists sufficiently shows.
Justi was exceptionally unwilling to give other writers their due unless they were safely dead.
Montesquieu is the only author whom he frequently mentions by name. Only three or four others are
mentioned at all in this volume, and never with precise reference to passages by which the correctness
of the judgment passed upon them might be decided. When Justi refers to “other cameralists” who
have proposed modifications of the system, he gives no clue to their identity, so that their own grounds
for their propositions might be examined. In this respect his methods are as crude as his manners.
I regret that I have been unable to secure a copy of the work in which Justi expanded his views of
fiscal science; viz., Das System des Finanzwesens, 1766.
360. Parts of the contents of Justi’s hooks might be cited as proof that the comparison is an
exaggeration, especially the volume, Natur und Wesen der Staaten. If substance, not form, is decisive,
the parallel is exact.
361. Die Natur und das Wesen der Staaten, als die Grundwissenschaft der Staatskunst, der Policey,
und alter Regierungswissenschaften, des-gleichen als die Quelle aller Gesetze, abgehandelt von
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Berlin, Stettin und Leipzig. .... 1760 (488 pages + index of 32
pages).
362. It was not from this book, however, that I arrived at my interpretation. Long before I discovered
it, I had reached my conclusion from equally decisive but less obvious evidence.
363. If we take the statement literally, it would locate this passage in Justi’s thinking during the
interval between his departure from Vienna and his arrival in Göttingen, i.e., about a year before
publication of Staatswirthschaft. It is not unlikely that revision of his notes for that volume clarifiedhis ideas in the direction of the book before us.
364. Justi rejects Hobbes’s theory of the inborn propensity to domineer.
365. Justi’s frequent use of the double negative without the affirmative force makes a puzzle of such
a sentence as this, in which the meaning cannot be positively fixed by the context. I think the above
rendering faithfully reflects the ambiguity. The original reads: “Wer wollte aber wohl läugnen, dass
dieser Wille der Völker bey allen und jeden Regierungen nicht in Betracht gezogen werden müsste?”
I understand Justi to urge the antecedent probability that every government would regard the will of
the subjects.
366. This may be inferred from the very significant fact that Justi sometimes uses the still more
democratic phrase, Glückseligkeit der Unterthanen, as designation of the ultimate purpose of the state
(e.g., §36), The whole conception was as yet, however, a matter of rhetoric rather than a decisive
factor in statecraft.
367. Der Grundriss einer Guten Regierung. In Fünf Büchern verfasset, von Johann Heinrich Gottlob
von Justi, Königlichem Grossbritannischen Bergrath. Frankfurth und Leipzig, 1759.
368. Justi’s form of expression seems to imply in the first place that the “great energy” of societies is
merely the arithmetical sum of the energies of the individuals. This being the case, one wonders just
how he pictured the process of getting out of that total more than was put in. He evidently assumed
that something more than a mere addition took place in society, but his account of the situation leaves
the essentials to be desired. The chief crudeness in this section of Justi’s philosophy is not in the
description of the central fact of a state, but in the absence of analysis of the sources of the “general
will” or “supreme power.” The non sequitur is at once in operation that a certain representative or
repository of this “general will,” say the monarch of a European state, being given, the concurrence
of social forces by which that monarch came into existence has served its day and generation, and has
gone out of business, leaving the monarch virtually absolute. I find no direct evidence that Justi
consciously borrowed anything from Hobbes, but the assumptions of the former are quite in accord
with the philosophy of the latter. Justi feels at liberty to tell when rulers ought to be ashamed of
themselves, but he has no recourse short of judgments of God if they do not mend their ways (vide
Grundriss, pp. 77 ff.).
369. From this point the fallacy of confounding means and ends is constantly on duty. The particular
mode of uniting the associated wills is assumed to be identical with, if not paramount to, the concept
“common happiness.” Consequently this particular mode of controlling association, the absolute state,
is substituted as paramount purpose, for a developing idea of “common happiness” which would hold
any means of its own realization, e.g., any form of civic constitution, as constantly liable to answer for
its results, and to modification as the actual paramount purpose from time to time seemed to demand.
370. No precise English equivalent for the content which Justi put into this phrase can be found.
371. This is perhaps the most distinct formulation of fundamental democracy to be found in Justi’s
books. It would be misrepresentation if I should try to explain it away. It is simply a partially
assimilated element of his system. It reflects a phase of reality which has always haunted men’s
thinking, and which may be counted on to reopen every supposed closed system of social philosophy
so long as there remains anything to adjust between the individual and the social factors in the human
process. What happened, however, in Justi’s system, was that working necessity so completely
outweighed in his judgment the claims of popular sovereignty in any applicable sense that political
absolutism was the unimpeached result.
372. Thus Justi identifies fundamental laws (Grundgesetze) and government (Regierung).
373. Here Hobbesism comes into the open in contrast with the democracy of §9. How and by whom
adjudicated, if not by the fundamental power? Justi avoids that question here, but he has given his
practical answer in the passage already noted in the Staatswirthschaft, viz., “The king can do nowrong,” which any other power in the state has a right to resist. The unconscious humor of the
reasoning is appealing when we reflect that the “contract” alleged is purely unilateral. In exchange for
total transfer of the citizens’ freedom to the newly constituted supreme power, no quid pro quo is
provided for in the nature of an enforcible obligation on the side of this new trustee to discharge the
trust according to the intention of the alleged grantors.
374. In pointing out the defects of Justi’s reasoning I am of course not blaming him for being merely
a reflection of his time. Blame and praise are not in question. The point is to detect precisely the
strength and the weakness of the methods of thinking of which Justi was an exponent. The object is
always to make use of these discoveries in criticism of current methods of thinking. We must observe,
then, in connection with this paragraph, that it is a long leap to a conclusion which is not contained
in the previously adduced premises. Between self-love and the love of the state the minor premise is
implied, as already indicated (§9, note), that the only means by which self-love can attain its ends is
through the state as traditionally constituted. Logically the reasoning is the vicious circle.
Psychologically, the relation between self-love and love of the state is unanalyzed. This latter is no
wonder, as the analysis is still incomplete.
375. Justi thus implies plainly enough the personal rulership of monarchs. In effect there was nothing
in his political philosophy which differed from the Stuart view of divine right. Such passages as p.
159, in which legislation by a representative body is treated as best, do not nullify this proposition.
Weighed against the whole tenor of his system, these flashes of modernness must be regarded as a sort
of mirage, which played about the edges of his theory but were not actually assimilated with it. Justi’s
views of a representative legislature seem, moreover, to have been not unlike those of the present Czar.
In 1907 the latter allowed the third Douma to be called, but he refused to acquiesce in its declaration
that he was no longer an autocrat. The boundaries which Justi draws between the executive and the
legislative powers leave the former still in possession of a different type of sovereignty from that
which today goes with genuine representative government (vide op. cit., p. 163).
376.  Was Sieyès’ famous mot after all a plagiarism?
377. Substitute for “sovereign power” and “people,” “employer” and “employee,” and we have the
familiar dictum of the classical economics on the absurdity of supposed conflict of interests between
wage payer and wage taker.
378. Justi omits his apologies to the spider and the fly. The other elements of happiness are described
in terms that have already been specified.
379. E.g., the story of Frederick the Great and the miller at Potsdam.
380. I find no evidence that there was intentional or conscious sophistry in Justi’s argument. He was
apparently a convinced advocate, at least to the extent that he had not clearly thought out a feasible
alternative; and he was not aware of weakness in his method of proof (vide op. cit., P- 35), Whether
his occasional praise of the English system impeaches his sincerity as an absolutist, or merely
punctuates the incoherence of his political philosophy, is, to be sure, an open question, but on the
whole, I incline to the view that these irreconcilable elements in his thinking show that he had not
faced the necessity of adjusting the incompatible doctrines.
381. “Regieren heisst die Handlungen anderer Menschen nach gewissen Absichten lenken” (p. 34).
382. Three distinct questions emerge here: first, Whether the policy which this doctrine prescribed was
the one best adapted to the stage of evolution then in progress; second, Whether the philosophy
expressed by the doctrine was a valid generalization; third, What were the actual effects of the doctrine
upon the theories and practices of the period? We might answer the first of these questions in the
affirmative, as indeed I am inclined to do, yet we might most confidently answer the second question
in the negative, and we might find that there were most unfortunate and confusing results to be
scheduled in answer to the third question. Our present study has no further reference to the first ofthese questions. We are dealing with the second, principally, and with the theoretical, more than the
applied, aspects of the third. That is, we are attempting to get first a clear view of Justi’s political
philosophy, because it was the setting in which his cameralism has to be interpreted; and we are to use
this analysis of the principal and subordinate factors of his system as a guide to the effects that the
system, and others of which it was a type, had upon the course of development in the social sciences
at large.
383. Justi thinks The Prince was a deeply veiled satire.
384. He says, to be sure (p. 64), “Whatever is plainly opposed to the ultimate end and nature of a
society can without doubt not be binding upon the society.” In the immediate context, however, he
appears to imply that this cannot be thought of anything that occurs under the regular forms of law.
He has elsewhere expressly denied that sovereignty can at last be in the people as opposed to the
government (vide p. 325).
385. The relation between cameralism and mercantilism is reviewed in the closing chapter (pp. 586
ff.). It is enough to say here that intimate acquaintance with the cameralists punctures the myth that
their conceptions of wealth were utterly bizarre.
386. The bathos of this conclusion is characteristic of the whole conception of which the paragraph
is an epitome. It involves the two factors pointed out above: first, absolutistic government as the final
term in civic relations; second, homiletical moralizing upon the character that rulers would have if they
knew their best interests, with the implication that actual rulers are enough like this ideal to make
obedience to them the ultimate duty and recourse of citizens. This remark applies also to the chapter
(pp. 109–28) on “General Idea of a Good Government.”
387. This passage then is of more than curious significance merely as presenting a Utopia. It is a
first-rate piece of evidence on our fundamental theorem that Justi had not focalized the economic
interest proper. He had not heard of “the economic man.” His fundamental assumption was the
personally ambitious man.
388. What business Justi has to embarrass a Utopia by consideration either of Spartan times or of “our
times,” it would be cruel to ask. He was evidently not aware that he was trying to stand with one foot
in the clouds and one on the earth. This attempt at a free flight of fancy only brings out more clearly
his conviction that for mundane purposes the quasi-absolute kings of his experience were necessary.
389. As our plan is to exhibit Justi’s system objectively, as an attempt at social science, rather than to
examine its psychological presuppositions, it is needless to comment on this naive mental philosophy.
390. For its value as evidence in another connection the context is worth translating, viz., “We
understand here riches in all sorts of goods which are based chiefly on a flourishing sustaining system
[Nahrungsstand], and without the same no people can properly be thought of as happy. .... Today there
is no doubt about this principle. If a corrupted statecraft once believed that the wealth of the subjects
must be hindered in order not to feed the spirit of uproar, or at least of opposition to the supreme
power, we have today gone beyond that petty principle. We have found that an impoverished people,
which has nothing to lose, is much more inclined to disorder than well-to-do citizens, and the credit
[Ansehen] of the supreme power is today so well established by reasonable rules of government, and
by standing armies, that there is little to fear from subjects in this respect. .... There can be no doubt
that the riches and welfare of the subjects should be the main purpose, and the consequent power and
strength of princes the subsidiary purpose, and not the reverse.” (This last proposition is a plain
negation of my fundamental theorem about cameralism. My justification throughout is appeal to the
whole system against its parts. I repeat that we must not force upon inconsistent elements a coherent
unity which did not exist. Judged by the rest of the system as contained in Justi’s books and in the
workings of the type of government which they formulated, the proposition quoted must be taken,
along with the other idealistic elements, as a symptom of partially assimilated insight, which would
presently give both to social science and to governmental policy a changed perspective.)391. Justi compares his own with earlier times in this respect in terms which, taken literally, claimed
that this theorem was the contemporary working rule. Here again was an uncritical mixture of relative
truth and of sheer assertion of ideal value. The latter is demonstrated by the admission which Justi
makes at the close of the paragraph (p. 242).
392. E. g., pp. 406 ff. et passim.
393.  Johann Heinrich Gottlobs von Justi, ehemaligen Königl. Gross-britannischen und
Braunschweig-Lunebergischen Churfürstl. Berg-Raths, und Ober-Policey- Commissarii, wie auch
Mitgliedes der Konigl. Societal der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Grundsätze der Policeywissenschaft,
in einen vernünftigen, auf den Endzweck der Policey gegrundeten, Zusain-menhange, und zum
Gebrauche academischer Vorlesungen abgefasset. Dritte Ausgabe, mit Verbesserungen und
Anmerkungen von Johann Beckmann, ordentlichem Professor der Oekonomie in Gottingen .... 1782.
All references are to this third edition.
394. I have not observed an instance in which Justi follows his contemporary’s spelling of the name.
395. The pot is scandalized at the color of the kettle.
396. Again “eine unbeschreibliche Menge,” which is a trifle strong for a critical treatise.
397. Probably “didactic” would be nearer to Justi’s thought than the word thus literally rendered.
398. These observations by Justi tell their own story about the state of the social sciences at his time,
and comment would be superfluous.
399. The difficulty which we find in getting a distinct conception of Justi’s meaning is due to the fact
that his own ideas were not clear. His classifications have largely been abandoned, even by
bureaucratic theorists. The change begins to be visible with Rau, Lehrbuch der pelitischen Oekonomie,
1826, etc. In England and America the distribution of activities, and consequently the theory of them,
left no place for Policey in Justi’s sense.
The editor of the third edition adds as his own definition of “Policey,” the following (p. 26): “The
science of governing the various occupations [Gewerbe] according to the purpose of the state.” Of
course “Smithism” was fundamentally a protest against the thing itself, but the thing itself was the very
genius of the cameralistic state. There consequently had to be a technology of it. The editor continues:
“The occupations are agricultural pursuits, artisanship, trade, and personal services. The first part of
Policey accordingly treats of the responsibilities of the ruler with respect to rural employments. .... The
second part of Policey is urban, i.e., the Policey of the handicrafts and trade, as the two occupations
peculiar to towns. .... In the third part I reckon, for example, medical practice, the ecclesiastical and
educational system, etc. The fourth part, or at all events the appendix, should treat of those abandoned
or unfortunate persons who will not pursue any of the occupations mentioned, and hence will or must
live upon the diligence of other people; i.e., beggars, almshouses, houses of correction, and
workhouses.
400.  Vide Grundfeste, I, 21. I cannot decide what difference in meaning, if any, Justi associated with
the two words Cultur and Anbau which he sometimes seems to use merely as synonyms in oratio
variata and sometimes as cumulative expressions.
401. Vide corresponding passages in Staatswirthschaft.
402. Also parallel with same topics in Staatswirthschaft.
403. The reference goes back to Oeconomica.
404. It is a fair surmise that Justi got this title from the heading of chap, xxxiii, in Schröder’s Furst.
Schatz- und Rent-Cammer.
405. “Baron von Bielfeld, born 1716, Hamburg, of an aristocratic merchant family, died 1770. He was
a friend of Frederick the Great when the latter was crown prince. Was for a while guest of the latter
in Rheinsberg, and immediately upon his accession entered his diplomatic service. After 1741 he was
Legationsrath in the foreign department, later second Hofmeister of a Prussian prince; after 1747Oberaufseher of the Prussian universities, but without the least loss of the king’s favor retired
presently to his estates. His writings, the most important of which, the Institutions Politiques, appeared
in 1760, suggest not merely by their French dress, but also by their genial cosmopolitan tone,
Frederick the Great, much more than contemporary academic specialists. Schlozer credits him with
the immortal honor of having first introduced learned politics at courts!” (Roscher, p. 426.)
406. In this case it is clear that the phrase “die öconomischen Wissenschaften,” which I have rendered
“economic sciences,” had a meaning for Justi which would be more exactly represented to our minds
by the phrase “social technologies.”
407. This definition is amplified on p. 4, also pp. 6–9.
408. Justi’s most explicit attempt to explain the etymology of the term Policey occurs on p. 5, Part I.
He quotes from Xenophon’s Athenian Republic to show that the word {￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿} meant “not only the
internal institutions of a state, but the whole governmental system of a community: and even what we
now express by the word republic.”
409. The author calls attention to the divergence of this proposition in form from that in Grundsätzen
der Policeywissenschaft Einleilung, §8, p. 7. He explains that the two formulas do not essentially
differ.
410. Johann Heinrich Gottlobs von Justi, Gesammelte Politische und Finanzschriften über wichtige
Gegenstände der Staatskunst, der Kriegswissenschaften und des Cameral- und Finanzwesens. ....
1761.
411. The book never appeared.
412. The whole foregoing passage (I, 175–79), it must be remembered, is incidental to discussion of
the question, What is the relation of the nobility to the state and commerce? The main point in Justi’s
mind was to establish the position that on the principle, noblesse oblige, a nobility should justify itself
by the sort of service which the state most needed. His argument was that war was not the most radical
employment of the state, that commerce went much nearer to the roots of happiness, and that, when
promotion of commerce was needed, the nobility ought to serve the state by assuming commercial
responsibilities. The context does not warrant any confident inferences from the passage in its bearings
upon mercantilism. There are traces in it, in the reference to stimulation of domestic industry, of the
actual association of ideas with the more fundamental processes of production. We find the same
cropping out elsewhere in qualification of the supposed extreme mercantilist theory.
413. I imagine that such a proposition, even with the explanations immediately to follow, was possible
only because of the ambiguity of the term Volk. Some of the political philosophers of the time could
interpret the personal ads of their own ruling princes as constructively the action of the Volk. That is,
the latter term carried a content of metaphysical theory. It did not necessarily mean the “people” in an
unequivocal democratic sense.
414. The implied antecedent of the pronoun is the plural “nations” in the preceding sentence, not the
collective and metaphysically construed noun Volk. The whole explanation would go to pieces under
analysis.
415. As in other passages, Justi goes on to speak of details which would enable the ruler to commit
the nation to policies that would constrain the legislative power to acquiesce—in the last instance on
the principle “my country right or wrong.” It is not to be denied, however, that Justi’s theory in this
passage really in a large measure anticipates the demands of the constitutionalists of the following
century (vide op. cit., pp. 21, 22). Yet his illustrations of acts which would make an absolute sovereign
into a despot are far from indicating limitations that would remove the conditions which to the modern
mind amount to practical absolutism. For instance, when Louis XIV declared his natural sons eligible
to the throne, and when Peter I of Russia claimed for the crown the prerogative of designating the
successor, each was an attempt to alter the constitution, and beyond the proper rights of the Unlimitedmonarch. That is, Justi argued in most cases for limitation of the monarch by the constitution not
otherwise, and the constitution which he had in mind must not be thought of as going into any such
details as the written or unwritten constitutions of modern states.
416. I.e., Justi had his eye so closely trained on personal freedom that he did not properly estimate the
degree of its dependence upon political freedom.
417. An explanation which occurs on p. 243 confirms and partially explains a detail of our knowledge
of Justi’s personal history, viz.: “Sr. Königliche Majestät von Grossbritannien und Churfürstl. Durchl.
zu Braunschweig-Lüneburg haben allergnädigst geruhet mich in diesem berühmten Musensitze als
Dero Oberpoliceycommisarium zu bestellen, etc., .... zugleich .... Erlaubniss ertheilet in den
Oeconomischen und Cameral Wissenschaften .... Vorlesungen zu halten.”
418. The form of expression in the last sentence has a bearing on the sense in which Justi thought of
Volk, i.e., not in the ordinary modern distributive sense, but as a more artificial collective concept.
419. Vide Grundriss der Policey-Wissenschaft, p. 77 (vide above, p. 444), and von Mohl, Gesch. u.
Lit. d. Staatswis., III, 471. Von Mohl quotes the second edition. I have referred to the corresponding
passage in the third. It is very evident that von Mohl had practically no knowledge of the setting of the
doctrine of population in Justi’s system. In fact, he qualified it sufficiently to make von Mohl’s
criticism gratuitous. He no more believed that population could be fed in unlimited numbers than
Malthus did. For the practical purposes of the states in whose interest he was elaborating a technique,
population was the first consideration, until, as he indicated in Staatswirthschaft, population should
reach three, four, or six times the number at his time. He never formulated the more general
Malthusian problem of population.
420. The last word is apparently a misprint for goods.
421. This passage is notable as proof that Justi was not the sort of mercantilist described as the
traditional type. The naivete of his ideas about the relative importance of a circulating medium is to
be noted, but it does not immediately concern our purpose, except that it was a very natural incident
of his predominantly administrative conception of the state.
422. It is more than possible that the first Frau Justi may have had a mind of her own at this point, and
that the domestic troubles of the house of Justi may have turned on this issue.
423.  Lehrbuch der politischen Oeconomie, 1826, etc.
424. Roscher, op. cit., pp. 430 ff.
425. Op. cit., pp. 533 ff.
426. Op. cit., p. 534, n.
427. This is only partially true of the fifth edition, which I have used. Roscher cites the third. The
motto of the fifth edition of Vol. I is from Cicero, De divin. i–iii, and on the page opposite the
beginning of the General Introduction, is a paragraph from Richard Hey, Observations on the Nature
of Civil Liberty. The motto of the third volume is from Horace; while only the second takes its motto
from Rousseau.
428. Among the more creditable facts about Becher is his adhesion to the same view. (Vide Roscher,
loc. cit.t p. 284, n. 2.)
429. Vide Handlung, 5te Aufl., p. 53.
430. Vide Century Dictionary, title “Eclectic,” II.
431. The title-page has the further legend, “Zu dem Leitfaden des politischen Studiums.” The center
of the page is occupied by a vignette of Montesquieu, in itself a critical index of first-rate importance.
The first edition was published in 1765. I have used only the fifth edition, 1787.432. This “general introduction” occupies forty-nine pages. It includes the chapter on computing the
population. It was evidently intended to introduce the three volumes as a whole. It is followed (p. 50)
by an introduction which relates specifically to Policey, the subject-matter of the first volume.
433. In a note Sonnenfels comments: “The notion of the isolated human being is perhaps merely a
literary abstraction. Man is always in society, and as Ferguson, in his Essays on the History of Civil
Society, acutely observes, ‘a savage caught somewhere in a forest, no more proves that man by nature
lives alone, than a sheep straying in a forest would prove that sheep do not flock together.’”
In the Preface to the third volume (5th ed.) the author says: “I have cited only those books that I have
read, and of which I can give assurance that it will pay to consult or read them.” The books which he
explicitly mentions will be carefully noted. He seldom locates the passages to which he refers, and I
am unable to decide whether the remark quoted applies to all three volumes, or whether he intended
it to include authors cited in this casual way. He later refers to Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Although
a German translation of the Wealth of Nations bears the date 1776, the same year in which the original
was published, I am not sure that the version appeared as early as the date would seem to indicate; and
I have no conclusive reason for believing that at the time of making his first printed allusion to Smith’s
work Sonnenfels knew it except by title. If he had actually read Smith and Ferguson in 1787, the
leaven was working in Germany rather earlier than is usually supposed. Even Ricardo did not discover
the Wealth of Nations till long after that date.
The phrase “so many steps, etc.,” might be turned into evidence that Sonennfels repudiated the “social
contract” idea, and held the evolutionary view of the origin of human society. A monograph recently
conceived it) Berlin and published in Leipzig employs exegesis of this sort to read into Adam Smith
and Adam Ferguson a considerable catalogue of sociological concepts which their philosophy had
never dreamed of, viz.: Hermann Huth, Sociale und individualistische Auffassung im 18. Jahrhundert,
vornehmlich bei Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Sociologie. If
Sonnenfels had consistently applied our logic, some of his phrases would have carried him nearer to
Darwin than to Rousseau. But—!!
The next section contains typical evidence that interpretation of an author by phrases isolated from the
general tenor of his thought is impossible.
434. Again, if we might credit the eighteenth century with the associations of the twentieth, we should
say that here was a profession of the most modern democratic political philosophy. What we actually
find here is evidence that valuations were coming into vogue which were logically incompatible with
the prevailing quasi-absolutistic political philosophy, and that they were accelerating the motion of
the social process toward retirement of the more arbitrary philosophy.
The perception had not yet been reached that this interdependence of private and public good
demanded a different means of adjusting in practice the claims of the co-operating factors. That is, the
rulers still decided for the people what was for the people’s good. This technique presupposed that the
rulers were not only superior in wisdom, but that they were disinterested judges. Whether the former
assumption was valid or not, the latter was directly contrary to fact. The rulers were to a considerable
extent competitors with the citizens for things desired by both. That the former should be perpetual
arbiters about relations in which they were perpetually interested parties, was the essential fallacy of
the old regime. I discover no evidence whatever that Sonnenfels was aware of this weakness in
quasi-absolutism. Until theorists arrived at this perception, they were intellectually with the old régime,
however symptomatic their emotions may have been of a changing order.
435. Again the approximateness of Sonnenfels’ philosophy must be pointed out. The alleged principle
was thoroughly modern in its abstract statement. It proves to be still archaic when interpreted by the
implications which clung to it. The crucial matter was to get a technique which could properly
ascertain the social will in contrast with the individual will. The old regime simply seized the power
to make the will of certain individuals subvert the will of the overwhelmingly larger number ofindividuals and count as the will of the society. The essence of quasi-absolutism remained in force in
political theories until the full significance of this dilemma was admitted.
436. The note to §17 is an important literary landmark, viz.: “It may be for this reason that numerous
as are the writers upon special parts of Staatswissenschaft, the catalogue of those who have undertaken
to cover the whole is extremely small, even if we add to Justi’s Staatswirth-schaft, and Bielefeld’s
Institutions politiques, St. Real’s Staatskunst and Stewart’s Staatswirthschaft, together with certain
so-called outlines and elements of the Polizey- und Cameralwissenschaften, and if we honor the
Aristotelian and also the Hanoverian edition of the Wolffian political books by allowing them to count
as principles of Staatswissenschaft.”
The “Stewart” mentioned in the note was evidently Sir James Steuart, and there is more than merely
verbal significance in the use of the term Staatswirthschaft as translation of his title, Inquiry into the
Principles of Political Economy. Probably no German was fully aware at this time that the term
“Political Economy” stood for a sort of analysis which had not yet been proposed in Germany, and that
its lines of demarkation ran in quite distinct directions from those of Staatswirthschaft.
437. Hauptgrundsatz der Staatswissenschaft und ihrer Zweige.
438. Op. cit., p. 444. Roscher leaves the impression that Sonnenfels commended Justi in this passage.
The precise contrary was the fact.
439. I will not enlarge on this unconscious confession that the author at last, in spite of himself, relied
upon “general happiness,” to give value to “enlargement of society,” rather than the reverse. I simply
let him speak for himself. (Vide pp. 493 and 531.)
440.  “Of that school of populationists which, after the middle of the eighteenth century, may count
as a revised edition of the mercantile system, Sonnenfels is unquestionably the most important
exponent in Germany.”—Roscher, op. cit., p. 536.
441. Vide Roscher, p. 426, “Jacob Friedrich von Bielfeld.”
442. These two writers are referred to as having furnished a brief history of political computation,
tracing it back to the middle of the seventeenth century.
443.  Göttliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen Gescklechts aus dem Geburt, dem
Tode und Fortpflanzung derselben erwiesen. 1st ed., 1742, 2d ed., 1761; vide Roscher, op. cit., p. 421.
444.  Abhandlung zu einem Versuche der wahrscheinlichen Menge des Volkes von Holland und
Westfrlesland, etc.; vide Roscher, op. cit., p. 421, “Kersseboom.”
445. Essai politique sur le commerce, 1734; German, 1756.
446. He refers to Montesquieu, Esprit des loix, Vol. I, chap, xxiv, p. 26.
447. The author’s own forms of statement are now epitomized.
448. Speaking of identical propositions!
449. Esprit des loix, Vol. I, Part II, chap. iv.
450. “Auf seine Handlungen, Personen, auf seine Ehre, und seine Güter.” The ambiguity of the term
Handlungen might be used as one of the stigmata of the untenable analysis in which it figures. The
same is true of the plural Personen, of Ehre as having a possible content not gathered from the other
three categories, and of Güter, in distinction primarily from Handlungen, and secondarily from the
other two concepts. The classification serves as basis of the technology which follows, but the
confusion which corresponds with the superficial analysis does not much affect the larger relations
which we are emphasizing, and we may pass it with this notice. Sonnenfels adds the note (p. 63): “The
English writers compress all into the words Liberty and Property [Freyheit und Eigenthum]. Freyheit
has special connection with Hondlungen, Personen, and Ehre; Eigenthum with Güter.”
451. Op. cit., pp. 536 ff.
452. The original should be compared, op. cit., p. 536.453. Sonnenfels simply refers to “ sermones fideles, etc.”
454. Esprit des loix, Vol. XXXIV, chap. ii.
455. A note to this section reads: “During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, a penalty of twenty pounds
was imposed upon anyone who absented himself for a month from public worship.” The authority for
the statement is given as, “Hume, Hist, de la maison de Tudor, Tome V.” Evidence of this and like
kinds, in spite of occasional appearances to the contrary, makes it probable that, whenever English
sources were cited, they were usually known to Sonnenfels by name only, or through translations,
usually French.
456. The four following sections elaborate the last proposition, and specify problems and duties for
Religionspolizey.
457. Political Essays, Vol II, Part I, “Essay on the Liberty of the Press.”
458. Hume is again cited rather vaguely, p. 181.
459. Illustration cited from Hume, “Leben Edwards I,” Geschichte von England, T. 2.
460. Reference is made to “die vortreffliche Abhandlung des Marchest Beccari: Von Verbrechen und
Strafen,” which appeared almost simultaneously with the publication of Sonnenfel’s first edition, and
supported his position on this subject.
461. On p. 4 of the Preface the edition of Forbonnais’ book which. Sonnenfels used is referred to as
“Elémens du Commerce, zweyte Leydner Auflage.”
462. Umriss der politischen Handlungswissenschaft. I have not found this expression in the earlier
cameralists. It seems to me to be in itself a sign that there was increasing instability in the notions of
classification and methodology. Although Sonnenfels is far from generalizing economic problems in
the spirit of an abstract science, the prominence and relative independence of business questions, as
distinguished from fiscal problems, is a still more meaning sign that general economic problems were
approaching the threshold of consciousness.
463. Perhaps it is mere fancy, but in Sonnenfels’ usage this expression seems to me to connote a less
governmental and more popular center of gravity for the concept “welfare” than was indicated by the
corresponding terms of the earlier cameralists.
464. Not mentioned by Roscher.
465. Sonnenfels’ note: “I. Beweis, dass es den österreischen Fabriken eben so leicht seyn werde, ein
Konsumme in Pohlen zu finden, als der Ckurbrandenburg. II. Gründliche Anleitung zu regelmässiger
Sprengung fester Steinfelsen u.s.w. III. K. K. Verordnung Kirchengelder und Kirchenrechnungen. IV.
Ganser’s Abhandlung van Torferde. V. Vorschlag zur Beleuchtung der Städte.” The author adds:
“This Preface was written in 1769. Since that time several works have been written which have
relations to the Austrian states.”
466. I am unable to explain this title except on the assumption that Sonnenfels quoted from memory
and meant the Diskurs.
467. It is to be noticed that Sonnenfels does not claim Justi’s Staatswirthschaft for Austria, although
it was a product of the author’s work in that country. It was not devoted particularly to Handlung, to
be sure, but covered the subject to such an extent that the omission is surprising.
468. Grundsätze der Handlungswissenschaft, Einleilung. Die einfachsten Begriffe des Handels and
seine Zweige.
469. Die politische Handlungswissenschaft. The phrase is a snapshot at the struggle for survival
among concepts. The predominant problem still was, What shall the government do about commerce?
There was not yet independent analysis of commerce itself, apart from state policy.470. Sonnenfels’ note to this paragraph is not a model of lucidity, but it must be quoted to complete
the evidence which we must consider in deciding about the precise stage in the process of critical
analysis which the author represents. The note is on the phrase, politische Handlungs-wissenschaft,
and it reads as follows: “The multiplication of means of support, through advantageous exchange of
that which nature [das Erdreich] and diligence produce, is taught by Handlungswissenschaft,” (the
adjective “political” does not appear at this point). With reference to this definition, and to the
paragraph just quoted, the work proceeds (Vol. II, p. 3): “This explanation appears to vary from the
ordinary one; i.e., the most advantageous exchange of products. In fact, however, it leads to the same.
For precisely this more advantageous exchange occurs in order to keep a great number of people
employed. Moreover, exchange itself is the business of commerce, and in this fact is to be found the
explanation of the science which guides this business. Commerce will also be regarded as the means
of increasing the resources [Vermögen] of the state. The increased wealth of the state is a constant
consequence of commerce, but not the ultimate purpose in the estimate of the stale to which riches
without citizens would be useless.”
471. Even the word “produce” is likely to have the effect of an anachronism when used as a translation
of terms employed at this period. The word in this case is “hervorbringen.” “Erzeugen,” “erzielen,”
“verdienen,” “gewinnen,” and similar synonyms, with their derivatives, occur without the precise
technical force of the English “produce,” “production,” etc.
472. In a context of this sort Bedürfnisse might more properly be rendered “necessities,” but in other
cases the translation “want” is nearer to the sense. I use it, therefore, as the most available equivalent,
although the subjective and objective phases of the words cannot always be fitted in the translation to
the original.
473. In the previous sections Sonnenfels had several times used the same word—Tausch—in the more
general sense of “exchange.” This is the first time in which the restricted meaning is strictly correct.
474. In a note the author adds: “Purists” (I do not know whether his use of the term “Puritaner” in this
sense was an intentional or an unconscious solecism) “in the vocabulary of commerce speak of
Manufaktur  when hammer and fire are not used, as Tuchmannfaktur, Cottonmanit-faktur. On the other
hand, where these two are necessary, that is called Fabriken, Stahlfabriken, Messingfabriken. Usage
has almost abolished this distinction. The word Fabrik is more general. We hear daily Tuchfabrik,
Cottonfabrik.”
475. An explanatory note adds: “The word Kunstarbeit will constantly be contrasted with
Landwirtlischaft  in order to indicate the class of Manufacturanten.” We may translate this obviously
inappropriate term, “suppliers,” as a mean between “manufacturers” which offends modern usage if
it includes farmers; and “producers” which would attribute to Sonnenfels a generalization that he had
not made. “The word diligence [Aemsigkeit] will also be used.”
476. The author’s note reads: “The total of commerce is thus the sum of two magnitudes, the wants
and the number of consumers.”
477. A note explains the last clause as follows: “A merchant buys cloth for 10 in England; the national
capital is diminished by 10. The merchant pays for freight 1, for storage, handling, etc., 3, so that the
cloth stands the merchant at 14; but because the ship was a national ship, and the other outlays were
within the country, or paid to citizens, the national capital has not lost these 4. The merchant sells the
cloth for 18. The nation gains 8, the merchant, however, only 4.”
478. This is almost an exact repetition of Justi, but the proposition was probably a commonplace at
the time.
479. The word is Erdreich. We might of course render it “land,” but this would immediately force
upon it an interpretation as equivalent to that term in its later technical sense. Our version is chosen
to avoid that anachronism and to preserve the archaic connotations of the term.480. “Das Erdreich ist entweder Privateigenthum oder Vermogen des Staates.” This juxtaposition of
Eigenthum and Vermögen brings out the fact previously noted, that the two terms are sometimes used
interchangeably, and sometimes with an approach to respect for their etymological distinctions. The
result is uncritical and fallacious German usage. Translation into English usually makes the matter
worse. It is a correct general proposition that at this period the class of writers we are dealing with
were unconcerned about precise discrimination between the ethical, the legal, and the merely objective
material connotations of the two words.
481. A note states that the so-called Ecole vétérinaire was opened in Vienna in 1766. At first only
treatment of horses was attempted, but attention was later extended to all species of farm animals.
482. The word Oekonomieaufseher is used later in the section apparently as a designation for the
officials constituted supervisors of agricultural management.
483. The term Grundverfassung, in the idiom of this period, had the effect of a pun. It seems to have
carried partially a literal and partially a derived meaning. That is, the concept in the author’s mind
seems to have been a blur of the two notions, land tenure and constitution in something approaching
the modern sense.
484.  This is the passage cited by Roscher in support of the proposition: “It is characteristic of
Sonnenfels’ absolutism to be more liberal at the expense of private rights than at the expense of
governmental power.” Roscher’s point appears to be well taken.
485. A note (p. 55) speaks of “Die ökon. Gescllschaft zu Petersburg.” The note continues: “The
organization in 1765 offered a prize on this subject: ‘Is it to the advantage of the state that the peasants
should possess properly? Does this question do credit to a government? to our century? to mankind?”
The better solutions are the monograph which received the prize, under the title, La Félicité publique
and another by Bearde de l’Abbaye. Meritorious also were those of Woelnor, Mark, Oeder, and
Merkel.”
486. The word is Handlung, and with the variation noted in §50 it illustrates the lack of uniformity in
usage throughout the book.
487. A note cites as such hindrance the ancient right of the lord to an option on the produce before it
is taken to market.
488. A note names Michaelmas (September 29) as the time shown by experience to be fairest for the
payment of agricultural taxes.
489. The number that the land could support per square mile (German) is estimated by Sonnenfels as
1,500; this after comparison with Süssmilch’s estimate of 2,750, and Vauban’s of 2,361.
490. A note begins with the words: “Die Oekonomisten, ein Zweig der Encyklopedisten, fodern eine
unter alien Umstanden freye Ausfuhr.” The same use of the term Oekenomisten occurs in a note to
§61.
491. In this part of the book the following are referred to: “Wiegand, der Verfasser des vernünftigen
Landwirths;” no further clue is given; “Young, Polilische Arithmetik;” Ingram, in Enc. Brit., title
“Arthur Young,” says: “.... in 1774 his Political Arithmetic, .... was soon translated into several foreign
languages.” Other references are: Nickols, Avant et Defavant, de la France, etc., édit nouvelle
d’Amst.; Principes de la législation universelle, author not named, but cited as representing “die
französischen Oekonomisten;” Arbuthnot, Sur l’utilité des grandes Fermes et des riches Fermiers,
traduit par Freville; Traité poli-tique et oeconomique sur les communes, ou observation sur
l’agriculture, sur l’origine, la destination et l’etat actuel des biens et communes, etc.; Getting,
Preisschrift in clem hanoverischen Magazin, p. 764; Peningthon, Réflexions sur les avantages qui
résultent du partage des communes pour être défraichis et mis en clos; Schlettwein in dem hanov.
Magazin, 704.492. For instance, “An ordinance of the Austrian states, to the effect that the calendars for the common
people should not be printed, without previous approval of the oconomischen Gesellschaften. These
societies are considered among the most important of these educational agencies.
493. Welche Verlag oder sogenanntes Kaufmannsgut machen.
494. The context brings out most clearly the shade of meaning which Sonnenfels associated with this
particular use of the term Oekonomisten; that is, it was pretty nearly coextensive with the class
Physiocrat and it did not mean, as it did later, “one who is studying problems relating to wealth.” It
meant “one who adheres to the peculiar theory about sources of wealth advocated by the physiocrats.”
495. A note adds the illustration: “A bale of cloth stands the merchant in the marketplace of Sinigaglia
1,500. He sells it for 2,000. The gain of 500 is increase of the mass.”
496. A note expands the argument in this way: “The harm which may come to a nation in the various
branches of its welfare is affirmative or negative. The affirmative is diminution of the greatness which
it possesses: if, for example, one thousand of the citizens emigrate, or a half-million capital flows out
without compensation. The negative is failure to realize the growth which is within the power of the
nation: if, for example, the foreign trade is conducted with foreign carriage, whereby the nation loses
the cost of carriage in the selling price. In the calculation of political commerce, gains not made are
entered on the debit side. That is, what might have been gained and was not is reckoned as a loss.”
497. While containing no distinctly new view, these sections show decided advance in maturity over
Becher’s treatment of Monopolism and Propolium. Sonnenfels’ major premise throughout the
discussion is that the maximum powers of the state are not developed unless the conditions are
maintained in which goods are manufactured within the nation in conformity with the four
specifications. A very fair anticipation of the modern argument against governmental conduct of
industry appears in §§126 ff. In §130 the reference occurs: “Sur les compagnies et les maitrises traduit
de l’Anglois. Chinki histoire Chochin chinoise, p. Coyer.”
498. As evidence we may quote the note to §135, viz.: “Die Oekonomisten erklären den Werth: Das
Maass des Bodens welches in der Erzielung enthalten ist. Dieser Begriff, ist eben so undeutlich, als
unrichtig. Das nämliche Maass Erdreichs von besserer oder schlechterer physischen Beschaffenheit
mit besserer oder schlechterer Bestellung trägt mehr: also würde die nämliche Sache von
verschiedenem Werthe seyn. Der Verfasser des Werts (Werks?) Essai sur le commerce en général,
Part I, chap, i, selzt dem Maasse des Erdreichs noch die Arbeit bei, welches den Werth zwar näher
bestimmt, aber immer zu metaphysisch ausdrückt.”
499. In this connection we read (§152): “Man liest bei Goldasten in den Reichshandlungen;” and a
little later, “Fortbonnais in Disc, praelim. zum Négotiant anglois.”
500. Book I, chap. i.
501. The author refers to his Abhandlung vom Mauthwesen in the tenth volume of his collected works.
502. In continuing the subject of the effect of the quality of products on price, Sonnenfels cites (note
to §176) Savary, Dictionaire du Commerce, T. IV, art. “Règlement,” and Justi, Abhandlung van
Manufacturen, Fabriken Reglements.
503. Further references in the chapter are as follows: “In den Briefen des La Porte,” cited from
memory, p. 273; in a note on p. 279 the author remarks: “Die Errichtung der Manufacturhäuser ist vor
Justi schon von Boden in seiner fürstlicken Machtkunst, von Schrödern in seiner fürstlichen Schatz-
und Rentkammer, u. a. m., als ein nützliches Mittel angepriesen worden;” then follows reference to
Justi’s monograph, Von Manufacturen und Fabriken. Justi is blamed for giving Schröder an empty
compliment for proposing that manufactures should be assisted by a scheme of landesfürstlichen
Wechsel, an impracticable notion, in Sonnenfels’ opinion. Fortbonais, Elém. du Com., chap, iii,
reappears, p. 283, and, in the same note, Hume, Polil. Essays of the Balance of Trade (sic); alle
Physlokraten are referred to at the same point, the implication being that they universally support aprohibitive policy with respect to imports; Rcimarus, Handlungsgrundsätze, is named without
indicating the reason; a second note on the same page (p. 283) contains a rather pointed criticism, viz.,
“England, France, even Holland, has prohibitions of imports, and what amounts to the same thing, high
entrance rights. When therefore many a writer confidently asserts that commerce flourishes most in
states where universal freedom of trade rules, we are justified in demanding that these states shall be
specified;” and finally (p. 299), Nickols.
504. A bibliographical item is to be noted. Sec. 221 expands the conclusion: “Summing up both sides,
we may say with Raynal: ‘Fairs and markets in themselves are a mischievous recourse, but
occasionally they are serviceable.’” A note adds: “Histoire polit. et phil. des établisse-mens de deux
Indes, T. IV. Der Verfasser führt die Erfindung der Messen zu dem 7ten Jahrhundert zurück: als durch
die Einfälle der Franken und Barbaren in Gallien die Handlung durch ungeheure, und unzählige
Gebühren gehemmet ward. Die erste Messe war zu St. Denys gestiftct worden. S. den Art. Foire in
der Encyclopedie, welche Turgot zum Verfasser hat.” The following section (§222) has a reference
to “Coyer, La noblesse commerçant.”
505. This note follows: “Die Selige Kaiserin liess einst dem ganzen Handelsstand die Adelung
anbieten. Viele aus demselben machten von diesem Anerbieten Gebrauch, und führen dann auch
geadelt den Handel immer fort. Die Erhebung in den Freyherren, und nachher in den Grafenstand, und
die Stelle eines K. K. Hofraths hielt H. Fries nicht ab, seine Geschäfte mit eben demselben Eifer
fortzusetzen, als er vorher gethan hat.”
506. Viz.: first, referring to Cromwell’s “Navigation Act” of 1651, a note remarks (p. 351): “Ich kenne
nur den Verfasser der Handlungs-grundsätze zur wahren Aufnahme der Länder, etc., §13, welcher
gegen wahren Vortheil dieser Akte einen Zweifel zu erheben scheint.” On p. 356 the following occurs:
“Das Werk von Bergier, Histoire des grands chemins d’Empire, ist allen unentbehrlich, die diesen
Theil der Verwaltung zu besorgen haben. Gautier, Von Anlage und Baue der Wege und Stadlstrassen
aus dem Franz., ist eine kleine Schrift von vieler Brauch-barkeit.” Again, p. 358: “Sur les Corvées ist
bereits in der Sammlung von Mirabeau aus Schriften unter dem Namen: Ami des hommes, eine schöne
Abhandlung eingeschaltet.” On p. 363 the vagrant observation appears: “Eines ungenannten
Anmerkung über den Gebrauch und Nutzen des Intelligenswesens.”
507. In general it may be observed that dependence upon Forbonnais becomes more evident from this
point. On p. 367 is this note: “Es kann meine Absicht nicht seyn, von der Marine anders zu handeln,
als nach der allgemeinen Verbindung derselben mit der politischen Handlung. Um wenigstens sich nur
einen Begriff derselben zu machen, wird La Science de la Marine par Villeneuve, und das Dictionaire
de la Marine zureichen.”
On admiralty law, the author remarks (p. 375): “Die Quellen dieser Seerechte sind des Harmenopolus
Sammlung der legum Rhodiarum; die Spanische Sammlung von 1057, welche unter dem Namen
consolato del Mare bekannt, das wisbysche Wasser- und Seerechtsbuch, die olero-nischen und
hanseatischen Seerechte, die lübekischen Seerechte, von denen Stein eine Abhandlung entworfen hat;
die englische Akte; die ordonnance de la marine von Ludwig dem XIV. Hierzu sind die Verträge, und
das Seeherkommen zu rechnen: von welchen in dem für die innerösterreichische Sehiffahrt
entworfenem Editto Marino einige Anwendung gemacht ist.” A sentence or two before this passage,
Sonnenfels refers to Curland, Grundsätze des europäischen Seerechts, and this work was apparently
his leading authority.
Referring to the history of men’s efforts to improve inland water communication, a note (p. 382) says:
“Diese Geschichte hat H. Oberlin in 3 lateinischen Werken gesammelt und bis auf unsere Zeiten
fortge-setzt. I, Prisca; II, media aevi; III, jungendorum marium fluminumque omnis aevi molimina.
Die österreich. Staaten sind von vielen Flüssen durchströmt, deren Vereinigung möglich ist, und
worüber viele Entwürfe gemacht worden. Besonders müssen irgend in den Archiven, oder
Registraturen die Entwurfe vom Philibert Luchese, über einige Flüsse der Monarchie aufbehalten seyn.Vielleicht sind die Entwurfe, welche H. Maire über die Vereinigung der Flüsse, in den sammtlichen
Staaten des Hauses Oesterreich heraus gegeben, und in einem sogenannten Mémoire raisonné sur la
circulation intérieure du commerce, etc., erklärt hat, nicht durchaus ausführbar; aber dass es ein
grosser Theil derselben ist, kann nicht gezweifelt werden und die Entwurfe zeigen: wie vor-theilhaft
die Handlung aller erbländischen Provinzen unter sich verbunden werden könnte.”
In chap. vii, on “Insurance”—chiefly marine insurance—the only writer directly referred to is
Forbonnais (p. 394, et passim).
In chap. viii (ix), on “Money,” Justi is apparently the guide whom Sonnenfels mainly trusts. On p. 423
he mentions him, and in a note (p. 426) he says, of the particular monograph referred to (Ursachen
des verderbten Munzwesens in Deutschland, und Mittel dagegen): “Dieser Vorschlag ist eigentlich
nur eine Zurückführung der Münzenbenennungen zu ihrem Ursprunge.” In a previous note (p. 525)
he says: “Die Schriftsteller welche von den Grundsätzen der Münzprägung handeln, haben über diesen
Gegenstand so viele Dunkelheit verbreitet, dass sie Anfünger ganz kleinmüthig machen. Diese
Dunkelheit rührt daher, weil sie den Grundsatzen eine Menge angewendeter Rechnungsbeispiele mit
untermengen, die nicht zu den Grundsätzen, sondern Zum prak-tischen Theile des Munzwesens
gehüren.”
Sec. 291 cites Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, 2te. Aufl.; also, Dutot, Réflexions politiques
sur les finances et le commerce, and Fortbonnais, Anfangsgründe, II. Tom., chap. ix, “De la
circulation.”
In chap. ix, on “The Circulation of Money,” there is a reference to “Montesq., Esprit des loix, Liv. 22,
“Principes sur le commerce;” to Hume, Essay of the Balance of Trade;” to “folgende Stelle
Ustaritzes,” viz., Theorie & pratique du commerce, Cap. III am Ende; Vol. III, p. 150, has the
reference: “Ustaritz, Consider. sur les financ (sic) d’Espagne;” to “Plinius, paneg. Traj.” to “X. Band
meiner gesammelten Schriften: Abhandlung von der Ursache der Theurung in grossen Städten und
dem Mittel, ihr abzuhelfen;” on p. 494 Hume is quoted again as authority for the statement that
although during the minority of Edward (VI ?) interest was prohibited in England, the rate was 14 per
cent. (Incidentally we may note that Sonnenfels uses “die Interessen” interchangeably with “die
Zinsen.”) Raynal is cited (p. 496) as authority for tracing disbelief in the justice of interest to the
Middle Ages. The Justinian Code is cited (p. 499): “4. Buch, 31. Tit., 26. Gesetze,” and five pages
later “der Verfasser des Werks, Des corps politiques.” On p. 508, referring to the advantages of a low
rate of interest, a note begins: “Dieser Gegenstand ist vorzüglich in englischen Schriftstellern
behandelt worden.” Child and Culpeper are named. Then follows the remark: “In der Sammlung von
politischen Abhandlungen, die in V Bänden 1750 zu Amsterdam bei Schenchzern erschien, sind die
verschiedenen für und wider die Interesseherabsitzung in dem Parlemente gehaltenen Reden,
aufbehalten, am ausführlichsten sind Lockes Briefe, welche unter dem Titel: Betrachtung über die
Münze, Geldzinse, Finanz und Handlung gesammelt sind. Auch die Vorrede, welche Fortbonais der
Uebersetzung des British Merchant vorausgesendet hat, ist eine eigene und mil vieler Gründlichkeit
geschriebene Abhandlung über die gesetzmässige Zinsherabsetzung.” On p. 519, “Dio Kassius” is
drawn upon for an illustration of the effect of a sudden increase of money in circulation in raising
prices, and at the same time lowering the rate of interest, and Hume’s “Essay of the Balance of Trade”
is again referred to (p. 520). In chap, xi, on “Trading Companies,” Raynal, “Hist, polit. et Philos.,
etc.,” is again used as a source; in chap. xii, on “Exchange,” Fortbonais, chap. viii, again appears to
be the author’s point of departure, and Dutot (op. cit.) is once more named. Siegel, Einleilung zum
Wechselrechte, and the same author’s “Corpus juris cambialis, welches Herr Usal fortgesetzt hat,” are
listed at the end of the chapter. Chap, xiii, on “Commercial Treaties,” mentions “die kleine Schrift Les
avantages que le Portugal pourroit tirer de son malheur.” Chap. xix, on “The Balance of Trade,”
quotes Hume “in dem Versuch über die Handlungsbilanz.” At the same time it is asserted that “die
Physiokraten halten die Berechnung der Bilanz für überflüssig.” The volume closes with the note: “S.X. Band meiner gesammelteh Schriften Abhand. von der Mauth.”
508. A note refers to “Justi, Staatswirth.—§407,” with the comment: “He is the only writer in whom
I remember to have read a claim for this exception in the case of scholars. He demands it also for the
clergy, but for both only in the case of their personal dues; and he later finds himself obliged, for the
same reasons, to call for the same exceptions in the case of all in the military and civic service of the
state.”
509. Reference is made to “Staatswirthschaft, System des Finanzwesens und seine 2 Quartbände über
die Polizey, unter dem Titel: Die Grundfeste zur Glückseligkeit der Staaten.”
510. No one in the cameralistic series came as near to the Smithian type of generalization as several
British predecessors of the author of The Wealth of Nations.